044b5a2c61
[Rule Tuning] Modification of WDigest Security Provider ( #2201 )
...
excluding svchost.exe running as system (main src of FPs for this use case).
(cherry picked from commit 6d61a68c29
2022-07-29 17:46:25 +00:00
61d671a1a6
[Rule Tuning] Missing MITRE ATT&CK Mappings ( #2073 )
...
* initial commit with eggshell mitre mapping added
* adding updated rules
* [Rule Tuning] MITRE for GCP rules
I've added Mitre references for the 4 GCP rules missing. Changed 3 of the rules from "Impact" to "Defense Evasion" based on the technique used and it's matched tactic.
* [Rule Tuning] Endgame Rule name updates for Mitre
Updated Endgame rule names for those with Mitre tactics to match the tactics.
* Update rules/integrations/aws/persistence_redshift_instance_creation.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_rds_snapshot_restored.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* adding 10 updated rules for google_workspace, ml and o365
* adding 22 rule updates for mitre att&ck mappings
* adding 24 rule updates related mainly to ML rules
* adding 3 rules related to detection via ML
* adding adjustments
* adding adjustments with solutions to recent pytest errors
* removed tabs from tags
* adjusted mappings and added techniques
* adjusted endgame rule mappings per review
* adjusted names to match different tactics
* added execution and defense evasion tag
* adjustments to address errors from merging with main
* added newlines to rules missing them at the end of the file
Co-authored-by: imays11 <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
2022-07-22 15:42:38 -04:00
141b00ec41
[Rule Tuning] Missing MITRE ATT&CK Mappings ( #2073 )
...
* initial commit with eggshell mitre mapping added
* adding updated rules
* [Rule Tuning] MITRE for GCP rules
I've added Mitre references for the 4 GCP rules missing. Changed 3 of the rules from "Impact" to "Defense Evasion" based on the technique used and it's matched tactic.
* [Rule Tuning] Endgame Rule name updates for Mitre
Updated Endgame rule names for those with Mitre tactics to match the tactics.
* Update rules/integrations/aws/persistence_redshift_instance_creation.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_rds_snapshot_restored.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* adding 10 updated rules for google_workspace, ml and o365
* adding 22 rule updates for mitre att&ck mappings
* adding 24 rule updates related mainly to ML rules
* adding 3 rules related to detection via ML
* adding adjustments
* adding adjustments with solutions to recent pytest errors
* removed tabs from tags
* adjusted mappings and added techniques
* adjusted endgame rule mappings per review
* adjusted names to match different tactics
* added execution and defense evasion tag
* adjustments to address errors from merging with main
* added newlines to rules missing them at the end of the file
Co-authored-by: imays11 <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
Removed changes from:
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_policy_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_metadata_process.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_metadata_user.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_process_all_hosts.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_sudo_activity.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_anomalous_user_name.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_information_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_network_configuration_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_network_connection_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_process_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_linux_system_user_discovery.toml
- rules/ml/ml_rare_process_by_host_linux.toml
- rules/ml/ml_rare_process_by_host_windows.toml
- rules/ml/ml_suspicious_login_activity.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_metadata_process.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_metadata_user.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_path_activity.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_process_all_hosts.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_process_creation.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_script.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_service.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_anomalous_user_name.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_rare_user_runas_event.toml
- rules/ml/ml_windows_rare_user_type10_remote_login.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_lolbas_wuauclt.toml
(selectively cherry picked from commit e8c39d19a7
2022-07-22 18:31:42 +00:00
25493a90c9
[New Rule] Suspicious HTML File Creation ( #2068 )
...
* [New Rule] Suspicious HTML File Creation
* Update initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml
* Update non-ecs-schema.json
* Update initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml
* Update rules/windows/initial_access_evasion_suspicious_htm_file_creation.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
(cherry picked from commit d312f49117
2022-07-22 14:22:56 +00:00
edef90b3ec
[Security Content] Add Investigation Guides to Cloud Rules - AWS ( #2104 )
...
* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides to Cloud Rules - AWS
* Apply suggestion from review
* Update rules/integrations/aws/exfiltration_ec2_snapshot_change_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/integrations/aws/impact_cloudwatch_log_stream_deletion.toml
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
* Apply suggestions from review
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
* .
* Applies suggestions from the https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/pull/2124 PR
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit d854b943e5
2022-07-20 15:30:04 +00:00
900a8cdbe9
[New Rule] Suspicious LSASS Access via MalSecLogon ( #2063 )
...
