Merge pull request #3584 from redsand/fp_fixes_some_logic_errors

FP: fixes some logic errors where conditions could not be met
This commit is contained in:
Florian Roth
2022-10-12 21:07:04 +02:00
committed by GitHub
3 changed files with 13 additions and 17 deletions
@@ -3,9 +3,9 @@ id: d7fb8f0e-bd5f-45c2-b467-19571c490d7e
status: stable
description: Ensure that all account usernames and authentication credentials are transmitted across networks using encrypted channels. Ensure that an encryption
is used for all sensitive information in transit. Ensure that an encrypted channels is used for all administrative account access.
author: Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime
author: Alexandr Yampolskyi, SOC Prime, Tim Shelton
date: 2019/03/26
modified: 2021/11/23
modified: 2022/10/10
references:
- https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/cis-controls-list/
- https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2-1.pdf
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ references:
logsource:
category: firewall
detection:
selection1:
selection:
dst_port:
- 8080
- 21
@@ -31,12 +31,14 @@ detection:
- 5902
- 5903
- 5904
selection2:
selection_allow1:
action:
- forward
- accept
- 2
condition: all of selection*
selection_allow2:
blocked: "false" # not all fws set action value, but are set to mark as blocked or allowed or not
condition: selection and 1 of selection_allow*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: low
@@ -82,4 +84,4 @@ level: low
# - PCI DSS 3.2 4.3
# - PCI DSS 3.2 7.1
# - PCI DSS 3.2 7.2
# - PCI DSS 3.2 7.3
# - PCI DSS 3.2 7.3
@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ title: First Time Seen Remote Named Pipe - Zeek
id: 021310d9-30a6-480a-84b7-eaa69aeb92bb
status: test
description: This detection excludes known namped pipes accessible remotely and notify on newly observed ones, may help to detect lateral movement and remote exec using named pipes
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton
references:
- https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_lm_namedpipe.yml
date: 2020/04/02
modified: 2021/11/27
modified: 2022/10/10
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
@@ -14,9 +14,6 @@ detection:
selection1:
path: \\\*\IPC$
selection2:
path: \\\*\IPC$
name:
- 'atsvc'
- 'samr'
- 'lsarpc'
- 'winreg'
@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@ title: Suspicious PsExec Execution - Zeek
id: f1b3a22a-45e6-4004-afb5-4291f9c21166
status: test
description: detects execution of psexec or paexec with renamed service name, this rule helps to filter out the noise if psexec is used for legit purposes or if attacker uses a different psexec client other than sysinternal one
author: 'Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron'
author: Samir Bousseaden, @neu5ron, Tim Shelton
references:
- https://github.com/neo23x0/sigma/blob/d42e87edd741dd646db946f30964f331f92f50e6/rules/windows/builtin/win_susp_psexec.yml
date: 2020/04/02
modified: 2021/11/27
modified: 2022/10/10
logsource:
product: zeek
service: smb_files
@@ -20,10 +20,7 @@ detection:
- '-stdout'
- '-stderr'
selection2:
name|contains|all:
- '\\'
- '\IPC$'
path|startswith: 'PSEXESVC'
name|startswith: 'PSEXESVC' #
condition: selection1 and not selection2
falsepositives:
- Unknown