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[Rule Tuning] Linux DR Tuning - 6 (#5497)

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* [Rule Tuning] Linux DR Tuning - 6

* Fix syntax error in discovery_esxi_software_via_grep.toml

* Update discovery_pam_version_discovery.toml

* Update discovery_virtual_machine_fingerprinting.toml

* Revise investigation title for kernel module enumeration

Updated the title of the investigation section to clarify focus on unusual kernel module enumeration.

* Update discovery_port_scanning_activity_from_compromised_host.toml

* Enhance ESQL query for subnet scanning detection

Updated ESQL query to include additional fields and conditions for better analysis of connection attempts from compromised hosts.

* Remove Elastic Endgame data source from rule

---------

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Ruben Groenewoud
2026-01-08 10:45:32 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent c2747b0b29
commit ccd3f70ee8
25 changed files with 754 additions and 608 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
rules/linux/discovery_docker_socket_discovery.toml
+10 -8
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2025/03/04"
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/04/07"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ Docker sockets facilitate communication between the Docker client and daemon, en
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional hosts or systems are affected.
- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for Docker socket interactions to detect and respond to similar threats more quickly in the future.
"""
risk_score = 21
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "dd983e79-22e8-44d1-9173-d57dba514cac"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper g
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"Domain: Container",
@@ -104,25 +104,27 @@ tags = [
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
process.name in ("curl", "socat", "nc", "netcat", "ncat", "nc.traditional") and
process.command_line like ("*/var/run/docker.sock*", "*/run/docker.sock*")
process.command_line like ("*/var/run/docker.sock*", "*/run/docker.sock*") and
process.parent.executable != null and
not (
process.parent.executable in ("/usr/sbin/sshd", "/www/server/panel/BT-Panel") or
process.parent.args in ("/usr/libexec/netdata/plugins.d/cgroup-name.sh", "/docker-entrypoint")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1613"
name = "Container and Resource Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1613/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_dynamic_linker_via_od.toml
+4 -7
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2024/02/01"
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/20"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ The dynamic linker in Linux environments is crucial for loading shared libraries
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems are affected or if there is a broader threat campaign.
- Update detection and monitoring systems to enhance visibility and alerting for similar suspicious activities involving the `od` utility and critical system files."""
references = ["https://github.com/arget13/DDexec"]
risk_score = 21
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "0369e8a6-0fa7-4e7a-961a-53180a4c966e"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper g
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
@@ -101,7 +101,6 @@ tags = [
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started")
and process.name == "od" and process.args in (
@@ -110,17 +109,15 @@ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1057"
name = "Process Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_esxi_software_via_find.toml
+8 -9
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/20"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ index = [
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -97,29 +98,27 @@ tags = [
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "executed", "process_started") and
process.name == "find" and process.args : ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*") and
not process.parent.executable == "/usr/lib/vmware/viewagent/bin/uninstall_viewagent.sh"
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "executed", "process_started", "ProcessRollup2") and
process.name == "find" and process.args like ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*") and
not ?process.parent.executable == "/usr/lib/vmware/viewagent/bin/uninstall_viewagent.sh"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1518"
name = "Software Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_esxi_software_via_grep.toml
+9 -10
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "crowdstrike"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/20"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ index = [
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -96,30 +97,28 @@ tags = [
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "executed", "process_started") and
process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "pgrep") and
process.args in ("vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram", "vmem") and
not process.parent.executable == "/usr/share/qemu/init/qemu-kvm-init"
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "executed", "process_started", "ProcessRollup2") and
process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "pgrep") and
process.args in ("vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram", "vmem") and
not ?process.parent.executable in ("/usr/share/qemu/init/qemu-kvm-init", "/etc/sysconfig/modules/kvm.modules")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1518"
name = "Software Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_kernel_module_enumeration.toml
+67 -61
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2020/04/23"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/01/24"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -18,71 +18,16 @@ false_positives = [
""",
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Enumeration of Kernel Modules"
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "2d8043ed-5bda-4caf-801c-c1feb7410504"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "new_terms"
query = '''
event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and event.action:(exec or exec_event) and (
(process.name:(lsmod or modinfo)) or
(process.name:kmod and process.args:list) or
(process.name:depmod and process.args:(--all or -a))
) and
not (
process.parent.name:(
mkinitramfs or cryptroot or framebuffer or dracut or jem or thin-provisioning-tools or readykernel or lvm2 or
vz-start or iscsi or mdadm or ovalprobes or bcache or plymouth or dkms or overlayroot or weak-modules or zfs or
systemd or whoopsie-upload-all or kdumpctl or apport-gtk or casper or rear or kernel-install or newrelic-infra
) or
process.parent.executable:/var/lib/dpkg/info/linux-modules*-generic.post*
)
'''
name = "Unusual Kernel Module Enumeration"
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Enumeration of Kernel Modules
### Investigating Unusual Kernel Module Enumeration
Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) enhance a Linux kernel's capabilities dynamically, without requiring a system reboot. Adversaries may exploit this by enumerating kernel modules to gather system information or identify vulnerabilities. The detection rule identifies suspicious enumeration activities by monitoring specific processes and arguments associated with module listing commands, while excluding benign parent processes to reduce false positives.
@@ -111,6 +56,67 @@ Loadable Kernel Modules (LKMs) enhance a Linux kernel's capabilities dynamically
- Update and patch the system to the latest security standards to mitigate any known vulnerabilities that could be exploited through kernel modules.
- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring for kernel module management, ensuring only authorized personnel can load or unload modules.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on other systems within the network."""
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "2d8043ed-5bda-4caf-801c-c1feb7410504"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "new_terms"
query = '''
event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and event.action:exec and (
(process.name:(lsmod or modinfo)) or
(process.name:kmod and process.args:list) or
(process.name:depmod and process.args:(--all or -a))
) and
not (
process.parent.name:(
mkinitramfs or cryptroot or framebuffer or dracut or jem or thin-provisioning-tools or readykernel or lvm2 or
vz-start or iscsi or mdadm or ovalprobes or bcache or plymouth or dkms or overlayroot or weak-modules or zfs or
systemd or whoopsie-upload-all or kdumpctl or apport-gtk or casper or rear or kernel-install or newrelic-infra
) or
process.parent.executable:(
/var/lib/dpkg/info/linux-modules*-generic.post* or "/var/ossec/bin/wazuh-modulesd" or "/opt/gitlab/embedded/bin/ruby" or
"/usr/share/initramfs-tools/hooks/thermal" or "/usr/libexec/iptables/iptables.init" or "/usr/sbin/mkinitramfs" or
"/usr/share/initramfs-tools/hooks/cryptroot" or "/usr/bin/kdumpctl"
) or
process.parent.args:(/var/lib/dpkg/info/* or /var/tmp/rpm-tmp* or "longhorn-manager" or "/usr/bin/entry") or
process.entry_leader.executable:(
"/usr/lib/apt/apt.systemd.daily" or "/usr/libexec/gnome-terminal-server" or "/usr/local/qualys/cloud-agent/bin/qualys-cloud-agent"
)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
@@ -127,8 +133,8 @@ reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
[rule.new_terms]
field = "new_terms_fields"
value = ["process.executable", "process.parent.executable"]
value = ["process.executable"]
[[rule.new_terms.history_window_start]]
field = "history_window_start"
value = "now-14d"
value = "now-5d"
rules/linux/discovery_kernel_seeking.toml
+59 -50
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2025/01/07"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/02/04"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -16,55 +16,6 @@ index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Kernel Seeking Activity"
references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/declawing-pumakit"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "3c9f7901-01d8-465d-8dc0-5d46671035fa"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
(process.parent.args like "/boot/*" or process.args like "/boot/*") and (
(process.name == "tail" and (process.args like "-c*" or process.args == "--bytes")) or
(process.name == "cmp" and process.args == "-i") or
(process.name in ("hexdump", "xxd") and process.args == "-s") or
(process.name == "dd" and process.args like "seek*")
)
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
@@ -99,6 +50,64 @@ Kernel seeking involves probing the Linux kernel for symbols and functions, ofte
- Update the Linux kernel and all related packages to the latest versions to patch any known vulnerabilities that could be exploited.