* [New Rule]
Identifies suspicious access to LSASS handle from a call trace pointing to seclogon.dll and with a suspicious access rights value, this may indicate an attempt to leak an Lsass handle via abusing the Secondary Logon service in preparation for credential access.
https://splintercod3.blogspot.com/p/the-hidden-side-of-seclogon-part-3.html
Data:
```
{
"_index": ".ds-logs-windows.sysmon_operational-default-2022.06.16-000005",
"_id": "QxU4rIEBTJjT82fLq8Cf",
"_score": 1,
"_source": {
"agent": {
"name": "02694w-win10",
"id": "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e",
"type": "filebeat",
"ephemeral_id": "137d194a-e542-4cd6-a1e3-f4ca9f5ad6b8",
"version": "8.0.0"
},
"process": {
"name": "svchost.exe",
"pid": 456,
"thread": {
"id": 15264
},
"entity_id": "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}",
"executable": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe"
},
"winlog": {
"computer_name": "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
"process": {
"pid": 2680,
"thread": {
"id": 3988
}
},
"channel": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational",
"event_data": {
"GrantedAccess": "0x14c0",
"TargetProcessId": "680",
"SourceUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"TargetImage": "C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe",
"CallTrace": "C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51",
"TargetProcessGUID": "{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}",
"TargetUser": "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
},
"opcode": "Info",
"version": 3,
"record_id": "1825496",
"task": "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)",
"event_id": "10",
"provider_guid": "{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}",
"api": "wineventlog",
"provider_name": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"user": {
"identifier": "S-1-5-18",
"domain": "NT AUTHORITY",
"name": "SYSTEM",
"type": "User"
}
},
"log": {
"level": "information"
},
"elastic_agent": {
"id": "85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e",
"version": "8.0.0",
"snapshot": false
},
"message": "Process accessed:\nRuleName: -\nUtcTime: 2022-06-28 21:29:49.829\nSourceProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}\nSourceProcessId: 456\nSourceThreadId: 15264\nSourceImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe\nTargetProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}\nTargetProcessId: 680\nTargetImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe\nGrantedAccess: 0x14C0\nCallTrace: C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51\nSourceUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\nTargetUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM",
"input": {
"type": "winlog"
},
"@timestamp": "2022-06-28T21:29:49.829Z",
"ecs": {
"version": "1.12.0"
},
"data_stream": {
"namespace": "default",
"type": "logs",
"dataset": "windows.sysmon_operational"
},
"host": {
"hostname": "02694w-win10",
"os": {
"build": "18363.815",
"kernel": "10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"name": "Windows 10 Enterprise",
"type": "windows",
"family": "windows",
"version": "10.0",
"platform": "windows"
},
"ip": [
"fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
"172.16.66.25"
],
"name": "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
"id": "6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160",
"mac": [
"00:50:56:03:c6:93"
],
"architecture": "x86_64"
},
"event": {
"agent_id_status": "verified",
"ingested": "2022-06-28T21:30:04Z",
"code": "10",
"provider": "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon",
"created": "2022-06-28T21:29:51.107Z",
"kind": "event",
"action": "Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)",
"category": [
"process"
],
"type": [
"access"
],
"dataset": "windows.sysmon_operational"
},
"user": {
"id": "S-1-5-18"
}
},
"fields": {
"elastic_agent.version": [
"8.0.0"
],
"event.category": [
"process"
],
"host.os.name.text": [
"Windows 10 Enterprise"
],
"winlog.provider_guid": [
"{5770385f-c22a-43e0-bf4c-06f5698ffbd9}"
],
"winlog.provider_name": [
"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
],
"host.hostname": [
"02694w-win10"
],
"winlog.computer_name": [
"02694w-win10.threebeesco.com"
],
"process.pid": [
456
],
"host.mac": [
"00:50:56:03:c6:93"
],
"winlog.process.pid": [
2680
],
"host.os.version": [
"10.0"
],
"winlog.record_id": [
"1825496"
],
"winlog.event_data.TargetUser": [
"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
],
"host.os.name": [
"Windows 10 Enterprise"
],
"log.level": [
"information"
],
"agent.name": [
"02694w-win10"
],
"host.name": [
"02694w-win10.threebeesco.com"
],
"event.agent_id_status": [
"verified"
],
"event.kind": [
"event"
],
"winlog.version": [
3
],
"host.os.type": [
"windows"
],
"user.id": [
"S-1-5-18"
],
"input.type": [
"winlog"
],
"data_stream.type": [
"logs"
],
"host.architecture": [
"x86_64"
],
"process.name": [
"svchost.exe"
],
"event.provider": [
"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
],
"event.code": [
"10"
],
"agent.id": [
"85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e"
],
"ecs.version": [
"1.12.0"
],
"event.created": [
"2022-06-28T21:29:51.107Z"
],
"winlog.event_data.CallTrace": [
"C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51"
],
"agent.version": [
"8.0.0"
],
"host.os.family": [
"windows"
],
"process.thread.id": [
15264
],
"winlog.event_data.TargetProcessGUID": [
"{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}"
],
"winlog.process.thread.id": [
3988
],
"winlog.event_data.TargetImage": [
"C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe"
],
"winlog.event_data.TargetProcessId": [
"680"
],
"process.entity_id": [
"{6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}"
],
"host.os.build": [
"18363.815"
],
"winlog.user.type": [
"User"
],
"host.ip": [
"fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
"172.16.66.25"
],
"agent.type": [
"filebeat"
],
"event.module": [
"windows"
],
"host.os.kernel": [
"10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)"
],
"winlog.api": [
"wineventlog"
],
"elastic_agent.snapshot": [
false
],
"host.id": [
"6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160"
],
"process.executable": [
"C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe"
],
"winlog.user.identifier": [
"S-1-5-18"
],
"winlog.event_data.SourceUser": [
"NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
],
"winlog.task": [
"Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)"
],
"winlog.user.domain": [
"NT AUTHORITY"
],
