[New Rule] Attempt to Remove File Quarantine Attribute (#674)

* [New Rule] Attempt to Remove File Quarantine Attribute

* Update rules/macos/defense_evasion_attempt_del_quarantine_attrib.toml

Co-authored-by: Brent Murphy <56412096+bm11100@users.noreply.github.com>

* relinted

* Update rules/macos/defense_evasion_attempt_del_quarantine_attrib.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: Brent Murphy <56412096+bm11100@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Samirbous
2020-12-08 12:27:03 +01:00
committed by GitHub
parent d1dc7b413e
commit c76439923b
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/08/14"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2020/11/03"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a potential Gatekeeper bypass. In macOS, when applications or programs are downloaded from the internet,
there is a quarantine flag set on the file. This attribute is read by Apple's Gatekeeper defense program at execution
time. An adversary may disable this attribute to evade defenses.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["auditbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License"
name = "Attempt to Remove File Quarantine Attribute"
references = [
"https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/20/k/new-macos-backdoor-connected-to-oceanlotus-surfaces.html",
]
risk_score = 43
rule_id = "f0b48bbc-549e-4bcf-8ee0-a7a72586c6a7"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "macOS", "Threat Detection", "Defense Evasion"]
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
process.name == "xattr" and process.args == "com.apple.quarantine" and process.args == "-d"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1089"
name = "Disabling Security Tools"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"