[New] Suricata and Elastic Defend Network Correlation (#5443)
* [New] Suricata and Elastic Defend - Command and Control Correlation This detection correlates Suricata alerts and events with Elastic Defend network events to identify the source process performing the network activity. * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * Update command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml * add suricata to schemas * merge from main * reset schemas * Update rules/cross-platform/command_and_control_suricata_elastic_defend_c2.toml Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
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[metadata]
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creation_date = "2025/12/10"
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integration = ["endpoint", "suricata"]
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2025/12/10"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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This detection correlates Suricata alerts with Elastic Defend network events to identify the source process performing
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the network activity.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.network-*", "filebeat-*", "logs-suricata.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Suricata and Elastic Defend Network Correlation"
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references = [
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"https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/",
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"https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/suricata",
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"https://www.elastic.co/docs/reference/integrations/endpoint"
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "9edd000e-cbd1-4d6a-be72-2197b5625a05"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = [
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"Domain: Endpoint",
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"Domain: Network",
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"OS: Linux",
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"OS: Windows",
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"OS: macOS",
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"Use Case: Threat Detection",
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"Tactic: Command and Control",
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"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
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"Data Source: Suricata",
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"Resources: Investigation Guide",
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]
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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sequence by source.port, source.ip, destination.ip with maxspan=1m
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[network where event.dataset == "suricata.eve" and event.kind == "alert" and event.severity != 3 and source.ip != null and destination.ip != null]
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[network where event.module == "endpoint" and event.action in ("disconnect_received", "connection_attempted")]
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'''
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Suricata and Elastic Defend Network Correlation
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### Possible investigation steps
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- Investigate in the Timeline feature the two events matching this correlation (Suricata and Elastic Defend).
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- Review the process details like command_line, privileges, global relevance and reputation.
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- Assess the destination.ip reputation and global relevance.
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- Review the parent process execution details like command_line, global relevance and reputation.
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- Examine all network connection details performed by the process during last 48h.
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- Correlate the alert with other security events or logs to identify any patterns or additional indicators of compromise related to the same process or network activity.
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### False positive analysis
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- Trusted system or third party processes performing network activity that looks like beaconing.
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### Response and remediation
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- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further unauthorized access or data exfiltration.
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- Terminate the suspicious processes and all associated children and parents.
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- Implement network-level controls to block traffic to the destination.ip.
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- Conduct a thorough review of the system's configuration files to identify unauthorized changes.
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- Reset credentials for any accounts associated with the source machine.
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- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further investigation and to determine if additional systems are affected.
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"""
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0011"
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name = "Command and Control"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0011/"
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