Justin Ibarra
46d5e37b76
* min_stack all rules to 8.3 * bump date Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
49 lines
1.7 KiB
TOML
49 lines
1.7 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2022/07/11"
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2022/08/24"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Detects the use of the insmod binary to load a Linux kernel object file. Threat actors can use this binary, given they have root privileges, to load a rootkit on a system providing them with complete control and the ability to hide from security products. Manually loading a kernel module in this manner should not be at all common and can indicate suspcious or malicious behavior.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Kernel module load via insmod"
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references = [
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"https://decoded.avast.io/davidalvarez/linux-threat-hunting-syslogk-a-kernel-rootkit-found-under-development-in-the-wild/"
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "2339f03c-f53f-40fa-834b-40c5983fc41f"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Persistence", "Rootkit"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type == "start" and process.executable : "/usr/sbin/insmod" and process.args : "*.ko"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1547"
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name = "Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1547.006"
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name = "Kernel Modules and Extensions"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1547/006/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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