Merge branch 'master' into rule-devel

This commit is contained in:
Florian Roth
2022-03-07 15:38:58 +01:00
8 changed files with 144 additions and 26 deletions
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via RUNDLL LAUNCHER
status: experimental
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020/10/18
modified: 2021/09/18
modified: 2022/03/06
references:
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009 #(Task 23)
tags:
@@ -21,7 +21,11 @@ logsource:
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|re: '(?i).*rundll32(?:\.exe)?(?:\s+)?shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*powershell.*\"'
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- 'rundll32.exe'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
- 'powershell'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use Rundll32 in Scripts
status: experimental
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020/10/09
modified: 2021/09/18
modified: 2022/03/06
references:
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009 #(Task30)
tags:
@@ -21,7 +21,16 @@ logsource:
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4697
ServiceFileName|re: '(?i).*&&.*rundll32.*shell32\.dll.*shellexec_rundll.*(value|invoke|comspec|iex).*"'
ServiceFileName|contains|all:
- '&&'
- 'rundll32'
- 'shell32.dll'
- 'shellexec_rundll'
ServiceFileName|contains:
- value
- invoke
- comspec
- iex
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -4,14 +4,9 @@ description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via COMPRESS OBFUSCATION
status: experimental
author: Timur Zinniatullin, oscd.community
date: 2020/10/18
modified: 2021/11/30
modified: 2022/03/06
references:
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009 #(Task 19)
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
falsepositives:
- unknown
level: medium
@@ -22,5 +17,16 @@ detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|re: '(?i).*new-object.*(?:system\.io\.compression\.deflatestream|system\.io\.streamreader).*text\.encoding\]::ascii.*readtoend'
condition: selection
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'new-object'
- 'text.encoding]::ascii'
- 'readtoend'
ImagePath|contains:
- ':system.io.compression.deflatestream'
- 'system.io.streamreader'
condition: selection
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1027
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.001
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: Detects Obfuscated Powershell via use MSHTA in Scripts
status: experimental
author: Nikita Nazarov, oscd.community
date: 2020/10/09
modified: 2021/11/30
modified: 2022/03/06
references:
- https://github.com/Neo23x0/sigma/issues/1009 #(Task31)
tags:
@@ -19,8 +19,14 @@ detection:
selection:
Provider_Name: 'Service Control Manager'
EventID: 7045
ImagePath|re: '(?i).*(set).*(&&).*(mshta).*(vbscript:createobject).*(\.run).*\(window\.close\).*"'
ImagePath|contains|all:
- 'set'
- '&&'
- 'mshta'
- 'vbscript:createobject'
- '.run'
- '(window.close)'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
level: high
@@ -4,10 +4,7 @@ status: experimental
description: HxTsr.exe is a Microsoft compressed executable file called Microsoft Outlook Communications.HxTsr.exe is part of Outlook apps, because it resides in a hidden "WindowsApps" subfolder of "C:\Program Files". Its path includes a version number, e.g., "C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_17.7466.41167.0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbwe\HxTsr.exe". Any instances of hxtsr.exe not in this folder may be malware camouflaging itself as HxTsr.exe
author: Sreeman
date: 2020/04/17
modified: 2021/07/07
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036
modified: 2022/03/06
logsource:
product: windows
category: process_creation
@@ -15,8 +12,12 @@ detection:
selection:
Image: hxtsr.exe
filter:
CurrentDirectory|re: '(?i)c:\\\\program files\\\\windowsapps\\\\microsoft\.windowscommunicationsapps_.*\\\\hxtsr\.exe'
CurrentDirectory|startswith: 'C:\program files\windowsapps\microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_'
CurrentDirectory|endswith: '\hxtsr.exe'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- unknown
level: medium
level: medium
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1036
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
title: Suspicious OfflineScannerShell.exe Execution From Another Folder
id: 02b18447-ea83-4b1b-8805-714a8a34546a
status: experimental
description: Use OfflineScannerShell.exe to execute mpclient.dll library in the current working directory
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/OfflineScannerShell/
author: frack113
date: 2022/03/06
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
lolbas:
Image|endswith: '\OfflineScannerShell.exe'
filter_correct:
CurrentDirectory: 'C:\Program Files\Windows Defender\Offline\'
filter_missing:
CurrentDirectory: null
condition: lolbas and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- unknown
level: medium
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1218
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
title: Suspicious Replace.exe Execution
id: 9292293b-8496-4715-9db6-37028dcda4b3
status: experimental
description: Replace.exe is used to replace file with another file
references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/Binaries/Replace/
author: frack113
date: 2022/03/06
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
lolbas:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'replace '
- '/A'
condition: lolbas
falsepositives:
- unknown
level: medium
tags:
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1105
@@ -10,18 +10,62 @@ tags:
- attack.t1574.011
author: Sreeman
date: 2020/09/29
modified: 2021/08/10
modified: 2022/03/06
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cmdline_1:
CommandLine|re: '(?i)sc config.*binpath=.*'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'sc '
- 'config '
- 'binpath='
selection_cmdline_2:
CommandLine|re: '(?i)sc failure.*command=.*'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'sc '
- 'failure'
- 'command='
selection_cmdline_3:
CommandLine|re: '(?i).*reg add.*(FailureCommand|ImagePath).*(\.sh|\.exe|\.dll|\.bin$|\.bat|\.cmd|\.js|\.msh$|\.reg$|\.scr|\.ps|\.vb|\.jar|\.pl).*'
condition: selection_cmdline_1 or selection_cmdline_2 or selection_cmdline_3
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'reg '
- 'add '
- 'FailureCommand'
CommandLine|contains:
- '.sh'
- '.exe'
- '.dll'
- '.bin$'
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
- '.js'
- '.msh$'
- '.reg$'
- '.scr'
- '.ps'
- '.vb'
- '.jar'
- '.pl'
selection_cmdline_4:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'reg '
- 'add '
- 'ImagePath'
CommandLine|contains:
- '.sh'
- '.exe'
- '.dll'
- '.bin$'
- '.bat'
- '.cmd'
- '.js'
- '.msh$'
- '.reg$'
- '.scr'
- '.ps'
- '.vb'
- '.jar'
- '.pl'
condition: 1 of selection_cmdline_*
falsepositives:
- unknown
level: medium