Merge branch 'master' into rule-devel
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
# These are supported funding model platforms
|
||||
|
||||
github: [thomaspatzke]
|
||||
patreon: # Replace with a single Patreon username
|
||||
open_collective: # Replace with a single Open Collective username
|
||||
ko_fi: # Replace with a single Ko-fi username
|
||||
tidelift: # Replace with a single Tidelift platform-name/package-name e.g., npm/babel
|
||||
community_bridge: # Replace with a single Community Bridge project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
|
||||
liberapay: # Replace with a single Liberapay username
|
||||
issuehunt: # Replace with a single IssueHunt username
|
||||
otechie: # Replace with a single Otechie username
|
||||
lfx_crowdfunding: # Replace with a single LFX Crowdfunding project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
|
||||
custom: # Replace with up to 4 custom sponsorship URLs e.g., ['link1', 'link2']
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ detection:
|
||||
ObjectName: '\Device\ConDrv'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- legal admin action
|
||||
- Legal admin action
|
||||
level: low
|
||||
@@ -12,14 +12,12 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: activitylogs
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
properties.message|startswith:
|
||||
- MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO
|
||||
properties.message|startswith: MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO
|
||||
properties.message|endswith:
|
||||
- /MUTATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE
|
||||
- /VALIDATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
properties.message|startswith:
|
||||
- MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO
|
||||
properties.message|startswith: MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO
|
||||
properties.message|endswith:
|
||||
- /MUTATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE
|
||||
- /VALIDATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,14 +14,12 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: activitylogs
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
properties.message|startswith:
|
||||
- MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/BATCH
|
||||
properties.message|startswith: MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/BATCH
|
||||
properties.message|endswith:
|
||||
- /CRONJOBS/WRITE
|
||||
- /JOBS/WRITE
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
properties.message|startswith:
|
||||
- MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/BATCH
|
||||
properties.message|startswith: MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/BATCH
|
||||
properties.message|endswith:
|
||||
- /CRONJOBS/WRITE
|
||||
- /JOBS/WRITE
|
||||
@@ -32,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
|
||||
- attack.privilege_escalation
|
||||
- attack.execution
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Azure Kubernetes CronJob/Job may be done by a system administrator.
|
||||
- Azure Kubernetes CronJob/Job may be done by a system administrator.
|
||||
- If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: activitylogs
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
properties.message:
|
||||
- MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ELEVATEACCESS/ACTION
|
||||
properties.message: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ELEVATEACCESS/ACTION
|
||||
condition: selection1
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -11,13 +11,12 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: activitylogs
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
properties.message:
|
||||
- MICROSOFT.SECURITY/ALERTSSUPPRESSIONRULES/WRITE
|
||||
properties.message: MICROSOFT.SECURITY/ALERTSSUPPRESSIONRULES/WRITE
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.impact
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Suppression Rule being created may be performed by a system administrator.
|
||||
- Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
|
||||
- Suppression Rule being created may be performed by a system administrator.
|
||||
- Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
|
||||
- Suppression Rule created from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,16 +12,14 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: gcp.audit
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
gcp.audit.method_name|startswith:
|
||||
- admissionregistration.k8s.io.v*.mutatingwebhookconfigurations.
|
||||
gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
|
||||
gcp.audit.method_name|startswith: admissionregistration.k8s.io.v*.mutatingwebhookconfigurations.
|
||||
gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
|
||||
- create
|
||||
- patch
|
||||
- replace
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
gcp.audit.method_name|startswith:
|
||||
- admissionregistration.k8s.io.v*.validatingwebhookconfigurations.
|
||||
gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
|
||||
gcp.audit.method_name|startswith: admissionregistration.k8s.io.v*.validatingwebhookconfigurations.
