[New Rule] AWS S3 Bucket Replicated to Another Account (#3895)
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[metadata]
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creation_date = "2024/07/12"
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integration = ["aws"]
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2024/07/12"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies when the `PutBucketReplication` operation is used to replicate S3 objects to a bucket in another AWS account. Adversaries may use bucket replication to exfiltrate sensitive data to an environment they control.
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"""
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false_positives = [
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"""
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Bucket replication accross accounts is a legitimate practice in some AWS environments. Ensure that the sharing is authorized before taking action.
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""",
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]
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from = "now-6m"
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index = ["filebeat-*", "logs-aws.cloudtrail-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "AWS S3 Bucket Replicated to Another Account"
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note = """
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## Triage and Analysis
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### Investigating AWS S3 Bucket Replicated to Another Account
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This rule identifies when an S3 bucket is replicated to another AWS account. While sharing bucket replication is a common practice, adversaries may exploit this feature to exfiltrate data by replicating objects to external accounts under their control.
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#### Possible Investigation Steps
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- **Identify the Actor**: Review the `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.arn` and `aws.cloudtrail.user_identity.access_key_id` fields to identify who made the change. Verify if this actor typically performs such actions and if they have the necessary permissions.
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- **Review the Sharing Event**: Identify the S3 bucket involved and review the event details. Look for `PutBucketReplication` actions where an `Account` key-value pair is included signifying replication to an external account.
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- **Request and Response Parameters**: Check the `aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters` and `aws.cloudtrail.response_elements` fields in the CloudTrail event to identify the role used and account ID where the bucket was replicated.
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- **Verify the Shared Bucket**: Check the S3 bucket that was replicated and its contents to determine the sensitivity of the data stored within it.
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- **Validate External Account**: Examine the AWS account to which the bucket was replicated. Determine whether this account is known and previously authorized to access such resources.
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- **Contextualize with Recent Changes**: Compare this sharing event against recent changes in S3 configurations. Look for any other recent permissions changes or unusual administrative actions.
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- **Correlate with Other Activities**: Search for related CloudTrail events before and after this change to see if the same actor or IP address engaged in other potentially suspicious activities.
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- **Interview Relevant Personnel**: If the share was initiated by a user, verify the intent and authorization for this action with the person or team responsible for managing DB backups and snapshots.
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### False Positive Analysis
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- **Legitimate Backup Actions**: Confirm if the S3 bucket replication aligns with scheduled backups or legitimate automation tasks.
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- **Consistency Check**: Compare the action against historical data of similar actions performed by the user or within the organization. If the action is consistent with past legitimate activities, it might indicate a false alarm.
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### Response and Remediation
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- **Immediate Review and Reversal**: If the change was unauthorized, update the S3 configurations to remove any unauthorized replication rules.
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- **Enhance Monitoring and Alerts**: Adjust monitoring systems to alert on similar actions, especially those involving sensitive data or permissions.
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- **Policy Update**: Review and possibly update your organization’s policies on S3 bucket/object sharing to tighten control and prevent unauthorized access.
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- **Incident Response**: If malicious intent is confirmed, consider it a data breach incident and initiate the incident response protocol. This includes further investigation, containment, and recovery.
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### Additional Information:
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For further guidance on managing and securing S3 buckets in AWS environments, refer to the [AWS S3 documentation](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/security.html/) and AWS best practices for security.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/userguide/replication-walkthrough-2.html/",
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"https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonS3/latest/API/API_PutBucketReplication.html/",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "d488f026-7907-4f56-ad51-742feb3db01c"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = [
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"Domain: Cloud",
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"Data Source: AWS",
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"Data Source: Amazon Web Services",
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"Data Source: AWS S3",
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"Resources: Investigation Guide",
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"Use Case: Threat Detection",
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"Tactic: Exfiltration",
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]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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any where event.dataset == "aws.cloudtrail"
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and event.action == "PutBucketReplication"
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and event.outcome == "success"
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and stringContains(aws.cloudtrail.request_parameters, "Account")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1537"
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name = "Transfer Data to Cloud Account"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0010"
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name = "Exfiltration"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0010/"
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