Jonhnathan
4190317ec2
* [Security Content] Adjust Mitre Att&ck Mappings - Windows Rules
* Fix dates
* Fix unit test errors
* updated tags and fixed branch conflicts
updated tags and fixed branch conflicts
* description nit
* Reverting unintended changes
* Update initial_access_suspicious_ms_office_child_process.toml
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Co-authored-by: imays11 <59296946+imays11@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit f584fb6e31)
78 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
78 lines
2.7 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/12/15"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/10/13"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies the use of the Exchange PowerShell cmdlet, Set-CASMailbox, to add a new ActiveSync allowed device.
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Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information.
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"""
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false_positives = ["Legitimate exchange system administration activity."]
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*", "endgame-*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "New ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceID Added via PowerShell"
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note = """## Setup
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If enabling an EQL rule on a non-elastic-agent index (such as beats) for versions <8.2, events will not define `event.ingested` and default fallback for EQL rules was not added until 8.2, so you will need to add a custom pipeline to populate `event.ingested` to @timestamp for this rule to work.
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"""
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references = [
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"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/",
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"https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/module/exchange/set-casmailbox?view=exchange-ps",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "ce64d965-6cb0-466d-b74f-8d2c76f47f05"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Tactic: Execution", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame", "Data Source: Elastic Defend"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
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process.name: ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe", "powershell_ise.exe") and process.args : "Set-CASMailbox*ActiveSyncAllowedDeviceIDs*"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1098"
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name = "Account Manipulation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1098.002"
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name = "Additional Email Delegate Permissions"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0003"
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name = "Persistence"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.001"
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name = "PowerShell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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