Merge PR #4762 from @nasbench - Fix false positives found in testing

fix: Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL Loaded By Uncommon/Suspicious Process - Add multiple new FP filters seen in the wild
fix: Potential System DLL Sideloading From Non System Locations - Add multiple new FP filters seen in the wild
new: CrackMapExec File Indicators
remove: CrackMapExec File Creation Patterns
remove: Suspicious Epmap Connection

deprecated/windows/file_event_win_crackmapexec_patterns.yml

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 title: CrackMapExec File Creation Patterns
 id: 9433ff9c-5d3f-4269-99f8-95fc826ea489
-status: test
+status: deprecated
 description: Detects suspicious file creation patterns found in logs when CrackMapExec is used
 references:
     - https://mpgn.gitbook.io/crackmapexec/smb-protocol/obtaining-credentials/dump-lsass
 author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
 date: 2022/03/12
-modified: 2022/05/27
+modified: 2024/03/01
 tags:
     - attack.credential_access
     - attack.t1003.001

deprecated/windows/net_connection_win_susp_epmap.yml

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 title: Suspicious Epmap Connection
 id: 628d7a0b-7b84-4466-8552-e6138bc03b43
-status: experimental
+status: deprecated
 description: Detects suspicious "epmap" connection to a remote computer via remote procedure call (RPC)
 references:
     - https://github.com/RiccardoAncarani/TaskShell/
 author: frack113, Tim Shelton (fps)
 date: 2022/07/14
-modified: 2023/09/28
+modified: 2024/03/01
 tags:
     - attack.lateral_movement
 logsource:

rules-threat-hunting/windows/image_load/image_load_dll_dbghelp_dbgcore_susp_load.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+title: Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL Loaded By Uncommon/Suspicious Process
+id: 0e277796-5f23-4e49-a490-483131d4f6e1
+related:
+    - id: bdc64095-d59a-42a2-8588-71fd9c9d9abc # Unsigned Loading
+      type: similar
+status: test
+description: |
+    Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL by a potentially uncommon or potentially suspicious process.
+    The Dbghelp and Dbgcore DLLs export functions that allow for the dump of process memory. Tools like ProcessHacker, Task Manager and some attacker tradecraft use the MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
+    As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
+    Keep in mind that many legitimate Windows processes and services might load the aforementioned DLLs for debugging or other related purposes. Investigate the CommandLine and the Image location of the process loading the DLL.
+references:
+    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
+    - https://www.pinvoke.net/default.aspx/dbghelp/MiniDumpWriteDump.html
+    - https://medium.com/@fsx30/bypass-edrs-memory-protection-introduction-to-hooking-2efb21acffd6
+author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community, Ecco
+date: 2019/10/27
+modified: 2024/03/01
+tags:
+    - attack.credential_access
+    - attack.t1003.001
+    - detection.threat_hunting
+logsource:
+    category: image_load
+    product: windows
+detection:
+    selection:
+        ImageLoaded|endswith:
+            - '\dbghelp.dll'
+            - '\dbgcore.dll'
+        Image|endswith:
+            - '\bash.exe'
+            - '\cmd.exe'
+            - '\cscript.exe'
+            - '\dnx.exe'
+            - '\excel.exe'
+            - '\monitoringhost.exe'
+            - '\msbuild.exe'
+            - '\mshta.exe'
+            - '\outlook.exe'
+            - '\powerpnt.exe'
+            - '\regsvcs.exe'
+            - '\rundll32.exe'
+            - '\sc.exe'
+            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
+            - '\winword.exe'
+            - '\wmic.exe'
+            - '\wscript.exe'
+            # - '\powershell.exe' # Note: Triggered by installing common software
+            # - '\regsvr32.exe'  # Note: triggered by installing common software
+            # - '\schtasks.exe'  # Note: triggered by installing software
+            # - '\svchost.exe'  # Note: triggered by some services
+    filter_main_tiworker:
+        # Note: This filter requires "CommandLine" field enrichment
+        CommandLine|startswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\WinSxS\'
+        CommandLine|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe -Embedding'
+    filter_main_generic:
+        # Note: This filter requires "CommandLine" field enrichment
+        Image|endswith: '\svchost.exe'
+        CommandLine|endswith:
+            - '-k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted'
+            - '-k WerSvcGroup'
+    filter_main_rundll32:
+        # Note: This filter requires "CommandLine" field enrichment
+        Image|endswith: '\rundll32.exe'
+        CommandLine|contains:
+            - '/d srrstr.dll,ExecuteScheduledSPPCreation'
+            - 'aepdu.dll,AePduRunUpdate'
+            - 'shell32.dll,OpenAs_RunDL'
+            - 'Windows.Storage.ApplicationData.dll,CleanupTemporaryState'
+    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
+falsepositives:
+    - Debugging scripts might leverage this DLL in order to dump process memory for further analysis.
+level: medium

rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_hktl_crackmapexec_indicators.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+title: CrackMapExec File Indicators
+id: 736ffa74-5f6f-44ca-94ef-1c0df4f51d2a
+related:
+    - id: 9433ff9c-5d3f-4269-99f8-95fc826ea489
+      type: obsoletes
+status: experimental
+description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by CrackMapExec.
+references:
+    - https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/
+author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
+date: 2024/03/11
+tags:
+    - attack.credential_access
+    - attack.t1003.001
+logsource:
+    product: windows
+    category: file_event
+detection:
+    selection_path:
+        TargetFilename|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Temp\' # The disk extension is hardcoded in the tool.
+    selection_names_str:
+        TargetFilename|endswith:
+            - '\temp.ps1' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/modules/keepass_trigger.py#L42C41-L42C68
+            - '\msol.ps1' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/modules/msol.py#L48C98-L48C106
+    selection_names_re:
+        - TargetFilename|re: '\\[0-9a-f]{8}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{4}-[0-9a-f]{12}\.txt$' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/protocols/wmi/wmiexec.py#L86
+        - TargetFilename|re: '\\[a-zA-Z]{8}\.tmp$' # https://github.com/byt3bl33d3r/CrackMapExec/blob/3c3e412193cb6d3237abe90c543e5d995bfa4447/cme/protocols/smb/atexec.py#L145C19-L146
+    condition: selection_path and 1 of selection_names_*
+falsepositives:
+    - Unknown
+level: high

rules/windows/image_load/image_load_dll_dbghelp_dbgcore_susp_load.yml

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-title: Load Of Dbghelp/Dbgcore DLL From Suspicious Process
-id: 0e277796-5f23-4e49-a490-483131d4f6e1
-related:
-    - id: bdc64095-d59a-42a2-8588-71fd9c9d9abc # Unsigned Loading
-      type: similar
-status: test
-description: |
-    Detects the load of dbghelp/dbgcore DLL (used to make memory dumps) by suspicious processes.
-    Tools like ProcessHacker and some attacker tradecraft use MiniDumpWriteDump API found in dbghelp.dll or dbgcore.dll.
-    As an example, SilentTrynity C2 Framework has a module that leverages this API to dump the contents of Lsass.exe and transfer it over the network back to the attacker's machine.
-references:
-    - https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/minidumpapiset/nf-minidumpapiset-minidumpwritedump
-    - https://www.pinvoke.net/default.aspx/dbghelp/MiniDumpWriteDump.html
-    - https://medium.com/@fsx30/bypass-edrs-memory-protection-introduction-to-hooking-2efb21acffd6
-author: Perez Diego (@darkquassar), oscd.community, Ecco
-date: 2019/10/27
-modified: 2023/03/09
-tags:
-    - attack.credential_access
-    - attack.t1003.001
-logsource:
-    category: image_load
-    product: windows
-detection:
-    selection:
-        ImageLoaded|endswith:
-            - '\dbghelp.dll'
-            - '\dbgcore.dll'
-        Image|endswith:
-            - '\msbuild.exe'
-            - '\cmd.exe'
-            # - '\svchost.exe'  triggered by installing common software
-            - '\rundll32.exe'
-            # - '\powershell.exe'  triggered by installing common software
-            - '\winword.exe'
-            - '\excel.exe'
-            - '\powerpnt.exe'
-            - '\outlook.exe'
-            - '\monitoringhost.exe'
-            - '\wmic.exe'
-            # - '\msiexec.exe'  an installer installing a program using one of those DLL will raise an alert
-            - '\bash.exe'
-            - '\wscript.exe'
-            - '\cscript.exe'
-            - '\mshta.exe'
-            # - '\regsvr32.exe'  triggered by installing common software
-            # - '\schtasks.exe'  triggered by installing software
-            - '\dnx.exe'
-            - '\regsvcs.exe'
-            - '\sc.exe'
-            - '\scriptrunner.exe'
-    filter_tiworker:
-        # CommandLine field added by aurora
-        CommandLine|startswith: 'C:\WINDOWS\winsxs\'
-        CommandLine|endswith: '\TiWorker.exe -Embedding'
-    condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
-falsepositives:
-    - Unknown
-level: high

