[New Rule] UAC Bypass via Elevated COM IEinstall (#450)

* [New Rule] Bypass UAC via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-on Installer * Linted * Update privilege_escalation_uac_bypass_com_ieinstal.toml * adjusted executable path for better performance * Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_uac_bypass_com_ieinstal.toml Co-authored-by: David French <56409778+threat-punter@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_uac_bypass_com_ieinstal.toml Co-authored-by: David French <56409778+threat-punter@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/privilege_escalation_uac_bypass_com_ieinstal.toml Co-authored-by: David French <56409778+threat-punter@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: David French <56409778+threat-punter@users.noreply.github.com>
2020-11-17 21:21:15 +01:00
parent 3af915ff49
commit ba4b8bc3e3
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+[metadata]
+creation_date = "2020/11/03"
+ecs_version = ["1.6.0"]
+maturity = "production"
+updated_date = "2020/11/03"
+
+[rule]
+author = ["Elastic"]
+description = """
+Identifies User Account Control (UAC) bypass attempts by abusing an elevated COM Interface to launch a malicious
+program. Attackers may attempt to bypass UAC to stealthily execute code with elevated permissions.
+"""
+from = "now-9m"
+index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*"]
+language = "eql"
+license = "Elastic License"
+name = "UAC Bypass Attempt via Elevated COM Internet Explorer Add-On Installer"
+references = ["https://swapcontext.blogspot.com/2020/11/uac-bypasses-from-comautoapprovallist.html"]
+risk_score = 47
+rule_id = "fc7c0fa4-8f03-4b3e-8336-c5feab0be022"
+severity = "medium"
+tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Privilege Escalation"]
+type = "eql"
+
+query = '''
+process where event.type in ("start", "process_started", "info") and
+ wildcard(process.executable, "C:\\*\\AppData\\*\\Temp\\IDC*.tmp\\*.exe") and
+ process.parent.name == "ieinstal.exe" and process.parent.args == "-Embedding"
+
+ /* uncomment once in winlogbeat */
+ /* and not (process.code_signature.subject_name == "Microsoft Corporation" and process.code_signature.trusted == true) */
+'''
+
+
+[[rule.threat]]
+framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
+[[rule.threat.technique]]
+id = "T1088"
+name = "Bypass User Account Control"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088/"
+
+
+[rule.threat.tactic]
+id = "TA0004"
+name = "Privilege Escalation"
+reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"