Generate docs from job=generate_and_commit_guids_and_docs branch=master [skip ci]

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CircleCI Atomic Red Team doc generator
2021-08-04 22:23:53 +00:00
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@@ -875,6 +875,9 @@ command-and-control,T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,2,Netcat C2,bcf0d1c1-3f
command-and-control,T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,3,Powercat C2,3e0e0e7f-6aa2-4a61-b61d-526c2cc9330e,powershell
command-and-control,T1571,Non-Standard Port,1,Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell,21fe622f-8e53-4b31-ba83-6d333c2583f4,powershell
command-and-control,T1571,Non-Standard Port,2,Testing usage of uncommonly used port,5db21e1d-dd9c-4a50-b885-b1e748912767,sh
command-and-control,T1572,Protocol Tunneling,1,DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume,ae9ef4b0-d8c1-49d4-8758-06206f19af0a,powershell
command-and-control,T1572,Protocol Tunneling,2,DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing,0c5f9705-c575-42a6-9609-cbbff4b2fc9b,powershell
command-and-control,T1572,Protocol Tunneling,3,DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query,748a73d5-cea4-4f34-84d8-839da5baa99c,powershell
command-and-control,T1219,Remote Access Software,1,TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows,8ca3b96d-8983-4a7f-b125-fc98cc0a2aa0,powershell
command-and-control,T1219,Remote Access Software,2,AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows,6b8b7391-5c0a-4f8c-baee-78d8ce0ce330,powershell
command-and-control,T1219,Remote Access Software,3,LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows,d03683ec-aae0-42f9-9b4c-534780e0f8e1,powershell
1 Tactic Technique # Technique Name Test # Test Name Test GUID Executor Name
875 command-and-control T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol 3 Powercat C2 3e0e0e7f-6aa2-4a61-b61d-526c2cc9330e powershell
876 command-and-control T1571 Non-Standard Port 1 Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell 21fe622f-8e53-4b31-ba83-6d333c2583f4 powershell
877 command-and-control T1571 Non-Standard Port 2 Testing usage of uncommonly used port 5db21e1d-dd9c-4a50-b885-b1e748912767 sh
878 command-and-control T1572 Protocol Tunneling 1 DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume ae9ef4b0-d8c1-49d4-8758-06206f19af0a powershell
879 command-and-control T1572 Protocol Tunneling 2 DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing 0c5f9705-c575-42a6-9609-cbbff4b2fc9b powershell
880 command-and-control T1572 Protocol Tunneling 3 DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query 748a73d5-cea4-4f34-84d8-839da5baa99c powershell
881 command-and-control T1219 Remote Access Software 1 TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows 8ca3b96d-8983-4a7f-b125-fc98cc0a2aa0 powershell
882 command-and-control T1219 Remote Access Software 2 AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows 6b8b7391-5c0a-4f8c-baee-78d8ce0ce330 powershell
883 command-and-control T1219 Remote Access Software 3 LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows d03683ec-aae0-42f9-9b4c-534780e0f8e1 powershell
@@ -537,6 +537,9 @@ command-and-control,T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,1,ICMP C2,0268e63c-e244
command-and-control,T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,2,Netcat C2,bcf0d1c1-3f6a-4847-b1c9-7ed4ea321f37,powershell
command-and-control,T1095,Non-Application Layer Protocol,3,Powercat C2,3e0e0e7f-6aa2-4a61-b61d-526c2cc9330e,powershell
command-and-control,T1571,Non-Standard Port,1,Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell,21fe622f-8e53-4b31-ba83-6d333c2583f4,powershell
command-and-control,T1572,Protocol Tunneling,1,DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume,ae9ef4b0-d8c1-49d4-8758-06206f19af0a,powershell
command-and-control,T1572,Protocol Tunneling,2,DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing,0c5f9705-c575-42a6-9609-cbbff4b2fc9b,powershell
command-and-control,T1572,Protocol Tunneling,3,DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query,748a73d5-cea4-4f34-84d8-839da5baa99c,powershell
command-and-control,T1219,Remote Access Software,1,TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows,8ca3b96d-8983-4a7f-b125-fc98cc0a2aa0,powershell
command-and-control,T1219,Remote Access Software,2,AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows,6b8b7391-5c0a-4f8c-baee-78d8ce0ce330,powershell
command-and-control,T1219,Remote Access Software,3,LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows,d03683ec-aae0-42f9-9b4c-534780e0f8e1,powershell
1 Tactic Technique # Technique Name Test # Test Name Test GUID Executor Name