- Implement enhanced monitoring and alerting for similar activities, focusing on the execution of the specified utilities with kernel-related arguments.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems may be affected."""
references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/declawing-pumakit"]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "3c9f7901-01d8-465d-8dc0-5d46671035fa"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
(process.parent.args like "/boot/*" or process.args like "/boot/*") and (
(process.name == "tail" and (process.args like "-c*" or process.args == "--bytes")) or
(process.name == "cmp" and process.args == "-i") or
(process.name in ("hexdump", "xxd") and process.args == "-s") or
(process.name == "dd" and process.args like "seek*")
) and process.parent.executable != null and
not (
process.parent.executable in (
"/usr/lib/needrestart/vmlinuz-get-version", "/bin/dracut", "/sbin/dracut", "/usr/sbin/dracut"
) or
process.parent.args in (
"/usr/bin/dracut", "/usr/lib/needrestart/vmlinuz-get-version", "/sbin/dracut", "/bin/dracut",
"/usr/sbin/dracut", "/usr/bin/spectre-meltdown-checker", "/usr/lib/module-init-tools/lsinitrd-quick"
)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
rules/linux/discovery_kernel_unpacking.toml
+58 -50
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2025/01/07"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/02/04"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -15,55 +15,6 @@ index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Kernel Unpacking Activity"
references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/declawing-pumakit"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "4f725dc5-ae44-46c1-9ac5-99f6f7a70d8a"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
(process.parent.args like "/boot/*" or process.args like "/boot/*") and (
(process.name in ("file", "unlzma", "gunzip", "unxz", "bunzip2", "unzstd", "unzip", "tar")) or
(process.name == "grep" and process.args == "ELF") or
(process.name in ("lzop", "lz4") and process.args in ("-d", "--decode"))
) and
not process.parent.name == "mkinitramfs"
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
@@ -98,6 +49,63 @@ Kernel unpacking involves using utilities to extract or inspect kernel images an
- Update the system's kernel and all related packages to the latest versions to mitigate any known vulnerabilities that could be exploited.
- Monitor the system for any recurring suspicious activity, focusing on the use of utilities and command patterns identified in the detection rule.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on other systems within the network."""
references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/declawing-pumakit"]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "4f725dc5-ae44-46c1-9ac5-99f6f7a70d8a"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Tactic: Defense Evasion",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
(process.parent.args like "/boot/*" or process.args like "/boot/*") and (
(process.name in ("file", "unlzma", "gunzip", "unxz", "bunzip2", "unzstd", "unzip", "tar")) or
(process.name == "grep" and process.args == "ELF") or
(process.name in ("lzop", "lz4") and process.args in ("-d", "--decode"))
) and
not (
process.parent.name == "mkinitramfs" or
process.parent.executable like (
"/usr/lib/needrestart/vmlinuz-get-version", "/usr/libexec/platform-python*", "/tmp/newroot/usr/libexec/platform-python*",
"/usr/bin/kdumpctl", "/usr/bin/stap-report", "/usr/sbin/nv-update-initrd"
) or
process.parent.command_line like "*ansible*" or
process.parent.args == "/usr/bin/kdumpctl"
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
rules/linux/discovery_kubeconfig_file_discovery.toml
+9 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2025/06/17"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/07/07"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -124,7 +124,14 @@ process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action
"/root/.kube/config",
"/var/lib/*/kubeconfig"
)
) and not process.name in ("stat", "md5sum", "dirname")
) and not (
process.name in ("stat", "md5sum", "dirname") or
(process.name like "python*" and process.args == "/usr/bin/yq" and process.parent.name == "fish") or
process.executable in (
"/usr/bin/file", "/usr/bin/readlink", "/bin/readlink", "/bin/file", "/tmp/newroot/bin/readlink",
"/tmp/newroot/bin/file", "/usr/local/bin/helm"
)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
rules/linux/discovery_kubectl_permission_discovery.toml
+16 -8
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2025/06/17"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike"]
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/10/17"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ them to gain unauthorized access or escalate privileges.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -57,7 +61,7 @@ Kubectl is a command-line tool for interacting with Kubernetes clusters, allowin
references = [
"https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/kubectl/generated/kubectl_auth/kubectl_auth_can-i/",
]
risk_score = 21
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "1600f9e2-5be6-4742-8593-1ba50cd94069"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -84,7 +88,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper g
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"Domain: Container",
@@ -93,13 +97,17 @@ tags = [
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "ProcessRollup2") and
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
process.name == "kubectl" and process.args == "auth" and process.args == "can-i"
'''
rules/linux/discovery_manual_mount_discovery_via_exports_or_fstab.toml
+11 -6
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2025/04/25"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "auditd_manager"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/07/07"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@ file to gather information about shared directories and potential targets for fu
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ In Linux environments, the `/etc/exports` and `/etc/fstab` files are crucial for
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems have been compromised.
- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for access to critical configuration files like `/etc/exports` and `/etc/fstab` to detect similar threats in the future.
