Improved test coverage

* Added test case
* Removed unused code

.github/workflows/pypi-publish.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+# This workflows will upload a Python Package using Twine when a release is created
+# For more information see: https://help.github.com/en/actions/language-and-framework-guides/using-python-with-github-actions#publishing-to-package-registries
+
+name: Upload Sigmatools Package to PyPI
+on:
+  release:
+    types: [created]
+
+jobs:
+  deploy:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+    - name: Set up Python
+      uses: actions/setup-python@v1
+      with:
+        python-version: '3.x'
+    - name: Install dependencies
+      run: |
+        python -m pip install --upgrade pip
+        pip install setuptools wheel twine
+    - name: Build and publish
+      env:
+        TWINE_USERNAME: ${{ secrets.PYPI_USERNAME }}
+        TWINE_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.PYPI_PASSWORD }}
+      run: |
+        make upload

.github/workflows/sigma-test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+# This workflow will install Python dependencies, run tests and lint with a single version of Python
+# For more information see: https://help.github.com/actions/language-and-framework-guides/using-python-with-github-actions
+
+name: Sigma Tools and Rule Tests
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches:
+      - "*"
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [ master ]
+
+jobs:
+  test-sigma:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+    - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+    - name: Set up Python 3.8
+      uses: actions/setup-python@v1
+      with:
+        python-version: 3.8
+    - name: Install dependencies
+      run: |
+        python -m pip install --upgrade pip
+        pip install -r tools/requirements.txt -r tools/requirements-devel.txt
+        wget -qO - https://artifacts.elastic.co/GPG-KEY-elasticsearch | sudo apt-key add -
+        sudo apt install -y apt-transport-https
+        echo "deb https://artifacts.elastic.co/packages/7.x/apt stable main" | sudo tee -a /etc/apt/sources.list.d/elastic.list
+        sudo apt update
+        sudo apt install -y elasticsearch
+        sudo systemctl start elasticsearch
+    - name: Test Sigma Tools and Rules
+      run: |
+        make test
+    - name: Test Generated Elasticsearch Query Strings
+      run: |
+        make test-backend-es-qs
+    - name: Test SQL(ite) Backend
+      run: |
+        make test-backend-sql

.gitignore

@@ -94,3 +94,7 @@ settings.json
 
 # VisualStudio
 .vs/
+.vscode/launch.json
+
+# sigma2attack
+heatmap.json

.travis.yml

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-language: python
-dist: xenial
-python:
-    # - 3.5  # Deactivated because Travis CI tests failed randomly (Travis's problem)
-    - 3.6
-    - 3.7
-sudo: true
-services:
-    - elasticsearch
-cache: pip
-before_install:
-    - curl -O https://artifacts.elastic.co/downloads/elasticsearch/elasticsearch-6.2.4.deb && sudo dpkg -i --force-confnew elasticsearch-6.2.4.deb && sudo service elasticsearch restart
-install:
-    - pip install -r tools/requirements-devel.txt
-    - pip install -r tests/requirements-test.txt 
-script:
-    - make test
-    - make test-backend-es-qs
-notifications:
-    email:
-        recipients:
-            - venom14@gmail.com
-            - thomas@patzke.org
-        on_success: change
-        on_failure: always

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,40 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/),
 and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0.html)
 from version 0.14.0.
 
+## 0.17.0 - 2020-06-12
+
+### Added
+
+* LOGIQ Backend (logiq)
+* CarbonBlack backend (carbonblack) and field mappings
+* Elasticsearch detection rule backend (es-rule)
+* ee-outliers backend
+* CrowdStrike backend (crowdstrike)
+* Humio backend (humio)
+* Aggregations in SQL backend
+* SQLite backend (sqlite)
+* AWS Cloudtrail ECS mappings
+* Overrides
+* Zeek configurations for various backends
+* Case-insensitive matching for Elasticsearch
+* ECS proxy mappings
+* RuleName field mapping for Winlogbeat
+* sigma2attack tool
+
+### Changed
+
+* Improved usage of keyword fields for Elasticsearch-based backends
+* Splunk XML backend rule titles from sigma rule instead of file name
+* Moved backend option list to --help-backend
+* Microsoft Defender ATP schema improvements
+
+### Fixed
+
+* Splunx XML rule name is now set to rule title
+* Backend list deduplicated
+* Wrong escaping of wildcard at end of value when startswith modifier is used.
+* Direct execution of tools on Windows systems by addition of script entry points
+
 ## 0.16.0 - 2020-02-25
 
 ### Added
@@ -83,7 +117,7 @@ from version 0.14.0.
 ### Added
 
 * Index mappings for Sumologic
-* Malicious cmdlets in wdatp
+* Malicious cmdlets in mdatp
 * QRadar support for keyword searches
 * QRadar mapping improvements
 * QRadar field selection

LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+# Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.0
+
+Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy of this rule set and associated documentation files (the "Rules"), to deal in the Rules without restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Rules, and to permit persons to whom the Rules are furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+
+If you share the Rules (including in modified form), you must retain the following if it is supplied within the Rules:
+
+1. identification of the authors(s) ("author" field) of the Rule and any others designated to receive attribution, in any reasonable manner requested by the Rule author (including by pseudonym if designated).
+
+2. a URI or hyperlink to the Rule set or explicit Rule to the extent reasonably practicable
+
+3. indicate the Rules are licensed under this Detection Rule License, and include the text of, or the URI or hyperlink to, this Detection Rule License to the extent reasonably practicable
+
+THE RULES ARE PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE RULES OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE RULES.

LICENSE.GPL.txt

@@ -1,674 +0,0 @@
-                    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
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Makefile

@@ -1,106 +1,123 @@
 .PHONY: test test-rules test-sigmac test-sigma2attack
 TMPOUT = $(shell tempfile||mktemp)
 COVSCOPE = tools/sigma/*.py,tools/sigma/backends/*.py,tools/sigmac,tools/merge_sigma,tools/sigma2attack
+export COVERAGE = coverage
 test: clearcov test-rules test-sigmac test-merge test-sigma2attack build finish
 
 clearcov:
 	rm -f .coverage
 
 finish:
-	coverage report --fail-under=90
+	$(COVERAGE) report --fail-under=90
 	rm -f $(TMPOUT)
 
 test-rules:
 	yamllint rules
 	tests/test_rules.py
-	tools/sigma-uuid -Ver rules/
+	tools/sigma_uuid -Ver rules/
 
 test-sigmac:
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -h
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -l
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvd -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs --shoot-yourself-in-the-foot rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c winlogbeat tests/test-modifiers.yml > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -O rulecomment -rvdI -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t kibana -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t graylog rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t xpack-watcher -O email,index,webhook -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O alert_methods=http_post,email -O emails=test@test.invalid -O http_post_url=http://test.invalid rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert-dsl -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O alert_methods=http_post,email -O emails=test@test.invalid -O http_post_url=http://test.invalid rules/ > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunkxml -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t logpoint -c tools/config/logpoint-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t wdatp rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala-rule rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala --backend-config tests/backend_config.yml rules/windows/process_creation/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-dsl -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-rule -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t powershell -c tools/config/powershell.yml -Ocsv rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t arcsight -c tools/config/arcsight.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t arcsight-esm -c tools/config/arcsight.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t qradar -c tools/config/qradar.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t limacharlie -c tools/config/limacharlie.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t carbonblack -c tools/config/carbon-black.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t qualys -c tools/config/qualys.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t netwitness -c tools/config/netwitness.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sumologic -O rulecomment -c tools/config/sumologic.yml rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sql -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=critical,status=stable,logsource=windows,tag=attack.execution' rules/ > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=critical,status=xstable,logsource=windows' rules/ > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=xcritical,status=stable,logsource=windows' rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level=critical' rules/ > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level=xcritical' rules/ > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'foo=bar' rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c ecs-proxy -t es-qs rules/proxy > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c sysmon -c logstash-windows -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c sysmon -c logstash-windows -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -c tools/config/generic/sysmon.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -Ooutput=curl -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -Ooutput=curl -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/filebeat-defaultindex.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/generic/sysmon.yml -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t grep rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t fieldlist rules/ > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=plain -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t kibana -c tests/config-multiple_mapping.yml -c tests/config-multiple_mapping-2.yml tests/mapping-conditional-multi.yml > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=json -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -o $(TMPOUT) - < tests/collection_repeat.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE)  tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=foobar -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/not_existing.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_yaml.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-no_identifiers.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-no_condition.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-invalid_identifier_reference.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-invalid_aggregation.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-wrong_identifier_definition.yml > /dev/null
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -o /not_possible rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c not_existing rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tests/invalid_yaml.yml rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tests/invalid_config.yml rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -h
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -l
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac --backend-help es-qs
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvd -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs --shoot-yourself-in-the-foot rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c winlogbeat tests/test-modifiers.yml > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -O rulecomment -rvdI -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t kibana -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t graylog rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t xpack-watcher -O email,index,webhook -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O alert_methods=http_post,email -O emails=test@test.invalid -O http_post_url=http://test.invalid rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert-dsl -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O alert_methods=http_post,email -O emails=test@test.invalid -O http_post_url=http://test.invalid rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ee-outliers -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs -c sysmon -c winlogbeat -O case_insensitive_whitelist=* rules/windows/process_creation > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-qs -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-rule -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t kibana -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t xpack-watcher  -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t elastalert  -c tools/config/ecs-cloudtrail.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunkxml -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t logpoint -c tools/config/logpoint-windows.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t mdatp rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala-rule rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t ala --backend-config tests/backend_config.yml rules/windows/process_creation/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-dsl -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t es-rule -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t powershell -c tools/config/powershell.yml -Ocsv rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t arcsight -c tools/config/arcsight.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t arcsight-esm -c tools/config/arcsight.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t qradar -c tools/config/qradar.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t limacharlie -c tools/config/limacharlie.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t carbonblack -c tools/config/carbon-black.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t qualys -c tools/config/qualys.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t netwitness -c tools/config/netwitness.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sumologic -O rulecomment -c tools/config/sumologic.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t humio -O rulecomment -c tools/config/humio.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t crowdstrike -O rulecomment -c tools/config/crowdstrike.yml rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sql -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t sqlite -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t logiq -c sysmon rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=critical,status=stable,logsource=windows,tag=attack.execution' rules/ > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=critical,status=xstable,logsource=windows' rules/ > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level>=high,level<=xcritical,status=stable,logsource=windows' rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level=critical' rules/ > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'level=xcritical' rules/ > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t splunk -c tools/config/splunk-windows-index.yml -f 'foo=bar' rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c ecs-proxy -t es-qs rules/proxy > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c sysmon -c logstash-windows -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c sysmon -c logstash-windows -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -c tools/config/generic/sysmon.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t es-qs rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -Ooutput=curl -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -Ooutput=curl -t kibana rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-windows.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/logstash-linux.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/filebeat-defaultindex.yml -t xpack-watcher rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -c tools/config/generic/sysmon.yml -c tools/config/splunk-windows.yml -t splunk rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t grep rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -rvdI -t fieldlist rules/ > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=plain -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t kibana -c tests/config-multiple_mapping.yml -c tests/config-multiple_mapping-2.yml tests/mapping-conditional-multi.yml > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=json -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -o $(TMPOUT) - < tests/collection_repeat.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE)  tools/sigmac -t xpack-watcher -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -O output=foobar -O es=es -O foobar rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/not_existing.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_yaml.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-no_identifiers.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-no_condition.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-invalid_identifier_reference.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-invalid_aggregation.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml tests/invalid_sigma-wrong_identifier_definition.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logons_single_source.yml
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tools/config/winlogbeat.yml -o /not_possible rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c not_existing rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tests/invalid_yaml.yml rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigmac -t es-qs -c tests/invalid_config.yml rules/windows/sysmon/sysmon_mimikatz_detection_lsass.yml
 
 test-merge:
 	tests/test-merge.sh
-	! coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/merge_sigma tests/not_existing.yml > /dev/null
+	! $(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/merge_sigma tests/not_existing.yml > /dev/null
 
 test-backend-es-qs:
 	tests/test-backend-es-qs.py
 
-test-sigma2attack:
-	coverage run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigma2attack
+test-backend-sql:
+	cd tools && python3 setup.py install
+	cd tools && $(COVERAGE) run -m pytest tests/test_backend_sql.py tests/test_backend_sqlite.py
 
-build: tools/sigmac tools/merge_sigma tools/sigma/*.py tools/setup.py tools/setup.cfg
+test-sigma2attack:
+	$(COVERAGE) run -a --include=$(COVSCOPE) tools/sigma2attack
+
+build: tools/sigma/*.py tools/setup.py tools/setup.cfg
 	cd tools && python3 setup.py bdist_wheel sdist
 
 upload-test: build

Pipfile

@@ -4,16 +4,19 @@ url = "https://pypi.org/simple"
 verify_ssl = true
 
 [dev-packages]
+coverage = "~=5.0"
+yamllint = "~=1.21"
+elasticsearch = "~=7.6"
+elasticsearch-async = "~=6.2"
+pytest = "~=5.4"
+colorama = "*"
 
 [packages]
-coverage = ">=4.4.1"
-yamllint = ">=1.10.0"
-elasticsearch = "*"
-elasticsearch-async = "*"
-pymisp = "*"
-PyYAML = ">=3.11"
-progressbar2 = "*"
-colorama = "*"
+requests = "~=2.23"
+urllib3 = "~=1.25"
+progressbar2 = "~=3.47"
+pymisp = "~=2.4.123"
+PyYAML = "~=5.1"
 
 [requires]
 python_version = "3.6"

