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Detect Threat indicators for VMware ESXi servers (#2708)

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shashank-elastic
2023-04-25 20:17:16 +05:30
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parent c60e1a61a9
commit 0107e0fcaa
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rules/linux/defense_evasion_esxi_suspicious_timestomp_touch.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.5.0"
updated_date = "2023/04/11"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies instances where the 'touch' command is executed on a Linux system with the "-r" flag,
which is used to modify the timestamp of a file based on another file's timestamp. The rule targets specific VM-related
paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*". These paths are associated with VMware virtualization
software, and their presence in the touch command arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to
tamper with timestamps of VM-related files and configurations on the system.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "ESXI Timestomping using Touch Command"
references = [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "30bfddd7-2954-4c9d-bbc6-19a99ca47e23"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Defense Evasion"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.name : "touch" and process.args : "-r" and process.args : ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1070"
name = "Indicator Removal"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1070.006"
name = "Timestomp"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/006/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
rules/linux/defense_evasion_rename_esxi_files.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.5.0"
updated_date = "2023/04/11"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies instances where VMware-related files, such as those with extensions like ".vmdk", ".vmx", ".vmxf", ".vmsd",
".vmsn", ".vswp", ".vmss", ".nvram", and ".vmem", are renamed on a Linux system. The rule monitors for the "rename"
event action associated with these file types, which could indicate malicious activity.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Renaming of ESXI Files"
references = [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "97db8b42-69d8-4bf3-9fd4-c69a1d895d68"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Defense Evasion"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "rename" and
file.Ext.original.name : ("*.vmdk", "*.vmx", "*.vmxf", "*.vmsd", "*.vmsn", "*.vswp", "*.vmss", "*.nvram", "*.vmem")
and not file.name : ("*.vmdk", "*.vmx", "*.vmxf", "*.vmsd", "*.vmsn", "*.vswp", "*.vmss", "*.nvram", "*.vmem")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1036.003"
name = "Rename System Utilities"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
rules/linux/defense_evasion_rename_esxi_index_file.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.5.0"
updated_date = "2023/04/11"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies instances where the "index.html" file within the "/usr/lib/vmware/*" directory is renamed on a Linux system.
The rule monitors for the "rename" event action associated with this specific file and path,
which could indicate malicious activity.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Renaming of ESXI index.html File"
references = [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "c125e48f-6783-41f0-b100-c3bf1b114d16"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Defense Evasion"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
file where host.os.type == "linux" and event.action == "rename" and file.name : "index.html" and
file.Ext.original.path : "/usr/lib/vmware/*"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1036"
name = "Masquerading"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1036.003"
name = "Rename System Utilities"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/003/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0005"
name = "Defense Evasion"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
rules/linux/discovery_esxi_software_via_find.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.5.0"
updated_date = "2023/04/11"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies instances where the 'find' command is started on a Linux system with arguments targeting
specific VM-related paths, such as "/etc/vmware/", "/usr/lib/vmware/", or "/vmfs/*".
These paths are associated with VMware virtualization software, and their presence in the find command arguments
may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to search for, analyze, or manipulate VM-related files
and configurations on the system.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "ESXI Discovery via Find"
references = [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "33a6752b-da5e-45f8-b13a-5f094c09522f"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Discovery"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and process.name : "find" and
process.args : ("/etc/vmware/*", "/usr/lib/vmware/*", "/vmfs/*")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1518"
name = "Software Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/discovery_esxi_software_via_grep.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.5.0"
updated_date = "2023/04/11"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies instances where a process named 'grep', 'egrep', or 'pgrep' is started on a Linux system with arguments
related to virtual machine (VM) files, such as "vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram",
or "vmem". These file extensions are associated with VM-related file formats, and their presence in grep command
arguments may indicate that a threat actor is attempting to search for, analyze, or manipulate VM files on the system.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "ESXI Discovery via Grep"
references = [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "2b662e21-dc6e-461e-b5cf-a6eb9b235ec4"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Discovery"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "start" and event.action == "exec" and
process.name : ("grep", "egrep", "pgrep") and
process.args : ("vmdk", "vmx", "vmxf", "vmsd", "vmsn", "vswp", "vmss", "nvram", "vmem")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1518"
name = "Software Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0007"
name = "Discovery"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/"
rules/linux/impact_esxi_process_kill.toml
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[metadata]
creation_date = "2023/04/11"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.5.0"
updated_date = "2023/04/11"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies instances where VMware processes, such as "vmware-vmx" or "vmx," are terminated on a Linux system
by a "kill" command. The rule monitors for the "end" event type, which signifies the termination of a process.
The presence of a "kill" command as the parent process for terminating VMware processes may indicate that a
threat actor is attempting to interfere with the virtualized environment on the targeted system.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Suspicious Termination of ESXI Process"
references = [
"https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/massive-esxiargs-ransomware-attack-targets-vmware-esxi-servers-worldwide/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "6641a5af-fb7e-487a-adc4-9e6503365318"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Linux", "Threat Detection", "Impact"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
process where host.os.type == "linux" and event.type == "end" and process.name : ("vmware-vmx", "vmx")
and process.parent.name : "kill"
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1489"
name = "Service Stop"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1489/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0040"
name = "Impact"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0040/"