"elastic_agent.id": [
"85e87161-ea22-4847-a978-fb4ed45ebf0e"
],
"data_stream.namespace": [
"default"
],
"winlog.event_data.GrantedAccess": [
"0x14c0"
],
"message": [
"Process accessed:\nRuleName: -\nUtcTime: 2022-06-28 21:29:49.829\nSourceProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-1300-00000000d300}\nSourceProcessId: 456\nSourceThreadId: 15264\nSourceImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\svchost.exe\nTargetProcessGUID: {6a3c3ef2-3646-62ab-0c00-00000000d300}\nTargetProcessId: 680\nTargetImage: C:\\WINDOWS\\system32\\lsass.exe\nGrantedAccess: 0x14C0\nCallTrace: C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+9c534|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNELBASE.dll+2726e|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+128f|c:\\windows\\system32\\seclogon.dll+10a0|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+76953|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+da036|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+37a4c|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+548c8|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c921|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+2c1db|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+1a86f|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19d1a|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+19301|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+18d6e|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\RPCRT4.dll+169a5|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+333ed|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+34142|C:\\WINDOWS\\System32\\KERNEL32.DLL+17bd4|C:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll+6ce51\nSourceUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM\nTargetUser: NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM"
],
"winlog.user.name": [
"SYSTEM"
],
"winlog.event_id": [
"10"
],
"event.ingested": [
"2022-06-28T21:30:04.000Z"
],
"event.action": [
"Process accessed (rule: ProcessAccess)"
],
"@timestamp": [
"2022-06-28T21:29:49.829Z"
],
"winlog.channel": [
"Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational"
],
"host.os.platform": [
"windows"
],
"data_stream.dataset": [
"windows.sysmon_operational"
],
"event.type": [
"access"
],
"winlog.opcode": [
"Info"
],
"agent.ephemeral_id": [
"137d194a-e542-4cd6-a1e3-f4ca9f5ad6b8"
],
"event.dataset": [
"windows.sysmon_operational"
]
}
}
```
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_handle_via_malseclogon.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 59736e3973
2022-07-20 14:31:31 +00:00
ec17d0b54d
2058 add setup field to metadata ( #2061 )
...
* Convert config header to setup in note field
* Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm
* only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable
Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
2022-07-18 20:15:19 -04:00
62298d92f4
2058 add setup field to metadata ( #2061 )
...
* Convert config header to setup in note field
* Parse note field into separate setup and note field with marko gfm
* only validate and parse note on elastic authored rules and add CLI description for new DR_BYPASS_NOTE_VALIDATION_AND_PARSE environment variable
Co-authored-by: brokensound77 <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
Removed changes from:
- rules/cross-platform/impact_hosts_file_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/application_added_to_google_workspace_domain.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/domain_added_to_google_workspace_trusted_domains.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_admin_role_deletion.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_mfa_enforcement_disabled.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/google_workspace_policy_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/mfa_disabled_for_google_workspace_organization.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_admin_role_assigned_to_user.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_api_access_granted_via_domain_wide_delegation_of_authority.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_custom_admin_role_created.toml
- rules/integrations/google_workspace/persistence_google_workspace_role_modified.toml
- rules/integrations/kubernetes/execution_user_exec_to_pod.toml
- rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_adding_the_hidden_file_attribute_with_via_attribexe.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_lolbas_wuauclt.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_certutil_commands.toml
- rules/windows/execution_command_shell_started_by_svchost.toml
(selectively cherry picked from commit a52751494e
2022-07-18 21:25:32 +00:00
d8ee4473a2
[Security Content] 8.4 - Add Investigation Guides ( #2069 )
...
* [Security Content] 8.4 - Add Investigation Guides
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_cmdline_dump_tool.toml
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_credential_dumping_msbuild.toml
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Removed changes from:
- rules/windows/execution_command_shell_started_by_svchost.toml
(selectively cherry picked from commit 3a8efc8183
2022-07-13 14:29:48 +00:00
de2a90090c
[New Rule] Domain Trust Enumeration via Nltest ( #2010 )
...
* adding detection rule
* removed changes from unrelated rule
* adjusted threat technique
* Update rules/windows/discovery_enumerating_domain_trusts_via_nltest.toml
* Update rules/windows/discovery_enumerating_domain_trusts_via_nltest.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* Update rules/windows/discovery_enumerating_domain_trusts_via_nltest.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* Update rules/windows/discovery_enumerating_domain_trusts_via_nltest.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 329530c8c3
2022-07-05 14:49:39 +00:00
8011420e71
Update discovery_privileged_localgroup_membership.toml ( #2046 )
...
(cherry picked from commit 853f8db8d0
2022-06-30 17:27:15 +00:00
0973ac07ef
Update discovery_remote_system_discovery_commands_windows.toml ( #2033 )
...
(cherry picked from commit c8ff1dc9cb
2022-06-14 13:52:02 +00:00
835b342a43
Update persistence_sdprop_exclusion_dsheuristics.toml ( #2017 )
...
(cherry picked from commit b6631f200e
2022-06-03 17:22:33 +00:00
a51d251e05
Adds logs-system.* index pattern ( #2016 )
...
(cherry picked from commit f857e009c5
2022-06-03 16:57:26 +00:00
29cf0c8f77
[New Rule] Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution ( #2005 )
...