537 command-and-control T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol 2 Netcat C2 bcf0d1c1-3f6a-4847-b1c9-7ed4ea321f37 powershell
538 command-and-control T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol 3 Powercat C2 3e0e0e7f-6aa2-4a61-b61d-526c2cc9330e powershell
539 command-and-control T1571 Non-Standard Port 1 Testing usage of uncommonly used port with PowerShell 21fe622f-8e53-4b31-ba83-6d333c2583f4 powershell
540 command-and-control T1572 Protocol Tunneling 1 DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume ae9ef4b0-d8c1-49d4-8758-06206f19af0a powershell
541 command-and-control T1572 Protocol Tunneling 2 DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing 0c5f9705-c575-42a6-9609-cbbff4b2fc9b powershell
542 command-and-control T1572 Protocol Tunneling 3 DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query 748a73d5-cea4-4f34-84d8-839da5baa99c powershell
543 command-and-control T1219 Remote Access Software 1 TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows 8ca3b96d-8983-4a7f-b125-fc98cc0a2aa0 powershell
544 command-and-control T1219 Remote Access Software 2 AnyDesk Files Detected Test on Windows 6b8b7391-5c0a-4f8c-baee-78d8ce0ce330 powershell
545 command-and-control T1219 Remote Access Software 3 LogMeIn Files Detected Test on Windows d03683ec-aae0-42f9-9b4c-534780e0f8e1 powershell
+4 -1
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@@ -1586,7 +1586,10 @@
- T1102.003 One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- T1205.001 Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- T1001.003 Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- [T1572 Protocol Tunneling](../../T1572/T1572.md)
- Atomic Test #1: DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume [windows]
- Atomic Test #2: DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing [windows]
- Atomic Test #3: DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query [windows]
- T1090 Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- [T1219 Remote Access Software](../../T1219/T1219.md)
- Atomic Test #1: TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows [windows]
@@ -981,7 +981,10 @@
- T1102.003 One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- T1205.001 Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- T1001.003 Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- T1572 Protocol Tunneling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- [T1572 Protocol Tunneling](../../T1572/T1572.md)
- Atomic Test #1: DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume [windows]
- Atomic Test #2: DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing [windows]
- Atomic Test #3: DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query [windows]
- T1090 Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing)
- [T1219 Remote Access Software](../../T1219/T1219.md)
- Atomic Test #1: TeamViewer Files Detected Test on Windows [windows]
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
| | Shared Modules [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [DLL Search Order Hijacking](../../T1574.001/T1574.001.md) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](../../T1140/T1140.md) | [LSASS Memory](../../T1003.001/T1003.001.md) | [System Checks](../../T1497.001/T1497.001.md) | | Remote Data Staging [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | [Software Deployment Tools](../../T1072/T1072.md) | [DLL Side-Loading](../../T1574.002/T1574.002.md) | [Dynamic Linker Hijacking](../../T1574.006/T1574.006.md) | [Deploy Container](../../T1610/T1610.md) | Man-in-the-Middle [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Information Discovery](../../T1082/T1082.md) | | Remote Email Collection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | Source [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Default Accounts](../../T1078.001/T1078.001.md) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | [Direct Volume Access](../../T1006/T1006.md) | Modify Authentication Process [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | System Location Discovery [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | SNMP (MIB Dump) [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | System Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Domain Account](../../T1136.002/T1136.002.md) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Disable Cloud Logs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [NTDS](../../T1003.003/T1003.003.md) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) | | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) | | Protocol Tunneling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | System Services [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Domain Account](../../T1136.002/T1136.002.md) | Elevated Execution with Prompt [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Disable Cloud Logs [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [NTDS](../../T1003.003/T1003.003.md) | [System Network Configuration Discovery](../../T1016/T1016.md) | | [Screen Capture](../../T1113/T1113.md) | | [Protocol Tunneling](../../T1572/T1572.md) | |
