Commit Graph

143 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Samirbous 8126bde72c [Rule Tuning] Suspicious Process Creation CallTrace (#2207)
Excluding some FPs by process.parent.executable and process.parent.args.

(cherry picked from commit 04dcf09c03)
2022-08-01 17:01:08 +00:00
Samirbous 777584bbc2 [Rule Tuning] Unusual Service Host Child Process - Childless Service (#2208)
Excluding some noisy unique processes.

(cherry picked from commit 1f21c5c57f)
2022-08-01 16:41:46 +00:00
Samirbous 2fe7336f2b [Deprecated Rule] Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos R… (#2209)
* [Deprecated Rule] Potential Privilege Escalation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP

FPs in certain cases with no room for tuning.

* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 8d34416049)
2022-08-01 16:29:46 +00:00
Samirbous 84121d910e [Rule Tuning] Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call (#2204)
Excluding some FPs by calltrace.

(cherry picked from commit a22fef8723)
2022-08-01 16:17:07 +00:00
Samirbous ccad691b30 [Rule Tuning] Remotely Started Services via RPC (#2211)
* [Rule Tuning] Remotely Started Services via RPC

excluding noisy FPs by process.executable to be compatible with winlog and endpoint

* Update lateral_movement_remote_services.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 6f69695820)
2022-08-01 16:12:14 +00:00
Samirbous 38e9b64fd6 [Rule Tuning] Process Termination followed by Deletion (#2206)
Excluded some FPs by process.executable and file.path.

(cherry picked from commit 91896db453)
2022-08-01 16:02:39 +00:00
Samirbous 475d67f1e8 [Rule Tuning] Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry (#2203)
* [Rule Tuning] Potential Remote Credential Access via Registry

Excluding some noisy FPs by file.path (user and machine hives std paths) and event.action (scoped to logged-in)

* Update credential_access_remote_sam_secretsdump.toml

(cherry picked from commit 049fbf7979)
2022-08-01 15:50:38 +00:00
Samirbous 0dfae46dcc [Rule Tuning] Kerberos Traffic from Unusual Process (#2202)
Excluding couple of FPs by process.executables to reduce FPs rate.

(cherry picked from commit 527507835f)
2022-07-29 20:28:55 +00:00
Isai 5b183e66fa [Rule Tuning] Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack (#2195)
* [Rule Tuning] Persistence via Update Orchestrator Service Hijack

I changed the query to exclude FPs for safe executables found in telemetry: MoUsoCoreWorker.exe and OfficeC2RClient.exe. Changed the query type to KQL to account for the wildcard needed to capture 2 of the executable paths found in telemetry. I'm open to changing back to eql with suggestions.

* Update persistence_via_update_orchestrator_service_hijack.toml

revert back to eql

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 386a8202c0)
2022-07-29 20:12:27 +00:00
Samirbous 044b5a2c61 [Rule Tuning] Modification of WDigest Security Provider (#2201)
excluding svchost.exe running as system (main src of FPs for this use case).

(cherry picked from commit 6d61a68c29)
2022-07-29 17:46:25 +00:00
shashank-elastic 6dfbcb61eb Rule(s) to identify potential mining activities (#2185)
(cherry picked from commit b2b5c170dd)
2022-07-29 17:31:28 +00:00
shashank-elastic 40529e9150 Rule tuning as part of Linux Detection Rules Review (#2170)
(cherry picked from commit 8afded11e7)
2022-07-29 16:26:57 +00:00
Colson Wilhoit fcf7a23401 [Rule Tuning] MacOS Installer Package Net Event (#2193)
* [Rule Tuning] MacOS Installer Package Net Event

