* [Tuning] Linux DR Tuning - Part 4
* Update defense_evasion_file_mod_writable_dir.toml
* Update defense_evasion_hidden_file_dir_tmp.toml
(cherry picked from commit 089e6671aa)
* [Tuning] Linux DR Tuning - Part 1
* Update command_and_control_linux_tunneling_and_port_forwarding.toml
* Update command_and_control_cat_network_activity.toml
(cherry picked from commit 1dc7fd6a42)
* [Tuning] Linux DR Tuning - Part 2
* Update defense_evasion_binary_copied_to_suspicious_directory.toml
* Update defense_evasion_base16_or_base32_encoding_or_decoding_activity.toml
(cherry picked from commit 0e48747aa6)
* [New Rule] Executable Masquerading as Kernel Proc
* Bumped dates
* Added endgame support
* Added auditd_manager support
* Removed auditd_manager support for now
(cherry picked from commit 90d64f0714)
* [Rule Tuning] Host Files System Changes via Windows Subsystem for Linux
* Update defense_evasion_wsl_filesystem.toml
(cherry picked from commit e0bdb59deb)
* [New Rules] UEBA GItHub BBRs and Rules
A new set of BBRs and rules that will be used to trigger new UEBA GitHub threshold Rules.
* Update rules/integrations/github/impact_github_member_removed_from_organization.toml
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
* edited BBR rules
-removed newly added member rule
* updated integration manifests and schemas
* Updated min_stack for some rules based on newest GitHub integration schema manifest
* testing min_stack bump to 8.8 for new fields
* removing offending rule to troubleshoot seperately
* added UEBA tags and created UEBA threshold rule
* updated non-ecs-schema to add signal.rule.tags
* updated non-ecs-schema with kibana.alert.workflow_status
* updated rule.threat.tactic
* added user.name to non-ecs-schema
* added quotes to kibana.alert.workflow_status value
* removed trailing space from rule name
* update tags and optimize query for UEBA threshold rule
* removed integration field from Higher-Order rule
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
* adjusted new_terms order and rule types based on review feedback
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
* remove user.name from detection_rules/etc/non-ecs-schema.json
* fix json formatting
---------
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <16747370+brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 442435830f)
* [Rule Tuning] Linux DR Tuning - Part 2
* [Rule Tuning] Linux DR Tuning - Part 2
* fix
* Update execution_shell_suspicious_parent_child_revshell_linux.toml
(cherry picked from commit 36226e5428)
* [New Rule] File System Debugger ‘debugfs’ Launched Inside a Privileged Container
This rule detects the use of the built-in Linux DebugFS utility from inside a privileged container. DebugFS is a special
file system debugging utility which supports reading and writing directly from a hard drive device. When launched inside
a privileged container, a container deployed with all the capabilities of the host machine, an attacker can access
sensitive host level files which could be used for further privilege escalation and container escapes to the host
machine.
* added references
* Apply suggestions from code review
* Update rules/integrations/cloud_defend/privilege_escalation_debugfs_launched_inside_a_privileged_container.toml
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
* Apply suggestions from code review
---------
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 10b241dcc5)
* [New Rule] Mount Launched Inside a Privileged Container
This rule detects the use of the mount utility from inside a privileged container. The mount command is used to make a
device or file system accessible to the system, and then to connect its root directory to a specified mount point on the
local file system. When launched inside a privileged container--a container deployed with all the capabilities of the
host machine-- an attacker can access sensitive host level files which could be used for further privilege escalation
and container escapes to the host machine. Any usage of mount inside a running privileged container should be further
investigated.
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit db5e1e5cf2)
* [New Rule] Potential Container Escape via Modified notify_on_release File
This rule detects modification of the cgroup notify_on_release file from inside a container. When the notify_on_release
flag is enabled (1) in a cgroup, then whenever the last task in the cgroup exits or attaches to another cgroup, the
command specified in the release_agent file is run and invoked from the host. A privileged container with SYS_ADMIN
capabilities, enables a threat actor to mount a cgroup directory and modify the notify_on_release flag in order to take
advantage of this feature, which could be used for further privilege escalation and container escapes to the host
machine.
* Apply suggestions from code review
* suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8e1dad0aeb)
* [New Rule] Potential Container Escape via Modified release_agent File
This rule detects modification of the CGroup release_agent file from inside a privileged container. The release_agent is a script that is executed at the termination of any process on that CGroup and is invoked from the host. A privileged container with SYS_ADMIN capabilities, enables a threat actor to mount a CGroup directory and modify the release_agent which could be used for further privilege escalation and container escapes to the host machine.
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0a37df713b)
Ruben Groenewoud