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content from the Jan 16, 2018 update

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John Wunder
2018-01-16 17:50:24 -05:00
committed by John Wunder
parent 26bf9a3a6b
commit bf0ae0abb5
3453 changed files with 40273 additions and 15160 deletions
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enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6.json
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--24fefa45-7747-4c4c-9f8a-c2508f8cd33c",
"id": "bundle--4f3ab4d2-a5c2-444b-8ba4-7d2cf86579f9",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--00d0b012-8a03-410e-95de-5826bf542de6",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:54.176Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Indicator Removal from Tools",
"description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems",
"description": "If a malicious tool is detected and quarantined or otherwise curtailed, an adversary may be able to determine why the malicious tool was detected (the indicator), modify the tool by removing the indicator, and use the updated version that is no longer detected by the target's defensive systems or subsequent targets that may use similar systems.\n\nA good example of this is when malware is detected with a file signature and quarantined by anti-virus software. An adversary who can determine that the malware was quarantined because of its file signature may use Software Packing or otherwise modify the file so it has a different signature, and then re-use the malware.\n\nDetection: The first detection of a malicious tool may trigger an anti-virus or other security tool alert. Similar events may also occur at the boundary through network IDS, email scanning appliance, etc. The initial detection should be treated as an indication of a potentially more invasive intrusion. The alerting system should be thoroughly investigated beyond that initial alert for activity that was not detected. Adversaries may continue with an operation, assuming that individual events like an anti-virus detect will not be investigated or that an analyst will not be able to conclusively link that event to other activity occurring on the network.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process use of network, Anti-virus, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -40,21 +40,9 @@
"Host intrusion prevention systems"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055.json
+4 -15
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--04bdf49a-f253-40c0-8417-f6f079819396",
"id": "bundle--813aa0c2-610f-4d6c-a01d-e20977c3b165",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--01a5a209-b94c-450b-b7f9-946497d91055",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:44.329Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Windows Management Instrumentation",
"description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
"description": "Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)\n\nAn adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nDetection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of \"wmic\" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: WMI service, winmgmt, running.\nHost/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.\nSMB authentication.\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -58,18 +58,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": true,
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8.json
+4 -5
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{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--d864a41b-beeb-42c8-916d-12661db070e2",
"id": "bundle--863191ee-8179-4294-8844-81096a0b2954",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--01df3350-ce05-4bdf-bdf8-0a919a66d4a8",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": ".bash_profile and .bashrc",
"description": "<code>~/.bash_profile</code> and <code>~/.bashrc</code> are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. <code>~/.bash_profile</code> is executed for login shells and <code>~/.bashrc</code> is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), <code>~/.bash_profile</code> is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, <code>~/.bashrc</code> is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling <code>~/.bash_profile</code> each time instead of <code>~/.bashrc</code>.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.\n\nDetection: While users may customize their <code>~/.bashrc</code> and <code>~/.bash_profile</code> files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"description": "<code>~/.bash_profile</code> and <code>~/.bashrc</code> are executed in a user's context when a new shell opens or when a user logs in so that their environment is set correctly. <code>~/.bash_profile</code> is executed for login shells and <code>~/.bashrc</code> is executed for interactive non-login shells. This means that when a user logs in (via username and password) to the console (either locally or remotely via something like SSH), <code>~/.bash_profile</code> is executed before the initial command prompt is returned to the user. After that, every time a new shell is opened, <code>~/.bashrc</code> is executed. This allows users more fine grained control over when they want certain commands executed.\n\nMac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling <code>~/.bash_profile</code> each time instead of <code>~/.bashrc</code>.\n\nThese files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell.\n\nDetection: While users may customize their <code>~/.bashrc</code> and <code>~/.bash_profile</code> files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -39,8 +39,7 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688.json
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--34328aa1-6d4a-4973-8de4-1725bbf91946",
"id": "bundle--7dc125d5-142b-4e37-9c06-52661465bb06",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--0259baeb-9f63-4c69-bf10-eb038c390688",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:25.060Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Screen Capture",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command <code>screencapture</code> is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command <code>xwd</code>. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn OSX, the native command <code>screencapture</code> is used to capture screenshots.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, there is the native command <code>xwd</code>. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -38,21 +38,9 @@
"File monitoring"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d.json
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--0f2a08d9-c5cb-47c5-9274-4cec3ffeb6d0",
"id": "bundle--7af8e67a-a041-4a32-8228-9de09b1d5c17",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--02fefddc-fb1b-423f-a76b-7552dd211d4d",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:54.661Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Bootkit",
"description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows XP\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "A bootkit is a malware variant that modifies the boot sectors of a hard drive, including the Master Boot Record (MBR) and Volume Boot Record (VBR). (Citation: MTrends 2016)\n\nAdversaries may use bootkits to persist on systems at a layer below the operating system, which may make it difficult to perform full remediation unless an organization suspects one was used and can act accordingly.\n\n===Master Boot Record===\nThe MBR is the section of disk that is first loaded after completing hardware initialization by the BIOS. It is the location of the boot loader. An adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite this area, diverting execution during startup from the normal boot loader to adversary code. (Citation: Lau 2011)\n\n===Volume Boot Record===\nThe MBR passes control of the boot process to the VBR. Similar to the case of MBR, an adversary who has raw access to the boot drive may overwrite the VBR to divert execution during startup to adversary code.\n\nDetection: Perform integrity checking on MBR and VBR. Take snapshots of MBR and VBR and compare against known good samples. Report changes to MBR and VBR as they occur for indicators of suspicious activity and further analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, MBR, VBR\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -48,18 +48,7 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows XP"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334.json
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--d2cc4d44-eb77-48b8-846a-bc2ff452fb16",
"id": "bundle--877a651d-1ae6-4fd8-be28-ad7565a41841",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--03259939-0b57-482f-8eb5-87c0e0d54334",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:38.910Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Logon Scripts",
"description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Write access to system or domain logon scripts",
"description": "===Windows===\n\nWindows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.\n\nIf adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.\n\n===Mac===\n\nMac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.\n\nDetection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Write access to system or domain logon scripts",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -46,20 +46,8 @@
"Process monitoring"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Write access to system or domain logon scripts"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--374843af-7fbf-435e-bc59-04dcf4fc297c",
"id": "bundle--33195777-a2e9-4f37-b301-4152fc7be30d",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--03d7999c-1f4c-42cc-8373-e7690d318104",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:35.733Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "System Owner/User Discovery",
"description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>users</code>,<code>w</code>, and <code>who</code>.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"description": "===Windows===\n\nAdversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>users</code>,<code>w</code>, and <code>who</code>.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -37,21 +37,9 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--9e44335f-6be8-49ff-a270-4825d4f8735a",
"id": "bundle--4bf3a99b-9745-42de-8e92-2262add999dc",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--04ee0cb7-dac3-4c6c-9387-4c6aa096f4cf",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Hidden Window",
"description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code> or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "The configurations for how applications run on macOS and OS X are listed in property list (plist) files. One of the tags in these files can be <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code>, which allows for Java applications to prevent the application's icon from appearing in the Dock. A common use for this is when applications run in the system tray, but don't also want to show up in the Dock. However, adversaries can abuse this feature and hide their running window (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).\n\nDetection: Plist files are ASCII text files with a specific format, so they're relatively easy to parse. File monitoring can check for the <code>apple.awt.UIElement</code> or any other suspicious plist tag in plist files and flag them.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -39,8 +39,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb.json
+4 -5
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--14aa3b08-786a-40d6-80fa-2a0e716029e3",
"id": "bundle--05ebd1d5-ab2e-4c67-8ebd-5504e739776c",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--04ef4356-8926-45e2-9441-634b6f3dcecb",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition",
"description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn\u2019t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "Mach-O binaries have a series of headers that are used to perform certain operations when a binary is loaded. The LC_LOAD_DYLIB header in a Mach-O binary tells macOS and OS X which dynamic libraries (dylibs) to load during execution time. These can be added ad-hoc to the compiled binary as long adjustments are made to the rest of the fields and dependencies (Citation: Writing Bad Malware for OSX). There are tools available to perform these changes. Any changes will invalidate digital signatures on binaries because the binary is being modified. Adversaries can remediate this issue by simply removing the LC_CODE_SIGNATURE command from the binary so that the signature isn\u2019t checked at load time (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X).\n\nDetection: Monitor processes for those that may be used to modify binary headers. Monitor file systems for changes to application binaries and invalid checksums/signatures. Changes to binaries that do not line up with application updates or patches are also extremely suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -47,8 +47,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--9870a733-34a9-4200-8a9f-baf610269771",
"id": "bundle--c480a6ab-3cec-4f24-8260-2948c279417a",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--06780952-177c-4247-b978-79c357fb311f",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Plist Modification",
"description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan).\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"description": "Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a user's privileges). \nAdversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)\n\nDetection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like \"Knock Knock\" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.\n\nMonitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -55,8 +55,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--cd87ad36-c729-418d-9c65-6a08fd5823d6",
"id": "bundle--0b6643e2-e6b1-4f48-8e05-3447d377d4ed",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--086952c4-5b90-4185-b573-02bad8e11953",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "HISTCONTROL",
"description": "The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that \u201c ls\u201d will not be saved, but \u201cls\u201d would be saved by history. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to \"ignorespace\". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to \"ignoredups\". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to \"ignoreboth\" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that \u201c ls\u201d will not be saved, but \u201cls\u201d would be saved by history. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.\n\nDetection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is also suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable\n\nDefense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -42,8 +42,7 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22.json
+49 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--d744adb7-59df-46a4-a9ca-6633169e23df",
"id": "bundle--004a4b70-09ad-411d-a7dd-5760229cd4c4",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--0a3ead4e-6d47-4ccb-854c-a6a4f9d96b22",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:19.735Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Credential Dumping",
"description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nTools may dump credentials in many different ways: extracting credential hashes for offline cracking, extracting plaintext passwords, and extracting Kerberos tickets, among others. Examples of credential dumpers include pwdump7, Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped. (Citation: Github Mimikatz Module sekurlsa)\n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. The action works by simulating a domain controller replication process from a remote domain controller, which may contain various pieces of information included in Active Directory such as passwords, historical hashes, and current hashes of potentially useful accounts, such as the KRBTGT account NTLM hash. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data. (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket. (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module)\n\nDetection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective DLL Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
"description": "Credential dumping is the process of obtaining account login and password information from the operating system and software. Credentials can be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.\n\nTools may dump credentials in many different ways: extracting credential hashes for offline cracking, extracting plaintext passwords, and extracting Kerberos tickets, among others. Examples of credential dumpers include pwdump7, Windows Credential Editor, Mimikatz, and gsecdump. These tools are in use by both professional security testers and adversaries.\n\nPlaintext passwords can be obtained using tools such as Mimikatz to extract passwords stored by the Local Security Authority (LSA). If smart cards are used to authenticate to a domain using a personal identification number (PIN), then that PIN is also cached as a result and may be dumped. (Citation: Github Mimikatz Module sekurlsa)\n\nDCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation. (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the \"lsadump\" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)\n\nDetection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.\n\nNTLM hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. \n\nOn Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nMonitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -47,6 +47,51 @@
"source_name": "GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module",
"description": "Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz/wiki/module-~-lsadump"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017",
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc228086.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft GetNCCChanges",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/dd207691.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Samba DRSUAPI",
"description": "SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"url": "https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/DRSUAPI"
},
{
"source_name": "Wine API samlib.dll",
"description": "Wine API. (n.d.). samlib.dll. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"url": "https://source.winehq.org/WineAPI/samlib.html"