|
||||
gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
|
||||
- create
|
||||
- patch
|
||||
- replace
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
status: success
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
-
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.initial_access
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: okta
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
displaymessage:
|
||||
- User attempted unauthorized access to app
|
||||
displaymessage: User attempted unauthorized access to app
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: security
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
EventID:
|
||||
- 4800
|
||||
EventID: 4800
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,12 +15,9 @@ logsource:
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
type: EXECVE
|
||||
a0:
|
||||
- arecord
|
||||
a1:
|
||||
- '-vv'
|
||||
a2:
|
||||
- '-fdat'
|
||||
a0: arecord
|
||||
a1: '-vv'
|
||||
a2: '-fdat'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.collection
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: auditd
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
key:
|
||||
- 'susp_activity'
|
||||
key: 'susp_activity'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Admin or User activity
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ fields:
|
||||
- key
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate administrative activity
|
||||
- Ligitimate software, cleaning hist file
|
||||
- Legitimate software, cleaning hist file
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.credential_access
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,12 +16,11 @@ detection:
|
||||
type: 'PATH'
|
||||
nametype: 'CREATE'
|
||||
name_1:
|
||||
name|startswith:
|
||||
name|startswith:
|
||||
- '/usr/lib/systemd/system/'
|
||||
- '/etc/systemd/system/'
|
||||
name_2:
|
||||
name|contains:
|
||||
- '/.config/systemd/user/'
|
||||
name|contains: '/.config/systemd/user/'
|
||||
condition: path and 1 of name_*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Admin work like legit service installs.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
commands:
|
||||
type: EXECVE
|
||||
a0:
|
||||
- unzip
|
||||
a0: unzip
|
||||
a1:
|
||||
a1|endswith:
|
||||
- '.jpg'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: f8341cb2-ee25-43fa-a975-d8a5a9714b39
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
description: Detects the usage of the unsafe bpftrace option
|
||||
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.execution
|
||||
- attack.t1059.004
|
||||
references:
|
||||
@@ -15,10 +15,8 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: linux
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- 'bpftrace'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '--unsafe'
|
||||
Image|endswith: 'bpftrace'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '--unsafe'
|
||||
condition: selection1
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate usage of the unsafe option
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,25 +12,19 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: linux
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection_1:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/lastlog'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/lastlog'
|
||||
selection_2:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '''x:0:'''
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '''x:0:'''
|
||||
selection_3:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/cat'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/cat'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '/etc/passwd'
|
||||
- '/etc/sudoers'
|
||||
selection_4:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/id'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/id'
|
||||
selection_5:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/lsof'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '-u'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/lsof'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '-u'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate administration activities
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,13 +12,10 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: linux
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection_1:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/groups'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/groups'
|
||||
selection_2:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/cat'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '/etc/group'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/cat'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '/etc/group'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate administration activities
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: linux
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- 'crontab'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '/tmp/'
|
||||
Image|endswith: 'crontab'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate administration activities
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: Detects suspicious sub processes of web server processes
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/web-shells-101-using-php-introduction-web-shells-part-2/
|
||||
date: 2021/10/15
|
||||
modified: 2022/03/14
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/09
|
||||
author: Florian Roth
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.persistence
|
||||
@@ -26,18 +26,18 @@ detection:
|
||||
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- '/bin/java'
|
||||
- 'tomcat'
|
||||
selection_websphere: # ? just guessing
|
||||
selection_websphere: # ? just guessing
|
||||
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- '/bin/java'
|
||||
- 'websphere'
|
||||
selection_sub_processes:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/whoami'
|
||||
- '/ifconfig'
|
||||
- '/usr/bin/ip'
|
||||
- '/bin/uname'
|
||||
condition: selection_sub_processes and ( selection_general or selection_tomcat )
|
||||
condition: selection_sub_processes and ( selection_general or selection_tomcat or selection_websphere)
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Web applications that invoke Linux command line tools
|
||||
- Web applications that invoke Linux command line tools
|
||||
level: critical
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: macos
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/osascript'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- '-e'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/osascript'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '-e'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Application installers might contain scripts as part of the installation process.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,15 +12,11 @@ logsource:
|
||||
category: process_creation
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/truncate'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '-s'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/truncate'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '-s'
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/dd'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- 'if='
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/dd'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'if='
|
||||
filter:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'of='
|
||||
condition: selection1 or (selection2 and not filter)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: macos
