Merge pull request #493 from alx1m1k/oscd
[OSCD] rules from Jet CSIRT team
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title: Brute Force
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description: Detects many authentication failures from one source to one destination which is may indicate Brute Force activity
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references:
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- None
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tags:
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- attack.t1110
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author: Aleksandr Akhremchik, oscd.community
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date: 2019/10/25
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status: experimental
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logsource:
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category: authentication
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detection:
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selection:
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action: failure
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timeframe: 600s
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condition: selection | count(category) by dst_ip > 30
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fields:
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- src_ip
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- dst_ip
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- user
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falsepositives:
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- Inventarization
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- Penetration testing
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- Vulnerability scanner
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- Legitimate application
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level: medium
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title: Auditing configuration changes on linux host
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description: Detect changes if auditd configuration files
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# Example config for this one (place it at the top of audit.rules)
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# -w /etc/audit/ -p wa -k etc_modify_auditconfig
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# -w /etc/libaudit.conf -p wa -k etc_modify_libauditconfig
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# -w /etc/audisp/ -p wa -k etc_modify_audispconfig
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references:
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- https://github.com/Neo23x0/auditd/blob/master/audit.rules
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- self experience
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.t1054
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author: Mikhail Larin, oscd.community
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status: experimental
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date: 2019/10/25
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logsource:
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product: linux
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service: auditd
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detection:
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selection:
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type: 'SYSCALL'
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key:
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- 'etc_modify_auditconfig'
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- 'etc_modify_libauditconfig'
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- 'etc_modify_audispconfig'
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condition: selection
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fields:
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- exe
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- comm
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- key
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falsepositives:
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- Legitimate administrative activity
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level: high
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title: Logging configuration changes on linux host
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description: Detect changes of syslog daemons configuration files
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# Example config for this one (place it at the top of audit.rules)
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# -w /etc/syslog.conf -p wa -k etc_modify_syslogconfig
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# -w /etc/rsyslog.conf -p wa -k etc_modify_rsyslogconfig
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# -w /etc/syslog-ng/syslog-ng.conf -p wa -k etc_modify_syslogngconfig
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references:
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- self experience
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tags:
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.t1054
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author: Mikhail Larin, oscd.community
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status: experimental
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date: 2019/10/25
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logsource:
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product: linux
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service: auditd
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detection:
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selection:
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type: 'SYSCALL'
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key:
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- 'etc_modify_syslogconfig'
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- 'etc_modify_rsyslogconfig'
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- 'etc_modify_syslogngconfig'
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condition: selection
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fields:
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- exe
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- comm
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- key
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falsepositives:
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- Legitimate administrative activity
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level: high
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title: Narrator's Feedback-Hub Persistence
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description: Detects abusing Windows 10 Narrator's Feedback-Hub
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references:
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- https://giuliocomi.blogspot.com/2019/10/abusing-windows-10-narrators-feedback.html
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tags:
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- attack.persistence
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- attack.t1060
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author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
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status: experimental
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date: 2019/10/25
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modified: 2019/11/10
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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condition: 1 of them
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selection1:
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EventID: 12
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EventType: DeleteValue
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TargetObject|endswith: '\AppXypsaf9f1qserqevf0sws76dx4k9a5206\Shell\open\command\DelegateExecute'
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selection2:
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EventID: 13
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TargetObject|endswith: '\AppXypsaf9f1qserqevf0sws76dx4k9a5206\Shell\open\command\(Default)'
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falsepositives:
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- unknown
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level: high
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title: Regsvr32 network activity
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description: Detects network connections and DNS queries initiated by Regsvr32.exe
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references:
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- https://pentestlab.blog/2017/05/11/applocker-bypass-regsvr32/
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- https://oddvar.moe/2017/12/13/applocker-case-study-how-insecure-is-it-really-part-1/
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- https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/master/atomics/T1117/T1117.md
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tags:
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- attack.execution
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- attack.defense_evasion
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- attack.t1117
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author: Dmitriy Lifanov, oscd.community
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status: experimental
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date: 2019/10/25
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modified: 2019/11/10
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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selection:
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EventID:
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- 3
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- 22
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Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- unknown
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level: high
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