Merge branch 'master' into rule-devel

This commit is contained in:
Florian Roth
2022-05-16 16:05:12 +02:00
225 changed files with 1222 additions and 749 deletions
+13
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
# These are supported funding model platforms
github: [thomaspatzke]
patreon: # Replace with a single Patreon username
open_collective: # Replace with a single Open Collective username
ko_fi: # Replace with a single Ko-fi username
tidelift: # Replace with a single Tidelift platform-name/package-name e.g., npm/babel
community_bridge: # Replace with a single Community Bridge project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
liberapay: # Replace with a single Liberapay username
issuehunt: # Replace with a single IssueHunt username
otechie: # Replace with a single Otechie username
lfx_crowdfunding: # Replace with a single LFX Crowdfunding project-name e.g., cloud-foundry
custom: # Replace with up to 4 custom sponsorship URLs e.g., ['link1', 'link2']
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ detection:
ObjectName: '\Device\ConDrv'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- legal admin action
- Legal admin action
level: low
@@ -12,14 +12,12 @@ logsource:
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection1:
properties.message|startswith:
- MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO
properties.message|startswith: MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO
properties.message|endswith:
- /MUTATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE
- /VALIDATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE
selection2:
properties.message|startswith:
- MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO
properties.message|startswith: MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/ADMISSIONREGISTRATION.K8S.IO
properties.message|endswith:
- /MUTATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE
- /VALIDATINGWEBHOOKCONFIGURATIONS/WRITE
@@ -14,14 +14,12 @@ logsource:
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection1:
properties.message|startswith:
- MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/BATCH
properties.message|startswith: MICROSOFT.KUBERNETES/CONNECTEDCLUSTERS/BATCH
properties.message|endswith:
- /CRONJOBS/WRITE
- /JOBS/WRITE
selection2:
properties.message|startswith:
- MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/BATCH
properties.message|startswith: MICROSOFT.CONTAINERSERVICE/MANAGEDCLUSTERS/BATCH
properties.message|endswith:
- /CRONJOBS/WRITE
- /JOBS/WRITE
@@ -32,5 +30,5 @@ tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.execution
falsepositives:
- Azure Kubernetes CronJob/Job may be done by a system administrator.
- Azure Kubernetes CronJob/Job may be done by a system administrator.
- If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
@@ -11,8 +11,7 @@ logsource:
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection1:
properties.message:
- MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ELEVATEACCESS/ACTION
properties.message: MICROSOFT.AUTHORIZATION/ELEVATEACCESS/ACTION
condition: selection1
level: high
falsepositives:
@@ -11,13 +11,12 @@ logsource:
service: activitylogs
detection:
selection:
properties.message:
- MICROSOFT.SECURITY/ALERTSSUPPRESSIONRULES/WRITE
properties.message: MICROSOFT.SECURITY/ALERTSSUPPRESSIONRULES/WRITE
condition: selection
level: medium
tags:
- attack.impact
falsepositives:
- Suppression Rule being created may be performed by a system administrator.
- Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
- Suppression Rule being created may be performed by a system administrator.
- Verify whether the user identity, user agent, and/or hostname should be making changes in your environment.
- Suppression Rule created from unfamiliar users should be investigated. If known behavior is causing false positives, it can be exempted from the rule.
@@ -12,16 +12,14 @@ logsource:
service: gcp.audit
detection:
selection1:
gcp.audit.method_name|startswith:
- admissionregistration.k8s.io.v*.mutatingwebhookconfigurations.
gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
gcp.audit.method_name|startswith: admissionregistration.k8s.io.v*.mutatingwebhookconfigurations.
gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
- create
- patch
- replace
selection2:
gcp.audit.method_name|startswith:
- admissionregistration.k8s.io.v*.validatingwebhookconfigurations.
gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
gcp.audit.method_name|startswith: admissionregistration.k8s.io.v*.validatingwebhookconfigurations.