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/dscl'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- 'create'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/dscl'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'create'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate administration activities
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
|
||||
category: process_creation
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/grep'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- 'password'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/grep'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'password'
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'laZagne'
|
||||
condition: selection1 or selection2
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
category: process_creation
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
Image:
|
||||
- '/usr/sbin/osascript'
|
||||
Image: '/usr/sbin/osascript'
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- '-e'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,34 +12,27 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: macos
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection_1:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/dscl'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/dscl'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- 'list'
|
||||
- '/users'
|
||||
selection_2:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/dscacheutil'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/dscacheutil'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- '-q'
|
||||
- 'user'
|
||||
selection_3:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '''x:0:'''
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '''x:0:'''
|
||||
selection_4:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/cat'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/cat'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '/etc/passwd'
|
||||
- '/etc/sudoers'
|
||||
selection_5:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/id'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/id'
|
||||
selection_6:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/lsof'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '-u'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/lsof'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '-u'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate administration activities
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,19 +12,15 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: macos
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection_1:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/dscacheutil'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/dscacheutil'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- '-q'
|
||||
- 'group'
|
||||
selection_2:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/cat'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '/etc/group'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/cat'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '/etc/group'
|
||||
selection_3:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/dscl'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/dscl'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- '-list'
|
||||
- '/groups'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,13 +12,10 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: macos
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection_1:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/arp'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '-a'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/arp'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '-a'
|
||||
selection_2:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/ping'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/ping'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- ' 10.' #10.0.0.0/8
|
||||
- ' 192.168.' #192.168.0.0/16
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: macos
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '/crontab'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '/tmp/'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '/crontab'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate administration activities
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate administrative activity
|
||||
- Ligitimate software, cleaning hist file
|
||||
- Legitimate software, cleaning hist file
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.credential_access
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ fields:
|
||||
- id.resp_h
|
||||
- answers
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- unknown
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
level: low
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '172.29.'
|
||||
- '172.30.'
|
||||
- '172.31.'
|
||||
- 'fd'
|
||||
- '2620:83:800f'
|
||||
#approved_rdp:
|
||||
#dst_ip:
|
||||
#- x.x.x.x
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- 'MsFteWds'
|
||||
condition: selection1 and not selection2
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
|
||||
- Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.lateral_movement
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ fields:
|
||||
- SubjectUserName
|
||||
- RelativeTargetName
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or pentest or backup software
|
||||
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
|
||||
- Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
service|startswith: '$'
|
||||
condition: selection and not computer_acct
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- normal enterprise SPN requests activity
|
||||
- Normal enterprise SPN requests activity
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.credential_access
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
category: proxy
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
r-dns:
|
||||
- 'api.telegram.org' # Often used by Bots
|
||||
r-dns: 'api.telegram.org' # Often used by Bots
|
||||
filter:
|
||||
c-useragent|contains:
|
||||
# Used https://core.telegram.org/bots/samples for this list
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ title: Bitsadmin to Uncommon TLD
|
||||
id: 9eb68894-7476-4cd6-8752-23b51f5883a7
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
description: Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs - https://twitter.com/jhencinski/status/1102695118455349248 - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281/
|
||||
author: Florian Roth
|
||||
author: Florian Roth, Tim Shelton
|
||||
date: 2019/03/07
|
||||
modified: 2021/08/09
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/09
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
category: proxy
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '.com'
|
||||
- '.net'
|
||||
- '.org'
|
||||
- '.scdn.co' # spotify streaming
|
||||
condition: selection and not falsepositives
|
||||
fields:
|
||||
- ClientIP
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '__pthread_tpp_change_priority: Assertion `new_prio == -1 || (new_prio >= fifo_min_prio && new_prio <= fifo_max_prio)'
|
||||
condition: keywords
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46185
|
||||
- 3rd party apache modules - https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46185
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ tags:
|
||||
- attack.t1190
|
||||
- cve.2021.20090
|
||||
- cve.2021.20091
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
category: webserver
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
path_traversal:
|
||||
c-uri|contains: # CVE-2021-20090 (Bypass Auth: Path Traversal)
|
||||
- '..%2f'
|
||||
# CVE-2021-20090 (Bypass Auth: Path Traversal)
|
||||
c-uri|contains: '..%2f'
|
||||
config_file_inj:
|
||||
