[New Rule] Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call (#1536)
* [New Rule] Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call
* updated query to catch also CallTrace with non ntdll modules
* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_suspicious_process_access_direct_syscall.toml
Co-authored-by: David French <56409778+threat-punter@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update defense_evasion_suspicious_process_access_direct_syscall.toml
Co-authored-by: David French <56409778+threat-punter@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit 81a62f5f68)
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[metadata]
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creation_date = "2021/10/11"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2021/10/11"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies suspicious process access events from unknown memory region. Endpoint security solutions usually hook userland
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Windows APIs in order to decide if the code that is being executed is malicious or not. It's possible to bypass hooked
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functions by writing malicious functions that call syscalls directly.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suspicious Process Access via Direct System Call"
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references = [
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"https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1278013896440324096",
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"https://www.ired.team/offensive-security/defense-evasion/using-syscalls-directly-from-visual-studio-to-bypass-avs-edrs"
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]
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "2dd480be-1263-4d9c-8672-172928f6789a"
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severity = "high"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Defense Evasion"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.code == "10" and
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length(winlog.event_data.CallTrace) > 0 and
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/* Sysmon CallTrace starting with unknown memory module instead of ntdll which host Windows NT Syscalls */
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not winlog.event_data.CallTrace : ("?:\\WINDOWS\\SYSTEM32\\ntdll.dll*", "?:\\WINDOWS\\SysWOW64\\ntdll.dll*")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1055"
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name = "Process Injection"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0005"
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name = "Defense Evasion"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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