[New Rules] Veeam Credential Access DRs (#3516)

* [New Rules] Veeam Credential Access DRs

* bump

* Update credential_access_veeam_commands.toml

* Update credential_access_veeam_backup_dll_imageload.toml

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_veeam_backup_dll_imageload.toml

Co-authored-by: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>

* Update credential_access_veeam_commands.toml

* Update rules/windows/credential_access_veeam_backup_dll_imageload.toml

Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Ruben Groenewoud <78494512+Aegrah@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Samirbous <64742097+Samirbous@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Terrance DeJesus <99630311+terrancedejesus@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jonhnathan
2024-03-21 10:00:48 -03:00
committed by GitHub
parent a6028b43b3
commit 779fa7710d
3 changed files with 242 additions and 0 deletions
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/03/14"
integration = ["windows"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2024/03/14"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies PowerShell scripts that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use
Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.powershell*"]
language = "kuery"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "PowerShell Script with Veeam Credential Access Capabilities"
references = [
"https://forums.veeam.com/veeam-backup-replication-f2/recover-esxi-password-in-veeam-t34630.html",
"https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/anatomy-of-alpha-spider-ransomware/"
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "5c602cba-ae00-4488-845d-24de2b6d8055"
setup = """## Setup
The 'PowerShell Script Block Logging' logging policy must be enabled.
Steps to implement the logging policy with Advanced Audit Configuration:
```
Computer Configuration >
Administrative Templates >
Windows PowerShell >
Turn on PowerShell Script Block Logging (Enable)
```
Steps to implement the logging policy via registry:
```
reg add "hklm\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging" /v EnableScriptBlockLogging /t REG_DWORD /d 1
```
"""
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Data Source: PowerShell Logs"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "query"
query = '''
event.category:process and host.os.type:windows and
powershell.file.script_block_text : (
(
"[dbo].[Credentials]" and
("Veeam" or "VeeamBackup")
) or
"ProtectedStorage]::GetLocalString"
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1555"
name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.001"
name = "PowerShell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/03/14"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2024/03/14"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies potential credential decrypt operations by PowerShell or unsigned processes using the Veeam.Backup.Common.dll
library. Attackers can use Veeam Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware
attacks.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.library*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Veeam Backup Library Loaded by Unusual Process"
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "aaab30ec-b004-4191-95e1-4a14387ef6a6"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
library where host.os.type == "windows" and event.action == "load" and
(dll.name : "Veeam.Backup.Common.dll" or dll.pe.original_file_name : "Veeam.Backup.Common.dll") and
(
process.code_signature.trusted == false or
process.code_signature.exists == false or
process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe")
)
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1555"
name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.001"
name = "PowerShell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
[metadata]
creation_date = "2024/03/14"
integration = ["windows", "endpoint", "system"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2024/03/14"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies commands that can access and decrypt Veeam credentials stored in MSSQL databases. Attackers can use Veeam
Credentials to target backups as part of destructive operations such as Ransomware attacks.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.process-*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*", "logs-system.security*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Potential Veeam Credential Access Command"
references = [
"https://thedfirreport.com/2021/12/13/diavol-ransomware/"
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "b661f86d-1c23-4ce7-a59e-2edbdba28247"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
(
(process.name : "sqlcmd.exe" or process.pe.original_file_name : "sqlcmd.exe") or
process.args : ("Invoke-Sqlcmd", "Invoke-SqlExecute", "Invoke-DbaQuery", "Invoke-SqlQuery")
) and
process.args : "*[VeeamBackup].[dbo].[Credentials]*"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1003"
name = "OS Credential Dumping"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1555"
name = "Credentials from Password Stores"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0006"
name = "Credential Access"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1059"
name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1059.001"
name = "PowerShell"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"