* [New Rule] Suspicious Microsoft Diagnostics Wizard Execution
https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Msdt/
https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_proxy_execution_via_msdt.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
(cherry picked from commit d6e96a83d5
2022-06-01 15:04:54 +00:00
1484c20795
[Security Content] 8.3 Add Investigation Guides - 3 ( #1990 )
...
* [Security Content] 8.3 Add Investigation Guides - 3
* bump date
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
(cherry picked from commit 27f5c2e695
2022-05-31 15:59:13 +00:00
d575fd4b3c
[Security Content] 8.3 - Add Investigation Guides 2 ( #1989 )
...
* [Security Content] 8.3 - Add Investigation Guides 2 - Initial Commit
* .
* Add Related rules
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
* .
* .
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
(cherry picked from commit e5d3c6329c
2022-05-31 15:56:50 +00:00
10c2d9de3d
[Rule Tuning] Suspicious MS Office Child Process ( #2003 )
...
added msdt.exe as a response to this in the wild 0day (works without vba and on latest office) ->
https://twitter.com/nao_sec/status/1530196847679401984
https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/4a24048f81afbe9fb62e7a6a49adbd1faf41f266b5f9feecdceb567aec096784/detection
(cherry picked from commit bfea11c99f
2022-05-31 12:23:08 +00:00
1d69a2bbae
[Promote Rule] Potential Invoke-Mimikatz PowerShell Script ( #1993 )
...
* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
* Update credential_access_mimikatz_powershell_module.toml
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 1f8813d02f
2022-05-25 20:04:28 +00:00
c5e3312727
[Rule tuning] Whitespace Padding in Process Command Line ( #1967 )
...
* [Rule tuning] Whitespace Padding in Process Command Line
* bump updated_date
* update comment
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 72c186b30b
2022-05-23 19:35:44 +00:00
18277206f8
[Security Content] 8.3 - Add Investigation Guides ( #1937 )
...
* 8.3 - Add Investigation Guides
* Apply suggestions
* Apply the refactor
* Apply suggestions from Samir
* .
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit a1bdf2b564
2022-05-19 16:25:46 +00:00
7c90f1d4c4
[Security Content] Refactor Existing Investigation Guides ( #1959 )
...
* Initial commit
* Update Investigation guides - security-docs review
* Update command_and_control_dns_tunneling_nslookup.toml
* Update defense_evasion_amsienable_key_mod.toml
* Apply security-docs review
* Remove dot
* Update rules/windows/command_and_control_rdp_tunnel_plink.toml
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
* Apply changes from review
* Apply the suggestion
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 817b97f428
2022-05-18 16:01:50 +00:00
f223e63030
Update command_and_control_common_webservices.toml ( #1970 )
...
(cherry picked from commit 27e6632ecd
2022-05-16 17:06:24 +00:00
ca7a148f5a
[New rule] Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update ( #1962 )
...
* [New rule] Remote Computer Account DnsHostName Update
Identifies remote update to a computer account DnsHostName attribute, if the new value is set a valid domain controller DNS hostname and the subject computer name is not a domain controller then it's high likely a preparation step to exploit CVE-2022-26923 in an attempt to elevate privileges from a standard domain user to domain admin privileges :
* added MS ref url
* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_suspicious_dnshostname_update.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_suspicious_dnshostname_update.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
(cherry picked from commit 19ff825a91
2022-05-11 17:42:44 +00:00
36413ad8b2
[New Rule] Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP ( #1947 )
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* [New Rule] Potential Local NTLM Relay via HTTP
Detect attempt to elevate privileges via coercing a privileged service to connect to a local rogue HTTP endpoint, leading to NTLM relay, example of logs while testing https://github.com/med0x2e/NTLMRelay2Self (step 5):
* Update credential_access_relay_ntlm_auth_via_http_spoolss.toml
* Update credential_access_relay_ntlm_auth_via_http_spoolss.toml
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 03836d45fa
2022-05-06 19:09:27 +00:00
5769a21867
[Rule Tuning] Update Rule Content Changes from Security Docs Team ( #1945 )
...
