Updates
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@@ -29,5 +29,5 @@ detection:
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ParentImage|endswith: '\wbem\WmiPrvSE.exe'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Unknown
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- Unknown
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level: high
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ description: Detects suspicious start of rundll32.exe with a parent process of E
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status: experimental
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references:
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- https://redcanary.com/blog/raspberry-robin/
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
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author: CD_ROM_
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date: 2022/05/21
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logsource:
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ detection:
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CommandLine|contains: '.dmp'
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condition: selection and dumpfile
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falsepositives:
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- Legitimate use of WinRAR with a command line in which .dmp appears incidentally
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- Legitimate use of WinRAR with a command line in which .dmp appears accidentally
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level: high
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tags:
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- attack.collection
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+7
-3
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
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title: Wab Execution From Non Default Location
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id: 395907ee-96e5-4666-af2e-2ca91688e151
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status: experimental
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description: Detects execution of wab.exe (Windows Contacts) from non default locations as seen with bumblebee activity
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description: Detects execution of wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) from non default locations as seen with bumblebee activity
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references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
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- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
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author: Nasreddine Bencherchali
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date: 2022/08/12
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modified: 2022/09/27
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.execution
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@@ -15,7 +17,9 @@ logsource:
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product: windows
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detection:
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selection:
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Image|endswith: '\wab.exe'
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Image|endswith:
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- '\wab.exe'
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- '\wabmig.exe'
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filter:
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Image|startswith:
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- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
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@@ -23,5 +27,5 @@ detection:
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- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Windows Mail\'
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condition: selection and not filter
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falsepositives:
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- Unlikely
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- Unknown
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level: high
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@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
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title: Wab.Exe Unusual Parent Or Child Processes
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title: Wab/Wabmig Unusual Parent Or Child Processes
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id: 63d1ccc0-2a43-4f4b-9289-361b308991ff
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status: experimental
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description: Detects unusual parent or children of the wab.exe (Windows Contacts) process as seen being used with bumblebee activity
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description: Detects unusual parent or children of the wab.exe (Windows Contacts) and Wabmig.exe (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool) processes as seen being used with bumblebee activity
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references:
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/08/08/bumblebee-roasts-its-way-to-domain-admin/
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- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/bumblebee-loader-cybercrime
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
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author: Nasreddine Bencherchali
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date: 2022/08/12
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modified: 2022/09/27
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.execution
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@@ -20,10 +22,15 @@ detection:
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- \WmiPrvSE.exe
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- \svchost.exe
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- \dllhost.exe
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Image|endswith: '\wab.exe'
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Image|endswith:
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- '\wab.exe'
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- '\wabmig.exe' # (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool)
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selection_child:
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ParentImage|endswith: '\wab.exe'
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# You can add specific suspicious child processes (such as cmd, powershell...) to increase the accuracy
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ParentImage|endswith:
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- '\wab.exe'
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- '\wabmig.exe' # (Microsoft Address Book Import Tool)
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condition: 1 of selection_*
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falsepositives:
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- Unlikely
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- Unknown
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level: high
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@@ -4,8 +4,10 @@ status: experimental
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description: Detects weak passwords or often abused passwords (seen used by threat actors) via the CLI. An example would be a threat actor creating a new user via the net command and providing the password inline
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references:
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- https://symantec-enterprise-blogs.security.com/blogs/threat-intelligence/espionage-asia-governments
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- https://thedfirreport.com/2022/09/26/bumblebee-round-two/
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author: Nasreddine Bencherchali
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date: 2022/09/14
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modified: 2022/09/27
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.execution
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@@ -19,6 +21,7 @@ detection:
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- 'Asd123.aaaa'
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- 'password123'
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- '123456789'
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- 'P@ssw0rd!'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Legitimate usage of the passwords by users via commandline (should be discouraged)
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