* Update rules/macos/execution_installer_package_spawned_network_event.toml

* Update rules/macos/execution_installer_package_spawned_network_event.toml

* Update execution_installer_package_spawned_network_event.toml

just deleting a typo

Co-authored-by: Isai <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 998afcf9c4)
2022-07-28 20:17:14 +00:00
Isai 60adba8f0c [New Rule] Kubernetes Pod Created with Sensitive hostPath Volume (#2094)
* [New Rule] Kubernetes Pod Created with Sensitive hostPath Volume

created new rule toml and updated non-ecs-schema with k8s fields

* Update rules/integrations/kubernetes/privilege_escalation_pod_created_with_sensitive_hospath_volume.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit c1486407aa)
2022-07-28 17:10:40 +00:00
Mika Ayenson b67ffd413a [Rule Tuning] Unexpected Child Process of macOS Screensaver Engine (#2184)
* add screensaver subtechnique

(cherry picked from commit 3a557503d1)
2022-07-27 18:50:26 +00:00
Jonhnathan 7a2d7237b6 [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - Cloud - 3 (#2132)
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - Cloud - 3

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>

* Update rules/integrations/aws/defense_evasion_cloudtrail_logging_suspended.toml

* update dates

* Apply suggestions from review

Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co>

Removed changes from:
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/impact_google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.toml

(selectively cherry picked from commit 91c00fd442)
2022-07-27 18:41:05 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 6a7b78f14c [Rule Tuning] Potential Microsoft Office Sandbox Evasion (#2123)
* filter run by macOS os type

(cherry picked from commit df670fac56)
2022-07-27 15:59:43 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 4534f04c0c fix typo in description (#2168)
(cherry picked from commit fcc9cc9d8e)
2022-07-27 12:52:56 +00:00
Mika Ayenson e11739383d [Rule Tuning] Authorization Plugin Modification (#2156)
* exclude files altered by shove processes

(cherry picked from commit cdafe17ffb)
2022-07-27 12:35:20 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 1fdfadbb7e [Rule Tuning] LaunchDaemon Creation or Modification and Immediate Loading (#2154)
* update query

(cherry picked from commit e6bab063dc)
2022-07-27 12:26:06 +00:00
Mika Ayenson da7270ec91 use atexist to logout of kibana cleanly (#2095)
(cherry picked from commit e74ad241ca)
2022-07-26 14:21:39 +00:00
shashank-elastic 8d4606d0dc Rule(s) deprecation as part of Linux Detection Rule Review (#2163)
(cherry picked from commit e9267e544c)
2022-07-26 13:19:25 +00:00
Colson Wilhoit 883607488a [New Rule] File made Immutable by Chattr (#2161)
* [New Rule] File made Immutable by Chattr

* Update rules/linux/defense_evasion_chattr_immutable_file.toml

(cherry picked from commit c222d4528d)
2022-07-25 18:12:55 +00:00
Colson Wilhoit a138a1f2a2 [New Rule] Chkconfig Service Add (#2159)
* [New Rule] Chkconfig Service Add

* Update rules/linux/persistence_chkconfig_service_add.toml

(cherry picked from commit 146f59f4bd)
2022-07-25 16:44:01 +00:00
Mika Ayenson a06662f91a filter Bitdefender FPs (#2109)
(cherry picked from commit b44714c83f)
2022-07-25 14:13:36 +00:00
Colson Wilhoit d988fcb0de [New Rule] Suspcious Etc File Creation (#2160)
* [New Rule] Suspcious Etc File Creation

* Update rules/linux/persistence_etc_file_creation.toml

* Update MITRE syntax

* Update rules/linux/persistence_etc_file_creation.toml

* Update rules/linux/persistence_etc_file_creation.toml

* Update rules/linux/persistence_etc_file_creation.toml

(cherry picked from commit 1746897359)
2022-07-25 13:49:28 +00:00
Mika Ayenson cbfa323c34 [Rule Tuning] Attempt to Unload Elastic Endpoint Security Kernel Extension (#2134)
* add subtechnique T1547/006/