Pipfile.lock

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
     "_meta": {
         "hash": {
-            "sha256": "c553c014d5959f8c30ffdb23d4648ff872dbffd5f6f982d8c029a5b4533a959d"
+            "sha256": "588c969e3c9cf945190a258f9607bbcc53ee9715d34e538b130a852459e4848a"
         },
         "pipfile-spec": 6,
         "requires": {
@@ -16,6 +16,147 @@
         ]
     },
     "default": {
+        "attrs": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:08a96c641c3a74e44eb59afb61a24f2cb9f4d7188748e76ba4bb5edfa3cb7d1c",
+                "sha256:f7b7ce16570fe9965acd6d30101a28f62fb4a7f9e926b3bbc9b61f8b04247e72"
+            ],
+            "version": "==19.3.0"
+        },
+        "certifi": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:017c25db2a153ce562900032d5bc68e9f191e44e9a0f762f373977de9df1fbb3",
+                "sha256:25b64c7da4cd7479594d035c08c2d809eb4aab3a26e5a990ea98cc450c320f1f"
+            ],
+            "version": "==2019.11.28"
+        },
+        "chardet": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:84ab92ed1c4d4f16916e05906b6b75a6c0fb5db821cc65e70cbd64a3e2a5eaae",
+                "sha256:fc323ffcaeaed0e0a02bf4d117757b98aed530d9ed4531e3e15460124c106691"
+            ],
+            "version": "==3.0.4"
+        },
+        "deprecated": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:408038ab5fdeca67554e8f6742d1521cd3cd0ee0ff9d47f29318a4f4da31c308",
+                "sha256:8b6a5aa50e482d8244a62e5582b96c372e87e3a28e8b49c316e46b95c76a611d"
+            ],
+            "version": "==1.2.7"
+        },
+        "idna": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:7588d1c14ae4c77d74036e8c22ff447b26d0fde8f007354fd48a7814db15b7cb",
+                "sha256:a068a21ceac8a4d63dbfd964670474107f541babbd2250d61922f029858365fa"
+            ],
+            "version": "==2.9"
+        },
+        "importlib-metadata": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:2a688cbaa90e0cc587f1df48bdc97a6eadccdcd9c35fb3f976a09e3b5016d90f",
+                "sha256:34513a8a0c4962bc66d35b359558fd8a5e10cd472d37aec5f66858addef32c1e"
+            ],
+            "markers": "python_version < '3.8'",
+            "version": "==1.6.0"
+        },
+        "jsonschema": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:4e5b3cf8216f577bee9ce139cbe72eca3ea4f292ec60928ff24758ce626cd163",
+                "sha256:c8a85b28d377cc7737e46e2d9f2b4f44ee3c0e1deac6bf46ddefc7187d30797a"
+            ],
+            "version": "==3.2.0"
+        },
+        "progressbar2": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:2c21c14482016162852c8265da03886c2b4dea6f84e5a817ad9b39f6bd82a772",
+                "sha256:7849b84c01a39e4eddd2b369a129fed5e24dfb78d484ae63f9e08e58277a2928"
+            ],
+            "index": "pypi",
+            "version": "==3.50.1"
+        },
+        "pymisp": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:1d27bc81ed492b5e6e216d099dcadf943d5c0c09457d6464ed33db8da39d0fdd",
+                "sha256:318cb9cee371ce3918b3216e2c1a61938747203f89f9d42d4e4a51b40066f9b3"
+            ],
+            "index": "pypi",
+            "version": "==2.4.123"
+        },
+        "pyrsistent": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:28669905fe725965daa16184933676547c5bb40a5153055a8dee2a4bd7933ad3"
+            ],
+            "version": "==0.16.0"
+        },
+        "python-dateutil": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:73ebfe9dbf22e832286dafa60473e4cd239f8592f699aa5adaf10050e6e1823c",
+                "sha256:75bb3f31ea686f1197762692a9ee6a7550b59fc6ca3a1f4b5d7e32fb98e2da2a"
+            ],
+            "version": "==2.8.1"
+        },
+        "python-utils": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:ebaadab29d0cb9dca0a82eab9c405f5be5125dbbff35b8f32cc433fa498dbaa7",
+                "sha256:f21fc09ff58ea5ebd1fd2e8ef7f63e39d456336900f26bdc9334a03a3f7d8089"
+            ],
+            "version": "==2.4.0"
+        },
+        "pyyaml": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:1adecc22f88d38052fb787d959f003811ca858b799590a5eaa70e63dca50308c",
+                "sha256:436bc774ecf7c103814098159fbb84c2715d25980175292c648f2da143909f95",
+                "sha256:460a5a4248763f6f37ea225d19d5c205677d8d525f6a83357ca622ed541830c2",
+                "sha256:5a22a9c84653debfbf198d02fe592c176ea548cccce47553f35f466e15cf2fd4",
+                "sha256:7a5d3f26b89d688db27822343dfa25c599627bc92093e788956372285c6298ad",
+                "sha256:9372b04a02080752d9e6f990179a4ab840227c6e2ce15b95e1278456664cf2ba",
+                "sha256:a5dcbebee834eaddf3fa7366316b880ff4062e4bcc9787b78c7fbb4a26ff2dd1",
+                "sha256:aee5bab92a176e7cd034e57f46e9df9a9862a71f8f37cad167c6fc74c65f5b4e",
+                "sha256:c51f642898c0bacd335fc119da60baae0824f2cde95b0330b56c0553439f0673",
+                "sha256:c68ea4d3ba1705da1e0d85da6684ac657912679a649e8868bd850d2c299cce13",
+                "sha256:e23d0cc5299223dcc37885dae624f382297717e459ea24053709675a976a3e19"
+            ],
+            "index": "pypi",
+            "version": "==5.1"
+        },
+        "requests": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:43999036bfa82904b6af1d99e4882b560e5e2c68e5c4b0aa03b655f3d7d73fee",
+                "sha256:b3f43d496c6daba4493e7c431722aeb7dbc6288f52a6e04e7b6023b0247817e6"
+            ],
+            "index": "pypi",
+            "version": "==2.23.0"
+        },
+        "six": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:236bdbdce46e6e6a3d61a337c0f8b763ca1e8717c03b369e87a7ec7ce1319c0a",
+                "sha256:8f3cd2e254d8f793e7f3d6d9df77b92252b52637291d0f0da013c76ea2724b6c"
+            ],
+            "version": "==1.14.0"
+        },
+        "urllib3": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:2f3db8b19923a873b3e5256dc9c2dedfa883e33d87c690d9c7913e1f40673cdc",
+                "sha256:87716c2d2a7121198ebcb7ce7cccf6ce5e9ba539041cfbaeecfb641dc0bf6acc"
+            ],
+            "index": "pypi",
+            "version": "==1.25.8"
+        },
+        "wrapt": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:b62ffa81fb85f4332a4f609cab4ac40709470da05643a082ec1eb88e6d9b97d7"
+            ],
+            "version": "==1.12.1"
+        },
+        "zipp": {
+            "hashes": [
+                "sha256:aa36550ff0c0b7ef7fa639055d797116ee891440eac1a56f378e2d3179e0320b",
+                "sha256:c599e4d75c98f6798c509911d08a22e6c021d074469042177c8c86fb92eefd96"
+            ],
+            "version": "==3.1.0"
+        }
+    },
+    "develop": {
         "aiohttp": {
             "hashes": [
                 "sha256:1e984191d1ec186881ffaed4581092ba04f7c61582a177b187d3a2f07ed9719e",
@@ -47,13 +188,6 @@
             ],
             "version": "==19.3.0"
         },
-        "certifi": {
-            "hashes": [
-                "sha256:017c25db2a153ce562900032d5bc68e9f191e44e9a0f762f373977de9df1fbb3",
-                "sha256:25b64c7da4cd7479594d035c08c2d809eb4aab3a26e5a990ea98cc450c320f1f"
-            ],
-            "version": "==2019.11.28"
-        },
         "chardet": {
             "hashes": [
                 "sha256:84ab92ed1c4d4f16916e05906b6b75a6c0fb5db821cc65e70cbd64a3e2a5eaae",
@@ -71,55 +205,48 @@
         },
         "coverage": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:15cf13a6896048d6d947bf7d222f36e4809ab926894beb748fc9caa14605d9c3",
-                "sha256:1daa3eceed220f9fdb80d5ff950dd95112cd27f70d004c7918ca6dfc6c47054c",
-                "sha256:1e44a022500d944d42f94df76727ba3fc0a5c0b672c358b61067abb88caee7a0",
-                "sha256:25dbf1110d70bab68a74b4b9d74f30e99b177cde3388e07cc7272f2168bd1477",
-                "sha256:3230d1003eec018ad4a472d254991e34241e0bbd513e97a29727c7c2f637bd2a",
-                "sha256:3dbb72eaeea5763676a1a1efd9b427a048c97c39ed92e13336e726117d0b72bf",
-                "sha256:5012d3b8d5a500834783689a5d2292fe06ec75dc86ee1ccdad04b6f5bf231691",
-                "sha256:51bc7710b13a2ae0c726f69756cf7ffd4362f4ac36546e243136187cfcc8aa73",
-                "sha256:527b4f316e6bf7755082a783726da20671a0cc388b786a64417780b90565b987",
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+                "sha256:9fad78c13e71546a76c2f8789623eec8e499f8d2d799f4b4547162ce0a4df435",
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+                "sha256:c3fc325ce4cbf902d05a80daa47b645d07e796a80682c1c5800d6ac5045193e5",
+                "sha256:cda33311cb9fb9323958a69499a667bd728a39a7aa4718d7622597a44c4f1441",
+                "sha256:db1d4e38c9b15be1521722e946ee24f6db95b189d1447fa9ff18dd16ba89f732",
+                "sha256:eda55e6e9ea258f5e4add23bcf33dc53b2c319e70806e180aecbff8d90ea24de",
+                "sha256:f372cdbb240e09ee855735b9d85e7f50730dcfb6296b74b95a3e5dea0615c4c1"
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-            "version": "==5.0.3"
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-            ],
-            "version": "==1.2.7"
+            "version": "==5.0.4"
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         "elasticsearch": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:1815ee1377e7d3cf32770738a70785fe4ab1f05be28336a330ed71cb295a7c6c",
-                "sha256:2a0ca516378ae9b87ac840e7bb529ec508f3010360dd9feed605dff2a898aff5"
+                "sha256:d228b2d37ac0865f7631335268172dbdaa426adec1da3ed006dddf05134f89c8",
+                "sha256:f4bb05cfe55cf369bdcb4d86d0129d39d66a91fd9517b13cd4e4231fbfcf5c81"
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             "index": "pypi",
-            "version": "==7.5.1"
+            "version": "==7.6.0"
         },
         "elasticsearch-async": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -131,10 +258,10 @@
         },
         "idna": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:c357b3f628cf53ae2c4c05627ecc484553142ca23264e593d327bcde5e9c3407",
-                "sha256:ea8b7f6188e6fa117537c3df7da9fc686d485087abf6ac197f9c46432f7e4a3c"
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+                "sha256:a068a21ceac8a4d63dbfd964670474107f541babbd2250d61922f029858365fa"
             ],
-            "version": "==2.8"
+            "version": "==2.9"
         },
         "idna-ssl": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -145,40 +272,47 @@
         },
         "importlib-metadata": {
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-                "sha256:b97607a1a18a5100839aec1dc26a1ea17ee0d93b20b0f008d80a5a050afb200b"
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             "markers": "python_version < '3.8'",
-            "version": "==1.5.0"
+            "version": "==1.6.0"
         },
-        "jsonschema": {
+        "more-itertools": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:4e5b3cf8216f577bee9ce139cbe72eca3ea4f292ec60928ff24758ce626cd163",
-                "sha256:c8a85b28d377cc7737e46e2d9f2b4f44ee3c0e1deac6bf46ddefc7187d30797a"
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-            "version": "==3.2.0"
+            "version": "==8.2.0"
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         "multidict": {
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+                "sha256:fc3b4adc2ee8474cb3cd2a155305d5f8eda0a9c91320f83e55748e1fcb68f8e3"
             ],
-            "version": "==4.7.4"
+            "version": "==4.7.5"
+        },
+        "packaging": {
+            "hashes": [
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+                "sha256:82f77b9bee21c1bafbf35a84905d604d5d1223801d639cf3ed140bd651c08752"
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+            "version": "==20.3"
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         "pathspec": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -187,65 +321,51 @@
             ],
             "version": "==0.7.0"
         },
-        "progressbar2": {
+        "pluggy": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:7538d02045a1fd3aa2b2834bfda463da8755bd3ff050edc6c5ddff3bc616215f",
-                "sha256:eb774d1e0d03ea4730f381c13c2c6ae7abb5ddfb14d8321d7a58a61aa708f0d0"
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+        },
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+                "sha256:c342dccb5250c08d45fd6f8b4a559613ca603b57498511740e65cd11a2e7dcec"
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+            "version": "==2.4.6"
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-            "version": "==2.3.0"
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-                "sha256:e9f45bd5b92c7974e59bcd2dcc8631a6b6cc380a904725fce7bc08872e691615"
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+                "sha256:436bc774ecf7c103814098159fbb84c2715d25980175292c648f2da143909f95",
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+                "sha256:5a22a9c84653debfbf198d02fe592c176ea548cccce47553f35f466e15cf2fd4",
+                "sha256:7a5d3f26b89d688db27822343dfa25c599627bc92093e788956372285c6298ad",
+                "sha256:9372b04a02080752d9e6f990179a4ab840227c6e2ce15b95e1278456664cf2ba",
+                "sha256:a5dcbebee834eaddf3fa7366316b880ff4062e4bcc9787b78c7fbb4a26ff2dd1",
+                "sha256:aee5bab92a176e7cd034e57f46e9df9a9862a71f8f37cad167c6fc74c65f5b4e",
+                "sha256:c51f642898c0bacd335fc119da60baae0824f2cde95b0330b56c0553439f0673",
+                "sha256:c68ea4d3ba1705da1e0d85da6684ac657912679a649e8868bd850d2c299cce13",
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-            "version": "==5.3"
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-            "version": "==2.22.0"
+            "version": "==5.1"
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         "six": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -268,21 +388,23 @@
                 "sha256:2f3db8b19923a873b3e5256dc9c2dedfa883e33d87c690d9c7913e1f40673cdc",
                 "sha256:87716c2d2a7121198ebcb7ce7cccf6ce5e9ba539041cfbaeecfb641dc0bf6acc"
             ],
+            "index": "pypi",
             "version": "==1.25.8"
         },
-        "wrapt": {
+        "wcwidth": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:565a021fd19419476b9362b05eeaa094178de64f8361e44468f9e9d7843901e1"
+                "sha256:cafe2186b3c009a04067022ce1dcd79cb38d8d65ee4f4791b8888d6599d1bbe1",
+                "sha256:ee73862862a156bf77ff92b09034fc4825dd3af9cf81bc5b360668d425f3c5f1"
             ],
-            "version": "==1.11.2"
+            "version": "==0.1.9"
         },
         "yamllint": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:7318e189027951983c3cb4d6bcaa1e75deef7c752320ca3ce84e407f2551e8ce",
-                "sha256:76912b6262fd7e0815d7b14c4c2bb2642c754d0aa38f2d3e4b4e21c77872a3bf"
+                "sha256:09d554bafc57beb22b01619c94e1ba0e8fbb016fa9c1b35ddc68d7bfc16d177f",
+                "sha256:7e1e698b3d344b64bc46cbe8c4df7dfdfe7c00ed1a8d1c851ecd5b552d93d193"
             ],
             "index": "pypi",
-            "version": "==1.20.0"
+            "version": "==1.21.0"
         },
         "yarl": {
             "hashes": [
@@ -308,11 +430,10 @@
         },
         "zipp": {
             "hashes": [
-                "sha256:ccc94ed0909b58ffe34430ea5451f07bc0c76467d7081619a454bf5c98b89e28",
-                "sha256:feae2f18633c32fc71f2de629bfb3bd3c9325cd4419642b1f1da42ee488d9b98"
+                "sha256:aa36550ff0c0b7ef7fa639055d797116ee891440eac1a56f378e2d3179e0320b",
+                "sha256:c599e4d75c98f6798c509911d08a22e6c021d074469042177c8c86fb92eefd96"
             ],
-            "version": "==2.1.0"
+            "version": "==3.1.0"
         }
-    },
-    "develop": {}
+    }
 }

