refactor: field IpAddress in ID 4624/4625 refactoring
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: 51238c62-2b29-4539-ad75-e94575368a12
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description: ntds.dit retrieving using synchronisation with legitimate domain controller using Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol
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author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
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date: 2019/10/24
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modified: 2019/11/13
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modified: 2022/04/27
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references:
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- https://twitter.com/gentilkiwi/status/1003236624925413376
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- https://gist.github.com/gentilkiwi/dcc132457408cf11ad2061340dcb53c2
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ detection:
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EventID: 4624
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ComputerName: '%DomainControllersNamesList%'
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selection2:
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IpAddress: '%DomainControllersIpsList%'
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SourceNetworkAddress: '%DomainControllersIpsList%'
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selection3:
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EventID: 4662
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ComputerName: '%DomainControllersNamesList%'
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ id: 757b2a11-73e7-411a-bd46-141d906e0167
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description: ntds.dit retrieving (only computer accounts) using synchronisation with legit domain controller using Netlogon Remote Protocol
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author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
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date: 2019/11/01
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modified: 2022/04/27
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references:
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- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
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tags:
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@@ -16,7 +17,7 @@ detection:
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EventID: 4624
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ComputerName: '%DomainControllersNamesList%'
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selection2:
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IpAddress: '%DomainControllersIpsList%'
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SourceNetworkAddress: '%DomainControllersIpsList%'
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selection3:
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EventID: 5145
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ComputerName: '%DomainControllersNamesList%'
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ description: Detect suspicious Kerberos TGT requests. Once an attacer obtains a
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status: experimental
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author: Mauricio Velazco, Michael Haag
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date: 2021/09/02
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modified: 2021/09/07
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modified: 2022/04/27
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references:
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- https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam
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- https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Active+Directory+Certificate+Services+ADCS+PKI+domain+admin+vulnerability/27668/
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ detection:
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TargetUserName|endswith: '$'
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CertThumbprint: '*'
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filter_local:
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IpAddress: '::1'
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ClientAddress: '::1'
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filter_thumbprint:
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CertThumbprint: ''
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condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: RDP login with localhost source address may be a tunnelled login
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references:
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- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2019/01/bypassing-network-restrictions-through-rdp-tunneling.html
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date: 2019/01/28
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modified: 2021/07/07
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modified: 2022/04/27
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tags:
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- attack.lateral_movement
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- car.2013-07-002
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@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ detection:
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selection:
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EventID: 4624
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LogonType: 10
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IpAddress:
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SourceNetworkAddress:
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- '::1'
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- '127.0.0.1'
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condition: selection
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: Teymur Kheirkhabarov, oscd.community
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references:
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- https://www.slideshare.net/heirhabarov/hunting-for-credentials-dumping-in-windows-environment
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date: 2019/10/22
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modified: 2021/11/27
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modified: 2022/04/27
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: security
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ detection:
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EventID: 5145
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RelativeTargetName|contains: '\winreg'
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filter:
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IpAddress: '%Admins_Workstations%'
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SourceAddress: '%Admins_Workstations%'
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condition: selection_1 and not filter
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falsepositives:
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- Legitimate usage of remote registry management by administrator
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@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ status: test
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description: A login from a public IP can indicate a misconfigured firewall or network boundary.