| | [Systemd Timers](../../T1053.006/T1053.006.md) | Domain Accounts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Emond](../../T1546.014/T1546.014.md) | Disable Crypto Hardware [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Network Device Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [System Network Connections Discovery](../../T1049/T1049.md) | | Sharepoint [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | [Unix Shell](../../T1059.004/T1059.004.md) | Domain Controller Authentication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Escape to Host](../../T1611/T1611.md) | [Disable Windows Event Logging](../../T1562.002/T1562.002.md) | [Network Sniffing](../../T1040/T1040.md) | [System Owner/User Discovery](../../T1033/T1033.md) | | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Remote Access Software](../../T1219/T1219.md) | |
| | User Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Dylib Hijacking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Event Triggered Execution [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [OS Credential Dumping](../../T1003/T1003.md) | [System Service Discovery](../../T1007/T1007.md) | | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) | |
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@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
| | | Exchange Email Delegate Permissions [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [OS Credential Dumping](../../T1003/T1003.md) | [System Service Discovery](../../T1007/T1007.md) | | Video Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | One-Way Communication [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Extra Window Memory Injection [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Domain Trust Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Password Cracking](../../T1110.002/T1110.002.md) | [System Time Discovery](../../T1124/T1124.md) | | Web Portal Capture [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | Port Knocking [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | | [External Remote Services](../../T1133/T1133.md) | Group Policy Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Dynamic-link Library Injection](../../T1055.001/T1055.001.md) | [Password Filter DLL](../../T1556.002/T1556.002.md) | Time Based Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | Protocol Impersonation [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Password Guessing](../../T1110.001/T1110.001.md) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | Protocol Tunneling [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Hijack Execution Flow [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Environmental Keying [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Password Guessing](../../T1110.001/T1110.001.md) | User Activity Based Checks [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | [Protocol Tunneling](../../T1572/T1572.md) | |
| | | Hypervisor [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Password Managers [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | | | | Proxy [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | |
| | | [Image File Execution Options Injection](../../T1546.012/T1546.012.md) | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | Execution Guardrails [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Password Spraying](../../T1110.003/T1110.003.md) | | | | | [Remote Access Software](../../T1219/T1219.md) | |
| | | LSASS Driver [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Local Accounts](../../T1078.003/T1078.003.md) | Exploitation for Defense Evasion [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://atomicredteam.io/contributing) | [Private Keys](../../T1552.004/T1552.004.md) | | | | | [Standard Encoding](../../T1132.001/T1132.001.md) | |
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@@ -66285,7 +66285,118 @@ command-and-control:
- Linux
- macOS
- Windows
atomic_tests: []
identifier: T1572
atomic_tests:
- name: DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume
auto_generated_guid: ae9ef4b0-d8c1-49d4-8758-06206f19af0a
description: |
This test simulates an infected host sending a large volume of DoH queries to a command and control server.
The intent of this test is to trigger threshold based detection on the number of DoH queries either from a single source system or to a single targe domain.
