This commit is contained in:
Nasreddine Bencherchali
2022-11-01 01:05:42 +01:00
parent 743ebf08f7
commit 0aff47946d
6 changed files with 51 additions and 14 deletions
@@ -17,14 +17,20 @@ logsource:
detection:
selection:
Description: 'Python Core'
filter:
filter_generic:
- Image|contains:
- 'Python' # FPs with python38.dll, python.exe etc.
- Image|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files\'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\ProgramData\Anaconda3\' # Comment out if you don't use Anaconda in your environment
condition: selection and not filter
filter_aurora:
# Example:
# ImageLoaded: C:\ProgramData\Anaconda3\DLLs\_queue.pyd
# ImageName: \Device\HarddiskVolume5\ProgramData\Anaconda3\DLLs\_queue.pyd
Provider_Name: Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process
ImageName|contains: '\ProgramData\Anaconda3\DLLs\'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
fields:
- Description
falsepositives:
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
title: Credentials Dumping Tools Accessing LSASS Memory
title: Credential Dumping Tools Accessing LSASS Memory
id: 32d0d3e2-e58d-4d41-926b-18b520b2b32d
status: experimental
description: Detects process access LSASS memory which is typical for credentials dumping tools
description: Detects processes requesting access to LSASS memory via suspicious access masks. This is typical for credentials dumping tools
references:
- https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow
- https://cyberwardog.blogspot.com/2017/03/chronicles-of-threat-hunter-hunting-for_22.html
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ references:
- http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf
author: Florian Roth, Roberto Rodriguez, Dimitrios Slamaris, Mark Russinovich, Thomas Patzke, Teymur Kheirkhabarov, Sherif Eldeeb, James Dickenson, Aleksey Potapov, oscd.community (update)
date: 2017/02/16
modified: 2022/10/20
modified: 2022/11/01
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
@@ -135,6 +135,12 @@ detection:
SourceImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
SourceImage|endswith: '.tmp\DropboxUpdate.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1410'
filter_msbuild:
# This FP was generated while building CPython from source and could be related to other similar examples.
# But if you don't do that kind of stuff consider removing it from the rule ;)
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
SourceImage|endswith: '\MSBuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1F3FFF'
# Old - too broad filter
# SourceImage|endswith: # easy to bypass. need to implement supportive rule to detect bypass attempts
# - '\wmiprvse.exe'
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ references:
- https://twitter.com/timbmsft/status/900724491076214784
author: Tim Burrell
date: 2020/01/02
modified: 2021/10/21
modified: 2022/11/01
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1562.002
@@ -19,7 +19,14 @@ detection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\WINDOWS\System32\svchost.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1F3FFF'
CallTrace|contains: 'UNKNOWN'
condition: selection
filter_msbuild:
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
SourceImage|endswith: '\MSBuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe'
# Just to make sure it's "really" .NET :)
CallTrace|contains:
- 'Microsoft.Build.ni.dll'
- 'System.ni.dll'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: high
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ references:
- http://security-research.dyndns.org/pub/slides/FIRST2017/FIRST-2017_Tom-Ueltschi_Sysmon_FINAL_notes.pdf
author: Florian Roth
date: 2021/11/27
modified: 2022/10/26
modified: 2022/11/01
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.001
@@ -55,9 +55,8 @@ detection:
- '\AppData\'
- '\Temporary'
filter1:
SourceImage|contains|all:
- 'C:\Users\'
- '\AppData\Local\'
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
SourceImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\'
SourceImage|endswith:
- '\Microsoft VS Code\Code.exe'
- '\software_reporter_tool.exe'
@@ -74,6 +73,7 @@ detection:
- '0x410'
- '0x1410'
filter_dropbox2:
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
SourceImage|contains: '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
SourceImage|endswith: '.tmp\DropboxUpdate.exe'
GrantedAccess: '0x1410'
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@ detection:
- '0x1010'
- '0x101010'
filter_ms_products:
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
SourceImage|contains|all:
- '\AppData\Local\Temp\'
- '\vs_bootstrapper_'
@@ -103,6 +104,10 @@ detection:
SourceImage|startswith:
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\'
- 'C:\Program Files\'
filter_keybase:
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Users\'
SourceImage|endswith: \AppData\Local\Keybase\keybase.exe
GrantedAccess: '0x1fffff'
condition: selection and not 1 of filter*
fields:
- User
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ status: experimental
description: Detects shellcode injection by Metasploit's migrate and Empire's psinject
author: Bhabesh Raj
date: 2022/03/11
modified: 2022/10/27
modified: 2022/11/01
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.privilege_escalation
@@ -53,6 +53,10 @@ detection:
- 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\Common7\IDE\devenv.exe'
- 'C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Visual Studio\2019\Community\Common7\IDE\devenv.exe'
CallTrace|startswith: 'C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll'
filter_ddvdatacollector:
SourceImage|startswith: 'C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\'
SourceImage|endswith: '\MSBuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe'
TargetImage: C:\Program Files\Dell\DellDataVault\DDVDataCollector.exe
condition: selection and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Empire's csharp_exe payload uses 0x1f3fff for process enumeration as well
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@ references:
- https://lolbas-project.github.io/lolbas/OtherMSBinaries/Tracker/
author: 'Avneet Singh @v3t0_, oscd.community'
date: 2020/10/18
modified: 2021/11/27
modified: 2022/11/01
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1055.001
@@ -21,7 +21,16 @@ detection:
CommandLine|contains:
- ' /d '
- ' /c '
condition: all of selection_*
filter_msbuild:
# Example:
# GrandparentImage: C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\Msbuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe
# ParentCommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\MSBuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe" /nologo /nodemode:1 /nodeReuse:true /low:false
# CommandLine: "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\MSBuild\Current\Bin\Tracker.exe" @"C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\tmp05c7789bc5534838bf96d7a0fed1ffff.tmp" /c "C:\Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\2022\Community\VC\Tools\MSVC\14.29.30133\bin\HostX86\x64\Lib.exe"
ParentImage|endswith: '\Msbuild\Current\Bin\MSBuild.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '\VC\Tools\MSVC\'
- '\bin\HostX86\x64\'
condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_*
falsepositives:
- Unknown
level: medium