gcp.audit.method_name|endswith:
- create
- patch
- replace
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ detection:
status: success
condition: selection
falsepositives:
-
- Unknown
level: medium
tags:
- attack.initial_access
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
service: okta
detection:
selection:
displaymessage:
- User attempted unauthorized access to app
displaymessage: User attempted unauthorized access to app
condition: selection
level: medium
tags:
+1 -2
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ logsource:
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 4800
EventID: 4800
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -15,12 +15,9 @@ logsource:
detection:
selection:
type: EXECVE
a0:
- arecord
a1:
- '-vv'
a2:
- '-fdat'
a0: arecord
a1: '-vv'
a2: '-fdat'
condition: selection
tags:
- attack.collection
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ logsource:
service: auditd
detection:
selection:
key:
- 'susp_activity'
key: 'susp_activity'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Admin or User activity
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ fields:
- key
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
- Ligitimate software, cleaning hist file
- Legitimate software, cleaning hist file
level: medium
tags:
- attack.credential_access
@@ -16,12 +16,11 @@ detection:
type: 'PATH'
nametype: 'CREATE'
name_1:
name|startswith:
name|startswith:
- '/usr/lib/systemd/system/'
- '/etc/systemd/system/'
name_2:
name|contains:
- '/.config/systemd/user/'
name|contains: '/.config/systemd/user/'
condition: path and 1 of name_*
falsepositives:
- Admin work like legit service installs.
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ logsource:
detection:
commands:
type: EXECVE
a0:
- unzip
a0: unzip
a1:
a1|endswith:
- '.jpg'
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: f8341cb2-ee25-43fa-a975-d8a5a9714b39
status: experimental
description: Detects the usage of the unsafe bpftrace option
author: Andreas Hunkeler (@Karneades)
tags:
tags:
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059.004
references:
@@ -15,10 +15,8 @@ logsource:
product: linux
detection:
selection1:
Image|endswith:
- 'bpftrace'
CommandLine|contains:
- '--unsafe'
Image|endswith: 'bpftrace'
CommandLine|contains: '--unsafe'
condition: selection1
falsepositives:
- Legitimate usage of the unsafe option
@@ -12,25 +12,19 @@ logsource:
product: linux
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '/lastlog'
Image|endswith: '/lastlog'
selection_2:
CommandLine|contains:
- '''x:0:'''
CommandLine|contains: '''x:0:'''
selection_3:
Image|endswith:
- '/cat'
Image|endswith: '/cat'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/etc/passwd'
- '/etc/sudoers'
selection_4:
Image|endswith:
- '/id'
Image|endswith: '/id'
selection_5:
Image|endswith:
- '/lsof'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-u'
Image|endswith: '/lsof'
CommandLine|contains: '-u'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
@@ -12,13 +12,10 @@ logsource:
product: linux
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '/groups'
Image|endswith: '/groups'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '/cat'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/etc/group'
Image|endswith: '/cat'
CommandLine|contains: '/etc/group'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
product: linux
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- 'crontab'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/tmp/'
Image|endswith: 'crontab'
CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ description: Detects suspicious sub processes of web server processes
references:
- https://www.acunetix.com/blog/articles/web-shells-101-using-php-introduction-web-shells-part-2/
date: 2021/10/15
modified: 2022/03/14
modified: 2022/05/09
author: Florian Roth
tags:
- attack.persistence
@@ -26,18 +26,18 @@ detection:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- '/bin/java'
- 'tomcat'
selection_websphere: # ? just guessing
selection_websphere: # ? just guessing
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- '/bin/java'
- 'websphere'
selection_sub_processes:
Image|endswith:
Image|endswith:
- '/whoami'
- '/ifconfig'
- '/usr/bin/ip'
- '/bin/uname'
condition: selection_sub_processes and ( selection_general or selection_tomcat )
condition: selection_sub_processes and ( selection_general or selection_tomcat or selection_websphere)
falsepositives:
- Web applications that invoke Linux command line tools
- Web applications that invoke Linux command line tools
level: critical
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/osascript'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-e'
Image|endswith: '/osascript'
CommandLine|contains: '-e'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Application installers might contain scripts as part of the installation process.