rules/windows/image_load/image_load_side_load_from_non_system_location.yml

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ references:
     - https://www.hexacorn.com/blog/2023/12/26/1-little-known-secret-of-runonce-exe-32-bit/
 author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
 date: 2022/08/14
-modified: 2024/01/10
+modified: 2024/03/11
 tags:
     - attack.defense_evasion
     - attack.persistence
@@ -445,36 +445,48 @@ detection:
     filter_main_generic:
         # Note: this filter is generic on purpose to avoid insane amount of FP from legitimate third party applications. A better approach would be to baseline everything and add specific filters to avoid blind spots
         ImageLoaded|contains:
-            - ':\Windows\System32\'
-            - ':\Windows\SysWOW64\'
-            - ':\Windows\WinSxS\'
-            - ':\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
-            - ':\Windows\SystemTemp\'
-            - ':\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
+            - 'C:\$WINDOWS.~BT\'
+            - 'C:\$WinREAgent\'
+            - 'C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\'
+            - 'C:\Windows\System32\'
+            - 'C:\Windows\SystemTemp\'
+            - 'C:\Windows\SysWOW64\'
+            - 'C:\Windows\WinSxS\'
+    filter_main_dot_net:
+        ImageLoaded|startswith: 'C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\'
+        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\cscui.dll'
     filter_main_defender:
-        Image|contains: ':\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
-        Image|endswith: '\version.dll'
+        ImageLoaded|contains: 'C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Platform\'
+        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\version.dll'
+    filter_optional_exchange:
+        ImageLoaded|contains: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft\Exchange Server\'
+        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\mswb7.dll'
+    filter_optional_arsenal_image_mounter:
+        ImageLoaded|contains: 'C:\Program Files\Arsenal-Image-Mounter-'
+        ImageLoaded|endswith:
+            - '\mi.dll'
+            - '\miutils.dl'
     filter_optional_office_appvpolicy:
-        Image|endswith: ':\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
-        ImageLoaded|endswith: ':\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\AppVPolicy.dll'
+        Image|endswith: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe'
+        ImageLoaded|endswith: 'C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\ClickToRun\AppVPolicy.dll'
     filter_optional_azure:
-        ImageLoaded|contains: ':\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\'
+        ImageLoaded|contains: 'C:\Packages\Plugins\Microsoft.GuestConfiguration.ConfigurationforWindows\'
     filter_optional_dell:
         Image|contains:
-            - ':\Program Files\WindowsApps\DellInc.DellSupportAssistforPCs'
-            - ':\Windows\System32\backgroundTaskHost.exe'
+            - 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\DellInc.DellSupportAssistforPCs'
+            - 'C:\Windows\System32\backgroundTaskHost.exe'
         ImageLoaded|contains: ':\Program Files\WindowsApps\DellInc.DellSupportAssistforPCs'
     filter_optional_dell_wldp:
-        Image|contains: ':\Program Files\WindowsApps\DellInc.DellSupportAssistforPCs'
+        Image|contains: 'C:\Program Files\WindowsApps\DellInc.DellSupportAssistforPCs'
         Image|endswith: '\wldp.dll'
     filter_optional_checkpoint:
         Image|contains:
-            - ':\Program Files\CheckPoint\'
-            - ':\Program Files (x86)\CheckPoint\'
+            - 'C:\Program Files\CheckPoint\'
+            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\CheckPoint\'
         Image|endswith: '\SmartConsole.exe'
         ImageLoaded|contains:
-            - ':\Program Files\CheckPoint\'
-            - ':\Program Files (x86)\CheckPoint\'
+            - 'C:\Program Files\CheckPoint\'
+            - 'C:\Program Files (x86)\CheckPoint\'
         ImageLoaded|endswith: '\PolicyManager.dll'
     condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_* and not 1 of filter_optional_*
 falsepositives: