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[Security Content] Add Investigation Guides to Threat Intel rules (#2827)

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* [Proposal] [DRAFT] Break Threat Intel Indicator Match rules into Indicator-type rules

* .

* Update threat_intel_indicator_match_hash.toml

* Update to include expiring rules, exclude expiring indexes

* .

* Apply suggestions from code review

* Push changes

* Update pyproject.toml

* Revert "Update pyproject.toml"

This reverts commit 17cfafbd96f337df756d87909d2478545ac9efe7.

* Update pyproject.toml

* Update integration-schemas.json.gz

* Revert "Update integration-schemas.json.gz"

This reverts commit 7dc19b7ccbf41f34b94d02b0ed702bd83df82f9d.

* Revert integrations-manifests to the one from main

* Fix maturity

* Update Name

* Update ignore_ids with the indicator rules guid

* Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_indicator_match_registry_expiring.toml

* Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_indicator_match_address_expiring.toml

* Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_indicator_match_hash_expiring.toml

* Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_indicator_match_url_expiring.toml

* Make changes to use labels

* Update non-ecs-schema.json

* Update rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_fleet_integrations.toml

* Apply suggestions from code review

* Backport to 8.5

* [Security Content] Add Investigation Guides to Threat Intel rules

* Fix Rule threat filters, add tags, and compatibility with process and dll fields for hash indicators

* Update threat_intel_indicator_match_hash.toml

* Update threat_intel_indicator_match_url.toml

* Update threat_intel_indicator_match_url.toml

* Apply suggestions from review, adds Setup guide

* Apply suggestions from code review

Co-authored-by: Nastasha Solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Colson Wilhoit <48036388+DefSecSentinel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Nastasha Solomon <79124755+nastasha-solomon@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jonhnathan
2023-07-27 11:30:14 -03:00
committed by GitHub
parent bbb24704b6
commit 9387a081bc
4 changed files with 234 additions and 0 deletions
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rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_indicator_match_address.toml
+58
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,64 @@ interval = "1h"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Threat Intel IP Address Indicator Match
Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
This rule is triggered when an IP address indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against a network event.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation so you can understand the nature of the connection. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field.
- Investigate the IP address, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
- Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Execute a reverse DNS lookup to retrieve hostnames associated with the given IP address.
- Assess whether this behavior is prevalent in the environment by looking for similar occurrences across hosts.
- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
### False Positive Analysis
- When a match is found, it's important to consider the indicator's initial release date. Threat intelligence is useful for augmenting existing security processes but can quickly become outdated. In other words, some threat intelligence only represents a specific set of activity observed at a specific time. For example, an IP address may have hosted malware observed in a Dridex campaign months ago, but it's possible that IP has been remediated and no longer represents any threat.
- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure.
- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning.
### Response and Remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work. Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration), the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration), or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_indicator_match_hash.toml
+60
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,66 @@ interval = "1h"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Threat Intel Hash Indicator Match
Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or an indicator ingested from a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, file operation events, etc.
> **Note**:
> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Gain context about the field that matched the local observation. This information can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.field` field.
- Investigate the hash , which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
- Search for the existence and reputation of the hash in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Scope other potentially compromised hosts in your environment by mapping hosts with file operations involving the same hash.
- Identify the process that created the file.
- Investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Enrich the information that you have right now by determining how the file was dropped, where it was downloaded from, etc. This can help you determine if the event is part of an ongoing campaign against the organization.
- Retrieve the involved file and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
### False Positive Analysis
- Adversaries often use legitimate tools as network administrators, such as `PsExec` or `AdFind`. These tools are often included in indicator lists, which creates the potential for false positives.
### Response and Remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work. Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration), the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration), or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_indicator_match_registry.toml
+55
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,61 @@ interval = "1h"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Threat Intel Windows Registry Indicator Match
Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
This rule is triggered when a Windows registry indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains registry data.
> **Note**:
> This investigation guide uses the [Osquery Markdown Plugin](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/invest-guide-run-osquery.html) introduced in Elastic Stack version 8.5.0. Older Elastic Stack versions will display unrendered Markdown in this guide.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Check related threat reports to gain context about the registry indicator of compromise (IoC) and to understand if it's a system-native mechanism abused for persistence, to store data, to disable security mechanisms, etc. Use this information to define the appropriate triage and respond steps.
- Identify the process responsible for the registry operation and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
### False Positive Analysis
- Adversaries can leverage dual-use registry mechanisms that are commonly used by normal applications. These registry keys can be added into indicator lists creating the potential for false positives.
### Response and Remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work. Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration), the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration), or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",
rules/cross-platform/threat_intel_indicator_match_url.toml
+61
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,67 @@ interval = "1h"
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Threat Intel URL Indicator Match"
note = """## Triage and Analysis
### Investigating Threat Intel URL Indicator Match
Threat Intel indicator match rules allow matching from a local observation, such as an endpoint event that records a file hash with an entry of a file hash stored within the Threat Intel integrations index.
Matches are based on threat intelligence data that's been ingested during the last 30 days. Some integrations don't place expiration dates on their threat indicators, so we strongly recommend validating ingested threat indicators and reviewing match results. When reviewing match results, check associated activity to determine whether the event requires additional investigation.
This rule is triggered when a URL indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or a threat intelligence integration matches against an event that contains URL data, like DNS events, network logs, etc.
#### Possible investigation steps
- Investigate the URL, which can be found in the `threat.indicator.matched.atomic` field:
- Identify the type of malicious activity related to the URL (phishing, malware, etc.).
- Check the reputation of the IP address in resources like VirusTotal, Hybrid-Analysis, CISCO Talos, Any.run, etc.
- Execute a WHOIS lookup to retrieve information about the domain registration and contacts to report abuse.
- If dealing with a phishing incident:
- Contact the user to gain more information around the delivery method, information sent, etc.
- Analyze whether the URL is trying to impersonate a legitimate address. Look for typosquatting, extra or unusual subdomains, or other anomalies that could lure the user.
- Investigate the phishing page to identify which information may have been sent to the attacker by the user.
- Identify the process responsible for the connection, and investigate the process execution chain (parent process tree) for unknown processes. Examine their executable files for prevalence, whether they are located in expected locations, and if they are signed with valid digital signatures.
- Retrieve the involved process executable and examine the host for derived artifacts that indicate suspicious activities:
- Analyze the process executable using a private sandboxed analysis system.
- Observe and collect information about the following activities in both the sandbox and the alert subject host:
- Attempts to contact external domains and addresses.
- Use the Elastic Defend network events to determine domains and addresses contacted by the subject process by filtering by the process' `process.entity_id`.
- Examine the DNS cache for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_0
- Use the Elastic Defend registry events to examine registry keys accessed, modified, or created by the related processes in the process tree.
- Examine the host services for suspicious or anomalous entries.
- $osquery_1
- $osquery_2
- $osquery_3
- Using the data collected through the analysis, scope users targeted and other machines infected in the environment.
### False Positive Analysis
- False positives might occur after large and publicly written campaigns if curious employees interact with attacker infrastructure.
- Some feeds may include internal or known benign addresses by mistake (e.g., 8.8.8.8, google.com, 127.0.0.1, etc.). Make sure you understand how blocking a specific domain or address might impact the organization or normal system functioning.
### Response and Remediation
- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
- If the triage identified malware, search the environment for additional compromised hosts.
- Implement temporary network rules, procedures, and segmentation to contain the malware.
- Stop suspicious processes.
- Immediately block the identified indicators of compromise (IoCs).
- Inspect the affected systems for additional malware backdoors like reverse shells, reverse proxies, or droppers that attackers could use to reinfect the system.
- Consider reporting the address for abuse using the provided contact information.
- Remove and block malicious artifacts identified during triage.
- Run a full antimalware scan. This may reveal additional artifacts left in the system, persistence mechanisms, and malware components.
- Determine the initial vector abused by the attacker and take action to prevent reinfection through the same vector.
- Using the incident response data, update logging and audit policies to improve the mean time to detect (MTTD) and the mean time to respond (MTTR).
## Setup
This rule needs threat intelligence indicators to work. Threat intelligence indicators can be collected using an [Elastic Agent integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#agent-ti-integration), the [Threat Intel module](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#ti-mod-integration), or a [custom integration](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html#custom-ti-integration).
More information can be found [here](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/current/es-threat-intel-integrations.html).
"""
references = [
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/beats/filebeat/current/filebeat-module-threatintel.html",
"https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/security/master/es-threat-intel-integrations.html",