@@ -12,15 +12,11 @@ logsource:
category: process_creation
detection:
selection1:
Image|endswith:
- '/truncate'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-s'
Image|endswith: '/truncate'
CommandLine|contains: '-s'
selection2:
Image|endswith:
- '/dd'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'if='
Image|endswith: '/dd'
CommandLine|contains: 'if='
filter:
CommandLine|contains: 'of='
condition: selection1 or (selection2 and not filter)
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/dscl'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'create'
Image|endswith: '/dscl'
CommandLine|contains: 'create'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
category: process_creation
detection:
selection1:
Image|endswith:
- '/grep'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'password'
Image|endswith: '/grep'
CommandLine|contains: 'password'
selection2:
CommandLine|contains: 'laZagne'
condition: selection1 or selection2
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
category: process_creation
detection:
selection1:
Image:
- '/usr/sbin/osascript'
Image: '/usr/sbin/osascript'
selection2:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-e'
@@ -12,34 +12,27 @@ logsource:
product: macos
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '/dscl'
Image|endswith: '/dscl'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'list'
- '/users'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '/dscacheutil'
Image|endswith: '/dscacheutil'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-q'
- 'user'
selection_3:
CommandLine|contains:
- '''x:0:'''
CommandLine|contains: '''x:0:'''
selection_4:
Image|endswith:
- '/cat'
Image|endswith: '/cat'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/etc/passwd'
- '/etc/sudoers'
selection_5:
Image|endswith:
- '/id'
Image|endswith: '/id'
selection_6:
Image|endswith:
- '/lsof'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-u'
Image|endswith: '/lsof'
CommandLine|contains: '-u'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
@@ -12,19 +12,15 @@ logsource:
product: macos
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '/dscacheutil'
Image|endswith: '/dscacheutil'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-q'
- 'group'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '/cat'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/etc/group'
Image|endswith: '/cat'
CommandLine|contains: '/etc/group'
selection_3:
Image|endswith:
- '/dscl'
Image|endswith: '/dscl'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '-list'
- '/groups'
@@ -12,13 +12,10 @@ logsource:
product: macos
detection:
selection_1:
Image|endswith:
- '/arp'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-a'
Image|endswith: '/arp'
CommandLine|contains: '-a'
selection_2:
Image|endswith:
- '/ping'
Image|endswith: '/ping'
CommandLine|contains:
- ' 10.' #10.0.0.0/8
- ' 192.168.' #192.168.0.0/16
@@ -12,10 +12,8 @@ logsource:
product: macos
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '/crontab'
CommandLine|contains:
- '/tmp/'
Image|endswith: '/crontab'
CommandLine|contains: '/tmp/'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administration activities
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ detection:
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate administrative activity
- Ligitimate software, cleaning hist file
- Legitimate software, cleaning hist file
level: medium
tags:
- attack.credential_access
+1 -1
View File
@@ -24,5 +24,5 @@ fields:
- id.resp_h
- answers
falsepositives:
- unknown
- Unknown
level: low
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ detection:
- '172.29.'
- '172.30.'
- '172.31.'
- 'fd'
- '2620:83:800f'
#approved_rdp:
#dst_ip:
#- x.x.x.x
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ detection:
- 'MsFteWds'
condition: selection1 and not selection2
falsepositives:
- update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
- Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ fields:
- SubjectUserName
- RelativeTargetName
falsepositives:
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or pentest or backup software
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
- Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
level: medium
tags:
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ detection:
service|startswith: '$'
condition: selection and not computer_acct
falsepositives:
- normal enterprise SPN requests activity
- Normal enterprise SPN requests activity
level: medium
tags:
- attack.credential_access
+1 -2
View File
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
selection:
r-dns:
- 'api.telegram.org' # Often used by Bots
r-dns: 'api.telegram.org' # Often used by Bots
filter:
c-useragent|contains:
# Used https://core.telegram.org/bots/samples for this list
+3 -2
View File
@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ title: Bitsadmin to Uncommon TLD
id: 9eb68894-7476-4cd6-8752-23b51f5883a7
status: experimental
description: Detects Bitsadmin connections to domains with uncommon TLDs - https://twitter.com/jhencinski/status/1102695118455349248 - https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Investigating+Microsoft+BITS+Activity/23281/
author: Florian Roth
author: Florian Roth, Tim Shelton
date: 2019/03/07
modified: 2021/08/09
modified: 2022/05/09
logsource:
category: proxy
detection:
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ detection:
- '.com'
- '.net'
- '.org'
- '.scdn.co' # spotify streaming
condition: selection and not falsepositives