(cherry picked from commit 286941cb8e)
2022-07-23 15:23:38 +00:00
Mika Ayenson f8a53b50b7 add CVE to tag (#2127)
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 1dc0fcec47)
2022-07-23 00:45:21 +00:00
Mika Ayenson cf1cdb1791 update description (#2149)
(cherry picked from commit f07c72254d)
2022-07-22 21:13:40 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 2a160e0106 [Rule Tuning] Remote SSH Login Enabled via systemsetup Command (#2147)
* exclude jamf fp and add ssh subtechnique
Co-authored-by: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit b3334941f9)
2022-07-22 21:11:14 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 53e035a91f exclude google drive FP (#2145)
(cherry picked from commit 84104773a6)
2022-07-22 21:01:10 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 5e21144896 [Rule Tuning] Suspicious Automator Workflows Execution (#2142)
* add subtechnique

Co-authored-by: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 44ae72d054)
2022-07-22 20:51:44 +00:00
Mika Ayenson f6ed0dcf7e update tags to include C2 tactic (#2140)
(cherry picked from commit f176b5ef57)
2022-07-22 20:40:24 +00:00
Colson Wilhoit 3be3902038 [Rule Tuning] Remove File Quarantine Attribute (#2129)
(cherry picked from commit d6527afd51)
2022-07-22 20:26:08 +00:00
Mika Ayenson db6ff5588c [Rule Tuning] Enumeration of Users or Groups via Built-in Commands (#2136)
* fix parens and exclude parent process FPs and update description

(cherry picked from commit 1e28385ea4)
2022-07-22 20:17:30 +00:00
Mika Ayenson ca898d0680 [Rule Tuning] Potential Privacy Control Bypass via TCCDB Modification (#2121)
* add exception for Bitdefender

(cherry picked from commit d2be29b226)
2022-07-22 20:08:50 +00:00
Mika Ayenson f1af12e81b [Rule Tuning] Modification of Environment Variable via Launchctl (#2119)
* add exception for vmoptions

(cherry picked from commit cefb84ae15)
2022-07-22 20:04:54 +00:00
Terrance DeJesus 61d671a1a6 [Rule Tuning] Missing MITRE ATT&CK Mappings (#2073)
* initial commit with eggshell mitre mapping added

* adding updated rules

* [Rule Tuning] MITRE for GCP rules

I've added Mitre references for the 4 GCP rules missing. Changed 3 of the rules from "Impact" to "Defense Evasion" based on the technique used and it's matched tactic.

* [Rule Tuning] Endgame Rule name updates for Mitre

Updated Endgame rule names for those with Mitre tactics to match the tactics.

* Update rules/integrations/aws/persistence_redshift_instance_creation.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_rds_snapshot_restored.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* adding 10 updated rules for google_workspace, ml and o365

* adding 22 rule updates for mitre att&ck mappings

* adding 24 rule updates related mainly to ML rules

* adding 3 rules related to detection via ML

* adding adjustments

* adding adjustments with solutions to recent pytest errors

* removed tabs from tags

* adjusted mappings and added techniques

* adjusted endgame rule mappings per review

* adjusted names to match different tactics

* added execution and defense evasion tag

* adjustments to address errors from merging with main

* added newlines to rules missing them at the end of the file

Co-authored-by: imays11 <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
2022-07-22 15:42:38 -04:00
Terrance DeJesus 141b00ec41 [Rule Tuning] Missing MITRE ATT&CK Mappings (#2073)
* initial commit with eggshell mitre mapping added

* adding updated rules

* [Rule Tuning] MITRE for GCP rules

I've added Mitre references for the 4 GCP rules missing. Changed 3 of the rules from "Impact" to "Defense Evasion" based on the technique used and it's matched tactic.

* [Rule Tuning] Endgame Rule name updates for Mitre

Updated Endgame rule names for those with Mitre tactics to match the tactics.

