Generated docs from job=generate-docs branch=master [ci skip]

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Atomic Red Team doc generator
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# Atomic Red Team
![GitHub Action Status](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/actions/workflows/validate-atomics.yml/badge.svg?branch=master) ![Atomics](https://img.shields.io/badge/Atomics-1735-flat.svg) ![GitHub Action Status](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/actions/workflows/generate-docs.yml/badge.svg?branch=master)
![GitHub Action Status](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/actions/workflows/validate-atomics.yml/badge.svg?branch=master) ![Atomics](https://img.shields.io/badge/Atomics-1736-flat.svg) ![GitHub Action Status](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/actions/workflows/generate-docs.yml/badge.svg?branch=master)
Atomic Red Team™ is a library of tests mapped to the
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@@ -79,8 +79,9 @@ defense-evasion,T1548.003,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Cachi
defense-evasion,T1542.001,Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware,1,UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation,b8a49f03-e3c4-40f2-b7bb-9e8f8fdddbf1,powershell
defense-evasion,T1574.011,Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness,1,Service Registry Permissions Weakness,f7536d63-7fd4-466f-89da-7e48d550752a,powershell
defense-evasion,T1574.011,Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness,2,Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe,f38e9eea-e1d7-4ba6-b716-584791963827,command_prompt
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,1,Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory.,812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24,sh
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,1,Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory,812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24,sh
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,2,Masquerade as a built-in system executable,35eb8d16-9820-4423-a2a1-90c4f5edd9ca,powershell
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,3,Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe,03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8,powershell
defense-evasion,T1564,Hide Artifacts,1,Extract binary files via VBA,6afe288a-8a8b-4d33-a629-8d03ba9dad3a,powershell
defense-evasion,T1564,Hide Artifacts,2,"Create a Hidden User Called ""$""",2ec63cc2-4975-41a6-bf09-dffdfb610778,command_prompt
defense-evasion,T1564,Hide Artifacts,3,"Create an ""Administrator "" user (with a space on the end)",5bb20389-39a5-4e99-9264-aeb92a55a85c,powershell
1 Tactic Technique # Technique Name Test # Test Name Test GUID Executor Name
79 defense-evasion T1542.001 Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware 1 UEFI Persistence via Wpbbin.exe File Creation b8a49f03-e3c4-40f2-b7bb-9e8f8fdddbf1 powershell
80 defense-evasion T1574.011 Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness 1 Service Registry Permissions Weakness f7536d63-7fd4-466f-89da-7e48d550752a powershell
81 defense-evasion T1574.011 Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness 2 Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe f38e9eea-e1d7-4ba6-b716-584791963827 command_prompt
82 defense-evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location 1 Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory. Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory 812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24 sh
83 defense-evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location 2 Masquerade as a built-in system executable 35eb8d16-9820-4423-a2a1-90c4f5edd9ca powershell
84 defense-evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location 3 Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe 03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8 powershell
85 defense-evasion T1564 Hide Artifacts 1 Extract binary files via VBA 6afe288a-8a8b-4d33-a629-8d03ba9dad3a powershell
86 defense-evasion T1564 Hide Artifacts 2 Create a Hidden User Called "$" 2ec63cc2-4975-41a6-bf09-dffdfb610778 command_prompt
87 defense-evasion T1564 Hide Artifacts 3 Create an "Administrator " user (with a space on the end) 5bb20389-39a5-4e99-9264-aeb92a55a85c powershell
+1 -1
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@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ defense-evasion,T1548.003,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Cachi
defense-evasion,T1548.003,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching,4,Unlimited sudo cache timeout (freebsd),a83ad6e8-6f24-4d7f-8f44-75f8ab742991,sh
defense-evasion,T1548.003,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching,5,Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching,91a60b03-fb75-4d24-a42e-2eb8956e8de1,sh
defense-evasion,T1548.003,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching,6,Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching (freebsd),4df6a0fe-2bdd-4be8-8618-a6a19654a57a,sh
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,1,Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory.,812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24,sh
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,1,Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory,812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24,sh