"""
risk_score = 21
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "bd18f4a3-c4c6-43b9-a1e4-b05e09998110"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper g
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
@@ -94,13 +96,16 @@ tags = [
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
process.name in ("cat", "grep", "tail", "less", "more", "egrep", "fgrep") and process.command_line like ("/etc/exports", "/etc/fstab")
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
process.name in ("cat", "grep", "tail", "less", "more", "egrep", "fgrep", "awk") and
process.command_line like ("/etc/exports", "/etc/fstab")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
rules/linux/discovery_pam_version_discovery.toml
+16 -9
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2024/12/16"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/20"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -101,52 +101,59 @@ tags = [
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and process.parent.name != null and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and ?process.parent.name != null and
(
(process.name in ("dpkg", "dpkg-query") and process.args == "libpam-modules") or
(process.name == "rpm" and process.args == "pam")
) and
not process.parent.name in ("dcservice", "inspectorssmplugin")
not (
?process.parent.name in ("dcservice", "inspectorssmplugin") or
?process.working_directory in ("/var/ossec", "/opt/msp-agent") or
?process.parent.executable in (
"/opt/CyberCNSAgent/cybercnsagent_linux", "/usr/local/manageengine/uems_agent/bin/dcpatchscan",
"/usr/local/manageengine/uems_agent/bin/dcconfig", "/usr/share/vicarius/topiad",
"/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd-chroot"
)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1082"
name = "System Information Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1543"
name = "Create or Modify System Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1556"
name = "Modify Authentication Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
rules/linux/discovery_ping_sweep_detected.toml
+52 -45
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/09/04"
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager"]
integration = ["endpoint", "auditd_manager", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/01/15"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -12,10 +12,52 @@ Adversaries may leverage built-in tools such as ping, netcat or socat to execute
attempting to evade detection or due to the lack of network mapping tools available on the compromised host.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*", "auditbeat-*", "logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*"]
index = [
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Network Scan Executed From Host"
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Potential Network Scan Executed From Host
In Linux environments, utilities like ping, netcat, and socat are essential for network diagnostics and communication. However, adversaries can exploit these tools to perform network scans, identifying active hosts and services for further exploitation. The detection rule identifies rapid execution of these utilities, signaling potential misuse for network reconnaissance, by monitoring process initiation events linked to these tools.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the process initiation events to confirm the rapid execution of utilities like ping, netcat, or socat by examining the process.name field in the alert.
- Identify the user account associated with the process execution by checking the user information in the event data to determine if the activity aligns with expected behavior.
- Analyze the command line arguments used with the executed utilities by inspecting the process.command_line field to understand the scope and intent of the network scan.
- Correlate the alert with other recent events on the host by reviewing event timestamps and related process activities to identify any patterns or additional suspicious behavior.
- Check network logs or firewall logs for any unusual outbound connections or traffic patterns originating from the host to assess the potential impact of the network scan.
- Investigate the host's recent login history and user activity to determine if there are signs of unauthorized access or compromise that could explain the network scan activity.
### False positive analysis
- Routine network diagnostics by system administrators can trigger alerts. To manage this, create exceptions for known administrator accounts or specific IP addresses frequently used for legitimate network diagnostics.
- Automated monitoring scripts that use these utilities for health checks or performance monitoring may cause false positives. Identify and exclude these scripts by their process names or execution paths.
- Scheduled tasks or cron jobs that involve network utilities for maintenance purposes can be mistaken for network scans. Exclude these tasks by their specific scheduling patterns or associated user accounts.
- Security tools that perform regular network sweeps as part of their functionality might be flagged. Whitelist these tools by their process names or hash values to prevent unnecessary alerts.
- Development or testing environments where network utilities are used for testing purposes can generate false positives. Implement exclusions based on environment-specific identifiers or network segments.
### Response and remediation
- Isolate the affected host from the network to prevent further reconnaissance or lateral movement by the adversary.
- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule, such as those involving ping, netcat, or socat, to halt ongoing network scans.
- Conduct a thorough review of the host's process logs and network activity to identify any additional indicators of compromise or related malicious activity.
- Reset credentials and review access permissions for accounts that were active on the compromised host to prevent unauthorized access.
- Apply patches and updates to the host's operating system and installed software to mitigate vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries.
- Enhance network monitoring and logging to detect similar reconnaissance activities in the future, ensuring that alerts are configured to notify security teams promptly.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional hosts or systems are affected."""
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "03c23d45-d3cb-4ad4-ab5d-b361ffe8724a"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -53,60 +95,26 @@ tags = [
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "threshold"
query = '''
event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.action:(exec or exec_event or executed or process_started) and
event.type:start and process.name:(ping or nping or hping or hping2 or hping3 or nc or ncat or netcat or socat)
event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:start and
event.action:(exec or exec_event or executed or process_started or start or ProcessRollup2) and
process.name:(ping or nping or hping or hping2 or hping3 or nc or ncat or netcat or socat)
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Potential Network Scan Executed From Host
In Linux environments, utilities like ping, netcat, and socat are essential for network diagnostics and communication. However, adversaries can exploit these tools to perform network scans, identifying active hosts and services for further exploitation. The detection rule identifies rapid execution of these utilities, signaling potential misuse for network reconnaissance, by monitoring process initiation events linked to these tools.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the process initiation events to confirm the rapid execution of utilities like ping, netcat, or socat by examining the process.name field in the alert.
- Identify the user account associated with the process execution by checking the user information in the event data to determine if the activity aligns with expected behavior.
- Analyze the command line arguments used with the executed utilities by inspecting the process.command_line field to understand the scope and intent of the network scan.
- Correlate the alert with other recent events on the host by reviewing event timestamps and related process activities to identify any patterns or additional suspicious behavior.
- Check network logs or firewall logs for any unusual outbound connections or traffic patterns originating from the host to assess the potential impact of the network scan.
- Investigate the host's recent login history and user activity to determine if there are signs of unauthorized access or compromise that could explain the network scan activity.
### False positive analysis
- Routine network diagnostics by system administrators can trigger alerts. To manage this, create exceptions for known administrator accounts or specific IP addresses frequently used for legitimate network diagnostics.
- Automated monitoring scripts that use these utilities for health checks or performance monitoring may cause false positives. Identify and exclude these scripts by their process names or execution paths.
- Scheduled tasks or cron jobs that involve network utilities for maintenance purposes can be mistaken for network scans. Exclude these tasks by their specific scheduling patterns or associated user accounts.
- Security tools that perform regular network sweeps as part of their functionality might be flagged. Whitelist these tools by their process names or hash values to prevent unnecessary alerts.
- Development or testing environments where network utilities are used for testing purposes can generate false positives. Implement exclusions based on environment-specific identifiers or network segments.
### Response and remediation
- Isolate the affected host from the network to prevent further reconnaissance or lateral movement by the adversary.
- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule, such as those involving ping, netcat, or socat, to halt ongoing network scans.
- Conduct a thorough review of the host's process logs and network activity to identify any additional indicators of compromise or related malicious activity.
- Reset credentials and review access permissions for accounts that were active on the compromised host to prevent unauthorized access.
- Apply patches and updates to the host's operating system and installed software to mitigate vulnerabilities that could be exploited by adversaries.
- Enhance network monitoring and logging to detect similar reconnaissance activities in the future, ensuring that alerts are configured to notify security teams promptly.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional hosts or systems are affected."""