* Update rules/integrations/aws/persistence_redshift_instance_creation.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_rds_snapshot_restored.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

* adding 10 updated rules for google_workspace, ml and o365

* adding 22 rule updates for mitre att&ck mappings

* adding 24 rule updates related mainly to ML rules

* adding 3 rules related to detection via ML

* adding adjustments

* adding adjustments with solutions to recent pytest errors

* removed tabs from tags

* adjusted mappings and added techniques

* adjusted endgame rule mappings per review

* adjusted names to match different tactics

* added execution and defense evasion tag

* adjustments to address errors from merging with main

* added newlines to rules missing them at the end of the file

Co-authored-by: imays11 <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

Removed changes from:
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_policy_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_metadata_process.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_metadata_user.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_process_all_hosts.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_sudo_activity.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_user_name.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_information_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_network_configuration_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_network_connection_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_process_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_user_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_rare_process_by_host_linux.toml
- rules/ml/ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml
- rules/ml/ml_suspicious_login_activity.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_metadata_process.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_metadata_user.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_path_activity.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_process_all_hosts.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_process_creation.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_script.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_service.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_user_name.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_rare_user_runas_event.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_rare_user_type10_remote_login.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_lolbas_wuauclt.toml

(selectively cherry picked from commit e8c39d19a7)
2022-07-22 18:31:42 +00:00
Mika Ayenson c12b3dcf50 [Rule Tuning] Attempt to Remove File Quarantine Attribute (#2117)
* Add exceptions for browser FPs

(cherry picked from commit cd11001fe8)
2022-07-22 18:27:50 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 5c5f49a96c [Rule Tuning] Kerberos Cached Credentials Dumping (#2103)
* Updated description to include threat actor utilization

(cherry picked from commit c1c83a536c)
2022-07-22 18:20:06 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 6e98740a90 [Rule Tuning] Access to Keychain Credentials Directories (#2101)
* rule tune to remove noisy FPs

(cherry picked from commit a9de227cfa)
2022-07-22 18:15:16 +00:00
Mika Ayenson 75560f96ec [Rule Tuning] Access of Stored Browser Credentials (#2098)
* audit update : added technique T1539 and excluded additional cookies path

(cherry picked from commit aaf9a708ae)
2022-07-22 17:58:53 +00:00
Jonhnathan cf4b6e6e1e [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - Cloud - 2 (#2124)
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - Cloud - 2

* Replace config/setup

* Applies suggestions from review

* Update credential_access_aws_iam_assume_role_brute_force.toml

* Apply suggestions from code review

* Update credential_access_aws_iam_assume_role_brute_force.toml

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 7ddae4b493)
2022-07-22 17:33:44 +00:00
Colson Wilhoit 7909fb47a0 [New Rule] Hidden so file (#2131)
* [New Rule] Hidden Shared Object File

* [Rule Tuning] Hidden File from Tmp

* Update updated_date

* Update rules/linux/defense_evasion_hidden_shared_object.toml

* Update rules/linux/defense_evasion_hidden_shared_object.toml

Co-authored-by: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/linux/defense_evasion_hidden_shared_object.toml

* Update rules/linux/defense_evasion_hidden_shared_object.toml

Co-authored-by: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 98d93bc21e)
2022-07-22 16:39:00 +00:00
Samirbous 25493a90c9 [New Rule] Suspicious HTML File Creation (#2068)
* [New Rule] Suspicious HTML File Creation

* Update initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml

* Update non-ecs-schema.json

* Update initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml

* Update rules/windows/initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

(cherry picked from commit d312f49117)
2022-07-22 14:22:56 +00:00
Terrance DeJesus fc26e83bfb removed googlecloud.audit from event datasets (#2105)
(cherry picked from commit 9cefd88b90)
2022-07-21 16:12:33 +00:00
Terrance DeJesus dd5501d167 [Rule Tuning] GCP Firewall Rules Should Include App Engine (#2107)
* removed googlecloud.audit and added app engine event actions

* adjusted query for rule created

* adjusted queries to exclude v1

* Update rules/integrations/gcp/defense_evasion_gcp_firewall_rule_deleted.toml

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 5ff3844fbe)
2022-07-21 15:57:30 +00:00
Jonhnathan edef90b3ec [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides to Cloud Rules - AWS (#2104)
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides to Cloud Rules - AWS

* Apply suggestion from review

* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_ec2_snapshot_change_activity.toml

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/integrations/aws/impact_cloudwatch_log_stream_deletion.toml

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>

* Apply suggestions from review

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>

* .