defense-evasion,T1497.001,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks,1,Detect Virtualization Environment (Linux),dfbd1a21-540d-4574-9731-e852bd6fe840,sh
defense-evasion,T1497.001,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks,2,Detect Virtualization Environment (FreeBSD),e129d73b-3e03-4ae9-bf1e-67fc8921e0fd,sh
defense-evasion,T1070.002,"Indicator Removal on Host: Clear FreeBSD, Linux or Mac System Logs",1,rm -rf,989cc1b1-3642-4260-a809-54f9dd559683,sh
1 Tactic Technique # Technique Name Test # Test Name Test GUID Executor Name
28 defense-evasion T1548.003 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching 4 Unlimited sudo cache timeout (freebsd) a83ad6e8-6f24-4d7f-8f44-75f8ab742991 sh
29 defense-evasion T1548.003 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching 5 Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching 91a60b03-fb75-4d24-a42e-2eb8956e8de1 sh
30 defense-evasion T1548.003 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching 6 Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching (freebsd) 4df6a0fe-2bdd-4be8-8618-a6a19654a57a sh
31 defense-evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location 1 Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory. Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory 812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24 sh
32 defense-evasion T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks 1 Detect Virtualization Environment (Linux) dfbd1a21-540d-4574-9731-e852bd6fe840 sh
33 defense-evasion T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks 2 Detect Virtualization Environment (FreeBSD) e129d73b-3e03-4ae9-bf1e-67fc8921e0fd sh
34 defense-evasion T1070.002 Indicator Removal on Host: Clear FreeBSD, Linux or Mac System Logs 1 rm -rf 989cc1b1-3642-4260-a809-54f9dd559683 sh
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ defense-evasion,T1027.013,Obfuscated Files or Information: Encrypted/Encoded Fil
defense-evasion,T1548.003,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching,1,Sudo usage,150c3a08-ee6e-48a6-aeaf-3659d24ceb4e,sh
defense-evasion,T1548.003,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching,3,Unlimited sudo cache timeout,a7b17659-dd5e-46f7-b7d1-e6792c91d0bc,sh
defense-evasion,T1548.003,Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching,5,Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching,91a60b03-fb75-4d24-a42e-2eb8956e8de1,sh
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,1,Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory.,812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24,sh
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,1,Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory,812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24,sh
defense-evasion,T1497.001,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks,4,Detect Virtualization Environment via ioreg,a960185f-aef6-4547-8350-d1ce16680d09,sh
defense-evasion,T1497.001,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks,6,Detect Virtualization Environment using sysctl (hw.model),6beae646-eb4c-4730-95be-691a4094408c,sh
defense-evasion,T1497.001,Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks,7,Check if System Integrity Protection is enabled,2b73cd9b-b2fb-4357-b9d7-c73c41d9e945,sh
1 Tactic Technique # Technique Name Test # Test Name Test GUID Executor Name
15 defense-evasion T1548.003 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching 1 Sudo usage 150c3a08-ee6e-48a6-aeaf-3659d24ceb4e sh
16 defense-evasion T1548.003 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching 3 Unlimited sudo cache timeout a7b17659-dd5e-46f7-b7d1-e6792c91d0bc sh
17 defense-evasion T1548.003 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Sudo and Sudo Caching 5 Disable tty_tickets for sudo caching 91a60b03-fb75-4d24-a42e-2eb8956e8de1 sh
18 defense-evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location 1 Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory. Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory 812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24 sh
19 defense-evasion T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks 4 Detect Virtualization Environment via ioreg a960185f-aef6-4547-8350-d1ce16680d09 sh
20 defense-evasion T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks 6 Detect Virtualization Environment using sysctl (hw.model) 6beae646-eb4c-4730-95be-691a4094408c sh
21 defense-evasion T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks 7 Check if System Integrity Protection is enabled 2b73cd9b-b2fb-4357-b9d7-c73c41d9e945 sh
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ defense-evasion,T1542.001,Pre-OS Boot: System Firmware,1,UEFI Persistence via Wp
defense-evasion,T1574.011,Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness,1,Service Registry Permissions Weakness,f7536d63-7fd4-466f-89da-7e48d550752a,powershell
defense-evasion,T1574.011,Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness,2,Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe,f38e9eea-e1d7-4ba6-b716-584791963827,command_prompt
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,2,Masquerade as a built-in system executable,35eb8d16-9820-4423-a2a1-90c4f5edd9ca,powershell