A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
supported_platforms:
- windows
input_arguments:
doh_server:
description: Default DoH resolver
type: string
default: https://8.8.8.8/resolve
query_type:
description: DNS query type
type: string
default: TXT
subdomain:
description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name
type: string
default: atomicredteam
query_volume:
description: Number of DNS queries to send
type: integer
default: '1000'
domain:
description: Default domain to simulate against
type: string
default: 127.0.0.1.xip.io
executor:
command: 'for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { (Invoke-WebRequest "#{doh_server}?name=#{subdomain}.$(Get-Random
-Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}&type=#{query_type}" -UseBasicParsing).Content
}
'
name: powershell
- name: DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing
auto_generated_guid: 0c5f9705-c575-42a6-9609-cbbff4b2fc9b
description: |
This test simulates an infected host beaconing via DoH queries to a command and control server at regular intervals over time.
This behaviour is typical of implants either in an idle state waiting for instructions or configured to use a low query volume over time to evade threshold based detection.
A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
supported_platforms:
- windows
input_arguments:
doh_server:
description: Default DoH resolver
type: string
default: https://8.8.8.8/resolve
runtime:
description: Time in minutes to run the simulation
type: integer
default: '30'
domain:
description: Default domain to simulate against
type: string
default: 127.0.0.1.xip.io
subdomain:
description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name
type: string
default: atomicredteam
query_type:
description: DNS query type
type: string
default: TXT
c2_interval:
description: Seconds between C2 requests to the command and control server
type: integer
default: '30'
c2_jitter:
description: Percentage of jitter to add to the C2 interval to create variance
in the times between C2 requests
type: integer
default: '20'
executor:
command: |
Set-Location PathToAtomicsFolder
.\T1572\src\T1572-doh-beacon.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} -RunTime #{runtime}
name: powershell
- name: DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query
auto_generated_guid: 748a73d5-cea4-4f34-84d8-839da5baa99c
description: |
This test simulates an infected host returning data to a command and control server using long domain names.
The simulation involves sending DoH queries that gradually increase in length until reaching the maximum length. The intent is to test the effectiveness of detection of DoH queries for long domain names over a set threshold.
Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
supported_platforms:
- windows
input_arguments:
doh_server:
description: Default DoH resolver
type: string
default: https://8.8.8.8/resolve
query_type:
description: DNS query type
type: string
default: TXT
subdomain:
description: Subdomain prepended to the domain name (should be 63 characters
to test maximum length)
type: string
default: atomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredte
domain:
description: Default domain to simulate against
type: string
default: 127.0.0.1.xip.io
executor:
command: |
Set-Location PathToAtomicsFolder
.\T1572\src\T1572-doh-domain-length.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type}
name: powershell
T1090:
technique:
created: '2017-05-31T21:31:08.479Z'
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@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
# T1572 - Protocol Tunneling
## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572)
<blockquote>Adversaries may tunnel network communications to and from a victim system within a separate protocol to avoid detection/network filtering and/or enable access to otherwise unreachable systems. Tunneling involves explicitly encapsulating a protocol within another. This behavior may conceal malicious traffic by blending in with existing traffic and/or provide an outer layer of encryption (similar to a VPN). Tunneling could also enable routing of network packets that would otherwise not reach their intended destination, such as SMB, RDP, or other traffic that would be filtered by network appliances or not routed over the Internet.
There are various means to encapsulate a protocol within another protocol. For example, adversaries may perform SSH tunneling (also known as SSH port forwarding), which involves forwarding arbitrary data over an encrypted SSH tunnel.(Citation: SSH Tunneling)
[Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) may also be abused by adversaries during [Dynamic Resolution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1568). Known as DNS over HTTPS (DoH), queries to resolve C2 infrastructure may be encapsulated within encrypted HTTPS packets.(Citation: BleepingComp Godlua JUL19)
Adversaries may also leverage [Protocol Tunneling](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1572) in conjunction with [Proxy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1090) and/or [Protocol Impersonation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1001/003) to further conceal C2 communications and infrastructure. </blockquote>
## Atomic Tests
- [Atomic Test #1 - DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume](#atomic-test-1---dns-over-https-large-query-volume)
- [Atomic Test #2 - DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing](#atomic-test-2---dns-over-https-regular-beaconing)
- [Atomic Test #3 - DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query](#atomic-test-3---dns-over-https-long-domain-query)
<br/>
## Atomic Test #1 - DNS over HTTPS Large Query Volume
This test simulates an infected host sending a large volume of DoH queries to a command and control server.