fields:
- ClientIP
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,5 +14,5 @@ detection:
- '__pthread_tpp_change_priority: Assertion `new_prio == -1 || (new_prio >= fifo_min_prio && new_prio <= fifo_max_prio)'
condition: keywords
falsepositives:
- https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46185
- 3rd party apache modules - https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=46185
level: medium
@@ -17,12 +17,12 @@ tags:
- attack.t1190
- cve.2021.20090
- cve.2021.20091
logsource:
logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
path_traversal:
c-uri|contains: # CVE-2021-20090 (Bypass Auth: Path Traversal)
- '..%2f'
# CVE-2021-20090 (Bypass Auth: Path Traversal)
c-uri|contains: '..%2f'
config_file_inj:
c-uri|contains|all: # Chaining of CVE-2021-20090 (Bypass Auth) and CVE-2021-20091 (Config File Injection)
- '..%2f'
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
category: webserver
detection:
selection:
c-uri|contains:
- /manager/controllers/default/resource/tvs.php?class_key=../../../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini%00
c-uri|contains: /manager/controllers/default/resource/tvs.php?class_key=../../../../../../../../../../windows/win.ini%00
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Scanning from Nuclei
+1 -1
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ fields:
- cs-method
- cs-User-Agent
falsepositives:
- web applications that use the same URL parameters as ReGeorg
- Web applications that use the same URL parameters as ReGeorg
level: high
tags:
- attack.persistence
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ fields:
- FileHash
- Fqbn
falsepositives:
- need tuning applocker or add exceptions in SIEM
- Need tuning applocker or add exceptions in SIEM
level: medium
tags:
- attack.execution
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ description: backdooring domain object to grant the rights associated with DCSyn
Extended Right cmdlet, will allow to re-obtain the pwd hashes of any user/computer
status: experimental
date: 2019/04/03
modified: 2022/05/05
modified: 2022/05/10
author: Samir Bousseaden; Roberto Rodriguez @Cyb3rWard0g; oscd.community; Tim Shelton
references:
- https://twitter.com/menasec1/status/1111556090137903104
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@ detection:
- '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
- '89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c'
filter1:
ObjectType: 'dnsNode'
ObjectType:
- 'dnsNode'
- 'dnsZoneScope'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
falsepositives:
- New Domain Controller computer account, check user SIDs within the value attribute of event 5136 and verify if it's a regular user or DC computer account.
@@ -34,5 +34,5 @@ detection:
- ObjectName|contains: 'admin'
condition: selection and selection_object
falsepositives:
- if source account name is not an admin then its super suspicious
- If source account name is not an admin then its super suspicious
level: high
@@ -15,8 +15,7 @@ detection:
selection_base:
EventID: 4704
selection_keywords:
PrivilegeList|contains:
- 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege'
PrivilegeList|contains: 'SeEnableDelegationPrivilege'
condition: all of selection*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ detection:
- '%%4417'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- if the source IP is not localhost then it's super suspicious, better to monitor both local and remote changes to GPO scheduledtasks
- If the source IP is not localhost then it's super suspicious, better to monitor both local and remote changes to GPO scheduledtasks
level: high
tags:
- attack.persistence
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ detection:
- 'sql\query'
condition: selection1 and not false_positives
falsepositives:
- update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
- Update the excluded named pipe to filter out any newly observed legit named pipe
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
@@ -23,6 +23,6 @@ detection:
PasswordLastSet: '-'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- automatic DC computer account password change
- Automatic DC computer account password change
- Legitimate DC computer account password change
level: high
@@ -67,8 +67,7 @@ detection:
- C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\
- C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\
filter2:
ProcessName|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files' # too many false positives with legitimate AV and EDR solutions
ProcessName|startswith: 'C:\Program Files' # too many false positives with legitimate AV and EDR solutions
filter3:
ProcessName: 'C:\Windows\CCM\CcmExec.exe'
condition: 1 of selection_* and not 1 of filter*
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@ fields:
- SubjectUserName
- RelativeTargetName
falsepositives:
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or pentest or backup software
- Help Desk operator doing backup or re-imaging end user machine or backup software
- Users working with these data types or exchanging message files
level: medium
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
title: KrbRelayUp Service Installation
id: e97d9903-53b2-41fc-8cb9-889ed4093e80
status: experimental
description: Detects service creation from KrbRelayUp tool used for privilege escalation in windows domain environments where LDAP signing is not enforced (the default settings)
author: Sittikorn S
date: 2022/05/11