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author: NVISO
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date: 2020/05/06
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modified: 2021/11/27
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modified: 2022/04/27
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: security
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@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ detection:
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selection:
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EventID: 4625
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ip_unknown:
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IpAddress|contains: '-'
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SourceNetworkAddress|contains: '-'
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ip_privatev4:
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IpAddress|startswith:
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SourceNetworkAddress|startswith:
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- '10.' #10.0.0.0/8
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- '192.168.' #192.168.0.0/16
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- '172.16.' #172.16.0.0/12
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@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ detection:
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- '127.' #127.0.0.0/8
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- '169.254.' #169.254.0.0/16
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ip_privatev6:
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- IpAddress: '::1' #loopback
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- IpAddress|startswith:
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- SourceNetworkAddress: '::1' #loopback
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- SourceNetworkAddress|startswith:
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- 'fe80::' #link-local
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- 'fc00::' #unique local
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condition: selection and not 1 of ip_*
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: Mauricio Velazco
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references:
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- https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/ESSOC/3.22.0/stories/UseCase#Active_directory_password_spraying
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date: 2021/06/01
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modified: 2021/07/09
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modified: 2022/04/27
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tags:
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- attack.t1110.003
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- attack.initial_access
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ detection:
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EventID: 4625
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LogonType: 3
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filter:
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IpAddress: '-'
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SourceNetworkAddress: '-'
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timeframe: 24h
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condition:
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- selection1 and not filter | count(TargetUserName) by IpAddress > 10
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@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ references:
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- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1195284233729777665
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author: '@SBousseaden, Florian Roth'
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date: 2019/11/15
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modified: 2021/07/07
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modified: 2022/04/27
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tags:
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- attack.privilege_escalation
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- attack.credential_access
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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ detection:
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LogonType: 3
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TargetUserName: 'ANONYMOUS_LOGON'
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WorkstationName: '-'
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IpAddress: '127.0.0.1'
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SourceNetworkAddress: '127.0.0.1'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Unknown
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@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ fieldmappings:
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event_data.Signature: Signature
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event_data.Source: Source
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event_data.SourceImage: SourceImage
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event_data.SourceNetworkAddress: IpAddress
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event_data.StartModule: StartModule
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event_data.Status: Status
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event_data.SubjectUserName: SubjectUserName
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@@ -15,4 +15,5 @@ fieldmappings:
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registryKey: microsoft.m365_defender.alerts.entities.registryKey
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registryValueType: microsoft.m365_defender.alerts.entities.registryValueType
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ipAddress: microsoft.m365_defender.alerts.entities.ipAddress
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SourceNetworkAddress: microsoft.m365_defender.alerts.entities.ipAddress
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@@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ fieldmappings:
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SourceImage: process
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SourceIp: ~srcipv4
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SourcePort: srcport
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SourceNetworkAddress: ~srcipv4
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src: ~srcipv4
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src_ip: ~srcipv4
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src_port: srcport
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@@ -519,6 +519,7 @@ fieldmappings:
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DeviceClassName: object_name
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CallTrace: calltrace
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IpAddress: ip_src
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SourceNetworkAddress: ip_src
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WorkstationName: hostname_src
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Workstation: hostname_src
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DestinationIp: ip_dst
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@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ fieldmappings:
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SourceHostname: src_host_name
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SourceImage: process_path
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SourceIp: src_ip_addr
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SourceNetworkAddress: src_ip_addr
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SourcePort: src_port
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SourcePortName: src_port_name
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StartAddress: thread_start_address
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@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ fieldmappings:
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Source: winlog.event_data.Source
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SourceImage: winlog.event_data.SourceImage
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SourceIp: winlog.event_data.SourceIp
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SourceNetworkAddress: winlog.event_data.IpAddress
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StartModule: winlog.event_data.StartModule
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Status: winlog.event_data.Status
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SubjectUserName: winlog.event_data.SubjectUserName
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@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@ fieldmappings:
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IpAddress:
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- originIp
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- impactedIp
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SourceNetworkAddress:
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- originIp
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- impactedIp
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ErrorCode: responseCode
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Task: vendorInfo
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PrivilegeList: subject
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@@ -471,6 +471,7 @@ fieldmappings:
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SidHistory: winlog.event_data.SidHistory
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SidList: winlog.event_data.SidList
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SourceAddress: source.ip
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SourceNetworkAddress: source.ip
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Status: winlog.event_data.Status
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StartType: winlog.event_data.StartType
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SubcategoryGuid: winlog.event_data.SubcategoryGuid
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@@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ fieldmappings:
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Signature: event_data.Signature
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Source: event_data.Source
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SourceImage: event_data.SourceImage
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SourceNetworkAddress: event_data.IpAddress
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StartModule: event_data.StartModule
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Status: event_data.Status
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SubjectUserName: event_data.SubjectUserName
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@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ fieldmappings:
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Source: winlog.event_data.Source
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SourceImage: winlog.event_data.SourceImage
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SourceIp: winlog.event_data.SourceIp
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SourceNetworkAddress: winlog.event_data.SourceIp
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src_ip: winlog.event_data.SourceIp
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SourcePort: winlog.event_data.SourcePort
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src_port: winlog.event_data.SourcePort
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