},
{
"source_name": "InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017",
"description": "Warren, J. (2017, July 11). Manipulating User Passwords with Mimikatz. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"url": "https://blog.stealthbits.com/manipulating-user-passwords-with-mimikatz-SetNTLM-ChangeNTLM"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017",
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc237008.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015",
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1729"
},
{
"source_name": "Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015",
"description": "Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"url": "http://www.harmj0y.net/blog/redteaming/mimikatz-and-dcsync-and-extrasids-oh-my/"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft SAMR",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/cc245496.aspx"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
@@ -66,18 +111,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--c9948fb5-ac69-4572-89af-daa1daca13d9",
"id": "bundle--ae3e9104-731a-4822-a600-697cafc43caa",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--0a5231ec-41af-4a35-83d0-6bdf11f28c65",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:40.542Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Execution through Module Load",
"description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via <code><file name=\"filename.extension\" loadFrom=\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\"></code> in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.\n\nDetection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to <code>%SystemRoot%</code> and <code>%ProgramFiles%</code> directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
"description": "The Windows module loader can be instructed to load DLLs from arbitrary local paths and arbitrary Universal Naming Convention (UNC) network paths. This functionality resides in NTDLL.dll and is part of the Windows Native API which is called from functions like CreateProcess(), LoadLibrary(), etc. of the Win32 API. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Library Files)\n\nThe module loader can load DLLs:\n\n*via specification of the (fully-qualified or relative) DLL pathname in the IMPORT directory;\n \n*via EXPORT forwarded to another DLL, specified with (fully-qualified or relative) pathname (but without extension);\n \n*via an NTFS junction or symlink program.exe.local with the fully-qualified or relative pathname of a directory containing the DLLs specified in the IMPORT directory or forwarded EXPORTs;\n \n*via <code><file name=\"filename.extension\" loadFrom=\"fully-qualified or relative pathname\"></code> in an embedded or external \"application manifest\". The file name refers to an entry in the IMPORT directory or a forwarded EXPORT.\n\nAdversaries can use this functionality as a way to execute arbitrary code on a system.\n\nDetection: Monitoring DLL module loads may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows modules load functions are common and may be difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Legitimate software will likely only need to load routine, bundled DLL modules or Windows system DLLs such that deviation from known module loads may be suspicious. Limiting DLL module loads to <code>%SystemRoot%</code> and <code>%ProgramFiles%</code> directories will protect against module loads from unsafe paths. \n\nCorrelation of other events with behavior surrounding module loads using API monitoring and suspicious DLLs written to disk will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, API monitoring, File monitoring, DLL monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -45,18 +45,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--5a9538fe-bf11-4513-b884-2bd5fb2abddc",
"id": "bundle--c7be9f0c-9911-4c81-b9f4-c5db7f91a0aa",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--0c8ab3eb-df48-4b9c-ace7-beacaac81cc5",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:20.934Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "File System Logical Offsets",
"description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)\n\nUtilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nDetection: Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: File monitoring, File system access controls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"description": "Windows allows programs to have direct access to logical volumes. Programs with direct access may read and write files directly from the drive by analyzing file system data structures. This technique bypasses Windows file access controls as well as file system monitoring tools. (Citation: Hakobyan 2009)\n\nUtilities, such as NinjaCopy, exist to perform these actions in PowerShell. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nDetection: Monitor handle opens on drive volumes that are made by processes to determine when they may directly access logical drives. (Citation: Github PowerSploit Ninjacopy)\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to copy files from the logical drive and evade common file system protections. Since this technique may also be used through PowerShell, additional logging of PowerShell scripts is recommended.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: File monitoring, File system access controls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -48,18 +48,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a.json
+6 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--3927306c-b5a1-4eda-85be-bf1ee302a9d1",
"id": "bundle--9aa15b67-8e16-459f-99e1-57c982f768a7",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--0ca7beef-9bbc-4e35-97cf-437384ddce6a",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:43.063Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "File System Permissions Weakness",
"description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
"description": "Processes may automatically execute specific binaries as part of their functionality or to perform other actions. If the permissions on the file system directory containing a target binary, or permissions on the binary itself, are improperly set, then the target binary may be overwritten with another binary using user-level permissions and executed by the original process. If the original process and thread are running under a higher permissions level, then the replaced binary will also execute under higher-level permissions, which could include SYSTEM.\n\nAdversaries may use this technique to replace legitimate binaries with malicious ones as a means of executing code at a higher permissions level. If the executing process is set to run at a specific time or during a certain event (e.g., system bootup) then this technique can also be used for persistence.\n\n===Services===\n\nManipulation of Windows service binaries is one variation of this technique. Adversaries may replace a legitimate service executable with their own executable to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService). Once the service is started, either directly by the user (if appropriate access is available) or through some other means, such as a system restart if the service starts on bootup, the replaced executable will run instead of the original service executable.\n\n===Executable Installers===\n\nAnother variation of this technique can be performed by taking advantage of a weakness that is common in executable, self-extracting installers. During the installation process, it is common for installers to use a subdirectory within the <code>%TEMP%</code> directory to unpack binaries such as DLLs, EXEs, or other payloads. When installers create subdirectories and files they often do not set appropriate permissions to restrict write access, which allows for execution of untrusted code placed in the subdirectories or overwriting of binaries used in the installation process. This behavior is related to and may take advantage of DLL Search Order Hijacking. Some installers may also require elevated privileges that will result in privilege escalation when executing adversary controlled code. This behavior is related to Bypass User Account Control. Several examples of this weakness in existing common installers have been reported to software vendors. (Citation: Mozilla Firefox Installer DLL Hijack) (Citation: Seclists Kanthak 7zip Installer)\n\nDetection: Look for changes to binaries and service executables that may normally occur during software updates. If an executable is written, renamed, and/or moved to match an existing service executable, it could be detected and correlated with other suspicious behavior. Hashing of binaries and service executables could be used to detect replacement against historical data.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from typical processes and services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Services\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Stefan Kanthak"
"Stefan Kanthak",
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -59,18 +60,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0.json
+81
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--19ce8bce-0d3a-4217-9d35-b6fe487baa7e",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--0dbf5f1b-a560-4d51-ac1b-d70caab3e1f0",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning",
"description": "Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution (LLMNR) and NetBIOS Name Service (NBT-NS) are Microsoft Windows components that serve as alternate methods of host identification. LLMNR is based upon the Domain Name System (DNS) format and allows hosts on the same local link to perform name resolution for other hosts. NBT-NS identifies systems on a local network by their NetBIOS name. (Citation: Wikipedia LLMNR) (Citation: TechNet NetBIOS)\n\nAdversaries can spoof an authoritative source for name resolution on a victim network by responding to LLMNR (UDP 5355)/NBT-NS (UDP 137) traffic as if they know the identity of the requested host, effectively poisoning the service so that the victims will communicate with the adversary controlled system. If the requested host belongs to a resource that requires identification/authentication, the username and NTLMv2 hash will then be sent to the adversary controlled system. The adversary can then collect the hash information sent over the wire through tools that monitor the ports for traffic or through Network Sniffing and crack the hashes offline through Brute Force to obtain the plaintext passwords.\n\nSeveral tools exist that can be used to poison name services within local networks such as NBNSpoof, Metasploit, and Responder. (Citation: GitHub NBNSpoof) (Citation: Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer) (Citation: GitHub Responder)\n\nDetection: Monitor <code>HKLM\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\DNSClient</code> for changes to the \"EnableMulticast\" DWORD value. A value of \u201c0\u201d indicates LLMNR is disabled. (Citation: Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS)\n\nMonitor for traffic on ports UDP 5355 and UDP 137 if LLMNR/NetBIOS is disabled by security policy.\n\nDeploy an LLMNR/NBT-NS spoofing detection tool. (Citation: GitHub Conveigh)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1171",
"external_id": "T1171"
},
{
"source_name": "Wikipedia LLMNR",
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, July 7). Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Link-Local%20Multicast%20Name%20Resolution"
},
{
"source_name": "TechNet NetBIOS",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). NetBIOS Name Resolution. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc958811.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "GitHub NBNSpoof",
"description": "Nomex. (2014, February 7). NBNSpoof. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"url": "https://github.com/nomex/nbnspoof"
},
{
"source_name": "Rapid7 LLMNR Spoofer",
"description": "Francois, R. (n.d.). LLMNR Spoofer. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.rapid7.com/db/modules/auxiliary/spoof/llmnr/llmnr%20response"
},
{
"source_name": "GitHub Responder",
"description": "Gaffie, L. (2016, August 25). Responder. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"url": "https://github.com/SpiderLabs/Responder"
},
{
"source_name": "Sternsecurity LLMNR-NBTNS",
"description": "Sternstein, J. (2013, November). Local Network Attacks: LLMNR and NBT-NS Poisoning. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.sternsecurity.com/blog/local-network-attacks-llmnr-and-nbt-ns-poisoning"
},
{
"source_name": "GitHub Conveigh",
"description": "Robertson, K. (2016, August 28). Conveigh. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"url": "https://github.com/Kevin-Robertson/Conveigh"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"Packet capture",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b.json
+23 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--28a661c4-0a94-424f-8398-9d0e5a04bb02",
"id": "bundle--a63b7aaa-2dbc-4465-9f10-94ab9fcc3647",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--0f20e3cb-245b-4a61-8a91-2d93f7cb0e9b",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.496Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Rootkit",
"description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Process whitelisting, Signature-based detection, System access controls, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., Hooking) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nAdversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)\n\nDetection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Process whitelisting, Signature-based detection, System access controls, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, root",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@
"source_name": "Wikipedia Rootkit",
"description": "Wikipedia. (2016, June 1). Rootkit. Retrieved June 2, 2016.",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rootkit"
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Windows Rootkits",
"description": "Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit",
"description": "Kurtz, G. (2012, November 19). HTTP iframe Injecting Linux Rootkit. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/http-iframe-injecting-linux-rootkit/"
},
{
"source_name": "BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit",
"description": "Pan, M., Tsai, S. (2014). You can\u2019t see me: A Mac OS X Rootkit uses the tricks you haven't known yet. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"url": "http://www.blackhat.com/docs/asia-14/materials/Tsai/WP-Asia-14-Tsai-You-Cant-See-Me-A-Mac-OS-X-Rootkit-Uses-The-Tricks-You-Havent-Known-Yet.pdf"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
@@ -48,21 +63,13 @@
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
"SYSTEM",
"root"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967.json
+5 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--8dc34e0b-89e2-4290-a8ae-061a5cfc731b",
"id": "bundle--3b3260ca-f07a-4f45-9247-0de13bd0bc1c",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--1035cdf2-3e5f-446f-a7a7-e8f6d7925967",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:34.528Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Audio Capture",
"description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -36,19 +36,9 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d.json
+6 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--c7ae1332-50fc-44c3-9761-e0279c5c6e98",
"id": "bundle--acb377e5-091c-4ba7-a1d7-79678f200158",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--10d51417-ee35-4589-b1ff-b6df1c334e8d",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:44.421Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "External Remote Services",
"description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley",
"description": "Remote services such as VPNs, Citrix, and other access mechanisms allow users to connect to internal enterprise network resources from external locations. There are often remote service gateways that manage connections and credential authentication for these services. Services such as Windows Remote Management can also be used externally.\n\nAdversaries may use remote services to access and persist within a network. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging) Access to Valid Accounts to use the service is often a requirement, which could be obtained through credential pharming or by obtaining the credentials from users after compromising the enterprise network. Access to remote services may be used as part of Redundant Access during an operation.\n\nDetection: Follow best practices for detecting adversary use of Valid Accounts for authenticating to remote services. Collect authentication logs and analyze for unusual access patterns, windows of activity, and access outside of normal business hours.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Daniel Oakley, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Daniel Oakley"
"Daniel Oakley",
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs"
@@ -42,18 +43,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--5af13739-79e6-4f6d-baac-f3b78c94717c",
"id": "bundle--6052ff26-e45c-4ed4-beff-8802b9f0f113",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--10d5f3b7-6be6-4da5-9a77-0f1e2bbfcc44",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:22.374Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Component Firmware",
"description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems\n\nPermissions Required: SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.",
"description": "Some adversaries may employ sophisticated means to compromise computer components and install malicious firmware that will execute adversary code outside of the operating system and main system firmware or BIOS. This technique may be similar to System Firmware but conducted upon other system components that may not have the same capability or level of integrity checking. Malicious device firmware could provide both a persistent level of access to systems despite potential typical failures to maintain access and hard disk re-images, as well as a way to evade host software-based defenses and integrity checks.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems\n\nPermissions Required: SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system.",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -40,18 +40,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Ability to update component device firmware from the host operating system."