* updated content to reflect changes from Security Docs team
* Update rules/linux/execution_flock_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_expect_binary.toml
* TOML linting
* added escape for crdential_access_spn_attribute_modified.toml
(cherry picked from commit e9f5585a9f
2022-05-06 17:23:22 +00:00
6a6d49a362
[New Rule] Service Creation via Local Kerberos Authentication ( #1941 )
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* [New Rule] Suspicious Service Creation via Local Kerberos Relay over LDAP
This rule will catch also the suspicious service that was created leveraging the imported kerberos ticket https://gist.github.com/tyranid/c24cfd1bd141d14d4925043ee7e03c82 which makes triage easier :
DATA :
```
"sequences" : [
{
"join_keys" : [
"6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160",
"0xefac5f"
],
"events" : [
{
"_index" : ".ds-logs-system.security-default-2022.04.12-000003",
"_id" : "XAy1YoABQhClK0XGpqaL",
"_source" : {
"agent" : {
"name" : "02694w-win10",
"id" : "77a829ec-a564-44d5-9bc4-61eeefbf783a",
"type" : "filebeat",
"ephemeral_id" : "6c751494-97a3-46aa-bab2-5baf01d17d04",
"version" : "8.0.0"
},
"process" : {
"name" : "-",
"pid" : 0,
"executable" : "-"
},
"winlog" : {
"computer_name" : "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
"process" : {
"pid" : 688,
"thread" : {
"id" : 5160
}
},
"keywords" : [
"Audit Success"
],
"logon" : {
"id" : "0x0",
"type" : "Network"
},
"channel" : "Security",
"event_data" : {
"LogonGuid" : "{82d3503b-9dac-ab6d-b045-8877b5aab051}",
"TargetOutboundDomainName" : "-",
"VirtualAccount" : "%%1843",
"LogonType" : "3",
"TransmittedServices" : "-",
"SubjectLogonId" : "0x0",
"LmPackageName" : "-",
"TargetOutboundUserName" : "-",
"KeyLength" : "0",
"RestrictedAdminMode" : "-",
"TargetLogonId" : "0xefac5f",
"SubjectUserName" : "-",
"TargetLinkedLogonId" : "0x0",
"ElevatedToken" : "%%1842",
"SubjectDomainName" : "-",
"ImpersonationLevel" : "%%1833",
"TargetUserName" : "Administrator",
"TargetDomainName" : "THREEBEESCO.COM",
"LogonProcessName" : "Kerberos",
"SubjectUserSid" : "S-1-0-0",
"TargetUserSid" : "S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500",
"AuthenticationPackageName" : "Kerberos"
},
"opcode" : "Info",
"version" : 2,
"record_id" : "59330",
"task" : "Logon",
"event_id" : "4624",
"provider_guid" : "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
"activity_id" : "{e22af019-58dd-0002-43f0-2ae2dd58d801}",
"api" : "wineventlog",
"provider_name" : "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"log" : {
"level" : "information"
},
"elastic_agent" : {
"id" : "77a829ec-a564-44d5-9bc4-61eeefbf783a",
"version" : "8.0.0",
"snapshot" : false
},
"source" : {
"port" : 50494,
"ip" : "127.0.0.1",
"domain" : "-"
},
"message" : """An account was successfully logged on.
Subject:
Security ID: S-1-0-0
Account Name: -
Account Domain: -
Logon ID: 0x0
Logon Information:
Logon Type: 3
Restricted Admin Mode: -
Virtual Account: No
Elevated Token: Yes
Impersonation Level: Impersonation
New Logon:
Security ID: S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500
Account Name: Administrator
Account Domain: THREEBEESCO.COM
Logon ID: 0xEFAC5F
Linked Logon ID: 0x0
Network Account Name: -
Network Account Domain: -
Logon GUID: {82d3503b-9dac-ab6d-b045-8877b5aab051}
Process Information:
Process ID: 0x0
Process Name: -
Network Information:
Workstation Name: -
Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1
Source Port: 50494
Detailed Authentication Information:
Logon Process: Kerberos
Authentication Package: Kerberos
Transited Services: -
Package Name (NTLM only): -
Key Length: 0
This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.
The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.
The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).
The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.
The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.
The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.
The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.
- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.
- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.
- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.
- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.""",
"input" : {
"type" : "winlog"
},
"@timestamp" : "2022-04-25T21:09:04.559Z",
"ecs" : {
"version" : "1.12.0"
},
"related" : {
"ip" : [
"127.0.0.1"
],
"user" : [
"Administrator"
]
},
"data_stream" : {
"namespace" : "default",
"type" : "logs",
"dataset" : "system.security"
},
"host" : {
"hostname" : "02694w-win10",
"os" : {
"build" : "18363.815",
"kernel" : "10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"name" : "Windows 10 Enterprise",
"family" : "windows",
"type" : "windows",
"version" : "10.0",
"platform" : "windows"
},
"ip" : [
"fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
"172.16.66.25"
],
"name" : "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
"id" : "6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160",
"mac" : [
"00:50:56:03:c6:93"
],
"architecture" : "x86_64"
},
"event" : {
"agent_id_status" : "verified",
"ingested" : "2022-04-25T21:51:53Z",
"code" : "4624",
"provider" : "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"kind" : "event",
"created" : "2022-04-25T21:51:15.561Z",
"action" : "logged-in",
"category" : [
"authentication"
],
"type" : [
"start"
],
"dataset" : "system.security",
"outcome" : "success"
},
"user" : {
"domain" : "THREEBEESCO.COM",
"name" : "Administrator",
"id" : "S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500"
}
}
},
{
"_index" : ".ds-logs-system.security-default-2022.04.12-000003",
"_id" : "Xwy1YoABQhClK0XGpqaL",
"_source" : {
"agent" : {
"name" : "02694w-win10",
"id" : "77a829ec-a564-44d5-9bc4-61eeefbf783a",
"ephemeral_id" : "6c751494-97a3-46aa-bab2-5baf01d17d04",
"type" : "filebeat",
"version" : "8.0.0"
},
"winlog" : {
"computer_name" : "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
"process" : {
"pid" : 688,
"thread" : {
"id" : 5160
}
},
"keywords" : [
"Audit Success"
],
"logon" : {
"id" : "0xefac5f"
},
"channel" : "Security",
"event_data" : {
"ServiceAccount" : "LocalSystem",
"SubjectUserName" : "Administrator",
"ServiceStartType" : "3",
"ServiceName" : "KrbSCM",
"ServiceType" : "0x10",
"SubjectDomainName" : "3B",
"SubjectLogonId" : "0xefac5f",
"SubjectUserSid" : "S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500",
"ServiceFileName" : "\"C:\\Users\\lgreen\\Downloads\\KrbRelayUp.exe\" system 1"
},
"opcode" : "Info",
"record_id" : "59331",
"task" : "Security System Extension",
"event_id" : "4697",
"provider_guid" : "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
"activity_id" : "{e22af019-58dd-0002-43f0-2ae2dd58d801}",
"api" : "wineventlog",
"provider_name" : "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"log" : {
"level" : "information"
},
"elastic_agent" : {
"id" : "77a829ec-a564-44d5-9bc4-61eeefbf783a",
"version" : "8.0.0",
"snapshot" : false
},
"message" : """A service was installed in the system.