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1046"
name = "Network Service Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
@@ -115,8 +123,7 @@ reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
[rule.threshold]
field = ["host.id", "process.parent.entity_id", "process.executable"]
value = 1
[[rule.threshold.cardinality]]
field = "process.args"
value = 100
rules/linux/discovery_polkit_version_discovery.toml
+11 -7
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2025/01/16"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "auditd_manager"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/20"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ an attacker attempting to exploit misconfigurations or vulnerabilities in the Po
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -86,32 +88,34 @@ tags = [
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and (
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "process_started", "executed") and (
(process.name == "dnf" and process.args == "dnf" and process.args == "info" and process.args == "polkit") or
(process.name == "rpm" and process.args == "polkit") or
(process.name == "apt" and process.args == "show" and process.args == "policykit-1") or
(process.name == "pkaction" and process.args == "--version")
) and
not (
?process.working_directory in ("/opt/msp-agent", "/opt/CyberCNSAgent") or
?process.parent.executable like ("/usr/local/cpanel/3rdparty/perl/*/bin/perl", "/usr/share/vicarius/topiad")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1082"
name = "System Information Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_port_scanning_activity_from_compromised_host.toml
+19 -11
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2025/03/04"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/09/29"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -94,9 +94,9 @@ tags = [
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"
query = '''
from logs-endpoint.events.network-*
from logs-endpoint.events.network-* metadata _id, _index, _version
| mv_expand event.action
| where
@timestamp > now() - 1h and
host.os.type == "linux" and
event.type == "start" and
event.action == "connection_attempted" and
@@ -104,42 +104,50 @@ from logs-endpoint.events.network-*
destination.port < 32768 and
not (
cidr_match(destination.ip, "127.0.0.0/8", "::1", "FE80::/10", "FF00::/8") or
process.name in ("java", "node") or
process.name like "python*" or
process.executable in (
"/opt/dbtk/bin/jsvc", "/usr/lib/dotnet/dotnet", "/usr/share/elasticsearch/jdk/bin/java", "/usr/sbin/haproxy",
"/usr/bin/java", "/opt/kaspersky/kesl/libexec/kesl", "/usr/bin/dotnet", "/opt/java/openjdk/bin/java"
"/opt/dbtk/bin/jsvc", "/usr/lib/dotnet/dotnet", "/usr/sbin/haproxy", "/opt/kaspersky/kesl/libexec/kesl",
"/usr/bin/dotnet", "/usr/sap/SAPBusinessOne/EDS/bin/EDFBackend", "/usr/local/bin/longhorn-instance-manager"
) or
process.executable like "/var/opt/kaspersky/kesl/*kesl" or
process.executable like "/usr/lib/jvm/*/java" or
process.executable like "/opt/google/chrome*" or
process.executable like "/var/lib/docker/*/java" or
process.executable like "/usr/lib64/jvm/*/java" or
process.executable like "/snap/*" or
process.executable like "/home/*/.local/share/JetBrains/*"
)
| keep
@timestamp,
_id,
_index,
_version,
host.os.type,
event.type,
event.action,
network.direction,
destination.port,
process.executable,
process.name,
destination.ip,
source.ip,
agent.id,
host.name
host.name,
event.dataset,
data_stream.namespace
| stats
Esql.event_count = count(),
Esql.destination_port_count_distinct = count_distinct(destination.port),
Esql.agent_id_count_distinct = count_distinct(agent.id),
Esql.host_name_values = values(host.name),
Esql.agent_id_values = values(agent.id),
Esql.source_ip_values = values(source.ip)
Esql.source_ip_values = values(source.ip),
Esql.event_dataset_values = values(event.dataset),
Esql.data_stream_namespace_values = values(data_stream.namespace)
by process.executable, destination.ip
| where
Esql.agent_id_count_distinct == 1 and
Esql.destination_port_count_distinct > 100
| sort Esql.event_count asc
| limit 100
'''
[[rule.threat]]
rules/linux/discovery_private_key_password_searching_activity.toml
+29 -9
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/11/04"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "auditd_manager"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/20"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -12,10 +12,12 @@ attacker attempting to escalate privileges or exfiltrate sensitive information.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ In Linux environments, private keys are crucial for secure communications and au
- Implement stricter access controls and permissions on directories containing private keys to limit exposure to unauthorized users.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
- Enhance monitoring and alerting for similar activities by ensuring that detection rules are tuned to capture variations of the 'find' command targeting sensitive files."""
risk_score = 21
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "627374ab-7080-4e4d-8316-bef1122444af"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -81,12 +83,14 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper g
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Tactic: Credential Access",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
@@ -95,15 +99,14 @@ tags = [
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and process.name == "find" and
process.command_line like ("*id_dsa*", "*id_rsa*", "*id_ed*", "*id_ecdsa*", "*id_xmss*", "*id_dh*") and
process.command_line like ("*/home/*", "*/etc/ssh*", "*/root/*", "/")
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "process_started", "executed") and
process.name == "find" and
process.command_line like ("*id_dsa*", "*id_rsa*", "*id_ed*", "*id_ecdsa*", "*id_xmss*", "*id_dh*") and
process.command_line like ("*/home/*", "*/etc/ssh*", "*/root/*", "/")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
@@ -112,3 +115,20 @@ id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1552"
name = "Unsecured Credentials"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1552.001"
name = "Credentials In Files"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
rules/linux/discovery_proc_maps_read.toml
+79 -48
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/01/29"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "auditd_manager"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/04/25"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -13,60 +13,16 @@ memory map to identify memory addresses for code injection or process hijacking.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious /proc/maps Discovery"
references = ["https://github.com/arget13/DDexec"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "2f95540c-923e-4f57-9dae-de30169c68b9"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
process.name in ("cat", "grep", "tail", "less", "more", "egrep", "fgrep") and process.args like "/proc/*/maps"
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
@@ -101,6 +57,63 @@ In Linux environments, the `/proc/*/maps` files provide detailed memory mapping
- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring on `/proc/*/maps` files to limit exposure and detect unauthorized access attempts.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are compromised.
- Update and enhance endpoint detection and response (EDR) solutions to improve monitoring and alerting for similar suspicious activities in the future."""
references = ["https://github.com/arget13/DDexec"]
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "2f95540c-923e-4f57-9dae-de30169c68b9"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Tactic: Credential Access",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
process.name in ("cat", "grep", "tail", "less", "more", "egrep", "fgrep", "awk") and process.args like "/proc/*/maps" and
not (
?process.parent.args in ("/usr/bin/finalrd", "/sbin/chkrootkit", "./uac", "/usr/sbin/chkrootkit") or
?process.parent.executable in ("/usr/sbin/chkrootkit", "/sbin/chkrootkit") or
?process.parent.name == "uac" or
?process.parent.executable in ("/opt/secl/linux-ir-scripts-v3/thieves.sh", "/opt/traps/rpm-installer/setup.sh") or
?process.working_directory like ("/opt/traps/deb-installer", "/opt/Tanium/TaniumClient/*") or
?process.parent.executable like ("/home/*/sunlight/thieves.sh")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
@@ -114,3 +127,21 @@ reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/"
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1003.007"
name = "Proc Filesystem"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/007/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
rules/linux/discovery_process_capabilities.toml
+4 -7
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2024/01/09"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/02/04"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ index = ["endgame-*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*", "logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Process Capability Enumeration"
risk_score = 21
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "5c351f54-4187-4ad8-abc8-29b0cfbef8b1"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper g
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
@@ -56,7 +56,6 @@ tags = [
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "ProcessRollup2") and
@@ -98,17 +97,15 @@ In Linux environments, the `getcap` command is used to list file capabilities, w
- Implement monitoring for similar `getcap` command executions across the environment to detect and respond to future attempts promptly.