README.md

@@ -88,9 +88,9 @@ Sysmon: Web Shell Detection
 Windows 'Security' Eventlog: Suspicious Number of Failed Logons from a Single Source Workstation
 ![sigma_rule example5](./images/Sigma_rule_example5.png)
 
-# Sigma Tools 
+# Sigma Tools
 
-## Sigmac 
+## Sigmac
 
 Sigmac converts sigma rules into queries or inputs of the supported targets listed below. It acts as a frontend to the
 Sigma library that may be used to integrate Sigma support in other projects. Further, there's `merge_sigma.py` which
@@ -98,9 +98,9 @@ merges multiple YAML documents of a Sigma rule collection into simple Sigma rule
 
 ### Usage
 
-```
+```bash
 usage: sigmac [-h] [--recurse] [--filter FILTER]
-              [--target {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,wdatp}]
+              [--target {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,mdatp,ee-outliers}]
               [--target-list] [--config CONFIG] [--output OUTPUT]
               [--backend-option BACKEND_OPTION] [--defer-abort]
               [--ignore-backend-errors] [--verbose] [--debug]
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ optional arguments:
                         tag that must appear in the rules tag list, case-
                         insensitive matching. Multiple log source
                         specifications are AND linked.
-  --target {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,wdatp}, -t {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,wdatp}
+  --target {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,mdatp}, -t {arcsight,es-qs,es-dsl,kibana,xpack-watcher,elastalert,graylog,limacharlie,logpoint,grep,netwitness,powershell,qradar,qualys,splunk,splunkxml,sumologic,fieldlist,mdatp}
                         Output target format
   --target-list, -l     List available output target formats
   --config CONFIG, -c CONFIG
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ tools/sigmac -t splunk -c ~/my-splunk-mapping.yml -c tools/config/generic/window
 * [Kibana](https://www.elastic.co/de/products/kibana)
 * [Elastic X-Pack Watcher](https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/x-pack/current/xpack-alerting.html)
 * [Logpoint](https://www.logpoint.com)
-* [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (WDATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsforbusiness/windows-atp)
+* [Microsoft Defender Advanced Threat Protection (MDATP)](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/microsoft-365/windows/microsoft-defender-atp)
 * [Azure Sentinel / Azure Log Analytics](https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/services/azure-sentinel/)
 * [Sumologic](https://www.sumologic.com/)
 * [ArcSight](https://software.microfocus.com/en-us/products/siem-security-information-event-management/overview)
@@ -201,11 +201,12 @@ tools/sigmac -t splunk -c ~/my-splunk-mapping.yml -c tools/config/generic/window
 * [PowerShell](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/scripting/getting-started/getting-started-with-windows-powershell?view=powershell-6)
 * [Grep](https://www.gnu.org/software/grep/manual/grep.html) with Perl-compatible regular expression support
 * [LimaCharlie](https://limacharlie.io)
+* [ee-outliers](https://github.com/NVISO-BE/ee-outliers)
 
 Current work-in-progress
 * [Splunk Data Models](https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/7.1.0/Knowledge/Aboutdatamodels)
 
-New targets are continuously developed. You can get a list of supported targets with `sigmac --target-list` or `sigmac -l`.
+New targets are continuously developed. You can get a list of supported targets with `sigmac --lists` or `sigmac -l`.
 
 ### Requirements
 
@@ -337,7 +338,7 @@ The content of this repository is released under the following licenses:
 
 * The toolchain (everything under `tools/`) is licensed under the [GNU Lesser General Public License](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/lgpl-3.0.en.html).
 * The [Sigma specification](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/wiki) is public domain.
-* Everything else, especially the rules contained in the `rules/` directory is released under the [GNU General Public License](https://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-3.0.en.html).
+* Everything else, especially the rules contained in the `rules/` directory is released under the [Detection Rule License (DRL) 1.0](https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/LICENSE.Detection.Rules.md).
 
 # Credits
 
@@ -345,4 +346,8 @@ This is a private project mainly developed by Florian Roth and Thomas Patzke wit
 
 # Info Graphic
 
+## Overview
 ![sigmac_info_graphic](./images/sigma_infographic_lq.png)
+
+## Coverage Illustration
+![sigmac_coverage](./images/Sigma_Coverage.png)

contrib/filter-uuid-patch

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
 # Remove all hunks from a patch that don't add the id attribute to minimize the impact (removed
-# comments etc.) of sigma-uuid script.
+# comments etc.) of sigma_uuid script.
 #
 # Usually used as follows:
 # 1. Add UUIDs to rules:
-# tools/sigma-uuid -er rules
+# tools/sigma_uuid -er rules
 # 2. Generate and filter patch
 # git diff | contrib/filter-uuid-patch > rule-uuid.diff
 # 3. Reset to previous state

other/godmode_sigma_rule.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+#    _____        __  __  ___        __      
+#   / ___/__  ___/ / /  |/  /__  ___/ /__    
+#  / (_ / _ \/ _  / / /|_/ / _ \/ _  / -_)   
+#  \___/\___/\_,_/ /_/  /_/\___/\_,_/\__/_   
+#    / __(_)__ ___ _  ___ _  / _ \__ __/ /__ 
+#   _\ \/ / _ `/  ' \/ _ `/ / , _/ // / / -_)
+#  /___/_/\_, /_/_/_/\_,_/ /_/|_|\_,_/_/\__/ 
+#        /___/ IDDQD                              
+#
+#  Florian Roth
+#  May 2020
+#  v0.3
+#
+#  A Proof-of-Concept with the most effective search queries
+
+title: Godmode Sigma Rule
+id: def6caac-a999-4fc9-8800-cfeff700ba98
+description: 'PoC rule to detect malicious activity - following the principle: if you had only one shot, what would you look for?'
+status: experimental
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2019/12/22
+modified: 2020/05/18
+level: high
+action: global
+---
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    # Different suspicious or malicious command line parameters
+    selection_plain:
+        CommandLine|contains:
+            - ' -NoP '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
+            - ' -W Hidden '  # Often used in malicious PowerShell commands
+            - ' -decode '  # Used with certutil
+            - ' /decode '  # Used with certutil 
+            - ' -e* JAB'  # PowerShell encoded commands
+            - ' -e* SUVYI'  # PowerShell encoded commands
+            - ' -e* SQBFAFgA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
+            - ' -e* aWV4I'  # PowerShell encoded commands
+            - ' -e* IAB'  # PowerShell encoded commands
+            - ' -e* PAA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
+            - ' -e* aQBlAHgA'  # PowerShell encoded commands
+            - 'vssadmin delete shadows'  # Ransomware
+            - 'reg SAVE HKLM\SAM'  # save registry SAM - syskey extraction
+            - ' -ma '  # ProcDump
+            - 'Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run'  # Run key in command line - often in combination with REG ADD
+            - '.downloadstring('  # PowerShell download command
+            - '.downloadfile('  # PowerShell download command
+            - ' /ticket:'  # Rubeus
+            - ' sekurlsa'  # Mimikatz
+            - ' p::d '  # Mimikatz 
+            - ';iex('  # PowerShell IEX
+            - 'schtasks* /create *AppData'  # Scheduled task creation pointing to AppData
+            - ' comsvcs.dll,MiniDump'  # Process dumping method apart from procdump
+            - ' comsvcs.dll,#24'  # Process dumping method apart from procdump
+    selection_parent_child:
+        ParentImage|contains:
+            # Office Dropper Detection
+            - '\WINWORD.EXE'
+            - '\EXCEL.EXE'
+            - '\POWERPNT.exe'
+            - '\MSPUB.exe'
+            - '\VISIO.exe'
+            - '\OUTLOOK.EXE'
+        Image|contains:
+            - '\cmd.exe'
+            - '\powershell.exe'
+            - '\wscript.exe'
+            - '\cscript.exe'
+            - '\schtasks.exe'
+            - '*\scrcons.exe'
+            - '\regsvr32.exe'
+            - '\hh.exe'
+            - '\wmic.exe'
+            - '\mshta.exe'
+            - '\msiexec.exe'
+            - '\forfiles.exe'
+            - '\AppData\'
+    selection_webshells:
+        Image|contains:
+            - '\apache*'
+            - '\tomcat*'
+            - '\w3wp.exe'
+            - '\php-cgi.exe'
+            - '\nginx.exe'
+            - '\httpd.exe'
+        CommandLine|contains:
+            - 'whoami'
+            - 'net user '
+            - 'ping -n '
+            - 'systeminfo'
+            - '&cd&echo'
+            - 'cd /d '  # https://www.computerhope.com/cdhlp.htm
+    # Running whoami as LOCAL_SYSTEM (usually after privilege escalation)
+    selection_whoami:
+        Image|contains: '\whoami.exe'
+        User: 'NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM' 
+    condition: 1 of them
+---
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: sysmon
+detection:
+    selection_file_creation:
+        EventID: 11
+        TargetFilename|contains: 
+            - '.dmp'  # dump process memory
+            - 'Desktop\how'  # Ransomware
+            - 'Desktop\decrypt'  # Ransomware
+    selection_registry_modifications:
+        EventID:
+            - 12
+            - 13
+        TargetObject|contains: 
+            - 'UserInitMprLogonScript'  # persistence
+            - '\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\'  # persistence
+    selection_registry_run:
+        EventID:
+            - 12
+            - 13
+        TargetObject|contains: 
+            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\'  # persistence
+            - '\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\'   # persistence
+        Details|contains:
+            - 'AppData'
+            - '\Users\Public\'
+            - '\Temp\'
+            - 'powershell'
+            - 'wscript'
+            - 'cscript'
+    condition: 1 of them
+---
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: system
+detection:
+    # Malicious service installs
+    selection:
+        EventID: 7045
+        ServiceName|contains: 
+            - 'WCESERVICE'
+            - 'WCE SERVICE'
+            - 'winexesvc'
+            - 'DumpSvc'
+            - 'pwdump'
+            - 'gsecdump'
+            - 'cachedump'
+    condition:
+        1 of them

rules-unsupported/sysmon_process_reimaging.yml

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: Detects process reimaging defense evasion technique
 # where
 #             selection1: ImageFileName != selection1: OriginalFileName
 #             selection1: ParentProcessGuid = selection2: ProcessGuid
-#             selection1: Image = selection2: TargetFileName
+#             selection1: Image = selection2: TargetFilename
 # and new field ImageFileName is coming from enrichment
 #             selection1: Image = ^.+\\<ImageFileName>$
 # Rule must trigger if selection1 and selection2 both occurs in timeframe of 120 sec.
@@ -45,4 +45,4 @@ detection:
         EventID: 11
 fields:
     - ProcessGuid
-    - TargetFileName
+    - TargetFilename

rules/cloud/aws_ec2_vm_export_failure.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+title: AWS EC2 VM Export Failure
+id: 54b9a76a-3c71-4673-b4b3-2edb4566ea7b
+status: experimental
+description: An attempt to export an AWS EC2 instance has been detected. A VM Export might indicate an attempt to extract information from an instance.
+references:
+  - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/vm-import/latest/userguide/vmexport.html#export-instance     
+author: Diogo Braz
+date: 2020/04/16
+tags:
+  - attack.collection    
+  - attack.t1005      
+  - attack.exfiltration
+  - attack.t1537
+level: low
+logsource:
+  service: cloudtrail
+detection:
+  selection:           
+    eventName: 'CreateInstanceExportTask'
+    eventSource: 'ec2.amazonaws.com'
+  filter1:
+    errorMessage: '*'
+  filter2:
+    errorCode: '*'
+  filter3:
+    eventName: 'ConsoleLogin'
+    responseElements: '*Failure*'
+  condition: selection and (filter1 or filter2 or filter3)

rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_create_account.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+title: Creation Of An User Account
+id: 759d0d51-bc99-4b5e-9add-8f5b2c8e7512
+status: experimental
+description: Detects the creation of a new user account. According to MITRE ATT&CK, "such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system" 
+references:
+    - 'MITRE Attack technique T1136; Create Account '
+date: 2020/05/18
+tags:
+    - attack.t1136
+    - attack.persistence
+author: Marie Euler
+logsource:
+    product: linux
+    service: auditd
+detection:
+    selection:
+        type: 'SYSCALL'
+        exe: '*/useradd'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - Admin activity
+level: medium