Subject:
Security ID: S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500
Account Name: Administrator
Account Domain: 3B
Logon ID: 0xEFAC5F
Service Information:
Service Name: KrbSCM
Service File Name: "C:\Users\lgreen\Downloads\KrbRelayUp.exe" system 1
Service Type: 0x10
Service Start Type: 3
Service Account: LocalSystem""",
"input" : {
"type" : "winlog"
},
"@timestamp" : "2022-04-25T21:09:04.561Z",
"ecs" : {
"version" : "1.12.0"
},
"related" : {
"user" : [
"Administrator"
]
},
"data_stream" : {
"namespace" : "default",
"type" : "logs",
"dataset" : "system.security"
},
"service" : {
"name" : "KrbSCM",
"type" : "Win32 Own Process"
},
"host" : {
"hostname" : "02694w-win10",
"os" : {
"build" : "18363.815",
"kernel" : "10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"name" : "Windows 10 Enterprise",
"family" : "windows",
"type" : "windows",
"version" : "10.0",
"platform" : "windows"
},
"ip" : [
"fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
"172.16.66.25"
],
"name" : "02694w-win10.threebeesco.com",
"id" : "6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160",
"mac" : [
"00:50:56:03:c6:93"
],
"architecture" : "x86_64"
},
"event" : {
"agent_id_status" : "verified",
"ingested" : "2022-04-25T21:51:53Z",
"code" : "4697",
"provider" : "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"created" : "2022-04-25T21:51:15.561Z",
"kind" : "event",
"action" : "service-installed",
"category" : [
"iam",
"configuration"
],
"type" : [
"admin",
"change"
],
"dataset" : "system.security",
"outcome" : "success"
},
"user" : {
"domain" : "3B",
"name" : "Administrator",
"id" : "S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500"
}
}
}
]
````
* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_service_creation.toml
* removed duplicate SubjectLogonId from non ecs fields list
(cherry picked from commit 3f047b987e
2022-04-29 12:38:41 +00:00
b025d3a764
[New Rule] Potential Privileged Escalation via KrbRelayUp ( #1940 )
...
* [New Rule] Potential Privileged Escalation via KrbRelayUp
Identifies a suspicious local successful logon event where the Logon Package is kerberos, the remote address is set to localhost and the target user SID is the builtin local Administrator account, this may indicate an attempt to leverage a Kerberos relay attack variant that can be used to elevate privilege locally from filtered administrator token to a token with full System privileges.
https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
DATA :
```
{
"_index" : ".ds-logs-system.security-default-2022.04.12-000003",
"_id" : "Cwy1YoABQhClK0XGfqEU",
"_source" : {
"agent" : {
"name" : "02694w-win10",
"id" : "77a829ec-a564-44d5-9bc4-61eeefbf783a",
"type" : "filebeat",
"ephemeral_id" : "6c751494-97a3-46aa-bab2-5baf01d17d04",
"version" : "8.0.0"
},
"process" : {
"name" : "-",
"pid" : 0,
"executable" : "-"
},
"winlog" : {
"computer_name" : "02694w-win10.corpcorp.com",
"process" : {
"pid" : 688,
"thread" : {
"id" : 9384
}
},
"keywords" : [
"Audit Success"
],
"logon" : {
"id" : "0x0",
"type" : "Network"
},
"channel" : "Security",
"event_data" : {
"LogonGuid" : "{daac0d7c-3273-752c-bf5d-ea1c60851819}",
"TargetOutboundDomainName" : "-",
"VirtualAccount" : "%%1843",
"LogonType" : "3",
"TransmittedServices" : "-",
"SubjectLogonId" : "0x0",
"LmPackageName" : "-",
"TargetOutboundUserName" : "-",
"KeyLength" : "0",
"RestrictedAdminMode" : "-",
"TargetLogonId" : "0xebd3d4",
"SubjectUserName" : "-",
"TargetLinkedLogonId" : "0x0",
"ElevatedToken" : "%%1842",
"SubjectDomainName" : "-",
"TargetUserName" : "Administrator",
"ImpersonationLevel" : "%%1833",
"LogonProcessName" : "Kerberos",
"TargetDomainName" : "CORPCORP.COM",
"SubjectUserSid" : "S-1-0-0",
"AuthenticationPackageName" : "Kerberos",
"TargetUserSid" : "S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500"
},
"opcode" : "Info",
"version" : 2,
"record_id" : "59063",
"task" : "Logon",
"event_id" : "4624",
"provider_guid" : "{54849625-5478-4994-a5ba-3e3b0328c30d}",
"activity_id" : "{e22af019-58dd-0002-43f0-2ae2dd58d801}",
"api" : "wineventlog",
"provider_name" : "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing"
},
"log" : {
"level" : "information"
},
"elastic_agent" : {
"id" : "77a829ec-a564-44d5-9bc4-61eeefbf783a",
"version" : "8.0.0",
"snapshot" : false
},
"source" : {
"port" : 50480,
"ip" : "127.0.0.1",
"domain" : "-"
},
"message" : """An account was successfully logged on.
