Merge pull request #2301 from SigmaHQ/rule-devel
refactor: reworked psexec / paexec rules
This commit is contained in:
+4
-2
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: ad1f4bb9-8dfb-4765-adb6-2a7cfb6c0f94
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description: Detects signs of potential use of the WSMAN provider from uncommon processes locally and remote execution.
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status: experimental
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date: 2020/06/24
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modified: 2021/11/17
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modified: 2021/11/23
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author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
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tags:
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- attack.execution
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@@ -30,10 +30,12 @@ detection:
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- Microsoft.WSMan.Management.dll
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filter_ps:
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Image|endswith: '\powershell.exe'
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filter_bits: # not available in Sysmon data, but Aurora logs
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CommandLine|contains: 'svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s BITS'
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respond_server:
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Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
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OriginalFileName: 'WsmWmiPl.dll'
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condition: (request_client and not filter_ps) or respond_server
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condition: (request_client and not filter_ps and not filter_bits) or respond_server
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falsepositives:
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- Unknown
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level: medium
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ id: 9ae01559-cf7e-4f8e-8e14-4c290a1b4784
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description: Detects potential use of UIPromptForCredentials functions by looking for some of the DLLs needed for it.
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status: experimental
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date: 2020/10/20
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modified: 2021/11/20
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modified: 2021/11/23
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author: Roberto Rodriguez (Cyb3rWard0g), OTR (Open Threat Research)
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tags:
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- attack.credential_access
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@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ detection:
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Image|startswith:
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- 'C:\Windows\System32\'
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- 'C:\Windows\explorer.exe'
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- 'C:\Program Files\'
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condition: selection and not filter
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falsepositives:
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- other legitimate processes loading those DLLs in your environment.
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@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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title: PsExec/PAExec Escalation to LOCAL SYSTEM
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id: 8834e2f7-6b4b-4f09-8906-d2276470ee23
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status: experimental
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description: Detects suspicious flags used by PsExec and PAExec to escalate a command line to LOCAL_SYSTEM rights
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references:
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- https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/psexec
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- https://www.poweradmin.com/paexec/
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- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
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author: Florian Roth
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date: 2021/11/23
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logsource:
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category: process_creation
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product: windows
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detection:
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selection_cmd_to_system: # Escalation to LOCAL_SYSTEM
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CommandLine|endswith: ' -s cmd.exe'
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selection_supporting_flags:
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CommandLine|contains:
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- 'PsExec'
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- 'PAExec'
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- 'accepteula'
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- 'cmd /c '
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condition: selection_supporting_flags and selection_cmd_to_system
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falsepositives:
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- Admins that use PsExec or PAExec to escalate to the SYSTEM account for maintenance purposes (rare)
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level: high
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tags:
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- attack.develop_capabilities
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- attack.t1587.001
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@@ -8,21 +8,21 @@ references:
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- https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2020/10/kegtap-and-singlemalt-with-a-ransomware-chaser.html
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author: Florian Roth
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date: 2021/05/22
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modified: 2021/11/23
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logsource:
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category: process_creation
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product: windows
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detection:
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selection_flags_1: # Escalation to LOCAL_SYSTEM
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CommandLine|contains|all:
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- '\\127.0.0.1'
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- ' -s '
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- 'cmd.exe'
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CommandLine|endswith:
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- ' -s cmd.exe'
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- ' -s -i cmd.exe'
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selection_flags_2:
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CommandLine|contains|all: # Accepting EULA in commandline - often used in automated attacks
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- ' /accepteula '
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- 'cmd /c '
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- 'accepteula'
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- ' -u '
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- ' -p '
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- ' \\'
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filter:
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CommandLine|contains:
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- 'paexec'
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