c-uri|contains|all: # Chaining of CVE-2021-20090 (Bypass Auth) and CVE-2021-20091 (Config File Injection)
|
||||
- '..%2f'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
category: webserver
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
c-uri|contains:
|
||||
- /manager/controllers/default/resource/tvs.php?class_key=../../../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini%00
|
||||
c-uri|contains: /manager/controllers/default/resource/tvs.php?class_key=../../../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini%00
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Scanning from Nuclei
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ fields:
|
||||
- cs-method
|
||||
- cs-User-Agent
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- web applications that use the same URL parameters as ReGeorg
|
||||
- Web applications that use the same URL parameters as ReGeorg
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.persistence
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ fields:
|
||||
- FileHash
|
||||
- Fqbn
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- need tuning applocker or add exceptions in SIEM
|
||||
- Need tuning applocker or add exceptions in SIEM
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.execution
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSyn
|
||||
Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
date: 2019/04/03
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/05
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/10
|
||||
author: Samir Bousseaden; Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g; oscd.community; Tim Shelton
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
|
||||
- '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
|
||||
filter1:
|
||||
ObjectType: 'dnsNode'
|
||||
ObjectType:
|
||||
- 'dnsNode'
|
||||
- 'dnsZoneScope'
|
||||
condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ detection:
|
||||
- ObjectName|contains: 'admin'
|
||||
condition: selection and selection_object
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- if source account name is not an admin then its super suspicious
|
||||
- If source account name is not an admin then its super suspicious
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
selection_base:
|
||||
EventID: 4704
|
||||
selection_keywords:
|
||||
PrivilegeList|contains:
|
||||
- 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege'
|
||||
PrivilegeList|contains: 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege'
|
||||
condition: all of selection*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '%%4417'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- if the source IP is not localhost then it's super suspicious, better to monitor both local and remote changes to GPO scheduledtasks
|
||||
- If the source IP is not localhost then it's super suspicious, better to monitor both local and remote changes to GPO scheduledtasks
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.persistence
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- 'sql\query'
|
||||
condition: selection1 and not false_positives
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
|
||||
- Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.lateral_movement
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +23,6 @@ detection:
|
||||
PasswordLastSet: '-'
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- automatic DC computer account password change
|
||||
- Automatic DC computer account password change
|
||||
- Legitimate DC computer account password change
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -67,8 +67,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\
|
||||
- C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\
|
||||
filter2:
|
||||
ProcessName|startswith:
|
||||
- 'C:\Program Files' # too many false positives with legitimate AV and EDR solutions
|
||||
ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Program Files' # too many false positives with legitimate AV and EDR solutions
|
||||
filter3:
|
||||
ProcessName: 'C:\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter*
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@ fields:
|
||||
- SubjectUserName
|
||||
- RelativeTargetName
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or pentest or backup software
|
||||
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
|
||||
- Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
title: KrbRelayUp Service Installation
|
||||
id: e97d9903-53b2-41fc-8cb9-889ed4093e80
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
description: Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)
|
||||
author: Sittikorn S
|
||||
date: 2022/05/11
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
category: system
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
EventID: '7045'
|
||||
ServiceName: 'KrbSCM'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.privilege_escalation
|
||||
- attack.t1543
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
Caption: 'sysmon64.exe - Application Error'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- none
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.t1562
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
EventID: 106
|
||||
filter1:
|
||||
TaskName:
|
||||
- \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan
|
||||
TaskName: \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan
|
||||
timeframe: 7d
|
||||
condition: selection and not 1 of filter* | count() by TaskName < 5
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
service: windefend
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
EventID:
|
||||
- 5013
|
||||
EventID: 5013
|
||||
Value|endswith:
|
||||
- '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware = 0x1()'
|
||||
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring = (Current)'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
ImageLoaded|contains: '\Temp\'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- there is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
|
||||
- There is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.persistence
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
TargetFilename|contains:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\123'
|
||||
TargetFilename|contains: 'C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\123'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
fields:
|
||||
- ComputerName
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,13 +14,12 @@ logsource:
|
||||
category: file_event
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
TargetFilename|endswith:
|
||||
TargetFilename|endswith:
|
||||
- '.iso.lnk'
|
||||
- '.img.lnk'
|
||||
- '.vhd.lnk'
|
||||
- '.vhdx.lnk'
|
||||
TargetFilename|contains:
|
||||
- '\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
|
||||
TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Cases in which a user mounts an image file for legitimate reasons
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ tags:
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
category: file_event
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
mimikatz_memssp_filename:
|
||||
TargetFilename|endswith:
|
||||
- 'mimilsa.log'
|
||||
TargetFilename|endswith: 'mimilsa.log'
|
||||
condition: mimikatz_memssp_filename
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unlikely
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
title: Suspcious CLR Logs Creation
|
||||
id: e4b63079-6198-405c-abd7-3fe8b0ce3263
|
||||
description: Detects suspicious .NET assembly executions. Could detect using Cobalt Strike's command execute-assembly.
|
||||
description: Detects suspicious .NET assembly executions. Could detect using Cobalt Strike's command execute-assembly.