The intent of this test is to trigger threshold based detection on the number of DoH queries either from a single source system or to a single targe domain.
A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
**Supported Platforms:** Windows
**auto_generated_guid:** ae9ef4b0-d8c1-49d4-8758-06206f19af0a
#### Inputs:
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|------|-------------|------|---------------|
| doh_server | Default DoH resolver | string | https://8.8.8.8/resolve|
| query_type | DNS query type | string | TXT|
| subdomain | Subdomain prepended to the domain name | string | atomicredteam|
| query_volume | Number of DNS queries to send | integer | 1000|
| domain | Default domain to simulate against | string | 127.0.0.1.xip.io|
#### Attack Commands: Run with `powershell`!
```powershell
for($i=0; $i -le #{query_volume}; $i++) { (Invoke-WebRequest "#{doh_server}?name=#{subdomain}.$(Get-Random -Minimum 1 -Maximum 999999).#{domain}&type=#{query_type}" -UseBasicParsing).Content }
```
<br/>
<br/>
## Atomic Test #2 - DNS over HTTPS Regular Beaconing
This test simulates an infected host beaconing via DoH queries to a command and control server at regular intervals over time.
This behaviour is typical of implants either in an idle state waiting for instructions or configured to use a low query volume over time to evade threshold based detection.
A custom domain and sub-domain will need to be passed as input parameters for this test to work. Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
**Supported Platforms:** Windows
**auto_generated_guid:** 0c5f9705-c575-42a6-9609-cbbff4b2fc9b
#### Inputs:
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|------|-------------|------|---------------|
| doh_server | Default DoH resolver | string | https://8.8.8.8/resolve|
| runtime | Time in minutes to run the simulation | integer | 30|
| domain | Default domain to simulate against | string | 127.0.0.1.xip.io|
| subdomain | Subdomain prepended to the domain name | string | atomicredteam|
| query_type | DNS query type | string | TXT|
| c2_interval | Seconds between C2 requests to the command and control server | integer | 30|
| c2_jitter | Percentage of jitter to add to the C2 interval to create variance in the times between C2 requests | integer | 20|
#### Attack Commands: Run with `powershell`!
```powershell
Set-Location PathToAtomicsFolder
.\T1572\src\T1572-doh-beacon.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type} -C2Interval #{c2_interval} -C2Jitter #{c2_jitter} -RunTime #{runtime}
```
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## Atomic Test #3 - DNS over HTTPS Long Domain Query
This test simulates an infected host returning data to a command and control server using long domain names.
The simulation involves sending DoH queries that gradually increase in length until reaching the maximum length. The intent is to test the effectiveness of detection of DoH queries for long domain names over a set threshold.
Upon execution, DNS information about the domain will be displayed for each callout in a JSON format.
**Supported Platforms:** Windows
**auto_generated_guid:** 748a73d5-cea4-4f34-84d8-839da5baa99c
#### Inputs:
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|------|-------------|------|---------------|
| doh_server | Default DoH resolver | string | https://8.8.8.8/resolve|
| query_type | DNS query type | string | TXT|
| subdomain | Subdomain prepended to the domain name (should be 63 characters to test maximum length) | string | atomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredteamatomicredte|
| domain | Default domain to simulate against | string | 127.0.0.1.xip.io|
#### Attack Commands: Run with `powershell`!
```powershell
Set-Location PathToAtomicsFolder
.\T1572\src\T1572-doh-domain-length.ps1 -DohServer #{doh_server} -Domain #{domain} -Subdomain #{subdomain} -QueryType #{query_type}
```
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