* Applies suggestions from the https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/2124 PR

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit d854b943e5)
2022-07-20 15:30:04 +00:00
Samirbous 900a8cdbe9 [New Rule] Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon (#2063)
* [New Rule]

Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclogon.dll and with a suspicious access rights value, this may indicate an attempt to leak an Lsass handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in preparation for credential access.

https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html

Data:

```
{
  "_index": ".ds-logs-windows.sysmon_operational-default-2022.06.16-000005",
  "_id": "QxU4rIEBTJjT82fLq8Cf",
  "_score": 1,
  "_source": {
    "agent": {
      "name": "02694w-win10",
      "id": "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e",
      "type": "filebeat",
      "ephemeral_id": "137d194a-e542-4cd6-a1e3-f4ca9f5ad6b8",
      "version": "8.0.0"
    },
    "process": {
      "name": "svchost.exe",
      "pid": 456,
      "thread": {
        "id": 15264
      },
      "entity_id": "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}",
      "executable": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe"
    },
    "winlog": {
      "computer_name": "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
      "process": {
        "pid": 2680,
        "thread": {
          "id": 3988
        }
      },
      "channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
      "event_data": {
        "GrantedAccess": "0x14c0",
        "TargetProcessId": "680",
        "SourceUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
        "TargetImage": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe",
        "CallTrace": "C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51",
        "TargetProcessGUID": "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}",
        "TargetUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
      },
      "opcode": "Info",
      "version": 3,
      "record_id": "1825496",
      "task": "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)",
      "event_id": "10",
      "provider_guid": "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}",
      "api": "wineventlog",
      "provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
      "user": {
        "identifier": "S-1-5-18",
        "domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
        "name": "SYSTEM",
        "type": "User"
      }
    },
    "log": {
      "level": "information"
    },
    "elastic_agent": {
      "id": "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e",
      "version": "8.0.0",
      "snapshot": false
    },
    "message": "Process accessed:\nRuleName: -\nUtcTime: 2022-06-28 21:29:49.829\nSourceProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}\nSourceProcessId: 456\nSourceThreadId: 15264\nSourceImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe\nTargetProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}\nTargetProcessId: 680\nTargetImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe\nGrantedAccess: 0x14C0\nCallTrace: C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51\nSourceUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\nTargetUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
    "input": {
      "type": "winlog"
    },
    "@timestamp": "2022-06-28T21:29:49.829Z",
    "ecs": {
      "version": "1.12.0"
    },
    "data_stream": {
      "namespace": "default",
      "type": "logs",
      "dataset": "windows.sysmon_operational"
    },
    "host": {
      "hostname": "02694w-win10",
      "os": {
        "build": "18363.815",
        "kernel": "10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
        "name": "Windows 10 Enterprise",
        "type": "windows",
        "family": "windows",
        "version": "10.0",
        "platform": "windows"
      },
      "ip": [
        "fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
        "172.16.66.25"
      ],
      "name": "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
      "id": "6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160",
      "mac": [
        "00:50:56:03:c6:93"
      ],
      "architecture": "x86_64"
    },
    "event": {
      "agent_id_status": "verified",
      "ingested": "2022-06-28T21:30:04Z",
      "code": "10",
      "provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
      "created": "2022-06-28T21:29:51.107Z",
      "kind": "event",
      "action": "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)",
      "category": [
        "process"
      ],
      "type": [
        "access"
      ],
      "dataset": "windows.sysmon_operational"
    },
    "user": {
      "id": "S-1-5-18"
    }
  },
  "fields": {
    "elastic_agent.version": [
      "8.0.0"
    ],
    "event.category": [
      "process"
    ],
    "host.os.name.text": [
      "Windows 10 Enterprise"
    ],
    "winlog.provider_guid": [
      "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}"