references:
- https://github.com/Dec0ne/KrbRelayUp
logsource:
product: windows
category: system
detection:
selection:
EventID: '7045'
ServiceName: 'KrbSCM'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
tags:
- attack.privilege_escalation
- attack.t1543
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ detection:
Caption: 'sysmon64.exe - Application Error'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- none
- Unknown
level: high
tags:
- attack.t1562
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ detection:
selection:
EventID: 106
filter1:
TaskName:
- \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan
TaskName: \Microsoft\Windows\Windows Defender\Windows Defender Scheduled Scan
timeframe: 7d
condition: selection and not 1 of filter* | count() by TaskName < 5
falsepositives:
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ logsource:
service: windefend
detection:
selection:
EventID:
- 5013
EventID: 5013
Value|endswith:
- '\Windows Defender\DisableAntiSpyware = 0x1()'
- '\Real-Time Protection\DisableRealtimeMonitoring = (Current)'
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ detection:
ImageLoaded|contains: '\Temp\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- there is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
- There is a relevant set of false positives depending on applications in the environment
level: high
tags:
- attack.persistence
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|contains:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\123'
TargetFilename|contains: 'C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\123'
condition: selection
fields:
- ComputerName
@@ -14,13 +14,12 @@ logsource:
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '.iso.lnk'
- '.img.lnk'
- '.vhd.lnk'
- '.vhdx.lnk'
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
TargetFilename|contains: '\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Cases in which a user mounts an image file for legitimate reasons
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ tags:
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
detection:
mimikatz_memssp_filename:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- 'mimilsa.log'
TargetFilename|endswith: 'mimilsa.log'
condition: mimikatz_memssp_filename
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
title: Suspcious CLR Logs Creation
id: e4b63079-6198-405c-abd7-3fe8b0ce3263
description: Detects suspicious .NET assembly executions. Could detect using Cobalt Strike's command execute-assembly.
description: Detects suspicious .NET assembly executions. Could detect using Cobalt Strike's command execute-assembly.
references:
- https://blog.menasec.net/2019/07/interesting-difr-traces-of-net-clr.html
- https://bohops.com/2021/03/16/investigating-net-clr-usage-log-tampering-techniques-for-edr-evasion/
@@ -33,5 +33,5 @@ detection:
- 'svchost'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675 - rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process
- Rundll32.exe with zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc in command line and msiexec.exe as parent process - https://twitter.com/SBousseaden/status/1388064061087260675
level: high
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ detection:
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Operations performed through Windows SCCM or equivalent
- read only access list authority
- Read only access list authority
level: medium
tags:
- attack.persistence
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ author: frack113
references:
- Malware Sandbox
date: 2022/03/09
modified: 2022/04/28
modified: 2022/05/08
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: '.exe'
TargetFilename|endswith: '.exe'
filter_whitelist:
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\system32\cleanmgr.exe'
- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
filter_update:
Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\svchost.exe'
TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\Download\Install\'
@@ -21,10 +26,6 @@ detection:
filter_tiworker:
Image|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
Image|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe'
filter_msiexec:
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\msiexec.exe'
filter_cleanmgr:
Image: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\cleanmgr.exe'
filter_programfiles:
- Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\'
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
title: Creation of an WerFault.exe in Unusual Folder
id: 28a452f3-786c-4fd8-b8f2-bddbe9d616d1
status: experimental
description: Detects WerFault copoed to a suspicious folder, which could be a sign of WerFault DLL hijacking
author: frack113
references:
- https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hackers-are-now-hiding-malware-in-windows-event-logs/
date: 2022/05/09
logsource:
product: windows
category: file_event
detection:
selection:
TargetFilename|endswith:
- '\WerFault.exe'
- '\wer.dll'
filter_whitelist:
TargetFilename|contains:
- '\System32\'
- '\SysWOW64\'
- '\WinSxS\'
condition: selection and not filter_whitelist
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1574.001
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ detection:
to_dll:
TargetFilename|endswith: '.dll'
filter_from_dll:
- OriginalFilename|endswith:
- OriginalFilename|endswith:
- '.dll'
- '.tmp' # VSCode FP
- OriginalFilename|contains:
- OriginalFilename|contains:
- '.dll.'