- Review and update access controls and user permissions to ensure that only authorized users have the necessary privileges to execute potentially sensitive commands like `getcap`."""
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1057"
name = "Process Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_pspy_process_monitoring_detected.toml
+37 -37
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2023/07/20"
integration = ["auditd_manager"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/01/24"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -16,7 +16,42 @@ from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected"
name = "Deprecated - Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected"
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Deprecated - Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected
Auditd is a Linux auditing system that tracks system calls, providing insights into process activities. Adversaries exploit tools like pspy to monitor processes via the /proc directory, seeking privilege escalation opportunities without root access. The detection rule identifies suspicious openat syscalls targeting /proc, excluding benign processes, to flag potential misuse of pspy for process discovery.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the process details associated with the alert, focusing on the process.pid and process.name fields to identify the process attempting to access the /proc directory.
- Investigate the host.id to determine if this activity is isolated to a single host or part of a broader pattern across multiple systems.
- Examine the process tree and parent processes of the flagged process to understand how it was initiated and if it is part of a legitimate workflow or potentially malicious activity.
- Check for any recent changes or installations on the host that might explain the presence of a tool like pspy, such as new software installations or updates.
- Correlate the timing of the alert with any other suspicious activities or alerts on the same host to identify potential lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
- Verify if the process name is a known benign process that might have been mistakenly excluded from the query, ensuring that the exclusion list is up-to-date and accurate.
### False positive analysis
- Frequent scanning by legitimate monitoring tools can trigger the rule. Identify and whitelist these tools by adding their process names to the exclusion list.
- System management scripts that regularly access the /proc directory may cause false positives. Review these scripts and exclude their process names if they are verified as non-threatening.
- Automated backup or security software that interacts with the /proc directory might be flagged. Confirm their legitimacy and add them to the exception list to prevent unnecessary alerts.
- Custom applications developed in-house that require access to the /proc directory for performance monitoring should be reviewed and excluded if they are deemed safe.
- Regularly update the exclusion list to reflect changes in legitimate software and tools used within the organization to minimize false positives.
### Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected host from the network to prevent potential lateral movement by the adversary.
- Terminate any suspicious processes identified as using the pspy utility to halt further unauthorized process monitoring.
- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's /proc directory access logs to identify any other unauthorized access attempts or anomalies.
- Reset credentials and review permissions for any accounts that may have been compromised or used in the attack to prevent further unauthorized access.
- Apply patches and updates to the affected system to address any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited for privilege escalation.
- Enhance monitoring and logging on the affected host to detect any future attempts to access the /proc directory using similar methods.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems may be affected."""
references = ["https://github.com/DominicBreuker/pspy"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "bdb04043-f0e3-4efa-bdee-7d9d13fa9edc"
@@ -61,41 +96,6 @@ sequence by process.pid, host.id with maxspan=5s
not process.name in ("agentbeat", "packetbeat")
] with runs=10
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Potential Pspy Process Monitoring Detected
Auditd is a Linux auditing system that tracks system calls, providing insights into process activities. Adversaries exploit tools like pspy to monitor processes via the /proc directory, seeking privilege escalation opportunities without root access. The detection rule identifies suspicious openat syscalls targeting /proc, excluding benign processes, to flag potential misuse of pspy for process discovery.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the process details associated with the alert, focusing on the process.pid and process.name fields to identify the process attempting to access the /proc directory.
- Investigate the host.id to determine if this activity is isolated to a single host or part of a broader pattern across multiple systems.
- Examine the process tree and parent processes of the flagged process to understand how it was initiated and if it is part of a legitimate workflow or potentially malicious activity.
- Check for any recent changes or installations on the host that might explain the presence of a tool like pspy, such as new software installations or updates.
- Correlate the timing of the alert with any other suspicious activities or alerts on the same host to identify potential lateral movement or privilege escalation attempts.
- Verify if the process name is a known benign process that might have been mistakenly excluded from the query, ensuring that the exclusion list is up-to-date and accurate.
### False positive analysis
- Frequent scanning by legitimate monitoring tools can trigger the rule. Identify and whitelist these tools by adding their process names to the exclusion list.
- System management scripts that regularly access the /proc directory may cause false positives. Review these scripts and exclude their process names if they are verified as non-threatening.
- Automated backup or security software that interacts with the /proc directory might be flagged. Confirm their legitimacy and add them to the exception list to prevent unnecessary alerts.
- Custom applications developed in-house that require access to the /proc directory for performance monitoring should be reviewed and excluded if they are deemed safe.
- Regularly update the exclusion list to reflect changes in legitimate software and tools used within the organization to minimize false positives.
### Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected host from the network to prevent potential lateral movement by the adversary.
- Terminate any suspicious processes identified as using the pspy utility to halt further unauthorized process monitoring.
- Conduct a thorough review of the affected system's /proc directory access logs to identify any other unauthorized access attempts or anomalies.
- Reset credentials and review permissions for any accounts that may have been compromised or used in the attack to prevent further unauthorized access.
- Apply patches and updates to the affected system to address any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited for privilege escalation.
- Enhance monitoring and logging on the affected host to detect any future attempts to access the /proc directory using similar methods.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems may be affected."""
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
rules/linux/discovery_subnet_scanning_activity_from_compromised_host.toml
+28 -10
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2025/03/04"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/09/02"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ Subnet scanning is a reconnaissance method used by attackers to map network topo
- Monitor network traffic closely for any signs of continued scanning or other suspicious activities from other hosts, indicating potential further compromise.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for a comprehensive investigation and to determine if additional hosts are affected.
