Files
cti/mobile-attack/x-mitre-analytic/x-mitre-analytic--93a35555-f71e-4230-9f2a-529a539e8612.json
2026-04-27 15:19:48 -04:00

81 lines
4.7 KiB
JSON

{
"type": "bundle",
"id": "bundle--2f3a014f-d50b-4e76-ab2a-138027b23ebb",
"spec_version": "2.0",
"objects": [
{
"type": "x-mitre-analytic",
"id": "x-mitre-analytic--93a35555-f71e-4230-9f2a-529a539e8612",
"created": "2025-10-21T15:10:28.402Z",
"created_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"revoked": false,
"external_references": [
{
"source_name": "mitre-attack",
"url": "https://attack.mitre.org/detectionstrategies/DET0646#AN1726",
"external_id": "AN1726"
}
],
"object_marking_refs": [
"marking-definition--fa42a846-8d90-4e51-bc29-71d5b4802168"
],
"modified": "2026-04-08T16:26:13.027Z",
"name": "Analytic 1726",
"description": "The defender correlates supervised-device application posture and background execution context with network-side evidence that an app rejects enterprise inspection or performs certificate/public-key-bound trust behavior during TLS establishment. Because direct app-level pin-validation observability is weaker on iOS, the analytic is anchored primarily to network control-plane effects: repeated TLS handshake rejection under enterprise inspection, destination-specific inspection bypass patterns, or persistent opaque app-to-endpoint encrypted sessions inconsistent with baseline app behavior. Additional confidence comes from managed app identity, background execution context, and supervised device policy state.",
"x_mitre_modified_by_ref": "identity--c78cb6e5-0c4b-4611-8297-d1b8b55e40b5",
"x_mitre_deprecated": false,
"x_mitre_version": "1.1",
"x_mitre_attack_spec_version": "3.3.0",
"x_mitre_domains": [
"mobile-attack"
],
"x_mitre_platforms": [
"iOS"
],
"x_mitre_log_source_references": [
{
"x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--b1e0bb80-23d4-44f2-b919-7e9c54898f43",
"name": "iOS:MDMLog",
"channel": "Supervised managed app with undeclared secure transport behavior or unexpected network role communicates with non-baselined destination over opaque TLS"
},
{
"x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--55c669d9-b42a-4cf6-a38a-07161b228ce9",
"name": "MobileEDR:telemetry",
"channel": "Managed app initiates or resumes network-capable execution while app_state=background or device_locked=true before opaque TLS session attempt"
},
{
"x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--3772e279-27d6-477a-9fe3-c6beb363594c",
"name": "NSM:Flow",
"channel": "App-destination pair shows consistent inspection bypass/refusal pattern followed by direct encrypted communication or repeated short-lived TLS sessions to same endpoint within correlation window"
},
{
"x_mitre_data_component_ref": "x-mitre-data-component--3772e279-27d6-477a-9fe3-c6beb363594c",
"name": "NSM:Inspection",
"channel": "TLS handshake from iOS app repeatedly fails or is rejected only when enterprise SSL inspection certificate is presented, indicating certificate or public-key pin validation effect"
}
],
"x_mitre_mutable_elements": [
{
"field": "TimeWindow",
"description": "Correlation window between app lifecycle event and network-side inspection failure or opaque TLS session"
},
{
"field": "AllowedAppList",
"description": "Managed apps expected to use certificate or public-key pinning for legitimate purposes"
},
{
"field": "AllowedDestinationList",
"description": "Approved endpoints expected for legitimate pinned sessions"
},
{
"field": "ForegroundStateRequired",
"description": "Whether the app is expected to perform network establishment only during user-driven workflows"
},
{
"field": "InspectionFailureThreshold",
"description": "Number of repeated TLS-inspection failures needed before escalating confidence"
}
]
}
]
}