Merge pull request #2301 from SigmaHQ/rule-devel

refactor: reworked psexec / paexec rules
This commit is contained in:
Florian Roth
2021-11-24 09:27:35 +01:00
committed by GitHub
4 changed files with 41 additions and 9 deletions
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: ad1f4bb9-8dfb-4765-adb6-2a7cfb6c0f94
description: Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes locally and remote execution.
status: experimental
date: 2020/06/24
modified: 2021/11/17
modified: 2021/11/23
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
tags:
- attack.execution
@@ -30,10 +30,12 @@ detection:
- Microsoft.WSMan.Management.dll
filter_ps:
Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
filter_bits: # not available in Sysmon data, but Aurora logs
CommandLine|contains: 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS'
respond_server:
Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
OriginalFileName: 'WsmWmiPl.dll'
condition: (request_client and not filter_ps) or respond_server
condition: (request_client and not filter_ps and not filter_bits) or respond_server
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: 9ae01559-cf7e-4f8e-8e14-4c290a1b4784
description: Detects potential use of UIPromptForCredentials functions by looking for some of the DLLs needed for it.
status: experimental
date: 2020/10/20
modified: 2021/11/20
modified: 2021/11/23
author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
tags:
- attack.credential_access
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ detection:
Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
condition: selection and not filter
falsepositives:
- other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment.
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
title: PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM
id: 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23
status: experimental
description: Detects suspicious flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights
references:
- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
- https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
author: Florian Roth
date: 2021/11/23
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_cmd_to_system: # Escalation to LOCAL_SYSTEM
CommandLine|endswith: ' -s cmd.exe'
selection_supporting_flags:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'PsExec'
- 'PAExec'
- 'accepteula'
- 'cmd /c '
condition: selection_supporting_flags and selection_cmd_to_system
falsepositives:
- Admins that use PsExec or PAExec to escalate to the SYSTEM account for maintenance purposes (rare)
level: high
tags:
- attack.develop_capabilities
- attack.t1587.001
@@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ references:
- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
author: Florian Roth
date: 2021/05/22
modified: 2021/11/23
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_flags_1: # Escalation to LOCAL_SYSTEM
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\\127.0.0.1'
- ' -s '
- 'cmd.exe'
CommandLine|endswith:
- ' -s cmd.exe'
- ' -s -i cmd.exe'
selection_flags_2:
CommandLine|contains|all: # Accepting EULA in commandline - often used in automated attacks
- ' /accepteula '
- 'cmd /c '
- 'accepteula'
- ' -u '
- ' -p '
- ' \\'
filter:
CommandLine|contains:
- 'paexec'