"""
risk_score = 21
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "860f2a03-a1cf-48d6-a674-c6d62ae608a1"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper g
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
@@ -93,34 +93,52 @@ tags = [
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "esql"
query = '''
from logs-endpoint.events.network-*
| keep @timestamp, host.os.type, event.type, event.action, process.executable, destination.ip, agent.id, host.name
from logs-endpoint.events.network-* metadata _id, _index, _version
| mv_expand event.action
| where
@timestamp > now() - 1 hours and
host.os.type == "linux" and
event.type == "start" and
event.action == "connection_attempted" and
not (
process.executable in ("/usr/local/bin/prometheus", "/app/extra/chrome") or
process.executable in ("/usr/local/bin/prometheus", "/app/extra/chrome", "/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxHeadless", "/usr/bin/prometheus") or
process.executable like "/usr/local/prometheus/*/prometheus" or
process.executable like "/usr/share/elastic-agent/*" or
process.executable like "/var/lib/docker/overlay*connectord" or
process.executable like "/opt/rumble/bin/rumble-agent*" or
process.executable like "/opt/gitlab/*" or
process.executable like "/opt/google/chrome/chrome*"
process.executable like "/opt/google/chrome/chrome*" or
process.executable like "/snap/firefox/*/firefox" or
process.executable like "/var/lib/docker/overlay2/*/qbittorrent-nox"
)
| keep
@timestamp,
_id,
_index,
_version,
host.os.type,
event.type,
event.action,
process.executable,
destination.ip,
agent.id,
host.name,
event.dataset,
data_stream.namespace
| stats
Esql.event_count = count(),
Esql.destination_ip_count_distinct = count_distinct(destination.ip),
Esql.agent_id_count_distinct = count_distinct(agent.id),
Esql.host_name_values = values(host.name),
Esql.agent_id_values = values(agent.id)
Esql.agent_id_values = values(agent.id),
Esql.event_dataset_values = values(event.dataset),
Esql.data_stream_namespace_values = values(data_stream.namespace)
by process.executable
| where
Esql.agent_id_count_distinct == 1 and
Esql.destination_ip_count_distinct > 250
| sort Esql.event_count asc
| limit 100
'''
[[rule.threat]]
rules/linux/discovery_suid_sguid_enumeration.toml
+54 -55
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2023/07/24"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/02/04"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -18,56 +18,6 @@ index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "SUID/SGUID Enumeration Detected"
references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "5b06a27f-ad72-4499-91db-0c69667bffa5"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.name == "find" and process.args : "-perm" and process.args : (
"/6000", "-6000", "/4000", "-4000", "/2000", "-2000", "/u=s", "-u=s", "/g=s", "-g=s", "/u=s,g=s", "/g=s,u=s"
) and not (
user.Ext.real.id == "0" or group.Ext.real.id == "0" or process.args_count >= 12 or
(process.args : "/usr/bin/pkexec" and process.args : "-xdev" and process.args_count == 7)
)
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
@@ -101,37 +51,87 @@ In Linux, SUID and SGID permissions allow programs to execute with elevated priv
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for a deeper forensic analysis to determine the scope of the compromise and identify any other affected systems.
- Apply patches and updates to the system and any vulnerable applications to mitigate known vulnerabilities that could be exploited through SUID/SGID binaries.
- Review and enhance access controls and privilege management policies to minimize the risk of privilege escalation through misconfigured binaries in the future."""
references = ["https://www.elastic.co/security-labs/primer-on-persistence-mechanisms"]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "5b06a27f-ad72-4499-91db-0c69667bffa5"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.name == "find" and process.args : "-perm" and process.args : (
"/6000", "-6000", "/4000", "-4000", "/2000", "-2000", "/u=s", "-u=s", "/g=s", "-g=s", "/u=s,g=s", "/g=s,u=s"
) and not (
user.Ext.real.id == "0" or group.Ext.real.id == "0" or process.args_count >= 12 or
(process.args : "/usr/bin/pkexec" and process.args : "-xdev" and process.args_count == 7)
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1083"
name = "File and Directory Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1548"
name = "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1548.001"
name = "Setuid and Setgid"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0004"
name = "Privilege Escalation"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
@@ -139,4 +139,3 @@ framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
rules/linux/discovery_suspicious_memory_grep_activity.toml
+10 -10
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/02/05"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "auditd_manager"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/20"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@ read a process's memory map to identify memory addresses for code injection or p
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -57,14 +59,15 @@ In Linux, the `/proc/*/maps` file reveals a process's memory layout, crucial for
- Implement stricter access controls and monitoring on sensitive files and directories, such as `/proc/*/maps`, to prevent unauthorized access.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to assess the need for broader organizational response measures."""
references = ["https://github.com/arget13/DDexec"]
risk_score = 21
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "d74d6506-427a-4790-b170-0c2a6ddac799"
severity = "low"
severity = "high"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
@@ -73,24 +76,21 @@ tags = [
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "fgrep", "rgrep") and process.args in ("[stack]", "[vdso]", "[heap]")
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
process.name in ("grep", "egrep", "fgrep", "rgrep") and process.args in ("[stack]", "[vdso]", "[heap]")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1057"
name = "Process Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1057/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_suspicious_network_tool_launched_inside_container.toml
+37 -36
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2025/03/12"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/12"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -24,6 +24,39 @@ index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Network Tool Launched Inside A Container"
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Suspicious Network Tool Launched Inside A Container
Containers are lightweight, portable units that encapsulate applications and their dependencies, often used to ensure consistent environments across development and production. Adversaries exploit network tools within containers for reconnaissance or lateral movement, leveraging utilities like `nc` or `nmap` to map networks or intercept traffic. The detection rule identifies these tools' execution by monitoring process starts and arguments, flagging potential misuse for further investigation.
### Possible investigation steps
- Examine the process arguments to understand the specific command or options used, which may provide insight into the intent of the tool's execution.
- Check the container's creation and modification timestamps to determine if the container was recently deployed or altered, which could indicate suspicious activity.
- Investigate the user or service account associated with the process start event to assess if it aligns with expected behavior or if it might be compromised.
- Analyze network logs and traffic patterns from the container to identify any unusual outbound connections or data exfiltration attempts.
- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs from the same container or host to identify potential lateral movement or further malicious activity.
### False positive analysis
- Development and testing environments often use network tools for legitimate purposes such as debugging or network configuration. To manage this, create exceptions for containers identified as part of these environments by tagging them appropriately and excluding them from the rule.
- Automated scripts or orchestration tools may trigger network utilities for routine checks or maintenance tasks. Identify these scripts and whitelist their associated container IDs or process names to prevent false alerts.
- Some monitoring solutions deploy containers with built-in network tools for performance analysis. Verify the legitimacy of these containers and exclude them from the rule by using specific labels or container IDs.
- Containers used for educational or training purposes might intentionally run network tools. Ensure these containers are marked and excluded from detection by setting up rules based on their unique identifiers or labels.
### Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected container to prevent further network reconnaissance or lateral movement. This can be done by restricting its network access or stopping the container entirely.
- Conduct a thorough review of the container's logs and process history to identify any unauthorized access or data exfiltration attempts. Focus on the execution of the flagged network utilities.
- Remove any unauthorized or suspicious network tools from the container to prevent further misuse. Ensure that only necessary and approved utilities are present.
- Patch and update the container image to address any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited. Rebuild and redeploy the container using the updated image.
- Implement network segmentation to limit the container's access to sensitive resources and reduce the potential impact of similar threats in the future.