    ],
    "winlog.provider_name": [
      "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    ],
    "host.hostname": [
      "02694w-win10"
    ],
    "winlog.computer_name": [
      "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com"
    ],
    "process.pid": [
      456
    ],
    "host.mac": [
      "00:50:56:03:c6:93"
    ],
    "winlog.process.pid": [
      2680
    ],
    "host.os.version": [
      "10.0"
    ],
    "winlog.record_id": [
      "1825496"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.TargetUser": [
      "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
    ],
    "host.os.name": [
      "Windows 10 Enterprise"
    ],
    "log.level": [
      "information"
    ],
    "agent.name": [
      "02694w-win10"
    ],
    "host.name": [
      "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com"
    ],
    "event.agent_id_status": [
      "verified"
    ],
    "event.kind": [
      "event"
    ],
    "winlog.version": [
      3
    ],
    "host.os.type": [
      "windows"
    ],
    "user.id": [
      "S-1-5-18"
    ],
    "input.type": [
      "winlog"
    ],
    "data_stream.type": [
      "logs"
    ],
    "host.architecture": [
      "x86_64"
    ],
    "process.name": [
      "svchost.exe"
    ],
    "event.provider": [
      "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
    ],
    "event.code": [
      "10"
    ],
    "agent.id": [
      "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e"
    ],
    "ecs.version": [
      "1.12.0"
    ],
    "event.created": [
      "2022-06-28T21:29:51.107Z"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.CallTrace": [
      "C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51"
    ],
    "agent.version": [
      "8.0.0"
    ],
    "host.os.family": [
      "windows"
    ],
    "process.thread.id": [
      15264
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.TargetProcessGUID": [
      "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}"
    ],
    "winlog.process.thread.id": [
      3988
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.TargetImage": [
      "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.TargetProcessId": [
      "680"
    ],
    "process.entity_id": [
      "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}"
    ],
    "host.os.build": [
      "18363.815"
    ],
    "winlog.user.type": [
      "User"
    ],
    "host.ip": [
      "fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
      "172.16.66.25"
    ],
    "agent.type": [
      "filebeat"
    ],
    "event.module": [
      "windows"
    ],
    "host.os.kernel": [
      "10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)"
    ],
    "winlog.api": [
      "wineventlog"
    ],
    "elastic_agent.snapshot": [
      false
    ],
    "host.id": [
      "6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160"
    ],
    "process.executable": [
      "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe"
    ],
    "winlog.user.identifier": [
      "S-1-5-18"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.SourceUser": [
      "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
    ],
    "winlog.task": [
      "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)"
    ],
    "winlog.user.domain": [
      "NT AUTHORITY"
    ],
    "elastic_agent.id": [
      "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e"
    ],
    "data_stream.namespace": [
      "default"
    ],
    "winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess": [
      "0x14c0"
    ],
    "message": [
      "Process accessed:\nRuleName: -\nUtcTime: 2022-06-28 21:29:49.829\nSourceProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}\nSourceProcessId: 456\nSourceThreadId: 15264\nSourceImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe\nTargetProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}\nTargetProcessId: 680\nTargetImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe\nGrantedAccess: 0x14C0\nCallTrace: C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51\nSourceUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\nTargetUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
    ],
    "winlog.user.name": [
      "SYSTEM"
    ],
    "winlog.event_id": [
      "10"
    ],
    "event.ingested": [
      "2022-06-28T21:30:04.000Z"
    ],
    "event.action": [
      "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)"
    ],
    "@timestamp": [
      "2022-06-28T21:29:49.829Z"
    ],
    "winlog.channel": [
      "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
    ],
    "host.os.platform": [
      "windows"
    ],
    "data_stream.dataset": [
      "windows.sysmon_operational"
    ],
    "event.type": [
      "access"
    ],
    "winlog.opcode": [
      "Info"
    ],
    "agent.ephemeral_id": [
      "137d194a-e542-4cd6-a1e3-f4ca9f5ad6b8"
    ],
    "event.dataset": [
      "windows.sysmon_operational"
    ]
  }
}
```

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>

(cherry picked from commit 59736e3973)
2022-07-20 14:31:31 +00:00