5 Rules covering various macro techniques
- Rule to look for GAC DLL loaded by an Office Product - Rule to look for any DLL in C:\Windows\assembly loaded by an Office Product - Rule to look for clr.dll loaded by an Office Product - Rule to look for directory services parsing dll loaded by an Office Product - Rule to look for kerberos dll loaded by an Office Product
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title: dotNET DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
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id: ff0f2b05-09db-4095-b96d-1b75ca24894a
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status: experimental
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description: Detects any assembly DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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references:
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- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
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author: Antonlovesdnb
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date: 2020/02/19
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tags:
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- attack.initial.access
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- attack.t1193
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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selection:
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EventID: 7
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Image:
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- '*\winword.exe'
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- '*\powerpnt.exe'
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- '*\excel.exe'
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- '*\outlook.exe'
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ImageLoaded:
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- '*C:\Windows\assembly\'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
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level: high
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title: CLR DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
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id: d13c43f0-f66b-4279-8b2c-5912077c1780
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status: experimental
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description: Detects CLR DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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references:
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- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
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author: Antonlovesdnb
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date: 2020/02/19
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tags:
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- attack.initial.access
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- attack.t1193
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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selection:
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EventID: 7
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Image:
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- '*\winword.exe'
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- '*\powerpnt.exe'
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- '*\excel.exe'
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- '*\outlook.exe'
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ImageLoaded:
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- '*clr.dll*'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
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level: high
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title: GAC DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
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id: 90217a70-13fc-48e4-b3db-0d836c5824ac
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status: experimental
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description: Detects any GAC DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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references:
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- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
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author: Antonlovesdnb
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date: 2020/02/19
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tags:
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- attack.initial.access
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- attack.t1193
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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selection:
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EventID: 7
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Image:
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- '*\winword.exe'
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- '*\powerpnt.exe'
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- '*\excel.exe'
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- '*\outlook.exe'
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ImageLoaded:
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- '*C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\assembly\GAC_MSIL'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
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level: high
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title: Active Directory Parsing DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
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id: a2a3b925-7bb0-433b-b508-db9003263cc4
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status: experimental
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description: Detects DSParse DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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references:
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- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
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author: Antonlovesdnb
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date: 2020/02/19
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tags:
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- attack.initial.access
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- attack.t1193
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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selection:
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EventID: 7
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Image:
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- '*\winword.exe'
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- '*\powerpnt.exe'
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- '*\excel.exe'
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- '*\outlook.exe'
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ImageLoaded:
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- '*dsparse.dll*'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
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level: high
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title: Active Directory Kerberos DLL Loaded Via Office Applications
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id: 7417e29e-c2e7-4cf6-a2e8-767228c64837
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status: experimental
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description: Detects Kerberos DLL being loaded by an Office Product
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references:
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- https://medium.com/threatpunter/detecting-adversary-tradecraft-with-image-load-event-logging-and-eql-8de93338c16
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author: Antonlovesdnb
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date: 2019/12/26
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tags:
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- attack.initial.access
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- attack.t1193
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logsource:
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product: windows
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service: sysmon
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detection:
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selection:
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EventID: 7
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Image:
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- '*\winword.exe'
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- '*\powerpnt.exe'
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- '*\excel.exe'
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- '*\outlook.exe'
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ImageLoaded:
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- '*kerberos.dll*'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Alerts on legitimate macro usage as well, will need to filter as appropriate
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level: high
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