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--d8c13eb7-81ed-4b03-baf3-099f6264a1de",
"id": "bundle--5171618e-ffcf-4792-9793-d19f82c710e5",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--128c55d3-aeba-469f-bd3e-c8996ab4112a",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:12.675Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Timestomp",
"description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)\n\nDetection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -46,19 +46,8 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--c8c0da7b-cd43-4192-880c-5d16248a44fa",
"id": "bundle--c2e36950-f3c4-4a33-afb9-f6bbdd7e229c",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--15dbf668-795c-41e6-8219-f0447c0e64ce",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:55.471Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Permission Groups Discovery",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are <code>net group /domain</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> for the domain, or <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the <code>groups</code> command and domain groups via the <code>ldapsearch</code> command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X, Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows XP\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExamples of commands that can list groups are <code>net group /domain</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> using the Net utility.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> for the domain, or <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> for local groups.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the <code>groups</code> command and domain groups via the <code>ldapsearch</code> command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -37,20 +37,8 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X",
"Windows 10",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows XP"
"Windows",
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--fd2695ba-2f72-42c5-a4aa-14fe32487405",
"id": "bundle--a76718e6-29af-4ca8-8abb-6817ea0eabd1",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--1608f3e1-598a-42f4-a01a-2e252e81728f",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:25.454Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Email Collection",
"description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
"description": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information from a target.\n\nFiles containing email data can be acquired from a user's system, such as Outlook storage or cache files .pst and .ost.\n\nAdversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network.\n\nSome adversaries may acquire user credentials and access externally facing webmail applications, such as Outlook Web Access.\n\nDetection: There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection.\n\nFile access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process use of network",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -34,18 +34,7 @@
"Process use of network"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--eb216201-7445-4778-9606-12a81631e447",
"id": "bundle--20091e21-71bd-479c-825e-53747bf888a7",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--18d4ab39-12ed-4a16-9fdb-ae311bba4a0f",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Rc.common",
"description": "During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute <code>source /etc/rc.common</code>, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: The <code>/etc/rc.common</code> file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root",
"description": "During the boot process, macOS and Linux both execute <code>source /etc/rc.common</code>, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.\n\nAdversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: The <code>/etc/rc.common</code> file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--d755ab43-3540-4a1f-8db1-7408389c1ec1",
"id": "bundle--bc8472e6-0b23-4bb4-9e3d-d30d9094e210",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--1b7ba276-eedc-4951-a762-0ceea2c030ec",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:31.584Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Data from Removable Media",
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access removable media drive and files",
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from any removable media (optical disk drive, USB memory, etc.) connected to the compromised system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries may search connected removable media on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. Interactive command shells may be in use, and common functionality within cmd may be used to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on removable media.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system's connected removable media. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access removable media drive and files",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -33,21 +33,9 @@
"Process command-line parameters"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Privileges to access removable media drive and files"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d.json
+6 -18
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--fc06dfee-4dd1-4924-8f34-8f38ec70a1bb",
"id": "bundle--68033149-e6b9-48e4-97a8-8145b26b5c97",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--1b84d551-6de8-4b96-9930-d177677c3b1d",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:26.474Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Code Signing",
"description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and MacOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X, Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows XP\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control",
"description": "Code signing provides a level of authenticity on a binary from the developer and a guarantee that the binary has not been tampered with. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing) However, adversaries are known to use code signing certificates to masquerade malware and tools as legitimate binaries (Citation: Janicab). The certificates used during an operation may be created, forged, or stolen by the adversary. (Citation: Securelist Digital Certificates) (Citation: Symantec Digital Certificates)\n\nCode signing to verify software on first run can be used on modern Windows and macOS/OS X systems. It is not used on Linux due to the decentralized nature of the platform. (Citation: Wikipedia Code Signing)\n\nCode signing certificates may be used to bypass security policies that require signed code to execute on a system.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze signing certificate metadata on software that executes within the environment to look for unusual certificate characteristics and outliers.\n\nPlatforms: Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
{
"source_name": "Securelist Digital Certificates",
"description": "Ladikov, A. (2015, January 29). Why You Shouldn\u2019t Completely Trust Files Signed with Digital Certificates. Retrieved March 31, 2016.",
"url": "https://securelist.com/blog/security-policies/68593/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/"
"url": "https://securelist.com/why-you-shouldnt-completely-trust-files-signed-with-digital-certificates/68593/"
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Digital Certificates",
@@ -54,20 +54,8 @@
"Windows User Account Control"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X",
"Windows 10",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows XP"
"Windows",
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21.json
+10 -21
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--6cae353a-c1b7-4784-ae68-213c425a8e3c",
"id": "bundle--4f662559-2fd0-4819-bc7a-cc2ef5cc7dc6",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,17 +8,13 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--1c338d0f-a65e-4073-a5c1-c06878849f21",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:09.815Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Process Hollowing",
"description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state and the process's memory is replaced with the code of a second program so that the second program runs instead of the original program. Windows and process monitoring tools believe the original process is running, whereas the actual program running is different. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing)\n\nProcess hollowing may be used similarly to DLL Injection to evade defenses and detection analysis of malicious process execution by launching adversary-controlled code under the context of a legitimate process.\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior.\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No",
"description": "Process hollowing occurs when a process is created in a suspended state then its memory is unmapped and replaced with malicious code. Similar to Process Injection, execution of the malicious code is masked under a legitimate process and may evade defenses and detection analysis. (Citation: Leitch Hollowing) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls that unmap process memory, such as ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, API monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus, Whitelisting by file name or path, Signature-based detection\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
}
],
"external_references": [
@@ -31,6 +27,11 @@
"source_name": "Leitch Hollowing",
"description": "Leitch, J. (n.d.). Process Hollowing. Retrieved November 12, 2014.",
"url": "http://www.autosectools.com/process-hollowing.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Engame Process Injection July 2017",
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
@@ -50,20 +51,8 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": false
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd.json
+46
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--69e72f57-7288-47e3-9bd2-b351335982d9",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--1ce03c65-5946-4ac9-9d4d-66db87e024bd",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Domain Fronting",
"description": "Domain fronting takes advantage of routing schemes in Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) and other services which host multiple domains to obfuscate the intended destination of HTTPS traffic or traffic tunneled through HTTPS. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015) The technique involves using different domain names in the SNI field of the TLS header and the Host field of the HTTP header. If both domains are served from the same CDN, then the CDN may route to the address specified in the HTTP header after unwrapping the TLS header. A variation of the the technique, \"domainless\" fronting, utilizes a SNI field that is left blank; this may allow the fronting to work even when the CDN attempts to validate that the SNI and HTTP Host fields match (if the blank SNI fields are ignored).\n\nFor example, if domain-x and domain-y are customers of the same CDN, it is possible to place domain-x in the TLS header and domain-y in the HTTP header. Traffic will appear to be going to domain-x, however the CDN may route it to domain-y.\n\nDetection: If SSL inspection is in place, the Host field of the HTTP header can be checked if it matches the HTTPS SNI or against a blacklist or whitelist of domain names. (Citation: Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: SSL/TLS inspection\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "command-and-control"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1172",
"external_id": "T1172"
},
{
"source_name": "Fifield Blocking Resistent Communication through domain fronting 2015",
"description": "David Fifield, Chang Lan, Rod Hynes, Percy Wegmann, and Vern Paxson. (2015). Blocking-resistant communication through domain fronting. Retrieved November 20, 2017.",
"url": "http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/meek-PETS-2015.pdf"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"SSL/TLS inspection"
],
"x_mitre_network_requirements": true,
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d.json
+72
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--5826b028-132f-4567-9aa6-496126b678c7",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--1df0326d-2fbc-4d08-a16b-48365f1e742d",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "SID-History Injection",
"description": "The Windows security identifier (SID) is a unique value that identifies a user or group account. SIDs are used by Windows security in both security descriptors and access tokens. (Citation: Microsoft SID) An account can hold additional SIDs in the SID-History Active Directory attribute (Citation: Microsoft SID)-History Attribute, allowing inter-operable account migration between domains (e.g., all values in SID-History are included in access tokens).\n\nAdversaries may use this mechanism for privilege escalation. With Domain Administrator (or equivalent) rights, harvested or well-known SID values (Citation: Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017) may be inserted into SID-History to enable impersonation of arbitrary users/groups such as Enterprise Administrators. This manipulation may result in elevated access to local resources and/or access to otherwise inaccessible domains via lateral movement techniques such as Remote Services, Windows Admin Shares, or Windows Remote Management.\n\nDetection: Examine data in user\u2019s SID-History attributes using the PowerShell Get-ADUser Cmdlet (Citation: Microsoft Get-ADUser), especially users who have SID-History values from the same domain. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015)\n\nMonitor Account Management events on Domain Controllers for successful and failed changes to SID-History. (Citation: AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015) (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\n\nMonitor Windows API calls to the <code>DsAddSidHistory</code> function. (Citation: Microsoft DsAddSidHistory)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Authentication logs, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1178",
"external_id": "T1178"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft SID",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Identifiers. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/aa379571.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Well Known SIDs Jun 2017",
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, June 23). Well-known security identifiers in Windows operating systems. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"url": "https://support.microsoft.com/help/243330/well-known-security-identifiers-in-windows-operating-systems"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Get-ADUser",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Active Directory Cmdlets - Get-ADUser. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/ee617241.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "AdSecurity SID History Sept 2015",
"description": "Metcalf, S. (2015, September 19). Sneaky Active Directory Persistence #14: SID History. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"url": "https://adsecurity.org/?p=1772"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft DsAddSidHistory",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Using DsAddSidHistory. Retrieved November 30, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/ms677982.aspx"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Vincent Le Toux"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Authentication logs",
"Windows event logs"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125.json
+7 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--56c87914-b757-45aa-b677-a430b33919f6",
"id": "bundle--a43fc0ea-f019-48bc-aa87-569180ea0754",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--1f47e2fd-fa77-4f2f-88ee-e85df308f125",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:26.057Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"name": "Local Port Monitor",
"description": "A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>. (Citation: Bloxham) The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions.\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to (Citation: AddMonitor).\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor registry writes to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Port Monitors",
"description": "A port monitor can be set through the (Citation: AddMonitor) API call to set a DLL to be loaded at startup. (Citation: AddMonitor) This DLL can be located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> and will be loaded by the print spooler service, spoolsv.exe, on boot. The spoolsv.exe process also runs under SYSTEM level permissions. (Citation: Bloxham) Alternatively, an arbitrary DLL can be loaded if permissions allow writing a fully-qualified pathname for that DLL to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>. The Registry key contains entries for the following:\n*Local Port\n*Standard TCP/IP Port\n*USB Monitor\n*WSD Port\n\nAdversaries can use this technique to load malicious code at startup that will persist on system reboot and execute as SYSTEM.\n\nDetection: * Monitor process API calls to (Citation: AddMonitor).\n* Monitor DLLs that are loaded by spoolsv.exe for DLLs that are abnormal.\n* New DLLs written to the System32 directory that do not correlate with known good software or patching may be suspicious.\n* Monitor Registry writes to <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Print\\Monitors</code>.\n* Run the Autoruns utility, which checks for this Registry key as a persistence mechanism (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, API monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -47,7 +47,8 @@
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Stefan Kanthak"
"Stefan Kanthak",
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -64,18 +65,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--424d54c6-2792-40a4-b703-6c193a2c97da",
"id": "bundle--534a9dbd-e6ff-45cc-b529-e6b5243db551",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--215190a9-9f02-4e83-bb5f-e0589965a302",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:33.499Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Regsvcs/Regasm",
"description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
"description": "Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)\n\nAdversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -60,18 +60,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": false
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--655ea78c-6122-40d0-ba88-2f69fe4d1b02",
"id": "bundle--5e8ae6c9-6bef-4d34-8604-db1bab4c05ee",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--241814ae-de3f-4656-b49e-f9a80764d4b7",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:51.330Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Security Software Discovery",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, <code>reg query</code> with Reg, <code>dir</code> with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, <code>reg query</code> with Reg, <code>dir</code> with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.\n\n===Mac===\n\nIt's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -38,20 +38,8 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--ee7818a8-57dd-463c-9dc6-935a77bdff68",
"id": "bundle--d75bf479-6c8d-4aea-a5f4-fb248b858526",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--246fd3c7-f5e3-466d-8787-4c13d9e3b61c",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:01.759Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Taint Shared Content",
"description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to shared folders and content with write permissions",
"description": "Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally.\n\nDetection: Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to shared folders and content with write permissions",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -32,18 +32,7 @@
"Process monitoring"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Access to shared folders and content with write permissions"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b.json
+4 -4
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--4ac1acac-0fcc-459b-8b7f-b9c58cd33122",
"id": "bundle--62b2a353-2d93-478c-a293-8c8d2e16a729",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--2715c335-1bf2-4efe-9f18-0691317ff83b",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Securityd Memory",
"description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple\u2019s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple\u2019s securityd utility takes the user\u2019s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user\u2019s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd\u2019s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user\u2019s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nPlatforms: OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root",
"description": "In OS X prior to El Capitan, users with root access can read plaintext keychain passwords of logged-in users because Apple\u2019s keychain implementation allows these credentials to be cached so that users are not repeatedly prompted for passwords. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) Apple\u2019s securityd utility takes the user\u2019s logon password, encrypts it with PBKDF2, and stores this master key in memory. Apple also uses a set of keys and algorithms to encrypt the user\u2019s password, but once the master key is found, an attacker need only iterate over the other values to unlock the final password. (Citation: OS X Keychain)\n\nIf an adversary can obtain root access (allowing them to read securityd\u2019s memory), then they can scan through memory to find the correct sequence of keys in relatively few tries to decrypt the user\u2019s logon keychain. This provides the adversary with all the plaintext passwords for users, WiFi, mail, browsers, certificates, secure notes, etc. (Citation: OS X Keychain) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: root",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
"root"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae.json
+57
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--1ea8be44-d201-444e-9719-c8bc441df22a",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--2892b9ee-ca9f-4723-b332-0dc6e843a8ae",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Screensaver",
"description": "Screensavers are programs that execute after a configurable time of user inactivity and consist of Portable Executable (PE) files with a .scr file extension. (Citation: Wikipedia Screensaver) The Windows screensaver application scrnsave.exe is located in <code>C:\\Windows\\System32\\</code> along with screensavers included with base Windows installations. The following screensaver settings are stored in the Registry (<code>HKCU\\Control Panel\\Desktop\\</code>) and could be manipulated to achieve persistence:\n\n*<code>SCRNSAVE.exe</code> - set to malicious PE path\n*<code>ScreenSaveActive</code> - set to '1' to enable the screensaver\n*<code>ScreenSaverIsSecure</code> - set to '0' to not require a password to unlock\n*<code>ScreenSaverTimeout</code> - sets user inactivity timeout before screensaver is executed\n\nAdversaries can use screensaver settings to maintain persistence by setting the screensaver to run malware after a certain timeframe of user inactivity. (Citation: ESET Gazer Aug 2017)\n\nDetection: Monitor process execution and command-line parameters of .scr files. Monitor changes to screensaver configuration changes in the Registry that may not correlate with typical user behavior.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to the screensaver binary path in the Registry. Suspicious paths and PE files may indicate outliers among legitimate screensavers in a network and should be investigated.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1180",
"external_id": "T1180"
},
{
"source_name": "Wikipedia Screensaver",
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, November 22). Screensaver. Retrieved December 5, 2017.",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Screensaver"
},
{
"source_name": "ESET Gazer Aug 2017",
"description": "ESET. (2017, August). Gazing at Gazer: Turla\u2019s new second stage backdoor. Retrieved September 14, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/eset-gazer.pdf"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Bartosz Jerzman"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--4e596787-6472-4845-9713-050cbc45918f",
"id": "bundle--127c4b74-64a1-47af-aaa7-bdf137fd1ed6",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--2ba5aa71-9d15-4b22-b726-56af06d9ad2f",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Startup Items",
"description": "Per Apple\u2019s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn\u2019t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"description": "Per Apple\u2019s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn\u2019t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory. \n\nAn adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.\n\nDetection: The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: root\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -52,8 +52,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53.json
+4 -12
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--13ce39e1-b569-4ccf-9c11-a636d78d29c2",
"id": "bundle--a0dee793-dced-4e48-bbc5-20a0504d671e",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--2c4d4e92-0ccf-4a97-b54c-86d662988a53",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Office Application Startup",
"description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros)\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:<code>C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm</code>\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:<code>C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\n<code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016\nAdd-ins: some require administrator permissions\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Loic Jaquemet",
"description": "Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.\n\n===Office Template Macros===\n\nMicrosoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)\n\nOffice Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros (Citation: MSDN VBA in Office) can inserted into the base templated and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. (Citation: enigma0x3 normal.dotm) (Citation: Hexacorn Office Template Macros)\n\nWord Normal.dotm location:<code>C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm</code>\n\nExcel Personal.xlsb location:<code>C:\\Users\\(username)\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB</code>\n\nAn adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.\n\n===Office Test===\n\nA Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)\n\n<code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf</code>\n\n===Add-ins===\n\nOffice add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)\n\nAdd-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nDetection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.\n\nMonitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)\n\nNon-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016\nAdd-ins: some require administrator permissions\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias, Loic Jaquemet",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -77,15 +77,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016\nAdd-ins: some require administrator permissions"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--e0182834-e214-4af5-a0d1-d3b9d5a6a698",
"id": "bundle--c939cf7f-1f4c-4fce-850e-8685385e9104",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--2e0dd10b-676d-4964-acd0-8a404c92b044",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:07.958Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Disabling Security Tools",
"description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Anti-virus, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Log analysis",
"description": "Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Anti-virus, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Log analysis",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -43,21 +43,9 @@
"Log analysis"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--b7a7b351-b3dd-45ca-b9ef-285d82f7a570",
"id": "bundle--5591ebd7-685c-4381-a339-e37e21a201b3",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--30208d3e-0d6b-43c8-883e-44462a514619",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:27.985Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Automated Collection",
"description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.",
"description": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. \n\nThis technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -36,21 +36,9 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest."
