Jonhnathan
96 lines
3.2 KiB
TOML
96 lines
3.2 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/10/19"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2024/03/08"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = "Identifies command shell activity started via RunDLL32, which is commonly abused by attackers to host malicious code."
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false_positives = ["Microsoft Windows installers leveraging RunDLL32 for installation."]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Command Shell Activity Started via RunDLL32"
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risk_score = 21
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rule_id = "9ccf3ce0-0057-440a-91f5-870c6ad39093"
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setup = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2,
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events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until version 8.2.
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Hence for this rule to work effectively, users will need to add a custom ingest pipeline to populate
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`event.ingested` to @timestamp.
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For more details on adding a custom ingest pipeline refer - https://www.elastic.co/guide/en/fleet/current/data-streams-pipeline-tutorial.html
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"""
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severity = "low"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Execution", "Tactic: Credential Access", "Tactic: Defense Evasion", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend", "Data Source: Sysmon"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
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process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe") and
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process.parent.name : "rundll32.exe" and process.parent.command_line != null and
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/* common FPs can be added here */
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not process.parent.args : ("C:\\Windows\\System32\\SHELL32.dll,RunAsNewUser_RunDLL",
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"C:\\WINDOWS\\*.tmp,zzzzInvokeManagedCustomActionOutOfProc")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.001"
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name = "PowerShell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.003"
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name = "Windows Command Shell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1552"
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name = "Unsecured Credentials"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0006"
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name = "Credential Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1218"
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name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1218.011"
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name = "Rundll32"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/011/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0005"
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name = "Defense Evasion"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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