Subject:
Security ID: S-1-0-0
Account Name: -
Account Domain: -
Logon ID: 0x0
Logon Information:
Logon Type: 3
Restricted Admin Mode: -
Virtual Account: No
Elevated Token: Yes
Impersonation Level: Impersonation
New Logon:
Security ID: S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500
Account Name: Administrator
Account Domain: CORPCORP.COM
Logon ID: 0xEBD3D4
Linked Logon ID: 0x0
Network Account Name: -
Network Account Domain: -
Logon GUID: {daac0d7c-3273-752c-bf5d-ea1c60851819}
Process Information:
Process ID: 0x0
Process Name: -
Network Information:
Workstation Name: -
Source Network Address: 127.0.0.1
Source Port: 50480
Detailed Authentication Information:
Logon Process: Kerberos
Authentication Package: Kerberos
Transited Services: -
Package Name (NTLM only): -
Key Length: 0
This event is generated when a logon session is created. It is generated on the computer that was accessed.
The subject fields indicate the account on the local system which requested the logon. This is most commonly a service such as the Server service, or a local process such as Winlogon.exe or Services.exe.
The logon type field indicates the kind of logon that occurred. The most common types are 2 (interactive) and 3 (network).
The New Logon fields indicate the account for whom the new logon was created, i.e. the account that was logged on.
The network fields indicate where a remote logon request originated. Workstation name is not always available and may be left blank in some cases.
The impersonation level field indicates the extent to which a process in the logon session can impersonate.
The authentication information fields provide detailed information about this specific logon request.
- Logon GUID is a unique identifier that can be used to correlate this event with a KDC event.
- Transited services indicate which intermediate services have participated in this logon request.
- Package name indicates which sub-protocol was used among the NTLM protocols.
- Key length indicates the length of the generated session key. This will be 0 if no session key was requested.""",
"input" : {
"type" : "winlog"
},
"@timestamp" : "2022-04-25T21:07:15.306Z",
"ecs" : {
"version" : "1.12.0"
},
"related" : {
"ip" : [
"127.0.0.1"
],
"user" : [
"Administrator"
]
},
"data_stream" : {
"namespace" : "default",
"type" : "logs",
"dataset" : "system.security"
},
"host" : {
"hostname" : "02694w-win10",
"os" : {
"build" : "18363.815",
"kernel" : "10.0.18362.815 (WinBuild.160101.0800)",
"name" : "Windows 10 Enterprise",
"family" : "windows",
"type" : "windows",
"version" : "10.0",
"platform" : "windows"
},
"ip" : [
"fe80::7587:a5c1:5a7b:68f6",
"172.16.66.25"
],
"name" : "02694w-win10.corpcorp.com",
"id" : "6a3c3ef2-208f-4d6f-90ee-b34f4e3fd160",
"mac" : [
"00:50:56:03:c6:93"
],
"architecture" : "x86_64"
},
"event" : {
"agent_id_status" : "verified",
"ingested" : "2022-04-25T21:51:43Z",
"code" : "4624",
"provider" : "Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing",
"kind" : "event",
"created" : "2022-04-25T21:51:08.433Z",
"action" : "logged-in",
"category" : [
"authentication"
],
"type" : [
"start"
],
"dataset" : "system.security",
"outcome" : "success"
},
"user" : {
"domain" : "CORPCORP.COM",
"name" : "Administrator",
"id" : "S-1-5-21-308926384-506822093-3341789130-500"
}
}
}
```
* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml
* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml
* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml
* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml
* Update privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml
* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_krbrelayup_suspicious_logon.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update etc/non-ecs-schema.json
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* relinted
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit a0672c7d2a
2022-04-26 23:41:59 +00:00
e3c8981b63
Review & Fix Invalid References ( #1936 )
...
(cherry picked from commit 20d2e92cfe
2022-04-26 20:59:20 +00:00
781043991a
[Rule Tuning] Exclude MS OneDrive/Teams from Component Object Model Hijacking ( #1932 )
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* adjusted query to exclude OneDrive process name and MS Teams DLL reference in registry data strings
* adjusted formatting for altered query
* removed unecessary string used for reference
* removed unecessary parenthesis from new filters in query
* Update rules/windows/persistence_suspicious_com_hijack_registry.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* Update rules/windows/persistence_suspicious_com_hijack_registry.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
* added FileSyncConfig.exe for OneDrive, added regsvr32 to Teams DLL filter
* added investigation notes
* removed comment from original rule creation
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <jonhnathancesar@gmail.com >
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 5bf321a505
2022-04-26 15:45:47 +00:00
d3aa90f6a8
[Rule Tuning] Remove logs-windows.* index ( #1928 )
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* Remove `logs-windows.*` index
* Update discovery_privileged_localgroup_membership.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 0943ffba5f
2022-04-14 12:27:47 +00:00
2889bf7d4e
MInor changes from Investigation Guides Review ( #1927 )
...