- '\SquirrelTemp\temp'
filter_tiworker:
@@ -12,13 +12,10 @@ logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- fxssvc.exe
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- ualapi.dll
Image|endswith: fxssvc.exe
ImageLoaded|endswith: ualapi.dll
filter:
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- C:\Windows\WinSxS\
ImageLoaded|startswith: C:\Windows\WinSxS\
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unlikely
@@ -12,8 +12,7 @@ logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\notepad.exe'
Image|endswith: '\notepad.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\samlib.dll'
- '\WinSCard.dll'
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\assembly\'
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\assembly\'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
ImageLoaded|contains:
- '\clr.dll'
ImageLoaded|contains: '\clr.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL'
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
ImageLoaded|contains:
- '\dsparse.dll'
ImageLoaded|contains: '\dsparse.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ detection:
- '\powerpnt.exe'
- '\excel.exe'
- '\outlook.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\kerberos.dll'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\kerberos.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
@@ -7,18 +7,17 @@ date: 2021/07/07
modified: 2022/05/06
references:
- 1bd85e1caa1415ebdc8852c91e37bbb7
- https://twitter.com/am0nsec/status/1412232114980982787
- https://twitter.com/am0nsec/status/1412232114980982787
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.impact
- attack.impact
- attack.t1490
logsource:
category: image_load
product: windows
detection:
selection:
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\vss_ps.dll'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\vss_ps.dll'
filter:
Image|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
@@ -39,4 +38,4 @@ detection:
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
level: high
@@ -12,15 +12,13 @@ logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\svchost.exe'
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\tsmsisrv.dll'
- '\tsvipsrv.dll'
- '\wlbsctrl.dll'
filter:
ImageLoaded|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -18,13 +18,10 @@ logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\dism.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith:
- '\dismcore.dll'
Image|endswith: '\dism.exe'
ImageLoaded|endswith: '\dismcore.dll'
filter:
ImageLoaded:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism\dismcore.dll'
ImageLoaded: 'C:\Windows\System32\Dism\dismcore.dll'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Actions of a legitimate telnet client
@@ -38,5 +38,5 @@ detection:
- Image|contains: '\Local\Microsoft\OneDrive\'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment.
- Other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment.
level: medium
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ detection:
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- Other Remote Desktop RDP tools
- domain controller using dns.exe
- Domain controller using dns.exe
level: high
tags:
- attack.lateral_movement
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ related:
status: experimental
description: Detects keywords that could indicate clearing PowerShell history
date: 2019/10/25
modified: 2021/10/16
modified: 2022/05/10
author: Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
references:
- https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a
@@ -18,19 +18,24 @@ logsource:
category: ps_module
definition: PowerShell Module Logging must be enabled
detection:
selection_payload_1:
selection_1a_payload:
Payload|contains:
- 'del'
- 'Remove-Item'
- 'rm'
Payload|contains|all:
- '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
selection_1b_payload:
Payload|contains: '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
selection_payload_2:
Payload|contains|all:
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
- 'HistorySaveStyle'
- 'HistorySaveStyle' # not sure if the homoglyph /- is intended, just checking for both
- 'SaveNothing'
condition: selection_payload_1 or selection_payload_2
selection_payload_3:
Payload|contains|all:
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
- '-HistorySaveStyle'
- 'SaveNothing'