- Enhance monitoring and alerting for the execution of network utilities within containers, ensuring that any future occurrences are detected promptly.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems or containers have been compromised."""
references = ["https://sysdig.com/blog/cve-2021-25741-kubelet-falco/"]
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "7290be75-2e10-49ec-b387-d4ed55b920ff"
@@ -69,43 +102,11 @@ type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.entry_leader.entry_meta.type == "container" and process.name in (
"nc.traditional", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nmap", "dig", "nslookup", "tcpdump", "tshark", "ngrep", "telnet",
"nc.traditional", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "nmap", "tcpdump", "tshark", "ngrep", "telnet",
"mitmproxy", "socat", "zmap", "masscan", "zgrab"
)
) and
not (process.name in ("nc.traditional", "nc", "ncat", "netcat") and process.args like ("-*z*", "localhost", "127.0.0.1"))
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Suspicious Network Tool Launched Inside A Container
Containers are lightweight, portable units that encapsulate applications and their dependencies, often used to ensure consistent environments across development and production. Adversaries exploit network tools within containers for reconnaissance or lateral movement, leveraging utilities like `nc` or `nmap` to map networks or intercept traffic. The detection rule identifies these tools' execution by monitoring process starts and arguments, flagging potential misuse for further investigation.
### Possible investigation steps
- Examine the process arguments to understand the specific command or options used, which may provide insight into the intent of the tool's execution.
- Check the container's creation and modification timestamps to determine if the container was recently deployed or altered, which could indicate suspicious activity.
- Investigate the user or service account associated with the process start event to assess if it aligns with expected behavior or if it might be compromised.
- Analyze network logs and traffic patterns from the container to identify any unusual outbound connections or data exfiltration attempts.
- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs from the same container or host to identify potential lateral movement or further malicious activity.
### False positive analysis
- Development and testing environments often use network tools for legitimate purposes such as debugging or network configuration. To manage this, create exceptions for containers identified as part of these environments by tagging them appropriately and excluding them from the rule.
- Automated scripts or orchestration tools may trigger network utilities for routine checks or maintenance tasks. Identify these scripts and whitelist their associated container IDs or process names to prevent false alerts.
- Some monitoring solutions deploy containers with built-in network tools for performance analysis. Verify the legitimacy of these containers and exclude them from the rule by using specific labels or container IDs.
- Containers used for educational or training purposes might intentionally run network tools. Ensure these containers are marked and excluded from detection by setting up rules based on their unique identifiers or labels.
### Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected container to prevent further network reconnaissance or lateral movement. This can be done by restricting its network access or stopping the container entirely.
- Conduct a thorough review of the container's logs and process history to identify any unauthorized access or data exfiltration attempts. Focus on the execution of the flagged network utilities.
- Remove any unauthorized or suspicious network tools from the container to prevent further misuse. Ensure that only necessary and approved utilities are present.
- Patch and update the container image to address any vulnerabilities that may have been exploited. Rebuild and redeploy the container using the updated image.
- Implement network segmentation to limit the container's access to sensitive resources and reduce the potential impact of similar threats in the future.
- Enhance monitoring and alerting for the execution of network utilities within containers, ensuring that any future occurrences are detected promptly.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems or containers have been compromised."""
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
rules/linux/discovery_unusual_user_enumeration_via_id.toml
+51 -50
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
creation_date = "2023/08/29"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/02/04"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -16,53 +16,6 @@ index = ["logs-endpoint.events.process*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unusual User Privilege Enumeration via id"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "afa135c0-a365-43ab-aa35-fd86df314a47"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "low"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
type = "eql"
query = '''
sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=1s
[process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.name == "id" and process.args_count == 2 and
not (
process.parent.name in ("rpm", "snarftmp", "quota_copy", "java") or
process.parent.args : "/var/tmp/rpm-tmp*"
)] with runs=20
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
@@ -97,18 +50,66 @@ The `id` command in Linux environments is used to display user identity informat
- Reset credentials for any user accounts that may have been exposed or compromised during the enumeration activity.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations team for further investigation and to assess the potential impact on other systems within the network.
- Implement enhanced monitoring and logging for similar enumeration activities to improve detection and response capabilities for future incidents."""
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "afa135c0-a365-43ab-aa35-fd86df314a47"
setup = """## Setup
This rule requires data coming in from Elastic Defend.
### Elastic Defend Integration Setup
Elastic Defend is integrated into the Elastic Agent using Fleet. Upon configuration, the integration allows the Elastic Agent to monitor events on your host and send data to the Elastic Security app.
#### Prerequisite Requirements:
- Fleet is required for Elastic Defend.
- To configure Fleet Server refer to the [documentation](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/fleet-server.html).
#### The following steps should be executed in order to add the Elastic Defend integration on a Linux System:
- Go to the Kibana home page and click "Add integrations".
- In the query bar, search for "Elastic Defend" and select the integration to see more details about it.
- Click "Add Elastic Defend".
- Configure the integration name and optionally add a description.
- Select the type of environment you want to protect, either "Traditional Endpoints" or "Cloud Workloads".
- Select a configuration preset. Each preset comes with different default settings for Elastic Agent, you can further customize these later by configuring the Elastic Defend integration policy. [Helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/configure-endpoint-integration-policy.html).
- We suggest selecting "Complete EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response)" as a configuration setting, that provides "All events; all preventions"
- Enter a name for the agent policy in "New agent policy name". If other agent policies already exist, you can click the "Existing hosts" tab and select an existing policy instead.
For more details on Elastic Agent configuration settings, refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/8.10/agent-policy.html).
- Click "Save and Continue".
- To complete the integration, select "Add Elastic Agent to your hosts" and continue to the next section to install the Elastic Agent on your hosts.
For more details on Elastic Defend refer to the [helper guide](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/install-endpoint.html).
"""
severity = "medium"
tags = [
"Domain: Endpoint",
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
type = "eql"
query = '''
sequence by host.id, process.parent.entity_id with maxspan=1s
[process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.name == "id" and process.args_count == 2 and
not (
process.parent.name in ("rpm", "snarftmp", "quota_copy", "java") or
process.parent.args like (
"/var/tmp/rpm-tmp*", "/tmp/netdata-kickstart.sh", "./k8s-certifikator.sh", "/usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh",
"./set_quota.sh"
) or
(process.parent.name == "java" and process.args == "oracle")
)] with runs=20
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1033"
name = "System Owner/User Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_virtual_machine_fingerprinting.toml
+64 -52
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/04/27"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike"]
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "auditd_manager"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/10/17"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -18,10 +18,52 @@ false_positives = [
""",
]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*", "logs-crowdstrike.fdr*"]
language = "kuery"
index = [
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-endpoint.events.*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Virtual Machine Fingerprinting"
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Virtual Machine Fingerprinting
Virtual Machine Fingerprinting involves identifying characteristics of a virtual environment, often to tailor attacks or evade detection. Adversaries exploit this by querying system files for hardware details, a tactic seen in malware like Pupy RAT. The detection rule flags non-root users accessing specific Linux paths indicative of VM queries, signaling potential reconnaissance activities.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the process execution details to identify the non-root user involved in accessing the specified paths, focusing on the user.name field.
- Examine the process.args field to determine which specific file paths were accessed, as this can indicate the type of virtual machine information being targeted.
- Investigate the parent process and command line arguments to understand the context of the process initiation and whether it aligns with legitimate user activity.
- Check for any related alerts or logs around the same timeframe to identify potential patterns or repeated attempts at virtual machine fingerprinting.