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--a0429a84-6255-4860-b3ca-78d667d9e4ad",
"id": "bundle--135c701a-7d23-4990-ad86-1f6c5fe0cb61",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--30973a08-aed9-4edf-8604-9084ce1b5c4f",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:25.967Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Clipboard Data",
"description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring",
"description": "Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. \n\n===Windows===\n\nApplications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) \n\n===Mac===\n\nOSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).\n\nDetection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -41,21 +41,9 @@
"API monitoring"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41.json
+9 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--1b579471-3adb-4e57-91d0-106047e93e5a",
"id": "bundle--4cc47985-82d1-42ef-8557-30f3fdd1cde2",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--317fefa6-46c7-4062-adb6-2008cf6bcb41",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:15.409Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "AppInit DLLs",
"description": "DLLs that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program. This value can be abused to obtain persistence by causing a DLL to be loaded into most processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later",
"description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\Software\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)\n\nThe AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator\n\nSystem Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"source_name": "Engame Process Injection July 2017",
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
@@ -59,18 +64,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--347d777c-f673-4fb8-9242-d756f7d3b601",
"id": "bundle--a6b17af3-8a98-4b85-b52f-1f09ef793f75",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--322bad5a-1c49-4d23-ab79-76d641794afa",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:21.315Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "System Service Discovery",
"description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are \"sc,\" \"tasklist /svc\" using Tasklist, and \"net start\" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -37,18 +37,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--76332863-5d1e-4f45-8947-57afb539f3c2",
"id": "bundle--c8bf32d0-e0c5-4df8-ab3a-e5ee04d510dc",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--3257eb21-f9a7-4430-8de1-d8b6e288f529",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:41.399Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Network Sniffing",
"description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) and Domain Name Service (DNS) poisoning can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Network interface access and packet capture driver",
"description": "Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.\n\nUser credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning, can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.\n\nDetection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Network interface access and packet capture driver",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -37,21 +37,9 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Network interface access and packet capture driver"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--7eee44a1-8fea-4456-80cc-eb8106ee69d2",
"id": "bundle--0d606085-e97b-46dd-91d6-32a9d43d9431",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--327f3cc5-eea1-42d4-a6cd-ed34b7ce8f61",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:27.755Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Application Deployment Software",
"description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to application deployment software (EPO, HPCA, Altiris, etc.)",
"description": "Adversaries may deploy malicious software to systems within a network using application deployment systems employed by enterprise administrators. The permissions required for this action vary by system configuration; local credentials may be sufficient with direct access to the deployment server, or specific domain credentials may be required. However, the system may require an administrative account to log in or to perform software deployment.\n\nAccess to a network-wide or enterprise-wide software deployment system enables an adversary to have remote code execution on all systems that are connected to such a system. The access may be used to laterally move to systems, gather information, or cause a specific effect, such as wiping the hard drives on all endpoints.\n\nDetection: Monitor application deployments from a secondary system. Perform application deployment at regular times so that irregular deployment activity stands out. Monitor process activity that does not correlate to known good software. Monitor account login activity on the deployment system.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nSystem Requirements: Access to application deployment software (EPO, HPCA, Altiris, etc.)",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -33,21 +33,9 @@
"Process monitoring"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Access to application deployment software (EPO, HPCA, Altiris, etc.)"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--e00361da-7acb-4a07-8a54-1a5b012797a6",
"id": "bundle--2382a870-acfc-4801-9b80-65ae786bbbf9",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--3489cfc5-640f-4bb3-a103-9137b97de79f",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Network Share Discovery",
"description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)\n\nNet can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the <code>df -aH</code> command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. \n\n===Windows===\n\nFile sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)\n\nNet can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\\\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>.\n\nAdversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the <code>df -aH</code> command.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nNormal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -47,20 +47,8 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--7f16a4cf-2bbf-43f0-a8ad-afb0a3e5f510",
"id": "bundle--be997317-196c-4516-9610-adcb494c5f4a",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--348f1eef-964b-4eb6-bb53-69b3dcb0c643",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:28.471Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Peripheral Device Discovery",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to gather information about attached peripheral devices and components connected to a computer system. The information may be used to enhance their awareness of the system and network environment or may be used for further actions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -33,18 +33,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--56586a2c-0f1e-47ad-b824-f68df03cbbcd",
"id": "bundle--f95453d1-1bf1-46a7-bfc0-dbe8373f48cc",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--354a7f88-63fb-41b5-a801-ce3b377b36f1",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:04.307Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "System Information Discovery",
"description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include <code>ver</code>, Systeminfo, and <code>dir</code> within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the <code>systemsetup</code> command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the <code>system_profiler</code> gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.\n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands and utilities that obtain this information include <code>ver</code>, Systeminfo, and <code>dir</code> within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, the <code>systemsetup</code> command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the <code>system_profiler</code> gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -35,21 +35,9 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--018da223-4571-4494-8ff7-2a26fcf2182c",
"id": "bundle--2a87d4cb-fd7e-4fcb-bcb4-2c3a9bfee6c4",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--355be19c-ffc9-46d5-8d50-d6a036c675b6",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:56.776Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Standard Application Layer Protocol",
"description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"description": "Adversaries may communicate using a common, standardized application layer protocol such as HTTP, HTTPS, SMTP, or DNS to avoid detection by blending in with existing traffic. Commands to the remote system, and often the results of those commands, will be embedded within the protocol traffic between the client and server.\n\nFor connections that occur internally within an enclave (such as those between a proxy or pivot node and other nodes), commonly used protocols are RPC, SSH, or RDP.\n\nDetection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect application layer protocols that do not follow the expected protocol for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -41,21 +41,9 @@
],
"x_mitre_network_requirements": true,
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9.json
+25 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--636f3fad-31e8-48ec-90d5-2605425c298c",
"id": "bundle--287186f0-67f4-414b-8d50-58cbf082e8fa",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--35dd844a-b219-4e2b-a6bb-efa9a75995a9",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:46.977Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Scheduled Task",
"description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAn adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nDetection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code>. If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in <code>%systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks</code> for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
"description": "Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. The account used to create the task must be in the Administrators group on the local system. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)\n\nAn adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.\n\nDetection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in <code>%systemroot%\\System32\\Tasks</code> for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nConfigure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the \"Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational\" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)\n\n*Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered\n*Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated\n*Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: Yes\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -36,19 +36,39 @@
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"source_name": "TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting",
"description": "Satyajit321. (2015, November 3). Scheduled Tasks History Retention settings. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://social.technet.microsoft.com/Forums/en-US/e5bca729-52e7-4fcb-ba12-3225c564674c/scheduled-tasks-history-retention-settings?forum=winserver8gen"
},
{
"source_name": "TechNet Scheduled Task Events",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). General Task Registration. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dd315590.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "TechNet Task Scheduler Security",
"description": "Microsoft. (2005, January 21). Task Scheduler and security. Retrieved June 8, 2016.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc785125.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task",
"description": "Loobeek, L. (2017, December 8). leoloobeek Status. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://twitter.com/leoloobeek/status/939248813465853953"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
"Process monitoring"
"Process monitoring",
"Windows event logs"
],
"x_mitre_effective_permissions": [
"Administrator",
@@ -59,18 +79,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": true
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--fa7ff010-5a2b-446b-b060-6d47859da424",
"id": "bundle--4206bebf-1e47-412b-be87-00bba8c72bde",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--36675cd3-fe00-454c-8516-aebecacbe9d9",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Login Item",
"description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's <code>~/Library/Preferences/</code> directory in a plist file called <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code> (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don\u2019t all have to since there is an option to \u2018Hide\u2019 the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "MacOS provides the option to list specific applications to run when a user logs in. These applications run under the logged in user's context, and will be started every time the user logs in. Login items installed using the Service Management Framework are not visible in the System Preferences and can only be removed by the application that created them (Citation: Adding Login Items). Users have direct control over login items installed using a shared file list which are also visible in System Preferences (Citation: Adding Login Items). These login items are stored in the user's <code>~/Library/Preferences/</code> directory in a plist file called <code>com.apple.loginitems.plist</code> (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Some of these applications can open visible dialogs to the user, but they don\u2019t all have to since there is an option to \u2018Hide\u2019 the window. If an adversary can register their own login item or modified an existing one, then they can use it to execute their code for a persistence mechanism each time the user logs in (Citation: Malware Persistence on OS X) (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).\n\nDetection: All the login items are viewable by going to the Apple menu -> System Preferences -> Users & Groups -> Login items. This area should be monitored and whitelisted for known good applications. Monitor process execution resulting from login actions for unusual or unknown applications.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -51,8 +51,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8.json
+95
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--7d9a27db-964f-4eae-b1a5-9fea3e93cb96",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--389735f1-f21c-4208-b8f0-f8031e7169b8",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Browser Extensions",
"description": "Browser extensions or plugins are small programs that can add functionality and customize aspects of internet browsers. They can be installed directly or through a browser's app store. Extensions generally have access and permissions to everything that the browser can access. (Citation: Wikipedia Browser Extension) (Citation: Chrome Extensions Definition)\n\nMalicious extensions can be installed into a browser through malicious app store downloads masquerading as legitimate extensions, through social engineering, or by an adversary that has already compromised a system. Security can be limited on browser app stores so may not be difficult for malicious extensions to defeat automated scanners and be uploaded. (Citation: Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers) Once the extension is installed, it can browse to websites in the background, (Citation: Chrome Extension Crypto Miner) steal all information that a user enters into a browser, to include credentials, (Citation: Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds) (Citation: Catch All Chrome Extension) and be used as an installer for a RAT for persistence. There have been instances of botnets using a persistent backdoor through malicious Chrome extensions. (Citation: Stantinko Botnet) There have also been similar examples of extensions being used for command & control (Citation: Chrome Extension C2 Malware).\n\nDetection: Inventory and monitor browser extension installations that deviate from normal, expected, and benign extensions. Process and network monitoring can be used to detect browsers communicating with a C2 server. However, this may would prove to be a difficult way of initially detecting a malicious extension depending on the nature and volume of the traffic it generates.\n\nMonitor for any new items written to the Registry or PE files written to disk. That may correlate with browser extension installation.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, System calls, Process use of network, Process monitoring, Browser extensions\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1176",
"external_id": "T1176"
},
{
"source_name": "Wikipedia Browser Extension",
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 8). Browser Extension. Retrieved January 11, 2018.",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Browser%20extension"
},
{
"source_name": "Chrome Extensions Definition",
"description": "Chrome. (n.d.). What are Extensions?. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://developer.chrome.com/extensions"
},
{
"source_name": "Malicious Chrome Extension Numbers",
"description": "Jagpal, N., et al. (2015, August). Trends and Lessons from Three Years Fighting Malicious Extensions. Retrieved November 17, 2017.",
"url": "https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43824.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Chrome Extension Crypto Miner",
"description": "Brinkmann, M. (2017, September 19). First Chrome extension with JavaScript Crypto Miner detected. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.ghacks.net/2017/09/19/first-chrome-extension-with-javascript-crypto-miner-detected/"
},
{
"source_name": "Banker Google Chrome Extension Steals Creds",
"description": "Marinho, R. (n.d.). (Banker(GoogleChromeExtension)).targeting. Retrieved November 18, 2017.",
"url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/BankerGoogleChromeExtensiontargetingBrazil/22722/"
},
{
"source_name": "Catch All Chrome Extension",
"description": "Marinho, R. (n.d.). \"Catch-All\" Google Chrome Malicious Extension Steals All Posted Data. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/CatchAll+Google+Chrome+Malicious+Extension+Steals+All+Posted+Data/22976/https:/threatpost.com/malicious-chrome-extension-steals-data-posted-to-any-website/128680/)"
},
{
"source_name": "Stantinko Botnet",
"description": "Vachon, F., Faou, M. (2017, July 20). Stantinko: A massive adware campaign operating covertly since 2012. Retrieved November 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/07/20/stantinko-massive-adware-campaign-operating-covertly-since-2012/"
},
{
"source_name": "Chrome Extension C2 Malware",
"description": "Kjaer, M. (2016, July 18). Malware in the browser: how you might get hacked by a Chrome extension. Retrieved November 22, 2017.",
"url": "https://kjaer.io/extension-malware/"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Justin Warner, ICEBRG"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Network protocol analysis",
"Packet capture",
"System calls",
"Process use of network",
"Process monitoring",
"Browser extensions"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--778f1b4f-f34b-45ec-98d5-ee5941b3a0b5",
"id": "bundle--fa048e0b-441c-4afb-a596-5d62a8d7a1ab",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--391d824f-0ef1-47a0-b0ee-c59a75e27670",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:17.472Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Execution through API",
"description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include: (Citation: Kanthak Verifier)\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