condition: 1 of selection_payload_* or all of selection_1*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
@@ -22,5 +22,5 @@ detection:
- 'DatabasePath '
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- unknown
- Unknown
level: high
@@ -22,8 +22,7 @@ detection:
- ' = ServerRemoteHost ' # HostName: 'ServerRemoteHost' french : Nom dhôte =
- 'wsmprovhost.exe' # HostApplication|contains: 'wsmprovhost.exe' french Application hôte =
false_positive_1:
ContextInfo|contains:
- '\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive.psm1'
ContextInfo|contains: '\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\Modules\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive\Microsoft.PowerShell.Archive.psm1'
condition: selection and not 1 of false_positive*
falsepositives:
@@ -9,24 +9,30 @@ author: Ilyas Ochkov, Jonhnathan Ribeiro, Daniil Yugoslavskiy, oscd.community
references:
- https://gist.github.com/hook-s3c/7363a856c3cdbadeb71085147f042c1a
date: 2022/01/25
modified: 2022/05/10
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
definition: Script block logging must be enabled
detection:
selection_1:
selection1a:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- 'del'
- 'Remove-Item'
- 'rm'
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
selection1b:
ScriptBlockText|contains: '(Get-PSReadlineOption).HistorySavePath'
selection_2:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
- 'HistorySaveStyle'
- 'HistorySaveStyle' # not sure if the homoglyph /- is intended, just checking for both
- 'SaveNothing'
condition: 1 of selection_*
selection_3:
ScriptBlockText|contains|all:
- 'Set-PSReadlineOption'
- '-HistorySaveStyle'
- 'SaveNothing'
condition: 1 of selection_* or all of selection1*
falsepositives:
- Legitimate PowerShell scripts
level: medium
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@ references:
logsource:
product: windows
category: ps_script
detection:
detection:
selection1:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- Clear-History
ScriptBlockText|contains: Clear-History
selection2a:
ScriptBlockText|contains:
- Remove-Item
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ detection:
- '[IO.File]::SetLastWriteTime'
condition: selection_ioc
falsepositives:
- Legitimeate admin script
- Legitimate admin script
level: medium
@@ -4,15 +4,28 @@ description: Detects the usage of the direct syscall of NtOpenProcess which migh
references:
- https://medium.com/falconforce/falconfriday-direct-system-calls-and-cobalt-strike-bofs-0xff14-741fa8e1bdd6
status: experimental
author: Christian Burkard
author: Christian Burkard, Tim Shelton
date: 2021/07/28
modified: 2022/05/15
logsource:
category: process_access
product: windows
detection:
selection:
CallTrace|startswith: 'UNKNOWN'
condition: selection
falsepositive1:
TargetImage: 'C:\Program Files\Cylance\Desktop\CylanceUI.exe'
SourceImage: 'C:\Windows\Explorer.EXE'
falsepositive2:
TargetImage: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeUpdate\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\Temp\*\MicrosoftEdgeUpdate.exe'
falsepositive3:
TargetImage|endswith: 'vcredist_x64.exe'
SourceImage|endswith: 'vcredist_x64.exe'
falsepositive4:
TargetImage: 'C:\Windows\system32\systeminfo.exe'
SourceImage|endswith: 'setup64.exe' #vmware
condition: selection and not 1 of falsepositive*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: critical
@@ -72,8 +72,7 @@ detection:
- TargetImage|endswith: '\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
- CallTrace|contains: '|C:\WINDOWS\System32\RPCRT4.dll+' # attempt to save the rule with a broader filter
filter_set_1:
SourceImage:
- 'C:\WINDOWS\Explorer.EXE'
SourceImage: 'C:\WINDOWS\Explorer.EXE'
TargetImage:
- 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe'
- 'C:\WINDOWS\explorer.exe'
@@ -26,5 +26,5 @@ tags:
- attack.t1021.006
- attack.s0002
falsepositives:
- low
- Unlikely
level: high
@@ -59,8 +59,7 @@ detection:
SourceImage|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
SourceImage|contains:
- 'Antivirus'
SourceImage|contains: 'Antivirus'
filter7:
SourceImage: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe'
filter8:
@@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ detection:
SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\McAfee\MMSSHost\MMSSHOST.exe'
filter_nextron:
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
SourceImage|endswith:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\thor64.exe'
- '\thor.exe'
