[New Rule] Unsigned DLL Side-Loading from a Suspicious Folder (#2409)

* Create defense_evasion_unsigned_dll_loaded_from_suspdir.toml

* Update non-ecs-schema.json

* Update defense_evasion_unsigned_dll_loaded_from_suspdir.toml

* Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_unsigned_dll_loaded_from_suspdir.toml

Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Samirbous
2023-01-25 13:23:20 +00:00
committed by GitHub
parent 8427c8cd22
commit bcd8ef15ba
2 changed files with 139 additions and 1 deletions
+3 -1
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,9 @@
"process.Ext.effective_parent.executable": "keyword",
"file.Ext.header_bytes": "keyword",
"file.Ext.entropy": "long",
"file.size": "long"
"file.size": "long",
"dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time": "long",
"dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time": "long"
},
"logs-windows.*": {
"powershell.file.script_block_text": "text"
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2022/11/22"
maturity = "production"
integration = ["endpoint"]
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.4.0"
updated_date = "2022/11/22"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies a Windows trusted program running from locations often abused by adversaries to masquerade as a trusted
program and loading a recently dropped DLL. This behavior may indicate an attempt to evade defenses via side-loading
a malicious DLL within the memory space of a signed processes.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unsigned DLL Side-Loading from a Suspicious Folder"
note = """## Setup
If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
"""
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "ca98c7cf-a56e-4057-a4e8-39603f7f0389"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Defense Evasion"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
library where
process.code_signature.trusted == true and
(dll.Ext.relative_file_creation_time <= 500 or dll.Ext.relative_file_name_modify_time <= 500) and
not dll.code_signature.status : ("trusted", "errorExpired", "errorCode_endpoint*", "errorChaining") and
/* Suspicious Paths */
dll.path : ("?:\\PerfLogs\\*.dll",
"?:\\Users\\*\\Pictures\\*.dll",
"?:\\Users\\*\\Music\\*.dll",
"?:\\Users\\Public\\*.dll",
"?:\\Users\\*\\Documents\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Tasks\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks\\*.dll",
"?:\\Intel\\*.dll",
"?:\\AMD\\Temp\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\AppReadiness\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\ServiceState\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\security\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\System\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\IdentityCRL\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Branding\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\csc\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\DigitalLocker\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\en-US\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\wlansvc\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Prefetch\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Fonts\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\diagnostics\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\TAPI\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\INF\\*.dll",
"?:\\windows\\tracing\\*.dll",
"?:\\windows\\IME\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Performance\\*.dll",
"?:\\windows\\intel\\*.dll",
"?:\\windows\\ms\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\dot3svc\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\ServiceProfiles\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\panther\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\RemotePackages\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\OCR\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\appcompat\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\apppatch\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\addins\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Setup\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Help\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\SKB\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Vss\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Web\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\servicing\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\CbsTemp\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Logs\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\WaaS\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\twain_32\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\ShellExperiences\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\ShellComponents\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\PLA\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Migration\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\debug\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Cursors\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Containers\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Boot\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\bcastdvr\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\TextInput\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\schemas\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\SchCache\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Resources\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\rescache\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Provisioning\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\PrintDialog\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\PolicyDefinitions\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\media\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\Globalization\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\L2Schemas\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\LiveKernelReports\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\ModemLogs\\*.dll",
"?:\\Windows\\ImmersiveControlPanel\\*.dll",
"?:\\$Recycle.Bin\\*.dll") and
/* DLL loaded from the process.executable current directory */
endswith~(substring(dll.path, 0, length(dll.path) - (length(dll.name) + 1)), substring(process.executable, 0, length(process.executable) - (length(process.name) + 1)))
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1574"
name = "Hijack Execution Flow"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1574.002"
name = "DLL Side-Loading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1574/002/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"