Merge PR #4399 From @Scoubi - New Rules Related To INDEX_ALLOCATION Potential Abuse

new: Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream
new: Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream - CLI

---------

Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <8741929+nasbench@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: phantinuss <79651203+phantinuss@users.noreply.github.com>

rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_hidden_dir_index_allocation.yml

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+title: Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream
+id: a8f866e1-bdd4-425e-a27a-37619238d9c7
+related:
+    - id: 0900463c-b33b-49a8-be1d-552a3b553dae
+      type: similar
+status: experimental
+description: |
+    Detects the creation of hidden file/folder with the "::$index_allocation" stream. Which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folder and files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" and "cmd.exe"
+references:
+    - https://twitter.com/pfiatde/status/1681977680688738305
+    - https://soroush.me/blog/2010/12/a-dotty-salty-directory-a-secret-place-in-ntfs-for-secret-files/
+    - https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/pentesters-windows-ntfs-tricks-collection/
+    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c3b23002d2bbede3c07e7307165fc2a235a427d/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md#atomic-test-5---create-hidden-directory-via-index_allocation
+    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3
+author: Scoubi (@ScoubiMtl)
+date: 2023/10/09
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.t1564.004
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    category: file_event
+detection:
+    selection:
+        # Note: Both Sysmon and ETW are unable to log the presence of such streams in the CommandLine. But EDRs such as Crowdstrike are able to use e.g. CMD console history. Users are advised to test this before usage
+        TargetFilename|contains: '::$index_allocation'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - Unlikely
+level: medium

rules/windows/process_creation/proc_creation_win_susp_hidden_dir_index_allocation.yml

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+title: Potential Hidden Directory Creation Via NTFS INDEX_ALLOCATION Stream - CLI
+id: 0900463c-b33b-49a8-be1d-552a3b553dae
+related:
+    - id: a8f866e1-bdd4-425e-a27a-37619238d9c7
+      type: similar
+status: experimental
+description: |
+    Detects command line containing reference to the "::$index_allocation" stream, which can be used as a technique to prevent access to folders or files from tooling such as "explorer.exe" or "cmd.exe"
+references:
+    - https://twitter.com/pfiatde/status/1681977680688738305
+    - https://soroush.me/blog/2010/12/a-dotty-salty-directory-a-secret-place-in-ntfs-for-secret-files/
+    - https://sec-consult.com/blog/detail/pentesters-windows-ntfs-tricks-collection/
+    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/5c3b23002d2bbede3c07e7307165fc2a235a427d/atomics/T1564.004/T1564.004.md#atomic-test-5---create-hidden-directory-via-index_allocation
+    - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-fscc/c54dec26-1551-4d3a-a0ea-4fa40f848eb3
+author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems), Scoubi (@ScoubiMtl)
+date: 2023/10/09
+tags:
+    - attack.defense_evasion
+    - attack.t1564.004
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    category: process_creation
+detection:
+    selection:
+        # Note: Both Sysmon and ETW are unable to log the presence of such stram in the CommandLine. But EDRs such as Crowdstrike are able to using for example CMD console history. Users are advised to test this before usage
+        CommandLine|contains: '::$index_allocation'
+    condition: selection
+falsepositives:
+    - Unlikely
+level: medium