- Assess the system for any signs of compromise or unauthorized access, particularly focusing on the presence of known malware like Pupy RAT or similar threats.
- Correlate the findings with MITRE ATT&CK framework references (TA0007, T1082) to understand the broader tactics and techniques potentially in use by the adversary.
### False positive analysis
- Non-root users running legitimate scripts or applications that query system files for hardware information may trigger the rule. Review the context of the process and user activity to determine if it aligns with expected behavior.
- System administrators or developers using automated tools for inventory or monitoring purposes might access these paths. Consider creating exceptions for known tools or scripts that are verified as safe.
- Security or compliance audits conducted by non-root users could inadvertently match the rule's criteria. Document and whitelist these activities if they are part of regular operations.
- Development environments where virtual machine detection is part of testing processes may cause false positives. Identify and exclude these environments from the rule's scope if they are consistently flagged.
- Regularly review and update the list of exceptions to ensure that only verified and necessary exclusions are maintained, minimizing the risk of overlooking genuine threats.
### Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further reconnaissance or potential lateral movement by the adversary.
- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert that are attempting to access the specified system files, especially those not initiated by the root user.
- Conduct a thorough review of recent user activity and process logs to identify any unauthorized access or anomalies that may indicate further compromise.
- Reset credentials for any non-root users involved in the alert to prevent unauthorized access, and review user permissions to ensure least privilege principles are enforced.
- Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to monitor for similar suspicious activities and enhance visibility into system processes and user actions.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for the specific file paths and processes identified in the query to detect and respond to future attempts at virtual machine fingerprinting."""
risk_score = 73
rule_id = "5b03c9fb-9945-4d2f-9568-fd690fee3fba"
setup = """## Setup
@@ -69,68 +111,38 @@ tags = [
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
"Data Source: SentinelOne",
"Resources: Investigation Guide",
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
type = "eql"
query = '''
event.category:process and host.os.type:linux and event.type:(start or process_started) and
process.args:("/sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version" or
"/sys/class/dmi/id/product_name" or
"/sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor" or
"/proc/scsi/scsi" or
"/proc/ide/hd0/model") and
not user.name:root
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "process_started") and
process.args in (
"/sys/class/dmi/id/bios_version", "/sys/class/dmi/id/product_name", "/sys/class/dmi/id/chassis_vendor",
"/proc/scsi/scsi", "/proc/ide/hd0/model"
) and not (
user.name == "root" or
?process.parent.name in ("LinkManager.exe", "saposcol", "svc_snow_discovery") or
?process.working_directory == "/home/qualys" or
?process.parent.executable in (
"/usr/sara/sbin/sys2prometheus", "/usr/sara/sbin/sys2ganglia", "/usr/libexec/valgrind/memcheck-amd64-linux",
"/var/lib/cfengine3/modules/init_node", "/opt/emby-server/system/EmbyServer"
)
)
'''
note = """## Triage and analysis
> **Disclaimer**:
> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
### Investigating Virtual Machine Fingerprinting
Virtual Machine Fingerprinting involves identifying characteristics of a virtual environment, often to tailor attacks or evade detection. Adversaries exploit this by querying system files for hardware details, a tactic seen in malware like Pupy RAT. The detection rule flags non-root users accessing specific Linux paths indicative of VM queries, signaling potential reconnaissance activities.
### Possible investigation steps
- Review the process execution details to identify the non-root user involved in accessing the specified paths, focusing on the user.name field.
- Examine the process.args field to determine which specific file paths were accessed, as this can indicate the type of virtual machine information being targeted.
- Investigate the parent process and command line arguments to understand the context of the process initiation and whether it aligns with legitimate user activity.
- Check for any related alerts or logs around the same timeframe to identify potential patterns or repeated attempts at virtual machine fingerprinting.
- Assess the system for any signs of compromise or unauthorized access, particularly focusing on the presence of known malware like Pupy RAT or similar threats.
- Correlate the findings with MITRE ATT&CK framework references (TA0007, T1082) to understand the broader tactics and techniques potentially in use by the adversary.
### False positive analysis
- Non-root users running legitimate scripts or applications that query system files for hardware information may trigger the rule. Review the context of the process and user activity to determine if it aligns with expected behavior.
- System administrators or developers using automated tools for inventory or monitoring purposes might access these paths. Consider creating exceptions for known tools or scripts that are verified as safe.
- Security or compliance audits conducted by non-root users could inadvertently match the rule's criteria. Document and whitelist these activities if they are part of regular operations.
- Development environments where virtual machine detection is part of testing processes may cause false positives. Identify and exclude these environments from the rule's scope if they are consistently flagged.
- Regularly review and update the list of exceptions to ensure that only verified and necessary exclusions are maintained, minimizing the risk of overlooking genuine threats.
### Response and remediation
- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further reconnaissance or potential lateral movement by the adversary.
- Terminate any suspicious processes identified in the alert that are attempting to access the specified system files, especially those not initiated by the root user.
- Conduct a thorough review of recent user activity and process logs to identify any unauthorized access or anomalies that may indicate further compromise.
- Reset credentials for any non-root users involved in the alert to prevent unauthorized access, and review user permissions to ensure least privilege principles are enforced.
- Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to monitor for similar suspicious activities and enhance visibility into system processes and user actions.
- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
- Implement additional monitoring and alerting for the specific file paths and processes identified in the query to detect and respond to future attempts at virtual machine fingerprinting."""
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1082"
name = "System Information Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_yum_dnf_plugin_detection.toml
+12 -11
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/06/25"
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel"]
integration = ["endpoint", "crowdstrike", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "auditd_manager"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2025/03/20"
updated_date = "2025/12/18"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
@@ -13,10 +13,12 @@ attempting to establish persistence in a YUM or DNF plugin.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = [
"auditbeat-*",
"endgame-*",
"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
"logs-endpoint.events.process*",
"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
"logs-auditd_manager.auditd-*",
]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
@@ -88,6 +90,7 @@ tags = [
"OS: Linux",
"Use Case: Threat Detection",
"Tactic: Discovery",
"Data Source: Auditd Manager",
"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
"Data Source: Elastic Endgame",
"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
@@ -96,27 +99,25 @@ tags = [
]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2") and
process.name == "grep" and process.args : "plugins*" and process.args : (
"/etc/yum.conf", "/usr/lib/yum-plugins/*", "/etc/yum/pluginconf.d/*",
"/usr/lib/python*/site-packages/dnf-plugins/*", "/etc/dnf/plugins/*", "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"
)
event.action in ("exec", "exec_event", "start", "ProcessRollup2", "executed", "process_started") and
process.name == "grep" and process.args : "plugins*" and process.args like (
"/etc/yum.conf", "/usr/lib/yum-plugins/*", "/etc/yum/pluginconf.d/*",
"/usr/lib/python*/site-packages/dnf-plugins/*", "/etc/dnf/plugins/*", "/etc/dnf/dnf.conf"
) and
not ?process.parent.executable == "/usr/lib/venv-salt-minion/bin/python.original"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1082"
name = "System Information Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"