Ruben Groenewoud
80 lines
3.2 KiB
TOML
80 lines
3.2 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2023/07/05"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/08/10"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This detection rule detects the creation of a shell through a chain consisting of the execution of a suspicious binary
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(located in a commonly abused location or executed manually) followed by a network event and ending with a shell being
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spawned. Stageless reverse tcp shells display this behaviour. Attackers may spawn reverse shells to establish
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persistence onto a target system.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Potential Reverse Shell via Suspicious Binary"
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references = [
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"https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Reverse%20Shell%20Cheatsheet.md"
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "fa3a59dc-33c3-43bf-80a9-e8437a922c7f"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Execution"]
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan=1s
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[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
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process.executable : (
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"./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/var/www/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/etc/init.d/*", "/etc/rc*.d/*",
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"/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/usr/lib/update-notifier/*",
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"/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*", "/root/*", "/etc/rc.local"
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) and
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process.parent.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and not
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process.name : ("curl", "wget", "ping", "apt", "dpkg", "yum", "rpm", "dnf", "dockerd") ]
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[ network where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("connection_attempted", "connection_accepted") and
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process.executable : (
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"./*", "/tmp/*", "/var/tmp/*", "/var/www/*", "/dev/shm/*", "/etc/init.d/*", "/etc/rc*.d/*",
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"/etc/crontab", "/etc/cron.*", "/etc/update-motd.d/*", "/usr/lib/update-notifier/*",
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"/boot/*", "/srv/*", "/run/*", "/root/*", "/etc/rc.local"
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) and destination.ip != null and destination.ip != "127.0.0.1" and destination.ip != "::1" ]
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[ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "exec" and event.type == "start" and
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process.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") and
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process.parent.name : ("bash", "dash", "sh", "tcsh", "csh", "zsh", "ksh", "fish") ]
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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name = "Execution"
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id = "TA0002"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.004"
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name = "Unix Shell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/004/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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name = "Command and Control"
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id = "TA0011"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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name = "Application Layer Protocol"
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id = "T1071"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1071/" |