# Generic Filter for 0x1410 filter (caused by so many programs like DropBox updates etc.)
@@ -77,8 +77,7 @@ detection:
SourceImage|startswith:
- 'C:\Progra Files\'
- 'C:\Progra Files (x86)\'
SourceImage|contains:
- 'Antivirus'
SourceImage|contains: 'Antivirus'
filter_mrt:
SourceImage: 'C:\WINDOWS\system32\MRT.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1418'
@@ -86,7 +85,7 @@ detection:
SourceImage: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\McAfee\MMSSHost\MMSSHOST.exe'
filter_nextron:
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\asgard2-agent\'
SourceImage|endswith:
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\thor64.exe'
- '\thor.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1fffff'
@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ detection:
ParentImage|contains|all:
- '\Windows\Installer\'
- 'msi'
ParentImage|endswith:
- 'tmp'
ParentImage|endswith: 'tmp'
condition: image and parent_image
fields:
- Image
@@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\crackmapexec.exe'
Image|endswith: '\crackmapexec.exe'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2012-R2-and-2012/dn800669(v=ws.11)
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1212
- attack.t1212
- attack.command_and_control
- attack.t1071
logsource:
@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@ detection:
- ':\Program Files(x86)\'
- ':\Program Files\'
legitimate_executable:
sha1:
- 'e570585edc69f9074cb5e8a790708336bd45ca0f'
sha1: 'e570585edc69f9074cb5e8a790708336bd45ca0f'
condition: legitimate_executable and not legitimate_process_path
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -25,8 +25,7 @@ detection:
- '/transfer'
- 'CSIDL_APPDATA'
selection2:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE'
CommandLine|contains: 'CSIDL_SYSTEM_DRIVE'
selection3:
CommandLine|contains:
- '\msf.ps1'
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ references:
tags:
- attack.g0032
- attack.execution
- attack.t1106
- attack.t1106
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2021/04/20
modified: 2021/06/27
@@ -20,15 +20,11 @@ detection:
- 'mshta'
- '.zip'
selection2:
ParentImage:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe'
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe'
ParentImage: 'C:\Windows\System32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe'
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\mshta.exe'
selection3:
ParentImage|contains:
- ':\Users\Public\'
Image:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
ParentImage|contains: ':\Users\Public\'
Image: 'C:\Windows\System32\rundll32.exe'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Should not be any false positives
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ references:
tags:
- attack.g0032
- attack.execution
- attack.t1059
- attack.t1059
author: Florian Roth
date: 2020/12/23
modified: 2021/06/27
@@ -32,8 +32,7 @@ detection:
- ' > %temp%\~'
# Network share discovery
selection4:
CommandLine|contains:
- '.255 10 C:\ProgramData\'
CommandLine|contains: '.255 10 C:\ProgramData\'
condition: 1 of selection*
falsepositives:
- Overlap with legitimate process activity in some cases (especially selection 3 and 4)
@@ -13,12 +13,9 @@ logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith:
- '\powershell.exe'
ParentImage|endswith:
- '\excel.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'DataExchange.dll'
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
ParentImage|endswith: '\excel.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'DataExchange.dll'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ detection:
selection1:
Image|contains: 'windows\system32\Physmem.sys'
selection2:
Image|contains:
Image|contains:
- 'Windows\system32\ime\SHARED\WimBootConfigurations.ini'
- 'Windows\system32\ime\IMEJP\WimBootConfigurations.ini'
- 'Windows\system32\ime\IMETC\WimBootConfigurations.ini'
@@ -31,10 +31,9 @@ detection:
- 'windows\system32\filepath2'
- 'windows\system32\ime'
registry_command:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'reg add'
CommandLine|contains: 'reg add'
registry_key:
CommandLine|contains:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\classes\clsid\{7c857801-7381-11cf-884d-00aa004b2e24}\inprocserver32'
- 'HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\software\classes\clsid\{cf4cc405-e2c5-4ddd-b3ce-5e7582d8c9fa}\inprocserver32'
condition: selection1 or selection2 or (selection3 and registry_command and registry_key)
@@ -16,11 +16,9 @@ detection:
- 'dll,MyStart'
- 'dll MyStart'
selection2a:
CommandLine|endswith:
- ' MyStart'
CommandLine|endswith: ' MyStart'
selection2b:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'rundll32.exe'
CommandLine|contains: 'rundll32.exe'
condition: selection1 or ( selection2a and selection2b )
falsepositives:
- Unknown
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@ logsource:
product: windows
detection:
selection1:
CommandLine|contains:
- '7z.exe a -v500m -mx9 -r0 -p'
CommandLine|contains: '7z.exe a -v500m -mx9 -r0 -p'
selection2:
ParentCommandLine|contains|all:
- 'wscript.exe'
@@ -32,14 +31,14 @@ detection:
ParentCommandLine|contains: 'C:\Windows'
CommandLine|contains: 'cmd.exe /C '
selection4:
CommandLine|contains|all:
CommandLine|contains|all:
- 'rundll32 c:\windows\'
- '.dll '
specific1:
ParentImage|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
Image|endswith: '\dllhost.exe'
filter1:
CommandLine:
CommandLine:
- ' '
- ''
condition: selection1 or selection2 or selection3 or selection4 or ( specific1 and not filter1 )

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