[New Rule] Evasion via Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter (#234)

* [New Rule] Evasion via Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml

Co-authored-by: Brent Murphy <56412096+bm11100@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Brent Murphy <56412096+bm11100@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Samirbous
2020-09-22 14:39:04 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 4948582d7c
commit c2e95a35dc
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/09/01"
ecs_version = ["1.6.0"]
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2020/09/01"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a suspicious AutoIt process execution. Malware written as AutoIt scripts tend to rename the AutoIt
executable to avoid detection.
"""
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "lucene"
license = "Elastic License"
name = "Renamed AutoIt Scripts Interpreter"
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "2e1e835d-01e5-48ca-b9fc-7a61f7f11902"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Windows"]
type = "query"
query = '''
event.category:process AND event.type:(start OR process_started) AND
process.pe.original_file_name:/[aA][uU][tT][oO][iI][tT]\d\.[eE][xX][eE]/ AND
NOT process.name:/[aA][uU][tT][oO][iI][tT]\d{1,3}\.[eE][xX][eE]/
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"