rules/linux/auditd/lnx_auditd_susp_C2_commands.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+title: Suspicious C2 Activities
+id: f7158a64-6204-4d6d-868a-6e6378b467e0
+status: experimental
+description: Detects suspicious activities as declared by Florian Roth in its 'Best Practice Auditd Configuration'. This includes the detection of the following commands; wget, curl, base64, nc, netcat, ncat, ssh, socat, wireshark, rawshark, rdesktop, nmap. These commands match a few techniques from the tactics "Command and Control", including not exhaustively the following; Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Non-Application Layer Protocol (T1095), Data Encoding (T1132)
+references:
+    - 'https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd'
+date: 2020/05/18
+tags:
+    - attack.command_and_control
+author: Marie Euler
+logsource:
+    product: linux
+    service: auditd
+detection:
+    selection:
+        key:
+            - 'susp_activity'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - Admin or User activity
+level: medium

rules/linux/lnx_shell_clear_cmd_history.yml

@@ -2,12 +2,20 @@ title: Clear Command History
 id: fdc88d25-96fb-4b7c-9633-c0e417fdbd4e
 status: experimental
 description: Clear command history in linux which is used for defense evasion.
+    # Example config for this one (place it in .bash_profile):
+    # (is_empty=false; inotifywait -m .bash_history | while read file; do if [ $(wc -l <.bash_history) -lt 1  ]; then if  [ "$is_empty" = false ]; then logger -i -p local5.info -t empty_bash_history "$USER : ~/.bash_history is empty "; is_empty=true; fi; else is_empty=false;  fi;  done ) &
+    # It monitors the size of .bash_history and log the words "empty_bash_history" whenever a previously not empty bash_history becomes empty
+    # We define an empty file as a document with 0 or 1 lines (it can be a line with only one space character for example)
+    # It has two advantages over the version suggested by Patrick Bareiss  :
+    #   - it is not relative to the exact command used to clear .bash_history : for instance Caldera uses "> .bash_history" to clear the history and this is not one the commands listed here. We can't be exhaustive for all the possibilities ! 
+    #   - the method suggested by Patrick Bareiss logs all the commands entered directly in a bash shell. therefore it may miss some events (for instance it doesn't log the commands launched from a Caldera agent). Here if .bash_history is cleared, it will always be detected 
 references:
     - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1146/T1146.yaml
     - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146/
     - https://www.hackers-arise.com/single-post/2016/06/20/Covering-your-BASH-Shell-Tracks-AntiForensics
 author: Patrick Bareiss
 date: 2019/03/24
+modified: 2020/05/28
 logsource:
     product: linux
 detection:
@@ -22,6 +30,7 @@ detection:
         - 'history -c'
         - 'history -w'
         - 'shred *bash_history'
+        - 'empty_bash_history'
     condition: keywords
 falsepositives:
     - Unknown

rules/linux/lnx_susp_ssh.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-title: Suspicious SSHD Error
+title: Suspicious OpenSSH Daemon Error
 id: e76b413a-83d0-4b94-8e4c-85db4a5b8bdc
 description: Detects suspicious SSH / SSHD error messages that indicate a fatal or suspicious error that could be caused by exploiting attempts
 references:
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ references:
     - https://github.com/ossec/ossec-hids/blob/master/etc/rules/sshd_rules.xml
 author: Florian Roth
 date: 2017/06/30
+modified: 2020/05/15
 logsource:
     product: linux
     service: sshd

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_clear_logs.yml

@@ -1,31 +1,31 @@
-title: Cisco Clear Logs
-id: ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956
-status: experimental
-description: Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion.
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/12
-tags:
-    - attack.defense_evasion
-    - attack.t1146
-    - attack.t1070
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - src
-    - CmdSet
-    - User
-    - Privilege_Level
-    - Remote_Address
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'clear logging'
-        - 'clear archive'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands.
-level: high
+title: Cisco Clear Logs
+id: ceb407f6-8277-439b-951f-e4210e3ed956
+status: experimental
+description: Clear command history in network OS which is used for defense evasion.
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1146/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/12
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.t1146
+    - attack.t1070
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - src
+    - CmdSet
+    - User
+    - Privilege_Level
+    - Remote_Address
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'clear logging'
+        - 'clear archive'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands.
+level: high

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_collect_data.yml

@@ -1,39 +1,39 @@
-title: Cisco Collect Data
-id: cd072b25-a418-4f98-8ebc-5093fb38fe1a
-status: experimental
-description: Collect pertinent data from the configuration files
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/11
-tags:
-    - attack.discovery
-    - attack.credential_access
-    - attack.collection
-    - attack.t1087
-    - attack.t1003
-    - attack.t1081
-    - attack.t1005
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - src
-    - CmdSet
-    - User
-    - Privilege_Level
-    - Remote_Address
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'show running-config'
-        - 'show startup-config'
-        - 'show archive config'
-        - 'more'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Commonly run by administrators.
-level: low
+title: Cisco Collect Data
+id: cd072b25-a418-4f98-8ebc-5093fb38fe1a
+status: experimental
+description: Collect pertinent data from the configuration files
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1081/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1005/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/11
+tags:
+    - attack.discovery
+    - attack.credential_access
+    - attack.collection
+    - attack.t1087
+    - attack.t1003
+    - attack.t1081
+    - attack.t1005
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - src
+    - CmdSet
+    - User
+    - Privilege_Level
+    - Remote_Address
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'show running-config'
+        - 'show startup-config'
+        - 'show archive config'
+        - 'more'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Commonly run by administrators.
+level: low

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_crypto_actions.yml

@@ -1,33 +1,33 @@
-title: Cisco Crypto Commands
-id: 1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d
-status: experimental
-description: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are installed.
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/12
-tags:
-    - attack.credential_access
-    - attack.defense_evasion
-    - attack.t1130
-    - attack.t1145
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - src
-    - CmdSet
-    - User
-    - Privilege_Level
-    - Remote_Address
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'crypto pki export'
-        - 'crypto pki import'
-        - 'crypto pki trustpoint'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Not commonly run by administrators.  Also whitelist your known good certificates.
-level: high
+title: Cisco Crypto Commands
+id: 1f978c6a-4415-47fb-aca5-736a44d7ca3d
+status: experimental
+description: Show when private keys are being exported from the device, or when new certificates are installed.
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1145/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1130/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/12
+tags:
+    - attack.credential_access
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.t1130
+    - attack.t1145
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - src
+    - CmdSet
+    - User
+    - Privilege_Level
+    - Remote_Address
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'crypto pki export'
+        - 'crypto pki import'
+        - 'crypto pki trustpoint'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Not commonly run by administrators.  Also whitelist your known good certificates.
+level: high

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_disable_logging.yml

@@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
-title: Cisco Disabling Logging
-id: 9e8f6035-88bf-4a63-96b6-b17c0508257e
-status: experimental
-description: Turn off logging locally or remote
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/11
-tags:
-    - attack.defense_evasion
-    - attack.t1089
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - src
-    - CmdSet
-    - User
-    - Privilege_Level
-    - Remote_Address
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'no logging'
-        - 'no aaa new-model'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Unknown
-level: high
+title: Cisco Disabling Logging
+id: 9e8f6035-88bf-4a63-96b6-b17c0508257e
+status: experimental
+description: Turn off logging locally or remote
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1089
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/11
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.t1089
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - src
+    - CmdSet
+    - User
+    - Privilege_Level
+    - Remote_Address
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'no logging'
+        - 'no aaa new-model'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown
+level: high

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_discovery.yml

@@ -1,46 +1,46 @@
-title: Cisco Discovery
-id: 9705a6a1-6db6-4a16-a987-15b7151e299b
-status: experimental
-description: Find information about network devices that are not stored in config files.
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/12
-tags:
-    - attack.discovery
-    - attack.t1083
-    - attack.t1201
-    - attack.t1057
-    - attack.t1018
-    - attack.t1082
-    - attack.t1016
-    - attack.t1049
-    - attack.t1033
-    - attack.t1124
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - src
-    - CmdSet
-    - User
-    - Privilege_Level
-    - Remote_Address
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'dir'
-        - 'show processes'
-        - 'show arp'
-        - 'show cdp'
-        - 'show version'
-        - 'show ip route'
-        - 'show ip interface'
-        - 'show ip sockets'
-        - 'show users'
-        - 'show ssh'
-        - 'show clock'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Commonly used by administrators for troubleshooting
-level: low
+title: Cisco Discovery
+id: 9705a6a1-6db6-4a16-a987-15b7151e299b
+status: experimental
+description: Find information about network devices that are not stored in config files.
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0007/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/12
+tags:
+    - attack.discovery
+    - attack.t1083
+    - attack.t1201
+    - attack.t1057
+    - attack.t1018
+    - attack.t1082
+    - attack.t1016
+    - attack.t1049
+    - attack.t1033
+    - attack.t1124
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - src
+    - CmdSet
+    - User
+    - Privilege_Level
+    - Remote_Address
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'dir'
+        - 'show processes'
+        - 'show arp'
+        - 'show cdp'
+        - 'show version'
+        - 'show ip route'
+        - 'show ip interface'
+        - 'show ip sockets'
+        - 'show users'
+        - 'show ssh'
+        - 'show clock'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Commonly used by administrators for troubleshooting
+level: low

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_dos.yml

@@ -1,28 +1,28 @@
-title: Cisco Denial of Service
-id: d94a35f0-7a29-45f6-90a0-80df6159967c
-status: experimental
-description: Detect a system being shutdown or put into different boot mode
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/15
-tags:
-    - attack.impact
-    - attack.t1499
-    - attack.t1495
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - CmdSet
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'shutdown'
-        - 'config-register 0x2100'
-        - 'config-register 0x2142'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands, though rarely.
-level: medium
+title: Cisco Denial of Service
+id: d94a35f0-7a29-45f6-90a0-80df6159967c
+status: experimental
+description: Detect a system being shutdown or put into different boot mode
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1495/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/15
+tags:
+    - attack.impact
+    - attack.t1499
+    - attack.t1495
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - CmdSet
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'shutdown'
+        - 'config-register 0x2100'
+        - 'config-register 0x2142'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands, though rarely.
+level: medium

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_file_deletion.yml

@@ -1,31 +1,31 @@
-title: Cisco Show Commands Input
-id: 71d65515-c436-43c0-841b-236b1f32c21e
-status: experimental
-description: See what files are being deleted from flash file systems
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/12
-tags:
-    - attack.defense_evasion
-    - attack.impact
-    - attack.t1107
-    - attack.t1488
-    - attack.t1487
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - CmdSet
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'erase'
-        - 'delete'
-        - 'format'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Will be used sometimes by admins to clean up local flash space.
-level: medium
+title: Cisco Show Commands Input
+id: 71d65515-c436-43c0-841b-236b1f32c21e
+status: experimental
+description: See what files are being deleted from flash file systems
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1107/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1488/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1487/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/12
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.impact
+    - attack.t1107
+    - attack.t1488
+    - attack.t1487
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - CmdSet
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'erase'
+        - 'delete'
+        - 'format'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Will be used sometimes by admins to clean up local flash space.
+level: medium

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_input_capture.yml

@@ -1,29 +1,29 @@
-title: Cisco Show Commands Input
-id: b094d9fb-b1ad-4650-9f1a-fb7be9f1d34b
-status: experimental
-description: See what commands are being input into the device by other people, full credentials can be in the history
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/11
-tags:
-    - attack.collection
-    - attack.credential_access
-    - attack.t1139
-    - attack.t1056
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - CmdSet
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'show history'
-        - 'show history all'
-        - 'show logging'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Not commonly run by administrators, especially if remote logging is configured.
-level: medium
+title: Cisco Show Commands Input
+id: b094d9fb-b1ad-4650-9f1a-fb7be9f1d34b
+status: experimental
+description: See what commands are being input into the device by other people, full credentials can be in the history
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/11
+tags:
+    - attack.collection
+    - attack.credential_access
+    - attack.t1139
+    - attack.t1056
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - CmdSet
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'show history'
+        - 'show history all'
+        - 'show logging'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Not commonly run by administrators, especially if remote logging is configured.
+level: medium

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_local_accounts.yml

@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
-title: Cisco Local Accounts
-id: 6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3
-status: experimental
-description: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/12
-tags:
-    - attack.persistence
-    - attack.t1136
-    - attack.t1098
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - CmdSet
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'username'
-        - 'aaa'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often.
-level: high
+title: Cisco Local Accounts
+id: 6d844f0f-1c18-41af-8f19-33e7654edfc3
+status: experimental
+description: Find local accounts being created or modified as well as remote authentication configurations
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/12
+tags:
+    - attack.persistence
+    - attack.t1136
+    - attack.t1098
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - CmdSet
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'username'
+        - 'aaa'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - When remote authentication is in place, this should not change often.
+level: high

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_modify_config.yml

@@ -1,38 +1,38 @@
-title: Cisco Modify Configuration
-id: 671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b
-status: experimental
-description: Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/12
-tags:
-    - attack.persistence
-    - attack.privilege_escalation
-    - attack.impact
-    - attack.t1493
-    - attack.t1100
-    - attack.t1168
-    - attack.t1490
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - CmdSet
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'ip http server'
-        - 'ip https server'
-        - 'kron policy-list'
-        - 'kron occurrence'
-        - 'policy-list'
-        - 'access-list'
-        - 'ip access-group'
-        - 'archive maximum'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands.
-level: medium
+title: Cisco Modify Configuration
+id: 671ffc77-50a7-464f-9e3d-9ea2b493b26b
+status: experimental
+description: Modifications to a config that will serve an adversary's impacts or persistence
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1100/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1168/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1493/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/12
+tags:
+    - attack.persistence
+    - attack.privilege_escalation
+    - attack.impact
+    - attack.t1493
+    - attack.t1100
+    - attack.t1168
+    - attack.t1490
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - CmdSet
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'ip http server'
+        - 'ip https server'
+        - 'kron policy-list'
+        - 'kron occurrence'
+        - 'policy-list'
+        - 'access-list'
+        - 'ip access-group'
+        - 'archive maximum'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Legitimate administrators may run these commands.
+level: medium

