* prepping for 8.4 branch
* adjusted schemas init file
* adjusted target matrix to only backport to 7.16, updated api schemas
* adjusted the lock-versions workflow to account for 7.16 and up support only
* Add test for version lock to schema map correlation
* decouple from static 7.13 references
* keep patch version for lock
* Update detection_rules/etc/packages.yml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* Build out the dataclasses for a base entry and version lock explicitly
* Ensure previous field does not have a nested previous
* Test validation on version lock for previous fields.
* [New rule] Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update
Identifies remote update to a computer account DnsHostName attribute, if the new value is set a valid domain controller DNS hostname and the subject computer name is not a domain controller then it's high likely a preparation step to exploit CVE-2022-26923 in an attempt to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to domain admin privileges :
* added MS ref url
* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_suspicious_dnshostname_update.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_suspicious_dnshostname_update.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
* new rule to check for executables launched from shared memory directory
* added references and false positive instances
* Update rules/linux/execution_shared_memory_executable.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_shared_memory_executable.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_shared_memory_executable.toml
* adjusted process to account for var run and lock directories
* TOML lint and query formatting
* TOML lint and query formatting
* Update rules/linux/execution_process_started_in_shared_memory_directory.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_process_started_in_shared_memory_directory.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_process_started_in_shared_memory_directory.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_process_started_in_shared_memory_directory.toml
* added BPFDoor tag to be threat specific
* TOML linting and adjusted risk because of root requirement
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
* [New Rule] Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP
Detect attempt to elevate privileges via coercing a privileged service to connect to a local rogue HTTP endpoint, leading to NTLM relay, example of logs while testing https://github.com/med0x2e/NTLMRelay2Self (step 5):
* Update credential_access_relay_ntlm_auth_via_http_spoolss.toml
* Update credential_access_relay_ntlm_auth_via_http_spoolss.toml
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
* Move etc directory under detection_rules
* Prepend original `etc` path with `detection_rules`
* Update docstrings in util and CODEOWNERS
* Add resiliency to tags to account for the old directory structure
* Bug fix: remove unused param caused by commit 6ed1a39efe
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
* adjusted query to exclude OneDrive process name and MS Teams DLL reference in registry data strings
* adjusted formatting for altered query
* removed unecessary string used for reference
* removed unecessary parenthesis from new filters in query
* Update rules/windows/persistence_suspicious_com_hijack_registry.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
* Update rules/windows/persistence_suspicious_com_hijack_registry.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
* added FileSyncConfig.exe for OneDrive, added regsvr32 to Teams DLL filter
* added investigation notes
* removed comment from original rule creation
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Jonhnathan