(cherry picked from commit 258418785f
2022-04-14 00:55:20 +00:00
10bc32b9aa
remove min_stack_version so old versions get config note ( #1926 )
2022-04-13 16:13:27 -04:00
c3ab31632f
[Security Content] Current Investigation Guides Review ( #1896 )
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* Modify investigation guides
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_created.toml
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
* Rewrite and apply previous reviews
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
* Update rules/windows/credential_access_spn_attribute_modified.toml
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit ebeb270075
2022-04-13 01:07:09 +00:00
03677ca4e8
[Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 5 ( #1895 )
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* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 5
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 46f5af436e
2022-04-13 00:15:04 +00:00
7fdf870d31
[Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 3 ( #1836 )
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* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 3
* Adjust Investigation Guides and Config
* Adjust Config
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 3a5fceac3b
2022-04-13 00:00:52 +00:00
deed08b896
Update discovery_net_command_system_account.toml ( #1912 )
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(cherry picked from commit 3b6c594a22
2022-04-11 18:05:59 +00:00
3c503f7c95
[Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 4 ( #1871 )
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* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 4
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/windows/initial_access_script_executing_powershell.toml
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
* lint
* Update persistence_user_account_creation.toml
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
* .
* Fixes and lint
* .
* .
* revert modifications
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update impact_stop_process_service_threshold.toml
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 290763d9bb
2022-04-10 18:38:57 +00:00
c425d98de1
[Rule Tuning] Add EQL optional field syntax ( #1910 )
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* Add optional EQL syntax
* Add min_stack_version
(cherry picked from commit 49074ddeaa
2022-04-05 19:35:15 +00:00
eeb8ab7744
Expand timestamp override tests ( #1907 )
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* Expand timestamp_override tests
* removed timestamp_override from eql sequence rules
* add config entry for eql rules with beats index and t_o
* add timestamp_override to missing fields
Removed changes from:
- rules/cross-platform/impact_hosts_file_modified.toml
- rules/windows/credential_access_lsass_memdump_file_created.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_adding_the_hidden_file_attribute_with_via_attribexe.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_execution_lolbas_wuauclt.toml
- rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_certutil_commands.toml
- rules/windows/execution_command_shell_started_by_svchost.toml
(selectively cherry picked from commit 6bdfddac8e
2022-04-01 23:28:54 +00:00
8d322f40c0
Svchost spawning Cmd - False Positives Tuning ( #1894 )
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(cherry picked from commit e1b4a0d87c
2022-03-31 22:30:43 +00:00
4ed2fbe932
[Security Content] Adjust Investigation Guides to be less generic ( #1805 )
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* PowerShell Suspicious Script with Audio Capture Capabilities
* PowerShell Keylogging Script
* PowerShell MiniDump Script
* Potential Process Injection via PowerShell
* PowerShell Suspicious Discovery Related Windows API Functions
* Suspicious Portable Executable Encoded in Powershell Script
* PowerShell PSReflect Script
* Startup/Logon Script added to Group Policy Object
* Group Policy Abuse for Privilege Addition
* Scheduled Task Execution at Scale via GPO
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
* Adjust Posh desc
* .
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
* .
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update privilege_escalation_group_policy_scheduled_task.toml
* Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_group_policy_iniscript.toml
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
(cherry picked from commit 8a59b49fea
2022-03-31 14:31:43 +00:00
5a263b253d
[Security Content] Add Investigation Guides - 2 ( #1822 )
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* Add Investigation Guides for Windows Rules - First half
* + 1/2
* Update impact_volume_shadow_copy_deletion_or_resized_via_vssadmin.toml
* Update credential_access_mod_wdigest_security_provider.toml
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update defense_evasion_amsienable_key_mod.toml
* Update defense_evasion_amsienable_key_mod.toml
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update command_and_control_certutil_network_connection.toml
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update collection_winrar_encryption.toml
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: nastasha-solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co >
(cherry picked from commit a3d7427d29
2022-03-30 17:46:02 +00:00
150ff0502e
Linux Shell Evasion Rule Tuning ( #1878 )
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* Linux Shell Evasion Rule Tuning
* Update execution_python_tty_shell.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_apt_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_apt_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_awk_binary_shell.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_awk_binary_shell.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_c89_c99_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_c89_c99_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_cpulimit_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_cpulimit_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_expect_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_expect_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_expect_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_find_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_find_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_gcc_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_gcc_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_mysql_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_mysql_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_nice_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_nice_binary.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_ssh_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_ssh_binary.toml
* Update execution_perl_tty_shell.toml
* Update execution_python_tty_shell.toml
* Update rules/linux/execution_apt_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_awk_binary_shell.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_c89_c99_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_cpulimit_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_expect_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_find_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_gcc_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_mysql_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_nice_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
* Update rules/linux/execution_ssh_binary.toml
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com >
2022-03-29 21:03:35 -04:00
Samirbous