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
|
||||
- https://bohops.com/2021/03/16/investigating-net-clr-usage-log-tampering-techniques-for-edr-evasion/
|
||||
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ detection:
|
||||
- 'svchost'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675 - rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process
|
||||
- Rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Operations performed through Windows SCCM or equivalent
|
||||
- read only access list authority
|
||||
- Read only access list authority
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.persistence
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: frack113
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- Malware Sandbox
|
||||
date: 2022/03/09
|
||||
modified: 2022/04/28
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/08
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
category: file_event
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith: '.exe'
|
||||
TargetFilename|endswith: '.exe'
|
||||
filter_whitelist:
|
||||
Image:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\system32\cleanmgr.exe'
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
|
||||
filter_update:
|
||||
Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
|
||||
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\'
|
||||
@@ -21,10 +26,6 @@ detection:
|
||||
filter_tiworker:
|
||||
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
|
||||
filter_msiexec:
|
||||
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
|
||||
filter_cleanmgr:
|
||||
Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\cleanmgr.exe'
|
||||
filter_programfiles:
|
||||
- Image|startswith:
|
||||
- 'C:\Program Files\'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
||||
title: Creation of an WerFault.exe in Unusual Folder
|
||||
id: 28a452f3-786c-4fd8-b8f2-bddbe9d616d1
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
description: Detects WerFault copoed to a suspicious folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking
|
||||
author: frack113
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-are-now-hiding-malware-in-windows-event-logs/
|
||||
date: 2022/05/09
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
category: file_event
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
TargetFilename|endswith:
|
||||
- '\WerFault.exe'
|
||||
- '\wer.dll'
|
||||
filter_whitelist:
|
||||
TargetFilename|contains:
|
||||
- '\System32\'
|
||||
- '\SysWOW64\'
|
||||
- '\WinSxS\'
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter_whitelist
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.persistence
|
||||
- attack.defense_evasion
|
||||
- attack.t1574.001
|
||||
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ detection:
|
||||
to_dll:
|
||||
TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
|
||||
filter_from_dll:
|
||||
- OriginalFilename|endswith:
|
||||
- OriginalFilename|endswith:
|
||||
- '.dll'
|
||||
- '.tmp' # VSCode FP
|
||||
- OriginalFilename|contains:
|
||||
- OriginalFilename|contains:
|
||||
- '.dll.'
|
||||
- '\SquirrelTemp\temp'
|
||||
filter_tiworker:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,13 +12,10 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- fxssvc.exe
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith:
|
||||
- ualapi.dll
|
||||
Image|endswith: fxssvc.exe
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith: ualapi.dll
|
||||
filter:
|
||||
ImageLoaded|startswith:
|
||||
- C:\Windows\WinSxS\
|
||||
ImageLoaded|startswith: C:\Windows\WinSxS\
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unlikely
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '\notepad.exe'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '\notepad.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith:
|
||||
- '\samlib.dll'
|
||||
- '\WinSCard.dll'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '\powerpnt.exe'
|
||||
- '\excel.exe'
|
||||
- '\outlook.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|startswith:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\assembly\'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\assembly\'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '\powerpnt.exe'
|
||||
- '\excel.exe'
|
||||
- '\outlook.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|contains:
|
||||
- '\clr.dll'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|contains: '\clr.dll'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '\powerpnt.exe'
|
||||
- '\excel.exe'
|
||||
- '\outlook.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|startswith:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '\powerpnt.exe'
|
||||
- '\excel.exe'
|
||||
- '\outlook.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|contains:
|
||||
- '\dsparse.dll'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|contains: '\dsparse.dll'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '\powerpnt.exe'
|
||||
- '\excel.exe'
|
||||
- '\outlook.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith:
|
||||
- '\kerberos.dll'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\kerberos.dll'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,18 +7,17 @@ date: 2021/07/07
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/06
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- 1bd85e1caa1415ebdc8852c91e37bbb7
|
||||
- https://twitter.com/am0nsec/status/1412232114980982787
|
||||
- https://twitter.com/am0nsec/status/1412232114980982787
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.defense_evasion
|
||||
- attack.impact
|
||||
- attack.impact
|
||||
- attack.t1490
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
category: image_load
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith:
|
||||
- '\vss_ps.dll'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\vss_ps.dll'
|
||||
filter:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '\svchost.exe'
|
||||
@@ -39,4 +38,4 @@ detection:
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -12,15 +12,13 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '\svchost.exe'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith:
|
||||
- '\tsmsisrv.dll'
|
||||
- '\tsvipsrv.dll'
|
||||
- '\wlbsctrl.dll'
|
||||
filter:
|
||||
ImageLoaded|startswith:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,13 +18,10 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '\dism.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith:
|
||||
- '\dismcore.dll'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '\dism.exe'
|
||||
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\dismcore.dll'
|
||||
filter:
|
||||
ImageLoaded:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism\dismcore.dll'
|
||||
ImageLoaded: 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism\dismcore.dll'
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Actions of a legitimate telnet client
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ detection:
|
||||
- Image|contains: '\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment.