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_moving_data.yml

@@ -1,39 +1,39 @@
-title: Cisco Stage Data
-id: 5e51acb2-bcbe-435b-99c6-0e3cd5e2aa59
-status: experimental
-description: Various protocols maybe used to put data on the device for exfil or infil
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002/
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/12
-tags:
-    - attack.collection
-    - attack.lateral_movement
-    - attack.command_and_control
-    - attack.exfiltration
-    - attack.impact
-    - attack.t1074
-    - attack.t1105
-    - attack.t1492
-    - attack.t1002
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - CmdSet
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'tftp'
-        - 'rcp'
-        - 'puts'
-        - 'copy'
-        - 'configure replace'
-        - 'archive tar'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Generally used to copy configs or IOS images.
-level: low
+title: Cisco Stage Data
+id: 5e51acb2-bcbe-435b-99c6-0e3cd5e2aa59
+status: experimental
+description: Various protocols maybe used to put data on the device for exfil or infil
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002/
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/12
+tags:
+    - attack.collection
+    - attack.lateral_movement
+    - attack.command_and_control
+    - attack.exfiltration
+    - attack.impact
+    - attack.t1074
+    - attack.t1105
+    - attack.t1492
+    - attack.t1002
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - CmdSet
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'tftp'
+        - 'rcp'
+        - 'puts'
+        - 'copy'
+        - 'configure replace'
+        - 'archive tar'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Generally used to copy configs or IOS images.
+level: low

rules/network/cisco/aaa/cisco_cli_net_sniff.yml

@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
-title: Cisco Sniffing
-id: b9e1f193-d236-4451-aaae-2f3d2102120d
-status: experimental
-description: Show when a monitor or a span/rspan is setup or modified
-references:
-    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
-author: Austin Clark
-date: 2019/08/11
-tags:
-    - attack.credential_access
-    - attack.discovery
-    - attack.t1040
-logsource:
-    product: cisco
-    service: aaa
-    category: accounting
-fields:
-    - CmdSet
-detection:
-    keywords:
-        - 'monitor capture point'
-        - 'set span'
-        - 'set rspan'
-    condition: keywords
-falsepositives:
-    - Admins may setup new or modify old spans, or use a monitor for troubleshooting.
-level: medium
+title: Cisco Sniffing
+id: b9e1f193-d236-4451-aaae-2f3d2102120d
+status: experimental
+description: Show when a monitor or a span/rspan is setup or modified
+references:
+    - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040
+author: Austin Clark
+date: 2019/08/11
+tags:
+    - attack.credential_access
+    - attack.discovery
+    - attack.t1040
+logsource:
+    product: cisco
+    service: aaa
+    category: accounting
+fields:
+    - CmdSet
+detection:
+    keywords:
+        - 'monitor capture point'
+        - 'set span'
+        - 'set rspan'
+    condition: keywords
+falsepositives:
+    - Admins may setup new or modify old spans, or use a monitor for troubleshooting.
+level: medium

rules/network/zeek/zeek-dce_rpc_domain_user_enumeration.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+title: Domain User Enumeration Network Recon 01
+description: Domain user and group enumeration via network reconnaissance. Seen in APT 29 and other common tactics and actors. Detects a set of RPC (remote procedure calls) used to enumerate a domain controller. The rule was created based off the datasets and hackathon from https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29
+id: 66a0bdc6-ee04-441a-9125-99d2eb547942
+references:
+    - "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29"
+    - "https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/issues/37"
+author: 'Nate Guagenti (@neu5ron), Open Threat Research (OTR)'
+date: 2020/05/03
+modified: 2020/05/03
+tags:
+    - attack.discovery
+    - attack.t1087
+    - attack.t1082
+logsource:
+    product: zeek
+    service: dce_rpc
+detection:
+    selection:
+        operation:
+            #- LsarEnumerateTrustedDomains #potentially too many FPs, removing. caused by netlogon
+            #- SamrEnumerateDomainsInSamServer #potentially too many FPs, removing. #method obtains a listing of all domains hosted by the server side of this protocol. This value is a cookie that the server can use to continue an enumeration on a subsequent call
+            - LsarLookupNames3 #method translates a batch of security principal names to their SID form  
+            - LsarLookupSids3 #translates a batch of security principal SIDs to their name forms
+            - SamrGetGroupsForUser #obtains a listing of groups that a user is a member of
+            - SamrLookupIdsInDomain #method translates a set of RIDs into account names
+            - SamrLookupNamesInDomain #method translates a set of account names into a set of RIDs
+            - SamrQuerySecurityObject #method queries the access control on a server, domain, user, group, or alias object
+            - SamrQueryInformationGroup #obtains attributes from a group object
+    timeframe: 30s
+    condition: selection | count(operation) by src_ip > 4
+falsepositives:
+    - Devices that may do authentication like a VPN or a firewall that looksup IPs to username
+    - False positives depend on scripts and administrative tools used in the monitored environment
+level: medium
+status: experimental

rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_mitre_bzar_execution.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for ATT&CK Execution
+id: b640c0b8-87f8-4daa-aef8-95a24261dd1d
+description: 'Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an ATT&CK-like Execution techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE.'
+author: '@neu5ron, SOC Prime'
+date: 2020/03/19
+references:
+    - https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck-execution
+tags:
+  - attack.execution
+  - attack.t1035
+  - attack.t1047
+  - attack.t1053
+logsource:
+  product: zeek
+  service: dce_rpc
+detection:
+  op1:
+    endpoint: 'JobAdd'
+    operation: 'atsvc'
+  op2:
+    endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
+    operation: 'SchRpcEnableTask'
+  op3:
+    endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
+    operation: 'SchRpcRegisterTask'
+  op4:
+    endpoint: 'ITaskSchedulerService'
+    operation: 'SchRpcRun'
+  op5:
+    endpoint: 'IWbemServices'
+    operation: 'ExecMethod'
+  op6:
+    endpoint: 'IWbemServices'
+    operation: 'ExecMethodAsync'
+  op7:
+    endpoint: 'svcctl'
+    operation: 'CreateServiceA'
+  op8:
+    endpoint: 'svcctl'
+    operation: 'CreateServiceW'
+  op9:
+    endpoint: 'svcctl'
+    operation: 'StartServiceA'
+  op10:
+    endpoint: 'svcctl'
+    operation: 'StartServiceW'
+  condition: 1 of them
+falsepositives:
+    - 'Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting'
+    - 'Windows management scripts or software'
+level: medium

rules/network/zeek/zeek_dce_rpc_mitre_bzar_persistence.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+title: MITRE BZAR Indicators for ATT&CK Persistence
+id: 53389db6-ba46-48e3-a94c-e0f2cefe1583
+description: 'Windows DCE-RPC functions which indicate an ATT&CK-like Persistence techniques on the remote system. All credit for the Zeek mapping of the suspicious endpoint/operation field goes to MITRE.'
+author: '@neu5ron, SOC Prime'
+date: 2020/03/19
+references:
+    - https://github.com/mitre-attack/bzar#indicators-for-attck-persistence
+tags:
+    - attack.persistence
+    - attack.t1004
+logsource:
+  product: zeek
+  service: dce_rpc
+detection:
+  op1:
+    endpoint: 'spoolss'
+    operation: 'RpcAddMonitor'
+  op2:
+    endpoint: 'spoolss'
+    operation: 'RpcAddPrintProcessor'
+  op3:
+    endpoint: 'IRemoteWinspool'
+    operation: 'RpcAsyncAddMonitor'
+  op4:
+    endpoint: 'IRemoteWinspool'
+    operation: 'RpcAsyncAddPrintProcessor'
+  op5:
+    endpoint: 'ISecLogon'
+    operation: 'SeclCreateProcessWithLogonW'
+  op6:
+    endpoint: 'ISecLogon'
+    operation: 'SeclCreateProcessWithLogonExW'
+  condition: 1 of them
+falsepositives:
+    - 'Windows administrator tasks or troubleshooting'
+    - 'Windows management scripts or software'
+level: medium

rules/network/zeek/zeek_http_executable_download_from_webdav.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+title: Executable from Webdav
+description: "Detects executable access via webdav6. Can be seen in APT 29 such as from the emulated APT 29 hackathon https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29/"
+id: aac2fd97-bcba-491b-ad66-a6edf89c71bf
+author: 'SOC Prime, Adam Swan'
+references:
+    - http://carnal0wnage.attackresearch.com/2012/06/webdav-server-to-download-custom.html
+    - https://github.com/OTRF/detection-hackathon-apt29
+tags:
+    - attack.command_and_control
+    - attack.t1043
+logsource:
+  product: zeek
+  service: http
+date: 2020/05/01
+detection:
+    selection_webdav:
+        - c-useragent: '*WebDAV*'
+        - c-uri: '*webdav*'
+    selection_executable:
+        - resp_mime_types: '*dosexec*'
+        - c-uri: '*.exe'
+    condition: selection_webdav AND selection_executable
+falsepositives:
+    - unknown
+level: medium
+status: experimental

rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_atsvc_task.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+title: Remote Task Creation via ATSVC Named Pipe - Zeek
+id: f6de6525-4509-495a-8a82-1f8b0ed73a00
+description: Detects remote task creation via at.exe or API interacting with ATSVC namedpipe
+author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5rn'
+date: 2020/04/03
+references:
+    - https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_atsvc_task.yml
+tags:
+    - attack.lateral_movement
+    - attack.persistence
+    - attack.t1053
+    - car.2013-05-004
+    - car.2015-04-001
+logsource:
+    product: zeek
+    service: smb_files
+detection:
+    selection:
+        path: \\*\IPC$
+        name: atsvc
+        #Accesses: '*WriteData*'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - unknown
+level: medium

rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_impacket_secretdump.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+title: Possible Impacket SecretDump Remote Activity - Zeek
+id: 92dae1ed-1c9d-4eff-a567-33acbd95b00e
+description: 'Detect AD credential dumping using impacket secretdump HKTL. Based on the SIGMA rules/windows/builtin/win_impacket_secretdump.yml'
+author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
+date: 2020/03/19
+references:
+    - https://blog.menasec.net/2019/02/threat-huting-10-impacketsecretdump.html
+tags:
+    - attack.credential_access
+    - attack.t1003
+logsource:
+    product: zeek
+    service: smb_files
+detection:
+  selection:
+    path: '\\*ADMIN$'
+    name: '*SYSTEM32\\*.tmp'
+  condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - 'unknown'
+level: high

rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_lm_namedpipe.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek
+id: 52d8b0c6-53d6-439a-9e41-52ad442ad9ad
+description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec
+    using named pipes
+author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
+date: 2020/04/02
+references:
+    - https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_lm_namedpipe.yml
+tags: 
+    - attack.lateral_movement
+    - attack.t1077
+logsource:
+    product: zeek
+    service: smb_files
+detection:
+    selection1:
+        path: \\*\IPC$
+    selection2:
+        path: \\*\IPC$
+        name:
+         - 'atsvc'
+         - 'samr'
+         - 'lsarpc'
+         - 'winreg'
+         - 'netlogon'
+         - 'srvsvc'
+         - 'protected_storage'
+         - 'wkssvc'
+         - 'browser'
+         - 'netdfs'
+         - 'svcctl'
+         - 'spoolss'
+         - 'ntsvcs'
+         - 'LSM_API_service'
+         - 'HydraLsPipe'
+         - 'TermSrv_API_service'
+         - 'MsFteWds'
+    condition: selection1 and not selection2
+falsepositives:
+    - update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
+level: high

rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_susp_psexec.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+title: Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek
+id: f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166
+description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
+author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
+date: 2020/04/02
+references:
+    - https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_psexec.yml
+tags:
+    - attack.lateral_movement
+    - attack.t1077
+logsource:
+    product: zeek
+    service: smb_files
+detection:
+    selection1:
+        path: \\*\IPC$
+        name:
+         - '*-stdin'
+         - '*-stdout'
+         - '*-stderr'
+    selection2:
+        name: \\*\IPC$
+        path: 'PSEXESVC*'
+    condition: selection1 and not selection2
+falsepositives:
+    - nothing observed so far
+level: high

rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+title: Suspicious Access to Sensitive File Extensions - Zeek
+id: 286b47ed-f6fe-40b3-b3a8-35129acd43bc
+description: Detects known sensitive file extensions via Zeek
+author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
+date: 2020/04/02
+references: https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_raccess_sensitive_fext.yml
+tags:
+  - attack.collection
+logsource:
+  product: zeek
+  service: smb_files
+detection:
+  selection:
+    name:
+      - '*.pst'
+      - '*.ost'
+      - '*.msg'
+      - '*.nst'
+      - '*.oab'
+      - '*.edb'
+      - '*.nsf'
+      - '*.bak'
+      - '*.dmp'
+      - '*.kirbi'
+      - '*\groups.xml'
+      - '*.rdp'
+  condition: selection
+fields:
+    - ComputerName
+    - SubjectDomainName
+    - SubjectUserName
+    - RelativeTargetName
+falsepositives:
+    - Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or pentest or backup software
+    - Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
+level: medium

rules/network/zeek/zeek_smb_converted_win_transferring_files_with_credential_data.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+title: Transferring Files with Credential Data via Network Shares - Zeek
+id: 2e69f167-47b5-4ae7-a390-47764529eff5
+description: Transferring files with well-known filenames (sensitive files with credential data) using network shares
+author: '@neu5ron, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community'
+date: 2020/04/02
+references:
+  - https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/373424f14574facf9e261d5c822345a282b91479/rules/windows/builtin/win_transferring_files_with_credential_data_via_network_shares.yml
+tags:
+  - attack.credential_access
+  - attack.t1003
+logsource:
+  product: zeek
+  service: smb_files
+detection:
+  selection:
+    name:
+      - '\mimidrv'
+      - '\lsass'
+      - '\windows\minidump\'
+      - '\hiberfil'
+      - '\sqldmpr'
+      - '\sam'
+      - '\ntds.dit'
+      - '\security'      
+  condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - Transferring sensitive files for legitimate administration work by legitimate administrator
+level: medium
+status: experimental

rules/proxy/proxy_raw_paste_service_access.yml

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ detection:
           - '.paste.ee/r/'
           - '.pastebin.com/raw/'
           - '.hastebin.com/raw/'
+          - '.ghostbin.co/paste/*/raw/'
     condition: selection
 fields:
     - ClientIP

rules/proxy/proxy_turla_comrat.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+title: Turla ComRAT
+id: 7857f021-007f-4928-8b2c-7aedbe64bb82
+status: experimental
+description: Detects Turla ComRAT patterns
+references:
+    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2020/05/26
+tags:
+    - attack.g0010
+logsource:
+    category: proxy
+detection:
+    selection:
+        c-uri|contains: '/index/index.php?h='
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown
+level: critical

