Merge PR #5774 from @mbabinski - Added rules related to ArcGIS Server Object Extension abuse
new: Suspicious File Created by ArcSOC.exe new: Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process --------- Co-authored-by: Nasreddine Bencherchali <monsteroffire2@gmail.com>
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title: Suspicious File Created by ArcSOC.exe
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id: e890acee-d488-420e-8f20-d9b19b3c3d43
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status: experimental
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description: |
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Detects instances where the ArcGIS Server process ArcSOC.exe, which hosts REST services running on an ArcGIS
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server, creates a file with suspicious file type, indicating that it may be an executable, script file,
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or otherwise unusual.
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references:
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- https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
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- https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
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author: Micah Babinski
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date: 2025-11-25
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tags:
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- attack.defense-evasion
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- attack.command-and-control
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- attack.persistence
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- attack.initial-access
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- attack.t1127
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- attack.t1105
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- attack.t1133
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logsource:
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category: file_event
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product: windows
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detection:
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selection:
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Image|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
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TargetFilename|endswith:
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- '.ahk'
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- '.aspx'
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- '.au3'
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- '.bat'
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- '.cmd'
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- '.dll'
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- '.exe'
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- '.hta'
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- '.js'
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- '.ps1'
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- '.py'
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- '.vbe'
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- '.vbs'
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- '.wsf'
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condition: selection
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falsepositives:
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- Unlikely
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level: high
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title: Suspicious ArcSOC.exe Child Process
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id: 8e95e73e-ba02-4a87-b4d7-0929b8053038
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status: experimental
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description: |
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Detects script interpreters, command-line tools, and similar suspicious child processes of ArcSOC.exe.
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ArcSOC.exe is the process name which hosts ArcGIS Server REST services. If an attacker compromises an ArcGIS
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Server system and uploads a malicious Server Object Extension (SOE), they can send crafted requests to the corresponding
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service endpoint and remotely execute code from the ArcSOC.exe process.
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references:
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- https://reliaquest.com/blog/threat-spotlight-inside-flax-typhoons-arcgis-compromise/
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- https://enterprise.arcgis.com/en/server/12.0/administer/windows/inside-an-arcgis-server-site.htm
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author: Micah Babinski
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date: 2025-11-25
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tags:
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- attack.execution
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- attack.t1059
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- attack.t1203
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logsource:
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category: process_creation
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product: windows
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detection:
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selection:
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ParentImage|endswith: '\ArcSOC.exe'
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Image|endswith:
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- '\cmd.exe'
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- '\cscript.exe'
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- '\mshta.exe'
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- '\powershell.exe'
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- '\pwsh.exe'
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- '\regsvr32.exe'
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- '\rundll32.exe'
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- '\wmic.exe'
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- '\wscript.exe'
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filter_main_cmd:
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Image|endswith: '\cmd.exe'
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CommandLine: 'cmd.exe /c "ver"'
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condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
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falsepositives:
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- Unknown
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level: high
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