|
||||
- Other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment.
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
condition: selection and not filter
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Other Remote Desktop RDP tools
|
||||
- domain controller using dns.exe
|
||||
- Domain controller using dns.exe
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.lateral_movement
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ related:
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
description: Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history
|
||||
date: 2019/10/25
|
||||
modified: 2021/10/16
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/10
|
||||
author: Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a
|
||||
@@ -18,19 +18,24 @@ logsource:
|
||||
category: ps_module
|
||||
definition: PowerShell Module Logging must be enabled
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection_payload_1:
|
||||
selection_1a_payload:
|
||||
Payload|contains:
|
||||
- 'del'
|
||||
- 'Remove-Item'
|
||||
- 'rm'
|
||||
Payload|contains|all:
|
||||
- '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
|
||||
selection_1b_payload:
|
||||
Payload|contains: '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
|
||||
selection_payload_2:
|
||||
Payload|contains|all:
|
||||
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
|
||||
- '–HistorySaveStyle'
|
||||
- '–HistorySaveStyle' # not sure if the homoglyph –/- is intended, just checking for both
|
||||
- 'SaveNothing'
|
||||
condition: selection_payload_1 or selection_payload_2
|
||||
selection_payload_3:
|
||||
Payload|contains|all:
|
||||
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
|
||||
- '-HistorySaveStyle'
|
||||
- 'SaveNothing'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection_payload_* or all of selection_1*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ detection:
|
||||
- 'DatabasePath '
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- unknown
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- ' = ServerRemoteHost ' # HostName: 'ServerRemoteHost' french : Nom d’hôte =
|
||||
- 'wsmprovhost.exe' # HostApplication|contains: 'wsmprovhost.exe' french Application hôte =
|
||||
false_positive_1:
|
||||
ContextInfo|contains:
|
||||
- '\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive.psm1'
|
||||
ContextInfo|contains: '\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive.psm1'
|
||||
condition: selection and not 1 of false_positive*
|
||||
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -9,24 +9,30 @@ author: Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a
|
||||
date: 2022/01/25
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/10
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
category: ps_script
|
||||
definition: Script block logging must be enabled
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection_1:
|
||||
selection1a:
|
||||
ScriptBlockText|contains:
|
||||
- 'del'
|
||||
- 'Remove-Item'
|
||||
- 'rm'
|
||||
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
|
||||
- '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
|
||||
selection1b:
|
||||
ScriptBlockText|contains: '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
|
||||
selection_2:
|
||||
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
|
||||
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
|
||||
- '–HistorySaveStyle'
|
||||
- '–HistorySaveStyle' # not sure if the homoglyph –/- is intended, just checking for both
|
||||
- 'SaveNothing'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection_*
|
||||
selection_3:
|
||||
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
|
||||
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
|
||||
- '-HistorySaveStyle'
|
||||
- 'SaveNothing'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection_* or all of selection1*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-3
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@ references:
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
category: ps_script
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
ScriptBlockText|contains:
|
||||
- Clear-History
|
||||
ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
|
||||
selection2a:
|
||||
ScriptBlockText|contains:
|
||||
- Remove-Item
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '[IO.File]::SetLastWriteTime'
|
||||
condition: selection_ioc
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Legitimeate admin script
|
||||
- Legitimate admin script
|
||||
level: medium
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,15 +4,28 @@ description: Detects the usage of the direct syscall of NtOpenProcess which migh
|
||||
references:
|
||||