"description": "Adversary tools may directly use the Windows application programming interface (API) to execute binaries. Functions such as the Windows API CreateProcess will allow programs and scripts to start other processes with proper path and argument parameters. (Citation: Microsoft CreateProcess)\n\nAdditional Windows API calls that can be used to execute binaries include: (Citation: Kanthak Verifier)\n\n*CreateProcessA() and CreateProcessW(),\n*CreateProcessAsUserA() and CreateProcessAsUserW(),\n*CreateProcessInternalA() and CreateProcessInternalW(),\n*CreateProcessWithLogonW(), CreateProcessWithTokenW(),\n*LoadLibraryA() and LoadLibraryW(),\n*LoadLibraryExA() and LoadLibraryExW(),\n*LoadModule(),\n*LoadPackagedLibrary(),\n*WinExec(),\n*ShellExecuteA() and ShellExecuteW(),\n*ShellExecuteExA() and ShellExecuteExW()\n\nDetection: Monitoring API calls may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances, since benign use of Windows API functions such as CreateProcess are common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. Correlation of other events with behavior surrounding API function calls using API monitoring will provide additional context to an event that may assist in determining if it is due to malicious behavior. Correlation of activity by process lineage by process ID may be sufficient.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -50,18 +50,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": false
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427.json
+7 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--422340a6-8bb0-4dec-a888-886cc22ba7f6",
"id": "bundle--c4e70805-98bd-429f-9539-8c208cca5d8f",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--39a130e1-6ab7-434a-8bd2-418e7d9d6427",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:49.119Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Service Registry Permissions Weakness",
"description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nDetection: Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path is changed to a location that is not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows XP\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to modify a service binPath/ImagePath value in the Registry",
"description": "Windows stores local service configuration information in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>. The information stored under a service's Registry keys can be manipulated to modify a service's execution parameters through tools such as the service controller, sc.exe, PowerShell, or Reg. Access to Registry keys is controlled through Access Control Lists and permissions. (Citation: MSDN Registry Key Security)\n\nIf the permissions for users and groups are not properly set and allow access to the Registry keys for a service, then adversaries can change the service binPath/ImagePath to point to a different executable under their control. When the service starts or is restarted, then the adversary-controlled program will execute, allowing the adversary to gain persistence and/or privilege escalation to the account context the service is set to execute under (local/domain account, SYSTEM, LocalService, or NetworkService).\n\nDetection: Service changes are reflected in the Registry. Modification to existing services should not occur frequently. If a service binary path is changed to a location that is not typical for that service and does not correlate with software updates, then it may be due to malicious activity. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current service information. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done to modify services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be changed through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Services, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to modify a service binPath/ImagePath value in the Registry\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -41,6 +41,9 @@
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Process command-line parameters",
"Services",
@@ -54,18 +57,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows 10",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows XP"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Ability to modify a service binPath/ImagePath value in the Registry"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--d6d586dd-3c64-405b-a487-2dab43cb6472",
"id": "bundle--0e14b1ca-40e6-4b5e-a79f-854e958a3b38",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--3b3cbbe0-6ed3-4334-b543-3ddfd8c5642d",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:31.197Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Custom Cryptographic Protocol",
"description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"description": "Adversaries may use a custom cryptographic protocol or algorithm to hide command and control traffic. A simple scheme, such as XOR-ing the plaintext with a fixed key, will produce a very weak ciphertext.\n\nCustom encryption schemes may vary in sophistication. Analysis and reverse engineering of malware samples may be enough to discover the algorithm and encryption key used.\n\nSome adversaries may also attempt to implement their own version of a well-known cryptographic algorithm instead of using a known implementation library, which may lead to unintentional errors. (Citation: F-Secure Cosmicduke)\n\nDetection: If malware uses custom encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect when communications do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -51,21 +51,9 @@
],
"x_mitre_network_requirements": true,
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4.json
+8 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--e1f9fe60-d12b-4ab2-a50e-96c283069223",
"id": "bundle--6497f6fc-0abc-4cd0-a197-b98536aaf849",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,13 +8,17 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--3b744087-9945-4a6f-91e8-9dbceda417a4",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:08.977Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Replication Through Removable Media",
"description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution",
"description": "Adversaries may move to additional systems, possibly those on disconnected or air-gapped networks, by copying malware to removable media and taking advantage of Autorun features when the media is inserted into another system and executes. This may occur through modification of executable files stored on removable media or by copying malware and renaming it to look like a legitimate file to trick users into executing it on a separate system.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute from removable media after it is mounted or when initiated by a user. If a remote access tool is used in this manner to move laterally, then additional actions are likely to occur after execution, such as opening network connections for Command and Control and system and network information Discovery.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nSystem Requirements: Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "lateral-movement"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
}
],
"external_references": [
@@ -35,18 +39,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Removable media allowed, Autorun enabled or vulnerability present that allows for code execution"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--0dcb940a-6664-4b1e-bf54-23303e6d49d0",
"id": "bundle--400270ab-b645-4bd0-9813-cb23abae507b",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--3c4a2599-71ee-4405-ba1e-0e28414b4bc5",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:20.537Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Data from Local System",
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access certain files and directories",
"description": "Sensitive data can be collected from local system sources, such as the file system or databases of information residing on the system prior to Exfiltration.\n\nAdversaries will often search the file system on computers they have compromised to find files of interest. They may do this using a Command-Line Interface, such as cmd, which has functionality to interact with the file system to gather information. Some adversaries may also use Automated Collection on the local system.\n\nDetection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect files from a system. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nSystem Requirements: Privileges to access certain files and directories",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -33,21 +33,9 @@
"Process command-line parameters"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Privileges to access certain files and directories"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--a287a0f7-bd60-4e85-9a58-2bb4d3376f69",
"id": "bundle--b51c8d15-95f6-4e29-9c30-8050d4fcd591",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--3ccef7ae-cb5e-48f6-8302-897105fbf55c",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information",
"description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nDetection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
"description": "Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.\n\nOne such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)\n\nDetection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -50,18 +50,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--6a5ba5f7-95e0-4e7b-b25c-ff0cc1af06e9",
"id": "bundle--bc068e58-1603-4bf7-b098-c179ec997cbc",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--428ca9f8-0e33-442a-be87-f869cb4cf73e",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:01.315Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Multilayer Encryption",
"description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) After SSL/TLS inspection, additional cryptographic analysis may be needed to analyze the second layer of encryption.\n\nWith Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"description": "An adversary performs C2 communications using multiple layers of encryption, typically (but not exclusively) tunneling a custom encryption scheme within a protocol encryption scheme such as HTTPS or SMTPS.\n\nDetection: If malware uses Standard Cryptographic Protocol, SSL/TLS inspection can be used to detect command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks) After SSL/TLS inspection, additional cryptographic analysis may be needed to analyze the second layer of encryption.\n\nWith Custom Cryptographic Protocol, if malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Malware reverse engineering, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -55,21 +55,9 @@
],
"x_mitre_network_requirements": true,
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0.json
+27 -18
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--71be2de5-2147-4c3c-96f9-812e212e617f",
"id": "bundle--1c0a25d9-8956-4589-9c21-c3a621f914fc",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--42e8de7b-37b2-4258-905a-6897815e58e0",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:38.511Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Masquerading",
"description": "Masquerading occurs when an executable, legitimate or malicious, is placed in a commonly trusted location (such as C:\\Windows\\System32) or named with a common name (such as \"explorer.exe\" or \"svchost.exe\") to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path. An adversary may even use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) Masquerading also may be done to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nContributors: ENDGAME",
"description": "Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.\n\nOne variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs. This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.\n\n\n===Windows===\nIn another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the <code>C:\\Windows\\System32</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"explorer.exe\" and \"svchost.exe\".\n\n===Linux===\nAnother variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)\n\nAn example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux would be the <code>/bin</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include \"rsyncd\" and \"dbus-inotifier\". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis) (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)\n\nDetection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.\n\nIf file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nContributors: ENDGAME, Bartosz Jerzman",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -27,13 +27,34 @@
"source_name": "Endgame Masquerade Ball",
"description": "Ewing, P. (2016, October 31). How to Hunt: The Masquerade Ball. Retrieved October 31, 2016.",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/how-hunt-masquerade-ball"
},
{
"source_name": "F-Secure CozyDuke",
"description": "F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/documents/996508/1030745/CozyDuke"
},
{
"source_name": "Remaiten",
"description": "Michal Malik AND Marc-Etienne M.L\u00e9veill\u00e9. (2016, March 30). Meet Remaiten \u2013 a Linux bot on steroids targeting routers and potentially other IoT devices. Retrieved September 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2016/03/30/meet-remaiten-a-linux-bot-on-steroids-targeting-routers-and-potentially-other-iot-devices/"
},
{
"source_name": "Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis",
"description": "Bryan Lee and Rob Downs. (2016, February 12). A Look Into Fysbis: Sofacy\u2019s Linux Backdoor. Retrieved September 10, 2017.",
"url": "https://researchcenter.paloaltonetworks.com/2016/02/a-look-into-fysbis-sofacys-linux-backdoor/"
},
{
"source_name": "Fysbis Dr Web Analysis",
"description": "Doctor Web. (2014, November 21). Linux.BackDoor.Fysbis.1. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://vms.drweb.com/virus/?i=4276269"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"ENDGAME"
"ENDGAME",
"Bartosz Jerzman"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -44,21 +65,9 @@
"Whitelisting by file name or path"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--43e7dc91-05b2-474c-b9ac-2ed4fe101f4d.json
+91 -29
View File
File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--0b76b54a-df77-43da-bff5-3b8c7b5d3324",
"id": "bundle--afcbcedc-4cb5-495a-998a-8eb386d1a3ac",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--44dca04b-808d-46ca-b25f-d85236d4b9f8",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Bash History",
"description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user\u2019s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user\u2019s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the \"history\" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user\u2019s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user\u2019s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)\n\nDetection: Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like \"history\" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -42,8 +42,7 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--be21442f-b282-4ae5-8707-34d7d34f453d",
"id": "bundle--d622f727-6eae-448a-9940-49655e22a2ae",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--45d84c8b-c1e2-474d-a14d-69b5de0a2bc0",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Source",
"description": "The <code>source</code> command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways <code>source /path/to/filename [arguments]</code> or <code>. /path/to/filename [arguments]</code>. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No",
"description": "The <code>source</code> command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways <code>source /path/to/filename [arguments]</code> or <code>. /path/to/filename [arguments]</code>. Take note of the space after the \".\". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.\n\nDetection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -37,8 +37,7 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": false
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586.json
+6 -21
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--8a3f1a21-5730-43eb-8d7e-e8fff29250a7",
"id": "bundle--6ca202d1-ba4c-4311-9fa1-9fe65ad58af1",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--46944654-fcc1-4f63-9dad-628102376586",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:40.604Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "DLL Search Order Hijacking",
"description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious. Disallow loading of remote DLLs. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Preloading)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction.\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
"description": "Windows systems use a common method to look for required DLLs to load into a program. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Search) Adversaries may take advantage of the Windows DLL search order and programs that ambiguously specify DLLs to gain privilege escalation and persistence. \n\nAdversaries may perform DLL preloading, also called binary planting attacks, (Citation: OWASP Binary Planting) by placing a malicious DLL with the same name as an ambiguously specified DLL in a location that Windows searches before the legitimate DLL. Often this location is the current working directory of the program. Remote DLL preloading attacks occur when a program sets its current directory to a remote location such as a Web share before loading a DLL. (Citation: Microsoft 2269637) Adversaries may use this behavior to cause the program to load a malicious DLL. \n\nAdversaries may also directly modify the way a program loads DLLs by replacing an existing DLL or modifying a .manifest or .local redirection file, directory, or junction to cause the program to load a different DLL to maintain persistence or privilege escalation. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Redirection) (Citation: Microsoft Manifests) (Citation: Mandiant Search Order)\n\nIf a search order-vulnerable program is configured to run at a higher privilege level, then the adversary-controlled DLL that is loaded will also be executed at the higher level. In this case, the technique could be used for privilege escalation from user to administrator or SYSTEM or from administrator to SYSTEM, depending on the program.\n\nPrograms that fall victim to path hijacking may appear to behave normally because malicious DLLs may be configured to also load the legitimate DLLs they were meant to replace.\n\nDetection: Monitor file systems for moving, renaming, replacing, or modifying DLLs. Changes in the set of DLLs that are loaded by a process (compared with past behavior) that do not correlate with known software, patches, etc., are suspicious. Monitor DLLs loaded into a process and detect DLLs that have the same file name but abnormal paths. Modifications to or creation of .manifest and .local redirection files that do not correlate with software updates are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nEffective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nSystem Requirements: Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction.\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -60,18 +60,14 @@
"source_name": "Mandiant Search Order",
"description": "Mandiant. (2010, August 31). DLL Search Order Hijacking Revisited. Retrieved December 5, 2014.",
"url": "https://www.mandiant.com/blog/dll-search-order-hijacking-revisited/"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft DLL Preloading",
"description": "Microsoft. (2010, August 12). More information about the DLL Preloading remote attack vector. Retrieved December 5, 2014.",
"url": "http://blogs.technet.com/b/srd/archive/2010/08/23/more-information-about-dll-preloading-remote-attack-vector.aspx"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Stefan Kanthak"
"Stefan Kanthak",
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
@@ -93,18 +89,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Ability to add a DLL, manifest file, or .local file, directory, or junction."