rules/proxy/proxy_ua_apt.yml

@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ detection:
         - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 9; *'  # Suspicious 'Windows NT 9' user agent - used by APT33 malware in 2018
         - 'hots scot'  # Unkown iOS zero-day implant https://twitter.com/craiu/status/1176437994288484352?s=20
         - 'Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MSIE 10.0; Windows NT)'  # https://blog.telsy.com/meeting-powerband-the-apt33-net-powerton-variant/
+        - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64) Chrome/28.0.1500.95 Safari/537.36'  # Hidden Cobra malware
+        - 'Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.2; Win32; rv:47.0)'  # Strong Pity loader https://twitter.com/VK_Intel/status/1264185981118406657
     condition: selection
 fields:
     - ClientIP

rules/web/web_citrix_cve_2019_19781_exploit.yml

@@ -10,13 +10,13 @@ references:
 author: Arnim Rupp, Florian Roth
 status: experimental
 date: 2020/01/02
-modified: 2020/01/15
+modified: 2020/03/14
 logsource:
     category: webserver
     description: 'Make sure that your Netscaler appliance logs all kinds of attacks (test with http://your-citrix-gw.net/robots.txt). The directory traversal with ../ might not be needed on certain cloud instances or for authenticated users, so we also check for direct paths. All scripts in portal/scripts are exploitable except logout.pl.'
 detection:
     selection:
-        c-uri-path: 
+        c-uri: 
             - '*/../vpns/*'
             - '*/vpns/cfg/smb.conf'
             - '*/vpns/portal/scripts/*.pl*'

rules/web/web_cve_2018_2894_weblogic_exploit.yml

@@ -1,8 +1,9 @@
 title: Oracle WebLogic Exploit
 id: 37e8369b-43bb-4bf8-83b6-6dd43bda2000
-description: Detects access to a webshell droped into a keytore folder on the WebLogic server
+description: Detects access to a webshell dropped into a keystore folder on the WebLogic server
 author: Florian Roth
 date: 2018/07/22
+modified: 2020/03/14
 status: experimental
 references:
     - https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2018-2894
@@ -12,7 +13,7 @@ logsource:
     category: webserver
 detection:
     selection:
-        c-uri-path: 
+        c-uri: 
             - '*/config/keystore/*.js*'
     condition: selection
 fields:

rules/web/web_cve_2019_3398_confluence.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+title: Confluence Exploitation CVE-2019-3398
+id: e9bc39ae-978a-4e49-91ab-5bd481fc668b
+status: experimental
+description: Detects the exploitation of the Confluence vulnerability described in CVE-2019-3398 
+references:
+    - https://devcentral.f5.com/s/articles/confluence-arbitrary-file-write-via-path-traversal-cve-2019-3398-34181
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2020/05/26
+tags:
+    - attack.initial_access
+    - attack.t1190
+logsource:
+    category: webserver
+detection:
+    selection:
+        cs-method: 'POST'
+        c-uri|contains|all:
+            - '/upload.action'
+            - 'filename=../../../../'
+    condition: selection
+fields:
+    - c-ip
+    - c-dns
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown
+level: critical
+

rules/web/web_cve_2020_0688_msexchange.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+title: CVE-2020-0688 Exchange Exploitation via Web Log
+id: fce2c2e2-0fb5-41ab-a14c-5391e1fd70a5
+status: experimental
+description: Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described in CVE-2020-0688 
+references:
+    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2020/02/29
+logsource:
+    category: webserver
+detection:
+    selection1:
+        cs-method: 'GET'
+        c-uri|contains:
+            - '/ecp/'
+            - '/owa/'
+    selection2: 
+        c-uri|contains: '__VIEWSTATE=' 
+    condition: selection1 and selection2
+fields:
+    - c-ip
+    - c-dns
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown
+tags:
+    - attack.initial_access
+    - attack.t1190
+level: critical
+

rules/web/web_exchange_cve_2020_0688_exploit.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+title: CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation Attempt
+id: 7c64e577-d72e-4c3d-9d75-8de6d1f9146a
+status: experimental
+description: Detects CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation attempts
+references:
+  - https://github.com/Ridter/cve-2020-0688
+author: NVISO
+date: 2020/02/27
+tags:
+  - attack.t1210
+logsource:
+  category: webserver
+detection:
+  selection:
+    c-uri|contains|all:
+      - "/ecp/default.aspx"
+      - "__VIEWSTATEGENERATOR="
+      - "__VIEWSTATE="
+  condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+  - Unknown
+level: high

rules/web/web_multiple_suspicious_resp_codes_single_source.yml

@@ -3,11 +3,12 @@ id: 6fdfc796-06b3-46e8-af08-58f3505318af
 description: Detects possible exploitation activity or bugs in a web application
 author: Thomas Patzke
 date: 2017/02/19
+modified: 2020/03/14
 logsource:
     category: webserver
 detection:
     selection:
-        response:
+        sc-status:
           - 400
           - 401
           - 403

rules/web/web_pulsesecure_cve-2019-11510.yml

@@ -5,11 +5,12 @@ references:
     - https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/47297
 author: Florian Roth
 date: 2019/11/18
+modified: 2020/03/14
 logsource:
     category: webserver
 detection:
     selection:
-        c-uri-path: '*?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/*'
+        c-uri: '*?/dana/html5acc/guacamole/*'
     condition: selection
 fields:
     - client_ip

rules/windows/builtin/win_GPO_scheduledtasks.yml

@@ -1,10 +1,11 @@
 title: Persistence and Execution at Scale via GPO Scheduled Task
 id: a8f29a7b-b137-4446-80a0-b804272f3da2
-description: Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, ususally used to deploy ransomware at scale
+description: Detect lateral movement using GPO scheduled task, usually used to deploy ransomware at scale
 author: Samir Bousseaden
 date: 2019/04/03
 references:
     - https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1106899890377052160
+    - https://www.secureworks.com/blog/ransomware-as-a-distraction
 tags:
     - attack.persistence
     - attack.lateral_movement

rules/windows/builtin/win_ad_replication_non_machine_account.yml

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: 17d619c1-e020-4347-957e-1d1207455c93
 description: Detects potential abuse of Active Directory Replication Service (ADRS) from a non machine account to request credentials.
 status: experimental
 date: 2019/07/26
-modified: 2019/11/10
+modified: 2020/03/02
 author: Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g
 references:
     - https://github.com/Cyb3rWard0g/ThreatHunter-Playbook/tree/master/playbooks/windows/06_credential_access/T1003_credential_dumping/ad_replication_non_machine_account.md
@@ -22,7 +22,8 @@ detection:
             - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
             - '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
     filter:
-        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
+        - SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
+        - SubjectUserName|startswith: 'MSOL_' #https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/reference-connect-accounts-permissions#ad-ds-connector-account
     condition: selection and not filter
 fields:
     - ComputerName

rules/windows/builtin/win_ad_user_enumeration.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+title: AD User Enumeration
+id: ab6bffca-beff-4baa-af11-6733f296d57a
+description: Detects access to a domain user from a non-machine account
+status: experimental
+date: 2020/03/30
+author: Maxime Thiebaut (@0xThiebaut)
+references:
+    - https://www.specterops.io/assets/resources/an_ace_up_the_sleeve.pdf
+    - http://www.stuffithoughtiknew.com/2019/02/detecting-bloodhound.html
+    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/attributes-all # For further investigation of the accessed properties
+tags:
+    - attack.discovery
+    - attack.t1087
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: security
+    definition: Requires the "Read all properties" permission on the user object to be audited for the "Everyone" principal
+detection:
+    selection:
+        EventID: 4662
+        ObjectType|contains: # Using contains as the data commonly is structured as "%{bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2}"
+            - 'bf967aba-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2' # The user class (https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/c-user)
+    filter:
+        - SubjectUserName|endswith: '$' # Exclude machine accounts
+        - SubjectUserName|startswith: 'MSOL_' # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/hybrid/reference-connect-accounts-permissions#ad-ds-connector-account
+    condition: selection and not filter
+falsepositives:
+    - Administrators configuring new users.
+level: medium

rules/windows/builtin/win_alert_ad_user_backdoors.yml

@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ logsource:
 detection:
     selection1:
         EventID: 4738
+    filter_null:
+        AllowedToDelegateTo: null
     filter1:
-        AllowedToDelegateTo: 
-            - null
-            - '-'
+        AllowedToDelegateTo: '-'
     selection2:
         EventID: 5136
         AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo'
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ detection:
     selection4:
         EventID: 5136
         AttributeLDAPDisplayName: 'msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity'
-    condition: (selection1 and not 1 of filter*) or selection2 or selection3 or selection4
+    condition: (selection1 and not filter1 and not filter_null) or selection2 or selection3 or selection4
 falsepositives:
     - Unknown
 level: high

rules/windows/builtin/win_etw_modification.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+title: COMPlus_ETWEnabled Registry Modification
+id: a4c90ea1-2634-4ca0-adbb-35eae169b6fc
+status: experimental
+description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
+references:
+  - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
+  - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
+  - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
+  - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
+author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
+date: 2020/06/05
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.t1112
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: security
+detection:
+    selection:
+        EventID: 4657
+        ObjectName|endswith: '\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework' 
+        ObjectValueName: 'ETWEnabled'
+        NewValue: '0'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - unknown
+level: critical

rules/windows/builtin/win_meterpreter_or_cobaltstrike_getsystem_service_installation.yml

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ action: global
 title: Meterpreter or Cobalt Strike Getsystem Service Installation
 id: 843544a7-56e0-4dcc-a44f-5cc266dd97d6
 description: Detects the use of getsystem Meterpreter/Cobalt Strike command by detecting a specific service installation
-author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov
+author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Ecco
 date: 2019/10/26
-modified: 2019/11/11
+modified: 2020/05/15
 references:
     - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-privilege-escalation-in-windows-environment
     - https://blog.cobaltstrike.com/2014/04/02/what-happens-when-i-type-getsystem/
@@ -13,9 +13,6 @@ tags:
     - attack.t1134
 detection:
     selection:
-        - ServiceFileName|contains:
-            - 'cmd'
-            - 'comspec'
         # meterpreter getsystem technique 1: cmd.exe /c echo 559891bb017 > \\.\pipe\5e120a
         - ServiceFileName|contains|all:
             - 'cmd'

rules/windows/builtin/win_mmc20_lateral_movement.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+title: MMC20 Lateral Movement
+id: f1f3bf22-deb2-418d-8cce-e1a45e46a5bd
+description: Detects MMC20.Application Lateral Movement; specifically looks for the spawning of the parent MMC.exe with a command line of "-Embedding" as a child of svchost.exe 
+author: '@2xxeformyshirt (Security Risk Advisors)'
+date: 2020/03/04
+references:
+  - https://enigma0x3.net/2017/01/05/lateral-movement-using-the-mmc20-application-com-object/
+  - https://drive.google.com/file/d/1lKya3_mLnR3UQuCoiYruO3qgu052_iS_/view?usp=sharing 
+tags:
+  - attack.execution
+  - attack.t1175
+logsource:
+  category: process_creation
+  product: windows
+detection:
+  selection:
+    ParentImage: '*\svchost.exe'
+    Image: '*\mmc.exe'
+    CommandLine: '*-Embedding*'
+  condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+  - Unlikely
+level: high

rules/windows/builtin/win_net_ntlm_downgrade.yml

@@ -23,8 +23,8 @@ detection:
         EventID: 13
         TargetObject: 
             - '*SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa\lmcompatibilitylevel'
-            - '*SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa\NtlmMinClientSec'
-            - '*SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa\RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'
+            - '*SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa*\NtlmMinClientSec'
+            - '*SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa*\RestrictSendingNTLMTraffic'
 ---
 # Windows Security Eventlog: Process Creation with Full Command Line
 logsource:
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ logsource:
 detection:
     selection2:
         EventID: 4657
-        ObjectName: '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa'
+        ObjectName: '\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\\*ControlSet*\Control\Lsa*'
         ObjectValueName: 
             - 'LmCompatibilityLevel'
             - 'NtlmMinClientSec'

rules/windows/builtin/win_possible_dc_shadow.yml

@@ -1,25 +1,29 @@
-title: Possible DC Sync
+title: Possible DC Shadow
 id: 32e19d25-4aed-4860-a55a-be99cb0bf7ed
 description: Detects DC sync via create new SPN
 status: experimental
-author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community
+author: Ilyas Ochkov, oscd.community, Chakib Gzenayi (@Chak092), Hosni Mribah
 date: 2019/10/25
 references:
     - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/ec5bb710499caae6667c7f7311ca9e92c03b9039/rules/windows/builtin/win_dcsync.yml
     - https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376
     - https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2
-    - https://jsecurity101.com/2019/Syncing-into-the-Shadows/
+    - https://blog.alsid.eu/dcshadow-explained-4510f52fc19d
 tags:
     - attack.credential_access
-    - attack.t1003
+    - attack.t1207
 logsource:
     product: windows
     service: security
 detection:
-    selection:
+    selection1:
         EventID: 4742
         ServicePrincipalNames: '*GC/*'
-    condition: selection
+    selection2:
+        EventID: 5136
+        LDAPDisplayName: servicePrincipalName
+        Value: 'GC/*'
+    condition: selection1 OR selection2
 falsepositives:
-    - Unkown
+    - Exclude known DCs
 level: high

rules/windows/builtin/win_rare_schtasks_creations.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 title: Rare Schtasks Creations
 id: b0d77106-7bb0-41fe-bd94-d1752164d066
-description: Detects rare scheduled tasks creations that only appear a few times per time frame and could reveal password dumpers, backdoor installs or other types
-    of malicious code
+description: Detects rare scheduled tasks creations that only appear a few times per time frame and could reveal password dumpers, backdoor installs or other types of malicious code
 status: experimental
 author: Florian Roth
 date: 2017/03/23

rules/windows/builtin/win_rare_service_installs.yml

@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 title: Rare Service Installs
 id: 66bfef30-22a5-4fcd-ad44-8d81e60922ae
-description: Detects rare service installs that only appear a few times per time frame and could reveal password dumpers, backdoor installs or other types of malicious
-    services
+description: Detects rare service installs that only appear a few times per time frame and could reveal password dumpers, backdoor installs or other types of malicious services
 status: experimental
 author: Florian Roth
 date: 2017/03/08

rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_add_sid_history.yml

@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ detection:
         SidHistory:
             - '-'
             - '%%1793'
-    condition: selection1 or (selection2 and not selection3)
+    filter_null:
+        SidHistory: null
+    condition: selection1 or (selection2 and not selection3 and not filter_null)
 falsepositives:
     - Migration of an account into a new domain
 level: medium

rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_backup_delete.yml

@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ logsource:
 detection:
     selection:
         EventID: 524
-        Source: Backup
+        Source: Microsoft-Windows-Backup
     condition: selection
 falsepositives:
     - Unknown

rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_dhcp_config.yml

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ logsource:
 detection:
     selection:
         EventID: 1033
+        Source: Microsoft-Windows-DHCP-Server
     condition: selection
 falsepositives: 
     - Unknown

rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_failed_logon_source.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+title: Failed Logon From Public IP
+id: f88e112a-21aa-44bd-9b01-6ee2a2bbbed1
+description: A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary.
+author: NVISO
+date: 2020/05/06
+tags:
+    - attack.initial_access
+    - attack.persistence
+    - attack.t1078
+    - attack.t1190
+    - attack.t1133
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: security
+detection:
+    selection:
+        EventID: 4625
+    unknown:
+        IpAddress|contains: '-'
+    privatev4:
+        IpAddress|startswith:
+            - '10.' #10.0.0.0/8
+            - '192.168.' #192.168.0.0/16
+            - '172.16.' #172.16.0.0/12
+            - '172.17.'
+            - '172.18.'
+            - '172.19.'
+            - '172.20.'
+            - '172.21.'
+            - '172.22.'
+            - '172.23.'
+            - '172.24.'
+            - '172.25.'
+            - '172.26.'
+            - '172.27.'
+            - '172.28.'
+            - '172.29.'
+            - '172.30.'
+            - '172.31.'
+            - '127.' #127.0.0.0/8
+            - '169.254.' #169.254.0.0/16
+    privatev6:
+        - IpAddress: '::1' #loopback 
+        - IpAddress|startswith:
+            - 'fe80::' #link-local
+            - 'fc00::' #unique local
+    condition: selection and not (unknown or privatev4 or privatev6)
+falsepositives:
+    - Legitimate logon attempts over the internet
+    - IPv4-to-IPv6 mapped IPs
+level: medium

rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_ldap_dataexchange.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+title: Suspicious LDAP-Attributes Used
+id: d00a9a72-2c09-4459-ad03-5e0a23351e36
+description: detects the usage of particular AttributeLDAPDisplayNames, which are known for data exchange via LDAP by the tool LDAPFragger and are additionally not commonly used in companies.
+status: experimental
+date: 2019/03/24
+author: xknow @xknow_infosec
+references:
+    - https://medium.com/@ivecodoe/detecting-ldapfragger-a-newly-released-cobalt-strike-beacon-using-ldap-for-c2-communication-c274a7f00961
+    - https://blog.fox-it.com/2020/03/19/ldapfragger-command-and-control-over-ldap-attributes/
+    - https://github.com/fox-it/LDAPFragger
+tags:
+    - attack.t1041
+    - attack.persistence
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: security
+detection:
+    selection:
+        EventID: 5136
+        AttributeValue: '*'
+        AttributeLDAPDisplayName:
+            - 'primaryInternationalISDNNumber'
+            - 'otherFacsimileTelephoneNumber'
+            - 'primaryTelexNumber'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - Companies, who may use these default LDAP-Attributes for personal information
+level: high

rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_mshta_execution.yml

@@ -2,8 +2,8 @@ title: MSHTA Suspicious Execution 01
 id: cc7abbd0-762b-41e3-8a26-57ad50d2eea3
 status: experimental
 description: Detection for mshta.exe suspicious execution patterns sometimes involving file polyglotism
-date: 22/02/2019
-modified: 22/02/2019
+date: 2019/02/22
+modified: 2019/02/22
 author: Diego Perez (@darkquassar), Markus Neis, Swisscom (Improve Rule)
 references:
     - http://blog.sevagas.com/?Hacking-around-HTA-files

rules/windows/builtin/win_user_driver_loaded.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+title: Suspicious Driver Loaded By User
+id: f63508a0-c809-4435-b3be-ed819394d612
+description: Detects the loading of drivers via 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege' required to load or unload a device driver. With this privilege, the user can dynamically load and unload device drivers or other code in to kernel mode. This user right does not apply to Plug and Play device drivers. If you exclude privileged users/admins and processes, which are allowed to do so, you are maybe left with bad programs trying to load malicious kernel drivers. This will detect Ghost-In-The-Logs (https://github.com/bats3c/Ghost-In-The-Logs) and the usage of Sysinternals and various other tools. So you have to work with a whitelist to find the bad stuff.
+status: experimental
+references:
+    - https://blog.dylan.codes/evading-sysmon-and-windows-event-logging/
+    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/threat-protection/auditing/event-4673
+tags:
+    - attack.t1089
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+date: 2019/04/08
+author: xknow (@xknow_infosec), xorxes (@xor_xes)
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: security
+detection:
+    selection_1:
+        EventID: 4673
+        PrivilegeList: 'SeLoadDriverPrivilege'
+        Service: '-'
+    selection_2:
+        ProcessName|contains:
+            - '*\Windows\System32\Dism.exe'
+            - '*\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
+            - '*\Windows\System32\fltMC.exe'
+            - '*\Windows\HelpPane.exe'
+            - '*\Windows\System32\mmc.exe'
+            - '*\Windows\System32\svchost.exe'
+            - '*\Windows\System32\wimserv.exe'
+            - '*\procexp64.exe'
+            - '*\procexp.exe'
+            - '*\procmon64.exe'
+            - '*\procmon.exe'
+    condition: selection_1 and not selection_2
+falsepositives:
+    - Other legimate tools loading drivers. There are some: Sysinternals, CPU-Z, AVs etc. - but not much. You have to baseline this according to your used products and allowed tools. Also try to exclude users, which are allowed to load drivers.
+level: medium

rules/windows/builtin/win_vul_cve_2020_0688.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+title: CVE-2020-0688 Exploitation via Eventlog
+id: d6266bf5-935e-4661-b477-78772735a7cb
+status: experimental
+description: Detects the exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerability as described in CVE-2020-0688 
+references:
+    - https://www.trustedsec.com/blog/detecting-cve-20200688-remote-code-execution-vulnerability-on-microsoft-exchange-server/
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2020/02/29
+tags:
+    - attack.initial_access
+    - attack.t1190
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: application
+detection:
+    selection1:
+        EventID: 4
+        Source: MSExchange Control Panel
+        Level: Error
+    selection2:
+        - '*&__VIEWSTATE=*'
+    condition: selection1 and selection2
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown
+level: high

rules/windows/deprecated/win_susp_esentutl_activity.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+title: Suspicious Esentutl Use
+id: 56a8189f-11b2-48c8-8ca7-c54b03c2fbf7
+status: experimental
+description: Detects flags often used with the LOLBAS Esentutl for malicious activity. It could be used in rare cases by administrators to access locked files or during maintenance. 
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2020/05/23
+references:
+    - https://lolbas-project.github.io/
+    - https://twitter.com/chadtilbury/status/1264226341408452610
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.execution
+    - attack.s0404
+    - attack.t1218
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    selection:
+        CommandLine|contains|all:
+            - ' /vss '
+            - ' /y '
+    condition: selection
+fields:
+    - CommandLine
+    - ParentCommandLine
+falsepositives:
+    - Administrative activity
+level: high

rules/windows/malware/mal_azorult_reg.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+title: Registy Entries For Azorult Malware
+id: f7f9ab88-7557-4a69-b30e-0a8f91b3a0e7
+description: Detects the presence of a registry key created during Azorult execution
+status: experimental
+references:
+  - https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/threat-encyclopedia/malware/trojan.win32.azoruit.a
+author: Trent Liffick
+date: 2020/05/08
+tags:
+  - attack.execution
+  - attack.t1112
+logsource:
+  product: windows
+  service: sysmon
+detection:
+  selection:
+    EventID:
+      - 12
+      - 13
+    TargetObject:
+      - '*SYSTEM\\*\services\localNETService'
+  condition: selection
+fields:
+  - Image
+  - TargetObject
+  - TargetDetails
+falsepositives:
+  - unknown
+level: critical

rules/windows/malware/win_mal_blue_mockingbird.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+action: global
+title: Blue Mockingbird
+id: c3198a27-23a0-4c2c-af19-e5328d49680e
+status: experimental
+description: Attempts to detect system changes made by Blue Mockingbird
+references:
+    - https://redcanary.com/blog/blue-mockingbird-cryptominer/
+tags:
+    - attack.execution
+    - attack.t1112
+    - attack.t1047
+author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
+date: 2020/05/14
+falsepositives:
+    - unknown
+level: high
+detection:
+    condition: 1 of them
+---
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+  exec_selection:
+    Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
+    CommandLine|contains|all:
+      - 'sc config'
+      - 'wercplsupporte.dll'
+---
+logsource:
+  category: process_creation
+  product: windows
+detection:
+  wmic_cmd:
+    Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
+    CommandLine|endswith: 'COR_PROFILER'
+---
+logsource:
+  product: windows
+  service: sysmon
+detection:
+  mod_reg:
+    EventID: 13
+    TargetObject|endswith:
+      - '\CurrentControlSet\Services\wercplsupport\Parameters\ServiceDll'

rules/windows/malware/win_mal_flowcloud.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+title: FlowCloud Malware
+id: 5118765f-6657-4ddb-a487-d7bd673abbf1
+status: experimental
+description: Detects FlowCloud malware from threat group TA410.
+references:
+  - https://www.proofpoint.com/us/blog/threat-insight/ta410-group-behind-lookback-attacks-against-us-utilities-sector-returns-new
+author: NVISO
+tags:
+  - attack.persistence
+  - attack.t1112
+date: 2020/06/09
+logsource:
+  product: windows
+  service: sysmon
+detection:
+  selection:
+    EventID:
+      - 12 # key create
+      - 13 # value set
+    TargetObject:
+      - 'HKLM\HARDWARE\{804423C2-F490-4ac3-BFA5-13DEDE63A71A}'
+      - 'HKLM\HARDWARE\{A5124AF5-DF23-49bf-B0ED-A18ED3DEA027}'
+      - 'HKLM\HARDWARE\{2DB80286-1784-48b5-A751-B6ED1F490303}'
+      - 'HKLM\SYSTEM\Setup\PrintResponsor\*'
+  condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+  - Unknown
+level: critical

rules/windows/malware/win_mal_octopus_scanner.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+title: Octopus Scanner Malware
+id: 805c55d9-31e6-4846-9878-c34c75054fe9
+status: experimental
+description: Detects Octopus Scanner Malware.
+references:
+  - https://securitylab.github.com/research/octopus-scanner-malware-open-source-supply-chain
+tags:
+  - attack.t1195
+author: NVISO
+date: 2020/06/09
+logsource:
+  product: windows
+  service: sysmon
+detection:
+  filecreate:
+    EventID: 11
+  selection:
+    TargetFilename|endswith:
+      - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Cache134.dat'
+      - '\AppData\Local\Microsoft\ExplorerSync.db'
+  condition: filecreate and selection
+falsepositives:
+  - Unknown
+level: high

rules/windows/other/win_defender_bypass.yml

@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-title: Windows Defender Exclusion Set
-id: e9c8808f-4cfb-4ba9-97d4-e5f3beaa244d
-description: 'Detects scenarios where an windows defender exclusion was added in registry where an entity would want to bypass antivirus scanning from windows defender'
-references:
-    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
-tags:
-    - attack.defense_evasion
-    - attack.t1089
-author: "@BarryShooshooga"
-date: 2019/10/26
-logsource:
-    product: windows
-    service: security
-    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Security Settings/Local Policies/Audit Policy, Registry System Access Control (SACL): Auditing/User'
-detection:
-    selection:
-        EventID: 
-            - 4657
-            - 4656
-            - 4660
-            - 4663
-        ObjectName|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\'
-    condition: selection
-falsepositives: 
-    - Intended inclusions by administrator
-level: high
+title: Windows Defender Exclusion Set
+id: e9c8808f-4cfb-4ba9-97d4-e5f3beaa244d
+description: 'Detects scenarios where an windows defender exclusion was added in registry where an entity would want to bypass antivirus scanning from windows defender'
+references:
+    - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/gootkit-malware-bypasses-windows-defender-by-setting-path-exclusions/
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.t1089
+author: "@BarryShooshooga"
+date: 2019/10/26
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: security
+    definition: 'Requirements: Audit Policy : Security Settings/Local Policies/Audit Policy, Registry System Access Control (SACL): Auditing/User'
+detection:
+    selection:
+        EventID: 
+            - 4657
+            - 4656
+            - 4660
+            - 4663
+        ObjectName|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Exclusions\'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives: 
+    - Intended inclusions by administrator
+level: high

rules/windows/powershell/powershell_create_local_user.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+title: PowerShell Create Local User
+id: 243de76f-4725-4f2e-8225-a8a69b15ad61
+status: experimental 
+description: Detects creation of a local user via PowerShell
+references:
+    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1136/T1136.md
+tags:
+    - attack.execution
+    - attack.t1086
+    - attack.persistence
+    - attack.t1136
+author: '@ROxPinTeddy' 
+date: 2020/04/11 
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: powershell
+detection:
+    selection:
+        EventID: 4104
+        Message|contains:
+            - 'New-LocalUser'
+    condition: selection 
+falsepositives:
+    - Legitimate user creation 
+level: medium

rules/windows/powershell/powershell_downgrade_attack.yml

@@ -8,19 +8,20 @@ tags:
     - attack.defense_evasion
     - attack.execution
     - attack.t1086
-author: Florian Roth (rule), Lee Holmes (idea)
+author: Florian Roth (rule), Lee Holmes (idea), Harish Segar (improvements)
 date: 2017/03/22
+modified: 2020/03/20
 logsource:
     product: windows
     service: powershell-classic
 detection:
     selection:
         EventID: 400
-        EngineVersion: '2.*'
+        EngineVersion|startswith: '2.'
     filter:
-        HostVersion: '2.*'
+        HostVersion|startswith: '2.'
     condition: selection and not filter
 falsepositives:
     - Penetration Test
     - Unknown
-level: medium
+level: medium