- https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-direct-system-calls-and-cobalt-strike-bofs-0xff14-741fa8e1bdd6
|
||||
status: experimental
|
||||
author: Christian Burkard
|
||||
author: Christian Burkard, Tim Shelton
|
||||
date: 2021/07/28
|
||||
modified: 2022/05/15
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
category: process_access
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
CallTrace|startswith: 'UNKNOWN'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositive1:
|
||||
TargetImage: 'C:\Program Files\Cylance\Desktop\CylanceUI.exe'
|
||||
SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE'
|
||||
falsepositive2:
|
||||
TargetImage: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
|
||||
SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Temp\*\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
|
||||
falsepositive3:
|
||||
TargetImage|endswith: 'vcredist_x64.exe'
|
||||
SourceImage|endswith: 'vcredist_x64.exe'
|
||||
falsepositive4:
|
||||
TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\system32\systeminfo.exe'
|
||||
SourceImage|endswith: 'setup64.exe' #vmware
|
||||
condition: selection and not 1 of falsepositive*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
level: critical
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -72,8 +72,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- TargetImage|endswith: '\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
|
||||
- CallTrace|contains: '|C:\WINDOWS\System32\RPCRT4.dll+' # attempt to save the rule with a broader filter
|
||||
filter_set_1:
|
||||
SourceImage:
|
||||
- 'C:\WINDOWS\Explorer.EXE'
|
||||
SourceImage: 'C:\WINDOWS\Explorer.EXE'
|
||||
TargetImage:
|
||||
- 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe'
|
||||
- 'C:\WINDOWS\explorer.exe'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags:
|
||||
- attack.t1021.006
|
||||
- attack.s0002
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- low
|
||||
- Unlikely
|
||||
level: high
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
SourceImage|startswith:
|
||||
- 'C:\Program Files\'
|
||||
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
|
||||
SourceImage|contains:
|
||||
- 'Antivirus'
|
||||
SourceImage|contains: 'Antivirus'
|
||||
filter7:
|
||||
SourceImage: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe'
|
||||
filter8:
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\McAfee\MMSSHost\MMSSHOST.exe'
|
||||
filter_nextron:
|
||||
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
|
||||
SourceImage|endswith:
|
||||
SourceImage|endswith:
|
||||
- '\thor64.exe'
|
||||
- '\thor.exe'
|
||||
# Generic Filter for 0x1410 filter (caused by so many programs like DropBox updates etc.)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -77,8 +77,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
SourceImage|startswith:
|
||||
- 'C:\Progra Files\'
|
||||
- 'C:\Progra Files (x86)\'
|
||||
SourceImage|contains:
|
||||
- 'Antivirus'
|
||||
SourceImage|contains: 'Antivirus'
|
||||
filter_mrt:
|
||||
SourceImage: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\MRT.exe'
|
||||
GrantedAccess: '0x1418'
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\McAfee\MMSSHost\MMSSHOST.exe'
|
||||
filter_nextron:
|
||||
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
|
||||
SourceImage|endswith:
|
||||
SourceImage|endswith:
|
||||
- '\thor64.exe'
|
||||
- '\thor.exe'
|
||||
GrantedAccess: '0x1fffff'
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-2
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
ParentImage|contains|all:
|
||||
- '\Windows\Installer\'
|
||||
- 'msi'
|
||||
ParentImage|endswith:
|
||||
- 'tmp'
|
||||
ParentImage|endswith: 'tmp'
|
||||
condition: image and parent_image
|
||||
fields:
|
||||
- Image
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '\crackmapexec.exe'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '\crackmapexec.exe'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ references:
|
||||
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800669(v=ws.11)
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.credential_access
|
||||
- attack.t1212
|
||||
- attack.t1212
|
||||
- attack.command_and_control
|
||||
- attack.t1071
|
||||
logsource:
|
||||
@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- ':\Program Files(x86)\'
|
||||
- ':\Program Files\'
|
||||
legitimate_executable:
|
||||
sha1:
|
||||
- 'e570585edc69f9074cb5e8a790708336bd45ca0f'
|
||||
sha1: 'e570585edc69f9074cb5e8a790708336bd45ca0f'
|
||||
condition: legitimate_executable and not legitimate_process_path
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- '/transfer'
|
||||
- 'CSIDL_APPDATA'
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- 'CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE'
|
||||