defense-evasion,T1036.005,Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location,3,Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe,03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8,powershell
defense-evasion,T1564,Hide Artifacts,1,Extract binary files via VBA,6afe288a-8a8b-4d33-a629-8d03ba9dad3a,powershell
defense-evasion,T1564,Hide Artifacts,2,"Create a Hidden User Called ""$""",2ec63cc2-4975-41a6-bf09-dffdfb610778,command_prompt
defense-evasion,T1564,Hide Artifacts,3,"Create an ""Administrator "" user (with a space on the end)",5bb20389-39a5-4e99-9264-aeb92a55a85c,powershell
1 Tactic Technique # Technique Name Test # Test Name Test GUID Executor Name
52 defense-evasion T1574.011 Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness 1 Service Registry Permissions Weakness f7536d63-7fd4-466f-89da-7e48d550752a powershell
53 defense-evasion T1574.011 Hijack Execution Flow: Services Registry Permissions Weakness 2 Service ImagePath Change with reg.exe f38e9eea-e1d7-4ba6-b716-584791963827 command_prompt
54 defense-evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location 2 Masquerade as a built-in system executable 35eb8d16-9820-4423-a2a1-90c4f5edd9ca powershell
55 defense-evasion T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location 3 Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe 03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8 powershell
56 defense-evasion T1564 Hide Artifacts 1 Extract binary files via VBA 6afe288a-8a8b-4d33-a629-8d03ba9dad3a powershell
57 defense-evasion T1564 Hide Artifacts 2 Create a Hidden User Called "$" 2ec63cc2-4975-41a6-bf09-dffdfb610778 command_prompt
58 defense-evasion T1564 Hide Artifacts 3 Create an "Administrator " user (with a space on the end) 5bb20389-39a5-4e99-9264-aeb92a55a85c powershell
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@@ -105,8 +105,9 @@
- T1542.003 Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- T1218.013 Mavinject [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- [T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md)
- Atomic Test #1: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory. [macos, linux]
- Atomic Test #1: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory [macos, linux]
- Atomic Test #2: Masquerade as a built-in system executable [windows]
- Atomic Test #3: Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe [windows]
- T1600 Weaken Encryption [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- T1036.008 Masquerade File Type [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- [T1564 Hide Artifacts](../../T1564/T1564.md)
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
- T1542.003 Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- T1218.013 Mavinject [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- [T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md)
- Atomic Test #1: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory. [macos, linux]
- Atomic Test #1: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory [macos, linux]
- T1036.008 Masquerade File Type [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- T1564 Hide Artifacts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- T1484.002 Domain Trust Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
- T1542.003 Bootkit [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- T1218.013 Mavinject [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- [T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md)
- Atomic Test #1: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory. [macos, linux]
- Atomic Test #1: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory [macos, linux]
- T1036.008 Masquerade File Type [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- T1564 Hide Artifacts [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- T1484.002 Domain Trust Modification [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
- T1218.013 Mavinject [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- [T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location](../../T1036.005/T1036.005.md)
- Atomic Test #2: Masquerade as a built-in system executable [windows]
- Atomic Test #3: Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe [windows]
- T1036.008 Masquerade File Type [CONTRIBUTE A TEST](https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/wiki/Contributing)
- [T1564 Hide Artifacts](../../T1564/T1564.md)
- Atomic Test #1: Extract binary files via VBA [windows]
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@@ -3963,7 +3963,7 @@ defense-evasion:
identifier: T1036.005
atomic_tests:
- name: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent
directory.
directory
auto_generated_guid: 812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24
description: 'Create and execute a process from a directory masquerading as
the current parent directory (`...` instead of normal `..`)
@@ -4017,6 +4017,69 @@ defense-evasion:
'
name: powershell
- name: Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe
auto_generated_guid: 03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8
description: |
This test simulates an adversary renaming cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe to masquerade as a legitimate application.
The test copies cmd.exe, renames it to VEDetector.exe, adds a registry run key for persistence, and executes the renamed binary.
