[New Rule] M365 SharePoint Site Administrator Added (#5806)
* [New Rule] M365 SharePoint Site Administrator Added * Update rules/integrations/o365/privilege_escalation_sharepoint_site_collection_admin_added.toml Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com>
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[metadata]
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creation_date = "2026/03/02"
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integration = ["o365"]
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2026/03/02"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic", "Austin Songer"]
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description = """
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Identifies when a new SharePoint Site Administrator is added in Microsoft 365. Site Administrators
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have full control over SharePoint Sites, including the ability to manage permissions, access all content, and
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modify site settings. Adversaries who compromise a privileged account may add themselves or a controlled account as a
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Site Administrator to maintain persistent, high-privilege access to sensitive SharePoint data. This technique
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was notably observed in the 0mega ransomware campaign, where attackers elevated privileges to exfiltrate data and deploy
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ransom notes across SharePoint sites.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"Legitimate IT administrators adding Site admins as part of routine SharePoint site management.",
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"Automated provisioning tools or scripts that assign Site admin roles during site creation workflows.",
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"Organizational restructuring where site ownership is being transferred to new administrators.",
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]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-o365.audit-*"]
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language = "kuery"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "M365 SharePoint Site Administrator Added"
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note = """## Triage and Analysis
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### Investigating M365 SharePoint Site Administrator Added
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Site Administrators in SharePoint Online have full control over a Site, including the ability to manage permissions, access all content, and configure site-level settings. Adversaries who gain access to a privileged account may assign Site Administrator rights to maintain persistent access or facilitate data exfiltration. The `SiteCollectionAdminAdded` audit event is logged when this privilege is granted.
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#### Possible Investigation Steps
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- Review the `user.id` field to determine who performed the action. Assess whether this user normally manages SharePoint site permissions.
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- Examine the `o365.audit.ModifiedProperties.SiteAdmin.NewValue` field to identify the account that was granted Site Administrator privileges.
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- Check the `o365.audit.SiteUrl` or `url.original` to determine which Site was targeted. Assess the sensitivity of the data stored in this site.
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- Review the `o365.audit.TargetUserOrGroupName` and `o365.audit.TargetUserOrGroupType` fields for additional context on the target principal.
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- Pivot to sign-in logs for the acting account to look for anomalies such as logins from unfamiliar locations, devices, or IP ranges.
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- Investigate whether the newly added admin account has performed subsequent actions such as file downloads, permission changes, or sharing link creation.
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- Check for other recent `SiteCollectionAdminAdded` events to determine if multiple Sites were targeted in a short time frame, which may indicate bulk privilege escalation.
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### False Positive Analysis
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- Routine SharePoint administration tasks by IT teams may trigger this alert. Correlate with change management tickets or scheduled maintenance windows.
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- Automated provisioning tools that assign Site admin roles during site creation or migration workflows may generate expected alerts.
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- Organizational changes such as team transitions or restructuring may involve legitimate Site admin reassignments.
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### Response and Remediation
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- If the admin addition is unauthorized, immediately remove the Site Administrator role from the suspicious account.
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- Reset credentials for both the account that performed the action and the account that was added, especially if compromise is suspected.
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- Review recent activity on the affected Site for signs of data exfiltration, permission changes, or content modifications.
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- Enable or verify enforcement of MFA for all accounts with SharePoint administrative privileges.
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- Audit the list of Site Administrators across all Sites to identify any other unauthorized additions.
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- Consider implementing Privileged Access Management (PAM) or Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to require just-in-time elevation for SharePoint admin roles.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/purview/audit-log-activities#site-permissions-activities",
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"https://www.obsidiansecurity.com/blog/saas-ransomware-observed-sharepoint-microsoft-365/",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "98ebd6a1-77db-4fe1-b4fd-1bd3c737b780"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = [
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"Domain: Cloud",
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"Domain: SaaS",
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"Domain: Identity",
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"Data Source: Microsoft 365",
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"Data Source: Microsoft 365 Audit Logs",
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"Use Case: Identity and Access Audit",
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"Tactic: Privilege Escalation",
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"Tactic: Persistence",
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"Resources: Investigation Guide",
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]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "query"
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query = '''
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event.dataset:o365.audit
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and event.provider:(SharePoint or OneDrive)
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and event.category:web
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and event.action:SiteCollectionAdminAdded
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and event.outcome:success
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1098"
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name = "Account Manipulation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1098.003"
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name = "Additional Cloud Roles"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0004"
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name = "Privilege Escalation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0004/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1098"
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name = "Account Manipulation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1098.003"
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name = "Additional Cloud Roles"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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