refactor: field IpAddress in ID 4624/4625 refactoring

This commit is contained in:
Florian Roth
2022-04-27 10:02:01 +02:00
parent 5b2374475d
commit a6e7866faa
18 changed files with 31 additions and 18 deletions
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: 51238c62-2b29-4539-ad75-e94575368a12
description: ntds.dit retrieving using synchronisation with legitimate domain controller using Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019/10/24
modified: 2019/11/13
modified: 2022/04/27
references:
- https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376
- https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ detection:
EventID: 4624
ComputerName: '%DomainControllersNamesList%'
selection2:
IpAddress: '%DomainControllersIpsList%'
SourceNetworkAddress: '%DomainControllersIpsList%'
selection3:
EventID: 4662
ComputerName: '%DomainControllersNamesList%'
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ id: 757b2a11-73e7-411a-bd46-141d906e0167
description: ntds.dit retrieving (only computer accounts) using synchronisation with legit domain controller using Netlogon Remote Protocol
author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
date: 2019/11/01
modified: 2022/04/27
references:
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
tags:
@@ -16,7 +17,7 @@ detection:
EventID: 4624
ComputerName: '%DomainControllersNamesList%'
selection2:
IpAddress: '%DomainControllersIpsList%'
SourceNetworkAddress: '%DomainControllersIpsList%'
selection3:
EventID: 5145
ComputerName: '%DomainControllersNamesList%'
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a
status: experimental
author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
date: 2021/09/02
modified: 2021/09/07
modified: 2022/04/27
references:
- https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ detection:
TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
CertThumbprint: '*'
filter_local:
IpAddress: '::1'
ClientAddress: '::1'
filter_thumbprint:
CertThumbprint: ''
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: RDP login with localhost source address may be a tunnelled login
references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
date: 2019/01/28
modified: 2021/07/07
modified: 2022/04/27
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
- car.2013-07-002
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ detection:
selection:
EventID: 4624
LogonType: 10
IpAddress:
SourceNetworkAddress:
- '::1'
- '127.0.0.1'
condition: selection
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
references:
- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
date: 2019/10/22
modified: 2021/11/27
modified: 2022/04/27
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ detection:
EventID: 5145
RelativeTargetName|contains: '\winreg'
filter:
IpAddress: '%Admins_Workstations%'
SourceAddress: '%Admins_Workstations%'
condition: selection_1 and not filter
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of remote registry management by administrator
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ status: test
description: A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary.
author: NVISO
date: 2020/05/06
modified: 2021/11/27
modified: 2022/04/27
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ detection:
selection:
EventID: 4625
ip_unknown:
IpAddress|contains: '-'
SourceNetworkAddress|contains: '-'
ip_privatev4:
IpAddress|startswith:
SourceNetworkAddress|startswith:
- '10.' #10.0.0.0/8
- '192.168.' #192.168.0.0/16
- '172.16.' #172.16.0.0/12
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ detection:
- '127.' #127.0.0.0/8
- '169.254.' #169.254.0.0/16
ip_privatev6:
- IpAddress: '::1' #loopback
- IpAddress|startswith:
- SourceNetworkAddress: '::1' #loopback
- SourceNetworkAddress|startswith:
- 'fe80::' #link-local
- 'fc00::' #unique local
condition: selection and not 1 of ip_*
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: Mauricio Velazco
references:
- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
date: 2021/06/01
modified: 2021/07/09
modified: 2022/04/27
tags:
- attack.t1110.003
- attack.initial_access
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ detection:
EventID: 4625
LogonType: 3
filter:
IpAddress: '-'
SourceNetworkAddress: '-'
timeframe: 24h
condition:
- selection1 and not filter | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 10
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ references:
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1195284233729777665
author: '@SBousseaden, Florian Roth'
date: 2019/11/15
modified: 2021/07/07
modified: 2022/04/27
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.credential_access
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ detection:
LogonType: 3
TargetUserName: 'ANONYMOUS_LOGON'
WorkstationName: '-'
IpAddress: '127.0.0.1'
SourceNetworkAddress: '127.0.0.1'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
+1
View File
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ fieldmappings:
event_data.Signature: Signature
event_data.Source: Source
event_data.SourceImage: SourceImage
event_data.SourceNetworkAddress: IpAddress
event_data.StartModule: StartModule
event_data.Status: Status
event_data.SubjectUserName: SubjectUserName
+1
View File
@@ -15,4 +15,5 @@ fieldmappings:
registryKey: microsoft.m365_defender.alerts.entities.registryKey
registryValueType: microsoft.m365_defender.alerts.entities.registryValueType
ipAddress: microsoft.m365_defender.alerts.entities.ipAddress
SourceNetworkAddress: microsoft.m365_defender.alerts.entities.ipAddress
+1
View File
@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ fieldmappings:
SourceImage: process
SourceIp: ~srcipv4
SourcePort: srcport
SourceNetworkAddress: ~srcipv4
src: ~srcipv4
src_ip: ~srcipv4
src_port: srcport
+1
View File
@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ fieldmappings:
DeviceClassName: object_name
CallTrace: calltrace
IpAddress: ip_src
SourceNetworkAddress: ip_src
WorkstationName: hostname_src
Workstation: hostname_src
DestinationIp: ip_dst
+1
View File
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ fieldmappings:
SourceHostname: src_host_name
SourceImage: process_path
SourceIp: src_ip_addr
SourceNetworkAddress: src_ip_addr
SourcePort: src_port
SourcePortName: src_port_name
StartAddress: thread_start_address
+1
View File
@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ fieldmappings:
Source: winlog.event_data.Source
SourceImage: winlog.event_data.SourceImage
SourceIp: winlog.event_data.SourceIp
SourceNetworkAddress: winlog.event_data.IpAddress
StartModule: winlog.event_data.StartModule
Status: winlog.event_data.Status
SubjectUserName: winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName
+3
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ fieldmappings:
IpAddress:
- originIp
- impactedIp
SourceNetworkAddress:
- originIp
- impactedIp
ErrorCode: responseCode
Task: vendorInfo
PrivilegeList: subject
@@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ fieldmappings:
SidHistory: winlog.event_data.SidHistory
SidList: winlog.event_data.SidList
SourceAddress: source.ip
SourceNetworkAddress: source.ip
Status: winlog.event_data.Status
StartType: winlog.event_data.StartType
SubcategoryGuid: winlog.event_data.SubcategoryGuid
+1
View File
@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ fieldmappings:
Signature: event_data.Signature
Source: event_data.Source
SourceImage: event_data.SourceImage
SourceNetworkAddress: event_data.IpAddress
StartModule: event_data.StartModule
Status: event_data.Status
SubjectUserName: event_data.SubjectUserName
+1
View File
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ fieldmappings:
Source: winlog.event_data.Source
SourceImage: winlog.event_data.SourceImage
SourceIp: winlog.event_data.SourceIp
SourceNetworkAddress: winlog.event_data.SourceIp
src_ip: winlog.event_data.SourceIp
SourcePort: winlog.event_data.SourcePort
src_port: winlog.event_data.SourcePort