This technique may be used to evade detection by mimicking legitimate software names or locations.
**Expected Output:**
- A new process named VEDetector.exe appears in the process list, but its behavior matches cmd.exe.
- SIEM/EDR systems may detect this as suspicious process activity (e.g., Sysmon Event ID 1 for process creation, or Event ID 13 for registry modifications).
- Registry modification in HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run may trigger persistence alerts in XDR platforms.
**References:**
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1036.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/)
- [Sysmon Process Creation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon)
supported_platforms:
- windows
input_arguments:
ved_path:
description: Directory path where VEDetector.exe will be created
type: Path
default: "$env:TEMP"
source_file:
description: Path to the source cmd.exe file
type: Path
default: "$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\cmd.exe"
dependency_executor_name: powershell
dependencies:
- description: 'The source cmd.exe file must exist on the system.
'
prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{source_file}") { exit 0 } else { exit 1
}
'
get_prereq_command: |
Write-Host "[-] Source file not found: #{source_file}. Ensure cmd.exe exists in the specified path."
exit 1
executor:
name: powershell
elevation_required: true
command: |
# Copy and rename cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe
Copy-Item -Path "#{source_file}" -Destination "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -Force
# Create registry run key for persistence
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "VEDetector" -Value "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -PropertyType String -Force
# Start the renamed process
Start-Process -FilePath "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"
Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
cleanup_command: |
# Remove registry key
Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "VEDetector" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Stop the process
Stop-Process -Name "VEDetector" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Remove the file
Remove-Item -Path "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Host "[+] Cleaned up VEDetector artifacts"
T1600:
technique:
type: attack-pattern
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@@ -2629,7 +2629,7 @@ defense-evasion:
identifier: T1036.005
atomic_tests:
- name: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent
directory.
directory
auto_generated_guid: 812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24
description: 'Create and execute a process from a directory masquerading as
the current parent directory (`...` instead of normal `..`)
+1 -1
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@@ -2177,7 +2177,7 @@ defense-evasion:
identifier: T1036.005
atomic_tests:
- name: Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent
directory.
directory
auto_generated_guid: 812c3ab8-94b0-4698-a9bf-9420af23ce24
description: 'Create and execute a process from a directory masquerading as
the current parent directory (`...` instead of normal `..`)
+63
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@@ -3173,6 +3173,69 @@ defense-evasion:
'
name: powershell
- name: Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe
auto_generated_guid: 03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8
description: |
This test simulates an adversary renaming cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe to masquerade as a legitimate application.
The test copies cmd.exe, renames it to VEDetector.exe, adds a registry run key for persistence, and executes the renamed binary.
This technique may be used to evade detection by mimicking legitimate software names or locations.
**Expected Output:**
- A new process named VEDetector.exe appears in the process list, but its behavior matches cmd.exe.
- SIEM/EDR systems may detect this as suspicious process activity (e.g., Sysmon Event ID 1 for process creation, or Event ID 13 for registry modifications).
- Registry modification in HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run may trigger persistence alerts in XDR platforms.
**References:**
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1036.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/)
- [Sysmon Process Creation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon)
supported_platforms:
- windows
input_arguments:
ved_path:
description: Directory path where VEDetector.exe will be created
type: Path
default: "$env:TEMP"
source_file:
description: Path to the source cmd.exe file
type: Path
default: "$env:SystemRoot\\System32\\cmd.exe"
dependency_executor_name: powershell
dependencies:
- description: 'The source cmd.exe file must exist on the system.