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--dddd6bf2-3196-46c7-a27e-fc3e812b7dad",
"id": "bundle--70a766f0-0fa0-48fb-9f99-9a6cb54060ba",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--478aa214-2ca7-4ec0-9978-18798e514790",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:45.613Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "New Service",
"description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. \n\nAdversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.\n\nDetection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nEffective Permissions: SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -54,18 +54,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--e5b60ec3-c48b-42e2-84e0-c2c8c6591413",
"id": "bundle--4e2c1635-6fe9-4caf-90f4-e73902121b12",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--4ae4f953-fe58-4cc8-a327-33257e30a830",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:24.512Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Application Window Discovery",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used or give context to information collected by a keylogger.\n\nIn Mac, this can be done natively with a small AppleScript script.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -36,20 +36,8 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--a68f5868-8526-49d8-a64e-ba8d584679fe",
"id": "bundle--06600dff-13ba-40fa-b58e-55e6aa5337a4",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--4b74a1d4-b0e9-4ef1-93f1-14ecc6e2f5b5",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:35.334Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Standard Cryptographic Protocol",
"description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"description": "Adversaries use command and control over an encrypted channel using a known encryption protocol like HTTPS or SSL/TLS. The use of strong encryption makes it difficult for defenders to detect signatures within adversary command and control traffic.\n\nSome adversaries may use other encryption protocols and algorithms with symmetric keys, such as RC4, that rely on encryption keys encoded into malware configuration files and not public key cryptography. Such keys may be obtained through malware reverse engineering.\n\nDetection: SSL/TLS inspection is one way of detecting command and control traffic within some encrypted communication channels. (Citation: SANS Decrypting SSL) SSL/TLS inspection does come with certain risks that should be considered before implementing to avoid potential security issues such as incomplete certificate validation. (Citation: SEI SSL Inspection Risks)\n\nIf malware uses encryption with symmetric keys, it may be possible to obtain the algorithm and key from samples and use them to decode network traffic to detect malware communications signatures. (Citation: Fidelis DarkComet)\n\nIn general, analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Malware reverse engineering, Process use of network, Process monitoring, SSL/TLS inspection\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -57,21 +57,9 @@
],
"x_mitre_network_requirements": true,
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--de501e72-ae2e-4716-a108-56ddd7c6c310",
"id": "bundle--5daf0ac7-88e4-41aa-aac1-deb9b6cbc46d",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--4be89c7c-ace6-4876-9377-c8d54cef3d63",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:50.958Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Hypervisor",
"description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: System calls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.\n\nDetection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: System calls\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -55,18 +55,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025.json
+67
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--c715e4a5-6ead-45f9-a145-86fdc3403a0b",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--4bf5845d-a814-4490-bc5c-ccdee6043025",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "AppCert DLLs",
"description": "Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppCertDLLs value in the Registry key <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Session Manager</code> are loaded into every process that calls the ubiquitously used application programming interface (API) functions: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n*CreateProcess\n*CreateProcessAsUser\n*CreateProcessWithLoginW\n*CreateProcessWithTokenW\n*WinExec\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer.\n\nDetection: Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppCertDLLs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) \n\nTools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may overlook AppCert DLLs as an auto-starting location. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) (Citation: Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007)\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows Registry\n\nEffective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1182",
"external_id": "T1182"
},
{
"source_name": "Engame Process Injection July 2017",
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
},
{
"source_name": "Sysinternals AppCertDlls Oct 2007",
"description": "Microsoft. (2007, October 24). Windows Sysinternals - AppCertDlls. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
"url": "https://forum.sysinternals.com/appcertdlls%20topic12546.html"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Loaded DLLs",
"Process Monitoring",
"Windows Registry"
],
"x_mitre_effective_permissions": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--2b35150a-f412-4543-a3d6-f6c82f8a89f7",
"id": "bundle--8d923eb5-b128-4ffc-bbc0-4fb7d6c46815",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--4eeaf8a9-c86b-4954-a663-9555fb406466",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:34.139Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Scheduled Transfer",
"description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"description": "Data exfiltration may be performed only at certain times of day or at certain intervals. This could be done to blend traffic patterns with normal activity or availability.\n\nWhen scheduled exfiltration is used, other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol.\n\nDetection: Monitor process file access patterns and network behavior. Unrecognized processes or scripts that appear to be traversing file systems and sending network traffic may be suspicious. Network connections to the same destination that occur at the same time of day for multiple days are suspicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -34,21 +34,9 @@
],
"x_mitre_network_requirements": true,
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79.json
+4 -6
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--b2098185-3972-4f4a-9ef9-8fe53a0c898c",
"id": "bundle--9ca423b5-c575-4426-bbf7-848ad5f806c4",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--514ede4c-78b3-4d78-a38b-daddf6217a79",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:20.148Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Winlogon Helper DLL",
"description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in <code>HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify</code> that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 R2\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "Winlogon is a part of some Windows versions that performs actions at logon. In Windows systems prior to Windows Vista, a Registry key can be modified that causes Winlogon to load a DLL on startup. Adversaries may take advantage of this feature to load adversarial code at startup for persistence.\n\nDetection: Monitor for changes to registry entries in <code>HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Winlogon\\Notify</code> that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current Winlogon helper values. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) New DLLs written to System32 that do not correlate with known good software or patching may also be suspicious.\n\nLook for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -42,9 +42,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows XP",
"Windows Server 2003 R2"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--2bec9dbd-531e-4f71-b3b8-9e0823daca5c",
"id": "bundle--88e4e05c-a2c8-437c-90d9-0133731acd15",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--519630c5-f03f-4882-825c-3af924935817",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:22.096Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Binary Padding",
"description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection",
"description": "Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.\n\nDetection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. \n\nWhen executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -32,21 +32,9 @@
"Signature-based detection"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484.json
+22 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--f9d66bc8-9b37-48d4-abb0-aeb91d3ae5e7",
"id": "bundle--967d9283-9400-4ad9-83bf-a73a954621d0",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--51dea151-0898-4a45-967c-3ebee0420484",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:59.769Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Remote Desktop Protocol",
"description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Remote Desktop Users\n\nSystem Requirements: RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group.",
"description": "Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.\n\nAdversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)\n\nAdversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, <code>c:\\windows\\system32\\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]</code>, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)\n\nDetection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.\n\nAlso, set up process monitoring for <code>tscon.exe</code> usage and monitor service creation that uses <code>cmd.exe /k</code> or <code>cmd.exe /c</code> in its arguments to prevent RDP session hijacking.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Remote Desktop Users\n\nSystem Requirements: RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group.\n\nContributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -32,11 +32,29 @@
"source_name": "Alperovitch Malware",
"description": "Alperovitch, D. (2014, October 31). Malware-Free Intrusions. Retrieved November 4, 2014.",
"url": "http://blog.crowdstrike.com/adversary-tricks-crowdstrike-treats/"
},
{
"source_name": "RDP Hijacking Korznikov",
"description": "Korznikov, A. (2017, March 17). Passwordless RDP Session Hijacking Feature All Windows versions. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
"url": "http://www.korznikov.com/2017/03/0-day-or-feature-privilege-escalation.html"
},
{
"source_name": "RDP Hijacking Medium",
"description": "Beaumont, K. (2017, March 19). RDP hijacking\u200a\u2014\u200ahow to hijack RDS and RemoteApp sessions transparently to move through an organisation. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
"url": "https://medium.com/@networksecurity/rdp-hijacking-how-to-hijack-rds-and-remoteapp-sessions-transparently-to-move-through-an-da2a1e73a5f6"
},
{
"source_name": "Kali Redsnarf",
"description": "NCC Group PLC. (2016, November 1). Kali Redsnarf. Retrieved December 11, 2017.",
"url": "https://github.com/nccgroup/redsnarf"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"Netflow/Enclave netflow",
@@ -47,18 +65,7 @@
"Remote Desktop Users"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group."
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--bc0073d1-c754-4c60-a9db-1a268aa15d3a",
"id": "bundle--63c02c9f-ae17-471a-8f3c-e328892c3512",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--51ea26b1-ff1e-4faa-b1a0-1114cd298c87",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:25.159Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Exfiltration Over Other Network Medium",
"description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
"description": "Exfiltration could occur over a different network medium than the command and control channel. If the command and control network is a wired Internet connection, the exfiltration may occur, for example, over a WiFi connection, modem, cellular data connection, Bluetooth, or another radio frequency (RF) channel. Adversaries could choose to do this if they have sufficient access or proximity, and the connection might not be secured or defended as well as the primary Internet-connected channel because it is not routed through the same enterprise network.\n\nDetection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before. Processes that normally require user-driven events to access the network (for example, a mouse click or key press) but access the network without such may be malicious.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: User interface, Process monitoring\n\nRequires Network: Yes\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -36,21 +36,9 @@
],
"x_mitre_network_requirements": true,
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--78c5fa0d-a506-4549-8c49-de0d8b7feaba",
"id": "bundle--0f9ebf48-89a8-40e7-b860-b46f530976a6",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--52d40641-c480-4ad5-81a3-c80ccaddf82d",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:43.135Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Authentication Package",
"description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\</code> with the key value of <code>\"Authentication Packages\"=<target binary></code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"description": "Windows Authentication Package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multiple security protocols to the operating system. (Citation: MSDN Authentication Packages)\n\nAdversaries can use the autostart mechanism provided by LSA Authentication Packages for persistence by placing a reference to a binary in the Windows Registry location <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\</code> with the key value of <code>\"Authentication Packages\"=<target binary></code>. The binary will then be executed by the system when the authentication packages are loaded.\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the LSA Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -51,18 +51,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0.json
+83
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--d8525912-a01a-43bb-b370-36a94e9615ed",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--52f3d5a6-8a0f-4f82-977e-750abf90d0b0",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Extra Window Memory Injection",
"description": "Before creating a window, graphical Windows-based processes must prescribe to or register a windows class, which stipulate appearance and behavior (via windows procedures, which are functions that handle input/output of data). (Citation: Microsoft Window Classes) Registration of new windows classes can include a request for up to 40 bytes of extra window memory (EWM) to be appended to the allocated memory of each instance of that class. This EWM is intended to store data specific to that window and has specific application programming interface (API) functions to set and get its value. (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function)\n\nAlthough small, the EWM is large enough to store a 32-bit pointer and is often used to point to a windows procedure. Malware may possibly utilize this memory location in part of an attack chain that includes writing code to shared sections of the process\u2019s memory, placing a pointer to the code in EWM, then invoking execution by returning execution control to the address in the process\u2019s EWM.\n\nExecution granted through EWM injection may take place in the address space of a separate live process. Similar to Process Injection, this may allow access to both the target process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Writing payloads to shared sections also avoids the use of highly monitored API calls such as WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) More sophisticated malware samples may also potentially bypass protection mechanisms such as data execution prevention (DEP) by triggering a combination of windows procedures and other system functions that will rewrite the malicious payload inside an executable portion of the target process. (Citation: MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013) (Citation: WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013)\n\nDetection: Monitor for API calls related to enumerating and manipulating EWM such as GetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft GetWindowLong function) and SetWindowLong (Citation: Microsoft SetWindowLong function). Malware associated with this technique have also used SendNotifyMessage (Citation: Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function) to trigger the associated window procedure and eventual malicious injection. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Data Execution Prevention\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1181",
"external_id": "T1181"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Window Classes",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). About Window Classes. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633574.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft GetWindowLong function",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). GetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633584.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft SetWindowLong function",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SetWindowLong function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms633591.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Engame Process Injection July 2017",
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"source_name": "MalwareTech Power Loader Aug 2013",
"description": "MalwareTech. (2013, August 13). PowerLoader Injection \u2013 Something truly amazing. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.malwaretech.com/2013/08/powerloader-injection-something-truly.html"
},
{
"source_name": "WeLiveSecurity Gapz and Redyms Mar 2013",
"description": "Matrosov, A. (2013, March 19). Gapz and Redyms droppers based on Power Loader code. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.welivesecurity.com/2013/03/19/gapz-and-redyms-droppers-based-on-power-loader-code/"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft SendNotifyMessage function",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). SendNotifyMessage function. Retrieved December 16, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644953.aspx"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_defense_bypassed": [
"Anti-virus",
"Host intrusion prevention systems",
"Data Execution Prevention"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--ac2f2688-0850-4b16-805b-0c99bc1b8353",
"id": "bundle--b9a4858c-b492-4a68-b133-c3e64f28aef4",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--53bfc8bf-8f76-4cd7-8958-49a884ddb3ee",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Launchctl",
"description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\"</code>. Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No",
"description": "Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute \"arg\" \"arg\" \"arg\"</code>. Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. \n\nAdversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.\n\nDetection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -55,8 +55,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": false
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47.json
+63
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--33497483-3188-4126-9573-b62c47acebbe",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--544b0346-29ad-41e1-a808-501bb4193f47",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Man in the Browser",
