[New Rule] AWS STS AssumeRole with New MFA Device [Rule Tuning] AWS IAM Deactivation of MFA Device (#4210)

* [New Rule] [Rule Tuning] AWS STS AssumeRole with New MFA Device, AWS IAM Deactivation of MFA Device

New terms rule for new MFA device with AssumeRole action. Rule tuning to add MITRE technique to "AWS IAM Deactivation of MFA Device"

* add serialNumber to non-ecs schema file

* fixed misspelled toml file name

* Update rules/integrations/aws/persistence_sts_assume_role_with_new_mfa.toml

Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>

detection_rules/etc/non-ecs-schema.json

@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@
   "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*": {
     "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.cidrIp": "keyword",
     "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.fromPort": "keyword",
-    "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.roleArn": "keyword"
+    "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.roleArn": "keyword",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.serialNumber": "keyword"
   },
   "logs-azure.signinlogs-*": {
     "azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_audiences.application_id": "keyword"

rules/integrations/aws/impact_iam_deactivate_mfa_device.toml

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2020/05/26"
 integration = ["aws"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/05/21"
+updated_date = "2024/10/25"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ tags = [
     "Data Source: AWS IAM",
     "Resources: Investigation Guide",
     "Tactic: Impact",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "query"
@@ -101,4 +102,19 @@ reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"
 id = "TA0040"
 name = "Impact"
 reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1556"
+name = "Modify Authentication Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1556.006"
+name = "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/"
 
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"

rules/integrations/aws/persistence_sts_assume_role_with_new_mfa.toml

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/10/25"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2024/10/25"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies when a user has assumed a role using a new MFA device. Users can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources using the AssumeRole API of AWS Security Token Service (STS). 
+While a new MFA device is not always indicative of malicious behavior it should be verified as adversaries can use this technique for persistence and privilege escalation.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    "AWS administrators or automated processes might regularly assume roles for legitimate administrative purposes and to perform periodic tasks such as data backups, updates, or deployments.",
+]
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS STS AssumeRole with New MFA Device"
+note = """## Setup
+
+The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html",
+    "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/cloudgoat/blob/d5863b80afd082d853f2e8df1955c6393695a4da/scenarios/iam_privesc_by_key_rotation/README.md",
+]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "a22f566b-5b23-4412-880d-c6c957acd321"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS STS",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider:sts.amazonaws.com
+    and event.action:(AssumeRole or AssumeRoleWithSAML or AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity)
+    and event.outcome:success
+    and user.id:* 
+    and aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.serialNumber:*
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1556"
+name = "Modify Authentication Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1556.006"
+name = "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1548"
+name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1550"
+name = "Use Alternate Authentication Material"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1550.001"
+name = "Application Access Token"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0008"
+name = "Lateral Movement"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["user.id", "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.serialNumber"]
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"
+
+