[New Rule] Persistence via Docker Shortcut Modification (#733)

* [New Rule] Persistence via Docker Shortcut Modification

* ref url decoded

* added exclusions

* Update rules/macos/persistence_docker_shortcuts_plist_modification.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/macos/persistence_docker_shortcuts_plist_modification.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* exclude some noisy procs and conv to kql

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Samirbous
2021-01-26 08:38:38 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent 6883ea0aa6
commit dc53fc1f04
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/12/18"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2020/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
An adversary can establish persistence by modifying an existing macOS dock property list in order to execute a
malicious application instead of the intended one when invoked.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License"
name = "Persistence via Docker Shortcut Modification"
references = [
"https://github.com/specterops/presentations/raw/master/Leo Pitt/Hey_Im_Still_in_Here_Modern_macOS_Persistence_SO-CON2020.pdf",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "c81cefcb-82b9-4408-a533-3c3df549e62d"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "macOS", "Threat Detection", "Persistence"]
type = "query"
query = '''
event.category : file and event.action : modification and
file.path : /Users/*/Library/Preferences/com.apple.dock.plist and
not process.name : (xpcproxy or cfprefsd or plutil or jamf or PlistBuddy or InstallerRemotePluginService)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1543"
name = "Create or Modify System Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"