diff --git a/detection_rules/etc/non-ecs-schema.json b/detection_rules/etc/non-ecs-schema.json
index 83df4742c..6849770a8 100644
--- a/detection_rules/etc/non-ecs-schema.json
+++ b/detection_rules/etc/non-ecs-schema.json
@@ -150,7 +150,8 @@
   "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*": {
     "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.cidrIp": "keyword",
     "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.fromPort": "keyword",
-    "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.roleArn": "keyword"
+    "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.roleArn": "keyword",
+    "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.serialNumber": "keyword"
   },
   "logs-azure.signinlogs-*": {
     "azure.signinlogs.properties.conditional_access_audiences.application_id": "keyword"
diff --git a/rules/integrations/aws/impact_iam_deactivate_mfa_device.toml b/rules/integrations/aws/impact_iam_deactivate_mfa_device.toml
index c9d1fb8a1..39e4c59dd 100644
--- a/rules/integrations/aws/impact_iam_deactivate_mfa_device.toml
+++ b/rules/integrations/aws/impact_iam_deactivate_mfa_device.toml
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 creation_date = "2020/05/26"
 integration = ["aws"]
 maturity = "production"
-updated_date = "2024/05/21"
+updated_date = "2024/10/25"
 
 [rule]
 author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ tags = [
     "Data Source: AWS IAM",
     "Resources: Investigation Guide",
     "Tactic: Impact",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
 ]
 timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
 type = "query"
@@ -101,4 +102,19 @@ reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531/"
 id = "TA0040"
 name = "Impact"
 reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1556"
+name = "Modify Authentication Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1556.006"
+name = "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/"
 
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
diff --git a/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_sts_assume_role_with_new_mfa.toml b/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_sts_assume_role_with_new_mfa.toml
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c4dcc60e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rules/integrations/aws/persistence_sts_assume_role_with_new_mfa.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2024/10/25"
+integration = ["aws"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2024/10/25"
+
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies when a user has assumed a role using a new MFA device. Users can assume a role to obtain temporary credentials and access AWS resources using the AssumeRole API of AWS Security Token Service (STS). 
+While a new MFA device is not always indicative of malicious behavior it should be verified as adversaries can use this technique for persistence and privilege escalation.
+"""
+false_positives = [
+    "AWS administrators or automated processes might regularly assume roles for legitimate administrative purposes and to perform periodic tasks such as data backups, updates, or deployments.",
+]
+index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
+language = "kuery"
+license = "Elastic License v2"
+name = "AWS STS AssumeRole with New MFA Device"
+note = """## Setup
+
+The AWS Fleet integration, Filebeat module, or similarly structured data is required to be compatible with this rule."""
+references = [
+    "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/STS/latest/APIReference/API_AssumeRole.html",
+    "https://github.com/RhinoSecurityLabs/cloudgoat/blob/d5863b80afd082d853f2e8df1955c6393695a4da/scenarios/iam_privesc_by_key_rotation/README.md",
+]
+risk_score = 21
+rule_id = "a22f566b-5b23-4412-880d-c6c957acd321"
+severity = "low"
+tags = [
+    "Domain: Cloud",
+    "Data Source: AWS",
+    "Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
+    "Data Source: AWS STS",
+    "Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
+    "Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
+    "Tactic: Persistence",
+    "Tactic: Lateral Movement",
+]
+timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
+type = "new_terms"
+
+query = '''
+event.dataset:aws.cloudtrail
+    and event.provider:sts.amazonaws.com
+    and event.action:(AssumeRole or AssumeRoleWithSAML or AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity)
+    and event.outcome:success
+    and user.id:* 
+    and aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.serialNumber:*
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1556"
+name = "Modify Authentication Process"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1556.006"
+name = "Multi-Factor Authentication"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0003"
+name = "Persistence"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1548"
+name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1550"
+name = "Use Alternate Authentication Material"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/"
+[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
+id = "T1550.001"
+name = "Application Access Token"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0008"
+name = "Lateral Movement"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
+
+[rule.new_terms]
+field = "new_terms_fields"
+value = ["user.id", "aws.cloudtrail.flattened.request_parameters.serialNumber"]
+[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
+field = "history_window_start"
+value = "now-10d"
+
+