"description": "Adversaries can take advantage of security vulnerabilities and inherent functionality in browser software to change content, modify behavior, and intercept information as part of various man in the browser techniques. (Citation: Wikipedia Man in the Browser)\n\nA specific example is when an adversary injects software into a browser that allows an them to inherit cookies, HTTP sessions, and SSL client certificates of a user and use the browser as a way to pivot into an authenticated intranet. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot)\n\nBrowser pivoting requires the SeDebugPrivilege and a high-integrity process to execute. Browser traffic is pivoted from the adversary's browser through the user's browser by setting up an HTTP proxy which will redirect any HTTP and HTTPS traffic. This does not alter the user's traffic in any way. The proxy connection is severed as soon as the browser is closed. Whichever browser process the proxy is injected into, the adversary assumes the security context of that process. Browsers typically create a new process for each tab that is opened and permissions and certificates are separated accordingly. With these permissions, an adversary could browse to any resource on an intranet that is accessible through the browser and which the browser has sufficient permissions, such as Sharepoint or webmail. Browser pivoting also eliminates the security provided by 2-factor authentication (Citation: cobaltstrike manual).\n\nDetection: This is a difficult technique to detect because adversary traffic would be masked by normal user traffic. No new processes are created and no additional software touches disk. Authentication logs can be used to audit logins to specific web applications, but determining malicious logins versus benign logins may be difficult if activity matches typical user behavior. Monitor for process injection against browser applications\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs, Packet capture, Process Monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Justin Warner, ICEBRG",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "collection"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1185",
"external_id": "T1185"
},
{
"source_name": "Wikipedia Man in the Browser",
"description": "Wikipedia. (2017, October 28). Man-in-the-browser. Retrieved January 10, 2018.",
"url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Man-in-the-browser"
},
{
"source_name": "Cobalt Strike Browser Pivot",
"description": "Mudge, R. (n.d.). Browser Pivoting. Retrieved January 10, 2018.",
"url": "https://www.cobaltstrike.com/help-browser-pivoting"
},
{
"source_name": "cobaltstrike manual",
"description": "Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.",
"url": "https://cobaltstrike.com/downloads/csmanual38.pdf"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Justin Warner, ICEBRG"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Authentication logs",
"Packet capture",
"Process Monitoring",
"API monitoring"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--1b93fc59-989c-44fa-b660-051bad38d141",
"id": "bundle--998c3b8a-c60b-4800-8b94-38a94907eef3",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--54a649ff-439a-41a4-9856-8d144a2551ba",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:29.858Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Remote Services",
"description": "An adversary may use valid credentials to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials",
"description": "An adversary may use Valid Accounts to log into a service specifically designed to accept remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user.\n\nDetection: Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Authentication logs\n\nSystem Requirements: Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -31,21 +31,9 @@
"Authentication logs"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_system_requirements": [
"Active remote service accepting connections and valid credentials"
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--92359df5-e8be-4427-9838-f24ed047c729",
"id": "bundle--370f7815-579c-48bb-9037-5674a0cfb640",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--56fca983-1cf1-4fd1-bda0-5e170a37ab59",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:17.915Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "File Deletion",
"description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X, Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows XP\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
"description": "Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.\n\nThere are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)\n\nDetection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Walker Johnson",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -48,20 +48,8 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X",
"Windows 10",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows XP"
"Windows",
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--79c2031d-2764-4988-8758-55b8252eed5d",
"id": "bundle--8d9f1e31-2675-4f7d-a1f3-7275d0c7af8c",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--56ff457d-5e39-492b-974c-dfd2b8603ffe",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Private Keys",
"description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)\n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or <code>C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\</code> on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, MacOS, OS X, Windows 10, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows XP\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
"description": "Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)\n\nAdversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or <code>C:\\Users\\(username)\\.ssh\\</code> on Windows.\n\nPrivate keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.\n\nAdversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)\n\nDetection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, Windows, macOS\n\nData Sources: File monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -53,20 +53,8 @@
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Linux",
"MacOS",
"OS X",
"Windows 10",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows XP"
"Windows",
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4.json
+6 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--943b09f3-6614-44f2-b248-f4270a909d11",
"id": "bundle--5a1e85ec-530b-43da-b220-310de47e3feb",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--57340c81-c025-4189-8fa0-fc7ede51bae4",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:23.587Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Modify Registry",
"description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman",
"description": "Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.\n\nAccess to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).\n\nThe Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.\n\nDetection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nDefense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Bartosz Jerzman, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Bartosz Jerzman"
"Bartosz Jerzman",
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -55,18 +56,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--facd11bb-6d8d-4ed9-a874-65e9b26219cd",
"id": "bundle--aa0b4747-f989-4c29-b578-1ac16ac657c6",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--5ad95aaa-49c1-4784-821d-2e83f47b079b",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "AppleScript",
"description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the <code>osalang</code> program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e \"script here\"</code>.\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
"description": "macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the <code>osalang</code> program.\nAppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. \n\nAdversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e \"script here\"</code>.\n\nDetection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: Yes",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -46,8 +46,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": true
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99.json
+77
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--a22387f3-262f-4dff-8c14-5015584b33cb",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--62166220-e498-410f-a90a-19d4339d4e99",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Image File Execution Options Injection",
"description": "Image File Execution Options (IFEO) enable a developer to attach a debugger to an application. When a process is created, any executable file present in an application\u2019s IFEO will be prepended to the application\u2019s name, effectively launching the new process under the debugger (e.g., \u201cC:\\dbg\\ntsd.exe -g notepad.exe\u201d). (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nIFEOs can be set directly via the Registry or in Global Flags via the Gflags tool. (Citation: Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017) IFEOs are represented as Debugger Values in the Registry under <code>HKLM\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options/<executable></code> and <code> HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Wow6432Node\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\<executable> </code> where <code><executable></code> is the binary on which the debugger is attached. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, this value can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious executable to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Installing IFEO mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation.\n\nMalware may also use IFEO for Defense Evasion by registering invalid debuggers that redirect and effectively disable various system and security applications. (Citation: FSecure Hupigon) (Citation: Symantec Ushedix June 2008)\n\nDetection: Monitor for common processes spawned under abnormal parents and/or with creation flags indicative of debugging such as <code>DEBUG_PROCESS</code> and <code>DEBUG_ONLY_THIS_PROCESS</code>. (Citation: Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010)\n\nMonitor the IFEOs Registry value for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process Monitoring, Windows Registry, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "defense-evasion"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1183",
"external_id": "T1183"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Dev Blog IFEO Mar 2010",
"description": "Shanbhag, M. (2010, March 24). Image File Execution Options (IFEO). Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
"url": "https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/mithuns/2010/03/24/image-file-execution-options-ifeo/"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft GFlags Mar 2017",
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, May 23). GFlags Overview. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
"url": "https://docs.microsoft.com/windows-hardware/drivers/debugger/gflags-overview"
},
{
"source_name": "Engame Process Injection July 2017",
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"source_name": "FSecure Hupigon",
"description": "FSecure. (n.d.). Backdoor - W32/Hupigon.EMV - Threat Description. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.f-secure.com/v-descs/backdoor%20w32%20hupigon%20emv.shtml"
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Ushedix June 2008",
"description": "Symantec. (2008, June 28). Trojan.Ushedix. Retrieved December 18, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/security%20response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062807-2501-99&tabid=2"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Process Monitoring",
"Windows Registry",
"Windows event logs"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5.json
+12 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--f916681a-cb23-489a-91d0-6650b901337e",
"id": "bundle--28887579-c813-4e7a-ad56-52a00e6d863f",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--62b8c999-dcc0-4755-bd69-09442d9359f5",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:06.045Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Rundll32",
"description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No",
"description": "The rundll32.exe program can be called to execute an arbitrary binary. Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of the rundll32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using rundll32.exe for normal operations.\n\nRundll32.exe can also be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Ricardo Dias",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -26,11 +26,19 @@
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1085",
"external_id": "T1085"
},
{
"source_name": "Trend Micro CPL",
"description": "Merces, F. (2014). CPL Malware Malicious Control Panel Items. Retrieved November 1, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.trendmicro.de/cloud-content/us/pdfs/security-intelligence/white-papers/wp-cpl-malware.pdf"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Ricardo Dias"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"File monitoring",
"Binary file metadata",
@@ -45,18 +53,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": false
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b.json
+7 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--a9dbe29d-4f26-465c-98a4-5f6f7f7940bd",
"id": "bundle--7c20f4c2-0f32-411e-9565-968d5517b341",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--62dfd1ca-52d5-483c-a84b-d6e80bf94b7b",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:34.928Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Modify Existing Service",
"description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nCommand-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.\n\nAdversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.\n\nDetection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) \n\nService information is stored in the Registry at <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services</code>.\n\nCommand-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.\n\nLook for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
"File monitoring",
@@ -43,18 +46,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--105292d0-c281-4704-a2d2-178180cc02c4",
"id": "bundle--469d2a2d-8817-4831-bcee-dcf55e7192c1",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--64196062-5210-42c3-9a02-563a0d1797ef",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:09.379Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Communication Through Removable Media",
"description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nRequires Network: No",
"description": "Adversaries can perform command and control between compromised hosts on potentially disconnected networks using removable media to transfer commands from system to system. Both systems would need to be compromised, with the likelihood that an Internet-connected system was compromised first and the second through lateral movement by Replication Through Removable Media. Commands and files would be relayed from the disconnected system to the Internet-connected system to which the adversary has direct access.\n\nDetection: Monitor file access on removable media. Detect processes that execute when removable media is mounted.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: File monitoring, Data loss prevention\n\nRequires Network: No",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -33,21 +33,9 @@
],
"x_mitre_network_requirements": false,
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5.json
+129
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--a8fbb8e2-8e74-415b-be61-29e707eb0d38",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--66f73398-8394-4711-85e5-34c8540b22a5",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Hooking",
"description": "Windows processes often leverage application programming interface (API) functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Windows API functions are typically stored in dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) as exported functions. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:\n* '''Hooks procedures''', which intercept and execute designated code in response to events such as messages, keystrokes, and mouse inputs. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)\n* '''Import address table (IAT) hooking''', which use modifications to a process\u2019s IAT, where pointers to imported API functions are stored. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n* '''Inline hooking''', which overwrites the first bytes in an API function to redirect code flow. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) (Citation: HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011) (Citation: MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015)\n\nSimilar to Process Injection, adversaries may use hooking to load and execute malicious code within the context of another process, masking the execution while also allowing access to the process's memory and possibly elevated privileges. Installing hooking mechanisms may also provide Persistence via continuous invocation when the functions are called through normal use.\n\nMalicious hooking mechanisms may also capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials for Credential Access. (Citation: Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017)\n\nHooking is commonly utilized by Rootkits to conceal files,\nprocesses, Registry keys, and other objects in order to hide malware and associated behaviors. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits)\n\nDetection: Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure. (Citation: Microsoft Hook Overview) (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools (Citation: Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012) (Citation: PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011) (Citation: Jay GetHooks Sept 2011) or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures. (Citation: Zairon Hooking Dec 2006) (Citation: EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017)\n\nRootkits detectors (Citation: GMER Rootkits) can also be used to monitor for various flavors of hooking activity.\n\nVerify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes (Citation: Microsoft Process Snapshot) to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions. (Citation: StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012) (Citation: Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014)\n\nAnalyze process behavior to determine if a process is performing actions it usually does not, such as opening network connections, reading files, or other suspicious actions that could relate to post-compromise behavior.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Binary file metadata, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "credential-access"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "privilege-escalation"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1179",
"external_id": "T1179"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Hook Overview",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Hooks Overview. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms644959.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Engame Process Injection July 2017",
"description": "Hosseini, A. (2017, July 18). Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques. Retrieved December 7, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process"
},
{
"source_name": "Adlice Software IAT Hooks Oct 2014",
"description": "Tigzy. (2014, October 15). Userland Rootkits: Part 1, IAT hooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.adlice.com/userland-rootkits-part-1-iat-hooks/"
},
{
"source_name": "MWRInfoSecurity Dynamic Hooking 2015",
"description": "Hillman, M. (2015, August 8). Dynamic Hooking Techniques: User Mode. Retrieved December 20, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.mwrinfosecurity.com/our-thinking/dynamic-hooking-techniques-user-mode/"
},
{
"source_name": "HighTech Bridge Inline Hooking Sept 2011",
"description": "Mariani, B. (2011, September 6). Inline Hooking in Windows. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/17802.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I Sept 2017",
"description": "Microsoft. (2017, September 15). TrojanSpy:Win32/Ursnif.gen!I. Retrieved December 18, 2017."