'
prereq_command: 'if (Test-Path "#{source_file}") { exit 0 } else { exit 1
}
'
get_prereq_command: |
Write-Host "[-] Source file not found: #{source_file}. Ensure cmd.exe exists in the specified path."
exit 1
executor:
name: powershell
elevation_required: true
command: |
# Copy and rename cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe
Copy-Item -Path "#{source_file}" -Destination "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -Force
# Create registry run key for persistence
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "VEDetector" -Value "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -PropertyType String -Force
# Start the renamed process
Start-Process -FilePath "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"
Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
cleanup_command: |
# Remove registry key
Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "VEDetector" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Stop the process
Stop-Process -Name "VEDetector" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Remove the file
Remove-Item -Path "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Host "[+] Cleaned up VEDetector artifacts"
T1600:
technique:
type: attack-pattern
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@@ -10,14 +10,16 @@ This may be done by placing an executable in a commonly trusted directory (ex: u
## Atomic Tests
- [Atomic Test #1 - Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory.](#atomic-test-1---execute-a-process-from-a-directory-masquerading-as-the-current-parent-directory)
- [Atomic Test #1 - Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory](#atomic-test-1---execute-a-process-from-a-directory-masquerading-as-the-current-parent-directory)
- [Atomic Test #2 - Masquerade as a built-in system executable](#atomic-test-2---masquerade-as-a-built-in-system-executable)
- [Atomic Test #3 - Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe](#atomic-test-3---masquerading-cmdexe-as-vedetectorexe)
<br/>
## Atomic Test #1 - Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory.
## Atomic Test #1 - Execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory
Create and execute a process from a directory masquerading as the current parent directory (`...` instead of normal `..`)
**Supported Platforms:** macOS, Linux
@@ -99,4 +101,84 @@ Remove-Item -Path "#{executable_filepath}" -ErrorAction Ignore
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## Atomic Test #3 - Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe
This test simulates an adversary renaming cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe to masquerade as a legitimate application.
The test copies cmd.exe, renames it to VEDetector.exe, adds a registry run key for persistence, and executes the renamed binary.
This technique may be used to evade detection by mimicking legitimate software names or locations.
**Expected Output:**
- A new process named VEDetector.exe appears in the process list, but its behavior matches cmd.exe.
- SIEM/EDR systems may detect this as suspicious process activity (e.g., Sysmon Event ID 1 for process creation, or Event ID 13 for registry modifications).
- Registry modification in HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run may trigger persistence alerts in XDR platforms.
**References:**
- [MITRE ATT&CK T1036.005](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1036/005/)
- [Sysmon Process Creation](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/downloads/sysmon)
**Supported Platforms:** Windows
**auto_generated_guid:** 03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8
#### Inputs:
| Name | Description | Type | Default Value |
|------|-------------|------|---------------|
| ved_path | Directory path where VEDetector.exe will be created | Path | $env:TEMP|
| source_file | Path to the source cmd.exe file | Path | $env:SystemRoot&#92;System32&#92;cmd.exe|
#### Attack Commands: Run with `powershell`! Elevation Required (e.g. root or admin)
```powershell
# Copy and rename cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe
Copy-Item -Path "#{source_file}" -Destination "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -Force
# Create registry run key for persistence
New-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "VEDetector" -Value "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -PropertyType String -Force
# Start the renamed process
Start-Process -FilePath "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe"
Start-Sleep -Seconds 5
```
#### Cleanup Commands:
```powershell
# Remove registry key
Remove-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -Name "VEDetector" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Stop the process
Stop-Process -Name "VEDetector" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
# Remove the file
Remove-Item -Path "#{ved_path}\VEDetector.exe" -Force -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
Write-Host "[+] Cleaned up VEDetector artifacts"
```
#### Dependencies: Run with `powershell`!
##### Description: The source cmd.exe file must exist on the system.
##### Check Prereq Commands:
```powershell
if (Test-Path "#{source_file}") { exit 0 } else { exit 1 }
```
##### Get Prereq Commands:
```powershell
Write-Host "[-] Source file not found: #{source_file}. Ensure cmd.exe exists in the specified path."
exit 1
```
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@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ atomic_tests:
name: powershell
- name: Masquerading cmd.exe as VEDetector.exe
auto_generated_guid: 03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8
description: |
This test simulates an adversary renaming cmd.exe to VEDetector.exe to masquerade as a legitimate application.
The test copies cmd.exe, renames it to VEDetector.exe, adds a registry run key for persistence, and executes the renamed binary.
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@@ -1759,3 +1759,4 @@ e6fbc036-91e7-4ad3-b9cb-f7210f40dd5d
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05e8942e-f04f-460a-b560-f7781257feec
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03ae82a6-9fa0-465b-91df-124d8ca5c4e8