selection3:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '\msf.ps1'
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.g0032
|
||||
- attack.execution
|
||||
- attack.t1106
|
||||
- attack.t1106
|
||||
author: Bhabesh Raj
|
||||
date: 2021/04/20
|
||||
modified: 2021/06/27
|
||||
@@ -20,15 +20,11 @@ detection:
|
||||
- 'mshta'
|
||||
- '.zip'
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
ParentImage:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe'
|
||||
Image:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe'
|
||||
ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe'
|
||||
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe'
|
||||
selection3:
|
||||
ParentImage|contains:
|
||||
- ':\Users\Public\'
|
||||
Image:
|
||||
- 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
|
||||
ParentImage|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
|
||||
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Should not be any false positives
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ references:
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
- attack.g0032
|
||||
- attack.execution
|
||||
- attack.t1059
|
||||
- attack.t1059
|
||||
author: Florian Roth
|
||||
date: 2020/12/23
|
||||
modified: 2021/06/27
|
||||
@@ -32,8 +32,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
- ' > %temp%\~'
|
||||
# Network share discovery
|
||||
selection4:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '.255 10 C:\ProgramData\'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '.255 10 C:\ProgramData\'
|
||||
condition: 1 of selection*
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Overlap with legitimate process activity in some cases (especially selection 3 and 4)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,12 +13,9 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection:
|
||||
Image|endswith:
|
||||
- '\powershell.exe'
|
||||
ParentImage|endswith:
|
||||
- '\excel.exe'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- 'DataExchange.dll'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
|
||||
ParentImage|endswith: '\excel.exe'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'DataExchange.dll'
|
||||
condition: selection
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
Image|contains: 'windows\system32\Physmem.sys'
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
Image|contains:
|
||||
Image|contains:
|
||||
- 'Windows\system32\ime\SHARED\WimBootConfigurations.ini'
|
||||
- 'Windows\system32\ime\IMEJP\WimBootConfigurations.ini'
|
||||
- 'Windows\system32\ime\IMETC\WimBootConfigurations.ini'
|
||||
@@ -31,10 +31,9 @@ detection:
|
||||
- 'windows\system32\filepath2'
|
||||
- 'windows\system32\ime'
|
||||
registry_command:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- 'reg add'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'reg add'
|
||||
registry_key:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\classes\clsid\{7c857801-7381-11cf-884d-00aa004b2e24}\inprocserver32'
|
||||
- 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\classes\clsid\{cf4cc405-e2c5-4ddd-b3ce-5e7582d8c9fa}\inprocserver32'
|
||||
condition: selection1 or selection2 or (selection3 and registry_command and registry_key)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -16,11 +16,9 @@ detection:
|
||||
- 'dll,MyStart'
|
||||
- 'dll MyStart'
|
||||
selection2a:
|
||||
CommandLine|endswith:
|
||||
- ' MyStart'
|
||||
CommandLine|endswith: ' MyStart'
|
||||
selection2b:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- 'rundll32.exe'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32.exe'
|
||||
condition: selection1 or ( selection2a and selection2b )
|
||||
falsepositives:
|
||||
- Unknown
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ logsource:
|
||||
product: windows
|
||||
detection:
|
||||
selection1:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains:
|
||||
- '7z.exe a -v500m -mx9 -r0 -p'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: '7z.exe a -v500m -mx9 -r0 -p'
|
||||
selection2:
|
||||
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- 'wscript.exe'
|
||||
@@ -32,14 +31,14 @@ detection:
|
||||
ParentCommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows'
|
||||
CommandLine|contains: 'cmd.exe /C '
|
||||
selection4:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
CommandLine|contains|all:
|
||||
- 'rundll32 c:\windows\'
|
||||
- '.dll '
|
||||
specific1:
|
||||
ParentImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
|
||||
Image|endswith: '\dllhost.exe'
|
||||
filter1:
|
||||
CommandLine:
|
||||
CommandLine:
|
||||
- ' '
|
||||
- ''
|
||||
condition: selection1 or selection2 or selection3 or selection4 or ( specific1 and not filter1 )
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user