},
{
"source_name": "Symantec Windows Rootkits",
"description": "Symantec. (n.d.). Windows Rootkit Overview. Retrieved December 21, 2017.",
"url": "https://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/windows.rootkit.overview.pdf"
},
{
"source_name": "Volatility Detecting Hooks Sept 2012",
"description": "Volatility Labs. (2012, September 24). MoVP 3.1 Detecting Malware Hooks in the Windows GUI Subsystem. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://volatility-labs.blogspot.com/2012/09/movp-31-detecting-malware-hooks-in.html"
},
{
"source_name": "PreKageo Winhook Jul 2011",
"description": "Prekas, G. (2011, July 11). Winhook. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://github.com/prekageo/winhook"
},
{
"source_name": "Jay GetHooks Sept 2011",
"description": "Satiro, J. (2011, September 14). GetHooks. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://github.com/jay/gethooks"
},
{
"source_name": "Zairon Hooking Dec 2006",
"description": "Felici, M. (2006, December 6). Any application-defined hook procedure on my machine?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://zairon.wordpress.com/2006/12/06/any-application-defined-hook-procedure-on-my-machine/"
},
{
"source_name": "EyeofRa Detecting Hooking June 2017",
"description": "Eye of Ra. (2017, June 27). Windows Keylogger Part 2: Defense against user-land. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://eyeofrablog.wordpress.com/2017/06/27/windows-keylogger-part-2-defense-against-user-land/"
},
{
"source_name": "GMER Rootkits",
"description": "GMER. (n.d.). GMER. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "http://www.gmer.net/"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Process Snapshot",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Taking a Snapshot and Viewing Processes. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ms686701.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "StackExchange Hooks Jul 2012",
"description": "Stack Exchange - Security. (2012, July 31). What are the methods to find hooked functions and APIs?. Retrieved December 12, 2017.",
"url": "https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/17904/what-are-the-methods-to-find-hooked-functions-and-apis"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Binary file metadata",
"DLL monitoring",
"Loaded DLLs",
"Process Monitoring",
"Windows event logs"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
]
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--616f42d8-a74e-40b2-b320-2a998dcc1f06",
"id": "bundle--2bddca41-01aa-4829-a9e2-dc0e5f441836",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--6856ddd6-2df3-4379-8b87-284603c189c3",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:28.613Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "System Firmware",
"description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nDetection: System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar, McAfee",
"description": "The BIOS (Basic Input/Output System) and The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) or Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) are examples of system firmware that operate as the software interface between the operating system and hardware of a computer. (Citation: Wikipedia BIOS) (Citation: Wikipedia UEFI) (Citation: About UEFI)\n\nSystem firmware like BIOS and (U)EFI underly the functionality of a computer and may be modified by an adversary to perform or assist in malicious activity. Capabilities exist to overwrite the system firmware, which may give sophisticated adversaries a means to install malicious firmware updates as a means of persistence on a system that may be difficult to detect.\n\nDetection: System firmware manipulation may be detected. (Citation: MITRE Trustworthy Firmware Measurement) Dump and inspect BIOS images on vulnerable systems and compare against known good images. (Citation: MITRE Copernicus) Analyze differences to determine if malicious changes have occurred. Log attempts to read/write to BIOS and compare against known patching behavior.\n\nLikewise, EFI modules can be collected and compared against a known-clean list of EFI executable binaries to detect potentially malicious modules. The CHIPSEC framework can be used for analysis to determine if firmware modifications have been performed. (Citation: McAfee CHIPSEC Blog) (Citation: Github CHIPSEC) (Citation: Intel HackingTeam UEFI Rootkit)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, BIOS, EFI\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Ryan Becwar, McAfee",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -81,18 +81,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68.json
+6 -16
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--fb466180-0c57-4094-aa4f-b4e1cbde00e0",
"id": "bundle--c921e331-6933-4ed3-8e9e-96e774a5c0a7",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--68c96494-1a50-403e-8844-69a6af278c68",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:42.222Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Change Default File Association",
"description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access. (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak",
"description": "When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access. (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.\n\nSystem file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\[handler]\\shell\\[action]\\command</code>. For example:\n*<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\open\\command</code>\n*<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\print\\command</code>\n*<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\\txtfile\\shell\\printto\\command</code>\n\nThe values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to execute arbitrary commands.\n\nDetection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. \n\nUser file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Explorer\\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.\n\nAlso look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nContributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Stefan Kanthak"
"Stefan Kanthak",
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"Windows Registry",
@@ -51,18 +52,7 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--f95b2593-d239-46ed-a6fe-c77931458a68",
"id": "bundle--8f775244-8258-4a13-96c4-145acde1743a",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--68f7e3a1-f09f-4164-9a62-16b648a0dd5a",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:26.966Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Regsvr32",
"description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
"description": "Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. Regsvr32.exe can be used to execute arbitrary binaries. (Citation: Microsoft Regsvr32)\n\nAdversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code to avoid triggering security tools that may not monitor execution of, and modules loaded by, the regsvr32.exe process because of whitelists or false positives from Windows using regsvr32.exe for normal operations. Regsvr32.exe is also a Microsoft signed binary.\n\nRegsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)\n\nDetection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry\n\nDefense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Casey Smith",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -63,18 +63,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": false
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--049a745a-266a-487c-a9ac-7ef16e51b22c",
"id": "bundle--136beab6-479f-4979-80a2-f2745f905f06",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--6a3be63a-64c5-4678-a036-03ff8fc35300",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Re-opened Applications",
"description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist</code>. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist</code>. \n\nAn adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).\n\nDetection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -36,8 +36,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--4ce3fe26-b910-4b0b-af0b-8a04a68b0c18",
"id": "bundle--17946382-462d-4ee9-93b5-659f4663509b",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--6a5848a8-6201-4a2c-8a6a-ca5af8c6f3df",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:47.384Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Indicator Blocking",
"description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems",
"description": "An adversary may attempt to block indicators or events from leaving the host machine. In the case of network-based reporting of indicators, an adversary may block traffic associated with reporting to prevent central analysis. This may be accomplished by many means, such as stopping a local process or creating a host-based firewall rule to block traffic to a specific server.\n\nDetection: Detect lack of reported activity from a host sensor. Different methods of blocking may cause different disruptions in reporting. Systems may suddenly stop reporting all data or only certain kinds of data.\n\nDepending on the types of host information collected, an analyst may be able to detect the event that triggered a process to stop or connection to be blocked.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Sensor health and status, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -38,18 +38,7 @@
"Host intrusion prevention systems"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--828e2e25-388f-4583-a0ec-a1212e401ce0",
"id": "bundle--36c0f077-1654-4f71-89e4-4cfe1ee3ada5",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--6aabc5ec-eae6-422c-8311-38d45ee9838a",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:18.867Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Redundant Access",
"description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nUse of a Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Command and Control protocol, or adversary infrastructure require prior threat intelligence on tools, IP addresses, and/or domains the adversary may use, along with the ability to detect use at the network boundary. Prior knowledge of indicators of compromise may also help detect adversary tools at the endpoint if tools are available to scan for those indicators.\n\nIf an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation.\n\nFor alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Authentication logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"description": "Adversaries may use more than one remote access tool with varying command and control protocols as a hedge against detection. If one type of tool is detected and blocked or removed as a response but the organization did not gain a full understanding of the adversary's tools and access, then the adversary will be able to retain access to the network. Adversaries may also attempt to gain access to Valid Accounts to use External Remote Services such as external VPNs as a way to maintain access despite interruptions to remote access tools deployed within a target network. (Citation: Mandiant APT1)\n\nUse of a Web Shell is one such way to maintain access to a network through an externally accessible Web server.\n\nDetection: Existing methods of detecting remote access tools are helpful. Backup remote access tools or other access points may not have established command and control channels open during an intrusion, so the volume of data transferred may not be as high as the primary channel unless access is lost.\n\nDetection of tools based on beacon traffic, Command and Control protocol, or adversary infrastructure require prior threat intelligence on tools, IP addresses, and/or domains the adversary may use, along with the ability to detect use at the network boundary. Prior knowledge of indicators of compromise may also help detect adversary tools at the endpoint if tools are available to scan for those indicators.\n\nIf an intrusion is in progress and sufficient endpoint data or decoded command and control traffic is collected, then defenders will likely be able to detect additional tools dropped as the adversary is conducting the operation.\n\nFor alternative access using externally accessible VPNs or remote services, follow detection recommendations under Valid Accounts and External Remote Services to collect account use information.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Network protocol analysis, File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Authentication logs\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Network intrusion detection system\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -55,21 +55,9 @@
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--6c685125-95e1-427e-a265-50c0ed944bfc",
"id": "bundle--500b289c-da0f-49f3-a3d4-97b2720b9c8a",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--6c174520-beea-43d9-aac6-28fb77f3e446",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:13.447Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Security Support Provider",
"description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n (Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"description": "Windows Security Support Provider (SSP) DLLs are loaded into the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. Once loaded into the LSA, SSP DLLs have access to encrypted and plaintext passwords that are stored in Windows, such as any logged-on user's Domain password or smart card PINs. The SSP configuration is stored in two Registry keys: <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Security Packages</code> and <code>HKLM\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\OSConfig\\Security Packages</code>. An adversary may modify these Registry keys to add new SSPs, which will be loaded the next time the system boots, or when the AddSecurityPackage Windows API function is called.\n (Citation: Graeber 2014)\n\nDetection: Monitor the Registry for changes to the SSP Registry keys. Monitor the LSA process for DLL loads. Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2 may generate events when unsigned SSP DLLs try to load into the LSA by setting the Registry key <code>HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Image File Execution Options\\LSASS.exe</code> with AuditLevel = 8. (Citation: Graeber 2014) (Citation: Microsoft Configure LSA)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: DLL monitoring, Windows Registry, Loaded DLLs\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -46,18 +46,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352.json
+75
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--2b6db6a6-97ef-4b2f-a6d2-18e5c20591f3",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "attack-pattern",
"id": "attack-pattern--6e6845c2-347a-4a6f-a2d1-b74a18ebd352",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2018-01-16T16:13:52.465Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "LSASS Driver",
"description": "The Windows security subsystem is a set of components that manage and enforce the security policy for a computer or domain. The Local Security Authority (LSA) is the main component responsible for local security policy and user authentication. The LSA includes multiple dynamic link libraries (DLLs) associated with various other security functions, all of which run in the context of the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) lsass.exe process. (Citation: Microsoft Security Subsystem)\n\nAdversaries may target lsass.exe drivers to obtain execution and/or persistence. By either replacing or adding illegitimate drivers (e.g., DLL Side-Loading or DLL Search Order Hijacking), an adversary can achieve arbitrary code execution triggered by continuous LSA operations.\n\nDetection: With LSA Protection enabled, monitor the event logs (Events 3033 and 3063) for failed attempts to load LSA plug-ins and drivers. (Citation: Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014)\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Autoruns/Autorunsc utility (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) to examine loaded drivers associated with the LSA.\n\nUtilize the Sysinternals Process Monitor utility to monitor DLL load operations in lsass.exe. (Citation: Microsoft DLL Security)\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, DLL monitoring, File monitoring, Kernel drivers, Loaded DLLs, Process Monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM\n\nRemote Support: No\n\nContributors: Vincent Le Toux",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "execution"
},
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
"phase_name": "persistence"
}
],
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1177",
"external_id": "T1177"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft Security Subsystem",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Security Subsystem Architecture. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/cc961760.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft LSA Protection Mar 2014",
"description": "Microsoft. (2014, March 12). Configuring Additional LSA Protection. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/library/dn408187.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "Microsoft DLL Security",
"description": "Microsoft. (n.d.). Dynamic-Link Library Security. Retrieved November 27, 2017.",
"url": "https://msdn.microsoft.com/library/windows/desktop/ff919712.aspx"
},
{
"source_name": "TechNet Autoruns",
"description": "Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.",
"url": "https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/bb963902"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Vincent Le Toux"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"DLL monitoring",
"File monitoring",
"Kernel drivers",
"Loaded DLLs",
"Process Monitoring"
],
"x_mitre_permissions_required": [
"Administrator",
"SYSTEM"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows"
],
"x_mitre_remote_support": false
}
]
}
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--5d8296ee-4756-46d4-89e8-506943f0815a",
"id": "bundle--069ef95b-a89a-4b3c-b258-1181a8c9a227",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--6faf650d-bf31-4eb4-802d-1000cf38efaf",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:37.917Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Video Capture",
"description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, potentially in specified intervals, in lieu of video files.\n\nMalware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture video or images. Video or image files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later. This technique differs from Screen Capture due to use of specific devices or applications for video recording rather than capturing the victim's screen.\n\nDetection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.\n\nBehavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the video camera, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain video or camera image data.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, API monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -36,18 +36,7 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e.json
+4 -5
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--b4ef9d97-460b-4867-8156-d36d449685c5",
"id": "bundle--9daba75c-c63b-4102-960c-596c6dd3758f",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--6fb6408c-0db3-41d9-a3a1-a32e5f16454e",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-12-14T16:46:06.044Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Gatekeeper Bypass",
"description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won\u2019t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don\u2019t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>xattr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</code> (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X).\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS\u2019s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the url where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper).\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: MacOS, OS X\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"description": "In macOS and OS X, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet, there is a special attribute set on the file called <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution time and provides a prompt to the user to allow or deny execution. \n\nApps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won\u2019t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don\u2019t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>xattr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</code>. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)\n \nIn typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS\u2019s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)\n\nDetection: Monitoring for the removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.\n\nPlatforms: macOS\n\nDefense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus\n\nPermissions Required: User, Administrator",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -56,8 +56,7 @@
"Administrator"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88.json
+4 -15
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--1c75f451-3287-4cce-ab52-735662d65d78",
"id": "bundle--10a468df-0398-42b5-bff7-72683d7877b8",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--6ff403bc-93e3-48be-8687-e102fdba8c88",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:43.472Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Software Packing",
"description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Windows 10\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, heuristic detection, Signature-based detection",
"description": "Software packing is a method of compressing or encrypting an executable. Packing an executable changes the file signature in an attempt to avoid signature-based detection. Most decompression techniques decompress the executable code in memory.\n\nUtilities used to perform software packing are called packers. Example packers are MPRESS and UPX. A more comprehensive list of known packers is available, (Citation: Wikipedia Exe Compression) but adversaries may create their own packing techniques that do not leave the same artifacts as well-known packers to evade defenses.\n\nDetection: Use file scanning to look for known software packers or artifacts of packing techniques. Packing is not a definitive indicator of malicious activity, because legitimate software may use packing techniques to reduce binary size or to protect proprietary code.\n\nPlatforms: Windows\n\nData Sources: Binary file metadata\n\nDefense Bypassed: Anti-virus, heuristic detection, Signature-based detection",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -41,18 +41,7 @@
"Signature-based detection"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Windows 10"
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0.json
+5 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--90aaa35b-8e41-43f8-b4c8-c9864ca36b2b",
"id": "bundle--99bd8b5b-1417-4425-905a-c25e8a2b3ca8",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--707399d6-ab3e-4963-9315-d9d3818cd6a0",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:30:27.342Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "System Network Configuration Discovery",
"description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -35,21 +35,9 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]
enterprise-attack/attack-pattern/attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08.json
+8 -17
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--58b50943-c064-495e-94ba-3632631a3cee",
"id": "bundle--6df009af-c99a-4515-b8d6-1fd3c0dd0ff6",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
"id": "attack-pattern--72b74d71-8169-42aa-92e0-e7b04b9f5a08",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"created": "2017-05-31T21:31:06.988Z",
"modified": "2017-12-14T16:55:59.600Z",
"modified": "2018-01-17T12:56:55.080Z",
"name": "Account Discovery",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are <code>net user</code>, <code>net group <groupname></code>, and <code>net localgroup <groupname></code> using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the <code>/etc/master.passwd</code> file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Windows Server 2003, Windows Server 2008, Windows Server 2012, Windows XP, Windows 7, Windows 8, Windows Server 2003 R2, Windows Server 2008 R2, Windows Server 2012 R2, Windows Vista, Windows 8.1, Linux, Windows 10, MacOS, OS X\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User",
"description": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. \n\n===Windows===\n\nExample commands that can acquire this information are <code>net user</code>, <code>net group <groupname></code>, and <code>net localgroup <groupname></code> using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.\n\n===Mac===\n\nOn Mac, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\n===Linux===\n\nOn Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the <code>/etc/master.passwd</code> file.\n\nAlso, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.\n\nDetection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.\n\nMonitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.\n\nPlatforms: Linux, macOS, Windows\n\nData Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring\n\nPermissions Required: User\n\nContributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire",
"kill_chain_phases": [
{
"kill_chain_name": "mitre-attack",
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"x_mitre_contributors": [
"Travis Smith, Tripwire"
],
"x_mitre_data_sources": [
"API monitoring",
"Process command-line parameters",
@@ -36,21 +39,9 @@
"User"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"Windows Server 2003",
"Windows Server 2008",
"Windows Server 2012",
"Windows XP",
"Windows 7",
"Windows 8",
"Windows Server 2003 R2",
"Windows Server 2008 R2",
"Windows Server 2012 R2",
"Windows Vista",
"Windows 8.1",
"Linux",
"Windows 10",
"MacOS",
"OS X"
"macOS",
"Windows"
]
}
]

Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More