* [Rule Tuning][New Rule][Deprecation] AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Activity Rules
1. Rule Tuning - to prevent duplicate alerts for AWS EC2 EBS Snapshot Shared of Made Public, the execution interval has been adjusted from 5m interval with 4m lookback to 5m interval with 1m lookback.
2. New Rule - to capture when access is removed from an EBS Snapshot. While this may be intentional behavior it could indicate malicious attempts to inhibit system recovery efforts post-compromise, or to maintain exclusive access to critical backups by removing permissions for all users except their own controlled account.
3. Deprecate - AWS EC2 Snapshot Activity is too broad a rule and the behavior of the other 2 rules resulting in duplicate alerts and non-specific context for which permission change type is happening (`add` vs `remove`).
* adding updated_date to new rule
* adding Deprecated to IG title
* adding source.address to keep fields
* tuning Microsoft Entra ID Protection Anonymized IP Risk Detection
* adjusted tags and mappings
* added max signals
* adjusted file name
* adding max signals note
* adjusted mitre mapping
* [Tuning] AWS Access Token Used from Multiple Addresses
Rule tuning for AWS STS Temporary IAM Session Token Used from Multiple Addresses
* update min stack
* add access key identification to IG
add access key identification to IG
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Co-authored-by: shashank-elastic <91139415+shashank-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>
* new rule Microsoft 365 Suspicious Inbox Rule to Delete or Move Emails
* updating uuid
* adjusted query logic per KQL parser
* adjusted metadata for integration
* rule tuning 'Potential Microsoft 365 Brute Force via Entra ID Sign-Ins'
* updated lookback windows, date truncation times
* updated investigation guide
* [New] BadSuccessor dMSA Abuse Detections
https://www.akamai.com/blog/security-research/abusing-dmsa-for-privilege-escalation-in-active-directory
using new term rule type with events 5136/5137 by winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName to detect unusual accounts performing dMSA changes (creation of a new dMSA account or the modification of the `msDS-ManagedAccountPrecededByLink` attribute to take over a target account)
* Update privilege_escalation_dmsa_creation_by_unusual_user.toml
* new rule 'Suspicious Email Access by First-Party Application via Microsoft Graph'
* updated patch version
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Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
* Add check-version-lock dev command
* Bump the version
* Add Check Double Bumps to lock-versions workflow
* Replace return with ctx aware exit
* Bump Version
* Update Double Bump Modulo calculation
* Update if formatting
* Undo formatting typo
* Add logic to process the local file
* Update for descriptiveness
* Allow double bump branch for testing
* Pass github token
* Re-restrict to main
* Patch version bump
* Add comment if no double bumps found
* Bump Version
* Add exceptions for non-interactive signin failures.
Include exceptions for error codes, restricted to `NonInteractiveUserSignInLogs` and token refreshes:
- 70043 : Refresh token expired or no longer valid due to conditional access frequency checks
- 70044 : Session expired or no longer valid due to conditional access frequency checks
- 50057 : User account is disabled
* Update rules/integrations/azure/credential_access_entra_signin_brute_force_microsoft_365.toml
* Update metadata for `updated_date`
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Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: shashank-elastic <91139415+shashank-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>
Isai