rules/windows/powershell/powershell_ntfs_ads_access.yml

@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ logsource:
 detection:
     keyword1:
         - "set-content"
+        - "add-content"
     keyword2:
         - "-stream"
     condition: keyword1 and keyword2

rules/windows/powershell/powershell_suspicious_download.yml

@@ -7,15 +7,20 @@ tags:
     - attack.t1086
 author: Florian Roth
 date: 2017/03/05
+modified: 2020/03/25
 logsource:
     product: windows
     service: powershell
 detection:
-    keywords:
-        Message:
-            - '*System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(*'
-            - '*system.net.webclient).downloadfile(*'
-    condition: keywords
+    downloadfile:
+        Message|contains|all:
+            - 'System.Net.WebClient'
+            - '.DownloadFile('
+    downloadstring:
+        Message|contains|all:
+            - 'System.Net.WebClient'
+            - '.DownloadString('
+    condition: downloadfile or downloadstring
 falsepositives:
     - PowerShell scripts that download content from the Internet
 level: medium

rules/windows/powershell/powershell_suspicious_invocation_generic.yml

@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ detection:
     hidden:
         - ' -w hidden '
         - ' -window hidden '
-        - ' - windowstyle hidden '
+        - ' -windowstyle hidden '
     noninteractive:
         - ' -noni '
         - ' -noninteractive '

rules/windows/powershell/powershell_suspicious_profile_create.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+title: Powershell Profile.ps1 Modification
+id: b5b78988-486d-4a80-b991-930eff3ff8bf
+status: experimental
+description: Detects a change in profile.ps1 of the Powershell profile
+references:
+    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/2019/05/29/turla-powershell-usage/
+author: HieuTT35
+date: 2019/10/24
+modified: 2020/04/03
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    service: sysmon
+detection:
+    event:
+        EventID: 11
+    target1:
+        TargetFilename|contains|all: 
+            - '\My Documents\PowerShell\'
+            - '\profile.ps1'
+    target2:
+        TargetFilename|contains|all: 
+            - 'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\'
+            - '\profile.ps1'
+    condition: event and (target1 or target2)
+falsepositives:
+    - System administrator create Powershell profile manually
+level: high
+tags:
+    - attack.persistence
+    - attack.privilege_escalation

rules/windows/powershell/powershell_wmimplant.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+title: WMImplant Hack Tool
+id: 8028c2c3-e25a-46e3-827f-bbb5abf181d7
+status: experimental
+description: Detects parameters used by WMImplant
+references:
+  - https://github.com/FortyNorthSecurity/WMImplant
+tags:
+  - attack.execution
+  - attack.t1047
+author: NVISO
+date: 2020/03/26
+logsource:
+  product: windows
+  service: powershell
+  description: "Script block logging must be enabled"
+detection:
+  selection:
+    ScriptBlockText|contains:
+      - "WMImplant"
+      - " change_user "
+      - " gen_cli "
+      - " command_exec "
+      - " disable_wdigest "
+      - " disable_winrm "
+      - " enable_wdigest "
+      - " enable_winrm "
+      - " registry_mod "
+      - " remote_posh "
+      - " sched_job "
+      - " service_mod "
+      - " process_kill "
+      # - " process_start "
+      - " active_users "
+      - " basic_info "
+      # - " drive_list "
+      # - " installed_programs "
+      - " power_off "
+      - " vacant_system "
+      - " logon_events "
+  condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+  - Administrative scripts that use the same keywords.
+level: high

rules/windows/process_creation/win_advanced_ip_scanner.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+title: Advanced IP Scanner 
+id: bef37fa2-f205-4a7b-b484-0759bfd5f86f
+status: experimental
+description: Detects the use of Advanced IP Scanner. Seems to be a popular tool for ransomware groups.
+references:
+    - https://news.sophos.com/en-us/2019/12/09/snatch-ransomware-reboots-pcs-into-safe-mode-to-bypass-protection/
+    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
+author: '@ROxPinTeddy'
+date: 2020/05/12
+tags:
+    - attack.discovery
+    - attack.t1046
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    selection:
+       Image|contains: '\advanced_ip_scanner'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - Legitimate administrative use
+level: medium

rules/windows/process_creation/win_apt_bear_activity_gtr19.yml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-title: Judgement Panda Exfil Activity
+title: Judgement Panda Credential Access Activity
 id: b83f5166-9237-4b5e-9cd4-7b5d52f4d8ee
 description: Detects Russian group activity as described in Global Threat Report 2019 by Crowdstrike
 references:

rules/windows/process_creation/win_apt_greenbug_may20.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+title: Greenbug Campaign Indicators
+id: 3711eee4-a808-4849-8a14-faf733da3612
+status: experimental
+description: Detects tools and process executions as observed in a Greenbug campaign in May 2020
+references:
+    - https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/greenbug-espionage-telco-south-asia
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2020/05/20
+modified: 2020/05/21
+tags:
+    - attack.g0049
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    selection1:
+        CommandLine|contains|all: 
+            - 'bitsadmin /transfer'
+            - 'CSIDL_APPDATA'
+    selection2:
+        CommandLine|contains: 
+            - 'CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE'
+    selection3: 
+        CommandLine|contains:
+            - '\msf.ps1'
+            - '8989 -e cmd.exe'
+            - 'system.Data.SqlClient.SqlDataAdapter($cmd); [void]$da.fill'
+            - '-nop -w hidden -c $k=new-object'
+            - '[Net.CredentialCache]::DefaultCredentials;IEX '
+            - ' -nop -w hidden -c $m=new-object net.webclient;$m'
+            - '-noninteractive -executionpolicy bypass whoami'
+            - '-noninteractive -executionpolicy bypass netstat -a'
+            - 'L3NlcnZlc'  # base64 encoded '/server='
+    selection4:
+        Image|endswith:
+            - '\adobe\Adobe.exe'
+            - '\oracle\local.exe'
+            - '\revshell.exe'
+            - 'infopagesbackup\ncat.exe'
+            - 'CSIDL_SYSTEM\cmd.exe'
+            - '\programdata\oracle\java.exe'
+            - 'CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA\comms\comms.exe'
+            - '\Programdata\VMware\Vmware.exe'
+    condition: 1 of them
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown
+level: critical

rules/windows/process_creation/win_apt_lazarus_session_highjack.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+title: Lazarus Session Highjacker
+id: 3f7f5b0b-5b16-476c-a85f-ab477f6dd24b
+description: Detects executables launched outside their default directories as used by Lazarus Group (Bluenoroff)
+status: experimental
+references:
+    - https://media.kasperskycontenthub.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/43/2018/03/07180244/Lazarus_Under_The_Hood_PDF_final.pdf
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.t1036
+author: Trent Liffick (@tliffick)
+date: 2020/06/03
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    selection:
+        Image: 
+            - '*\mstdc.exe'
+            - '*\gpvc.exe'
+    filter:
+        Image:
+            - 'C:\Windows\System32\\*'
+            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\\*'
+    condition: selection and not filter
+falsepositives:
+    - unknown
+level: high

rules/windows/process_creation/win_apt_tropictrooper.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 title: TropicTrooper Campaign November 2018
 id: 8c7090c3-e0a0-4944-bd08-08c3a0cecf79
-author: '@41thexplorer, Windows Defender ATP'
+author: '@41thexplorer, Microsoft Defender ATP'
 status: stable
 date: 2019/11/12
 description: Detects TropicTrooper activity, an actor who targeted high-profile organizations in the energy and food and beverage sectors in Asia

rules/windows/process_creation/win_apt_turla_comrat_may20.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+title: Turla Group Commands May 2020
+id: 9e2e51c5-c699-4794-ba5a-29f5da40ac0c
+status: experimental
+description: Detects commands used by Turla group as reported by ESET in May 2020
+references:
+    - https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/ESET_Turla_ComRAT.pdf
+tags:
+    - attack.g0010
+    - attack.execution
+    - attack.t1086
+    - attack.t1053
+    - attack.t1027
+    - attack.discovery
+    - attack.t1016
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2020/05/26
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown
+detection:
+    selection1:
+        CommandLine|contains:
+            - 'tracert -h 10 yahoo.com'
+            - '.WSqmCons))|iex;'
+            - 'Fr`omBa`se6`4Str`ing'
+    selection2:
+        CommandLine|contains|all:
+            - 'net use https://docs.live.net'
+            - '@aol.co.uk'
+    condition: 1 of them
+level: critical

rules/windows/process_creation/win_apt_unidentified_nov_18.yml

@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ description: A sigma rule detecting an unidetefied attacker who used phishing em
     YYTRIUM/APT29 campaign in 2016.
 references:
     - https://twitter.com/DrunkBinary/status/1063075530180886529
-author: '@41thexplorer, Windows Defender ATP'
+author: '@41thexplorer, Microsoft Defender ATP'
 date: 2018/11/20
 modified: 2018/12/11
 tags:

rules/windows/process_creation/win_bootconf_mod.yml

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ logsource:
 detection:
     selection1:
         Image|endswith: \bcdedit.exe
-        CommandLine: set
+        CommandLine|contains: set
     selection2:
         - CommandLine|contains|all:
             - bootstatuspolicy

rules/windows/process_creation/win_commandline_path_traversal.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+title: Cmd.exe CommandLine Path Traversal
+id: 087790e3-3287-436c-bccf-cbd0184a7db1
+description: detects the usage of path traversal in cmd.exe indicating possible command/argument confusion/hijacking
+status: experimental
+date: 2020/06/11
+author: xknow @xknow_infosec
+references:
+    - https://hackingiscool.pl/cmdhijack-command-argument-confusion-with-path-traversal-in-cmd-exe/
+    - https://twitter.com/Oddvarmoe/status/1270633613449723905
+tags:
+    - attack.t1059
+    - attack.execution
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    selection:
+        ParentCommandLine|contains: 'cmd*/c'
+        CommandLine|contains: '/../../'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - (not much) some benign Java tools may product false-positive commandlines for loading libraries
+level: high

rules/windows/process_creation/win_copying_sensitive_files_with_credential_data.yml

@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ detection:
         - Image|endswith: '\esentutl.exe'
           CommandLine|contains:
             - 'vss'
-            - '/m'
-            - '/y'
+            - ' /m '
+            - ' /y '
         - CommandLine|contains:
             - '\windows\ntds\ntds.dit'
             - '\config\sam'
             - '\config\security'
-            - '\config\system'
+            - '\config\system '  # space needed to avoid false positives with \config\systemprofile\
             - '\repair\sam'
             - '\repair\system'
             - '\repair\security'

rules/windows/process_creation/win_crime_maze_ransomware.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+title: Maze Ransomware
+id: 29fd07fc-9cfd-4331-b7fd-cc18dfa21052
+status: experimental
+description: Detects specific process characteristics of Maze ransomware word document droppers
+references:
+    - https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/05/tactics-techniques-procedures-associated-with-maze-ransomware-incidents.html
+    - https://app.any.run/tasks/51e7185c-52d7-4efb-ac0d-e86340053473/
+    - https://app.any.run/tasks/65a79440-373a-4725-8d74-77db9f2abda4/
+author: Florian Roth
+date: 2020/05/08
+tags:
+    - attack.execution
+    - attack.t1204
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    # Dropper
+    selection1:
+        ParentImage|endswith:
+            - '\WINWORD.exe'
+        Image|endswith:
+            - '*.tmp'
+    # Binary Execution
+    selection2:
+        Image|endswith: '\wmic.exe'
+        ParentImage|contains: '\Temp\'
+        CommandLine|endswith: 'shadowcopy delete'
+    # Specific Pattern
+    selection3: 
+        CommandLine|endswith: 'shadowcopy delete'
+        CommandLine|contains: '\..\..\system32'
+    condition: 1 of them
+fields:
+    - ComputerName
+    - User
+    - Image
+falsepositives:
+    - Unlikely
+level: critical

rules/windows/process_creation/win_etw_modification_cmdline.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+title: COMPlus_ETWEnabled Command Line Arguments
+id: 41421f44-58f9-455d-838a-c398859841d4
+status: experimental
+description: Potential adversaries stopping ETW providers recording loaded .NET assemblies.
+references:
+  - https://twitter.com/_xpn_/status/1268712093928378368
+  - https://social.msdn.microsoft.com/Forums/vstudio/en-US/0878832e-39d7-4eaf-8e16-a729c4c40975/what-can-i-use-e13c0d23ccbc4e12931bd9cc2eee27e4-for?forum=clr
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/ee2355c801d892f2894b0f7b14a20e6cc50e0e54/docs/design/coreclr/jit/viewing-jit-dumps.md#setting-configuration-variables
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/f62e93416a1799aecc6b0947adad55a0d9870732/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfigvalues.h#L35-L38
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/7abe42dc1123722ed385218268bb9fe04556e3d3/src/coreclr/src/inc/clrconfig.h#L33-L39
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/search?p=1&q=COMPlus_&unscoped_q=COMPlus_
+  - https://bunnyinside.com/?term=f71e8cb9c76a
+  - http://managed670.rssing.com/chan-5590147/all_p1.html
+  - https://github.com/dotnet/runtime/blob/4f9ae42d861fcb4be2fcd5d3d55d5f227d30e723/docs/coding-guidelines/clr-jit-coding-conventions.md#1412-disabling-code
+author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
+date: 2020/05/02
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+logsource:
+    category: process_creation
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    selection:
+        CommandLine|contains: 'COMPlus_ETWEnabled=0'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - unknown
+level: critical

rules/windows/process_creation/win_etw_trace_evasion.yml

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 title: Disable of ETW Trace
 id: a238b5d0-ce2d-4414-a676-7a531b3d13d6
 description: Detects a command that clears or disables any ETW trace log which could indicate a logging evasion.
+status: experimental
 references:
     - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/administration/windows-commands/wevtutil
     - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/process_creation/win_mal_lockergoga.yml
@@ -25,3 +26,5 @@ detection:
     selection_disable_2:
         CommandLine: '* set-log* /e:false*'
     condition: selection_clear_1 or selection_clear_2 or selection_disable_1 or selection_disable_2
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown