Isai
ee06afd9e1
* [Rule Tuning][New Rule] AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Share with External Account/ to Allow Public Access AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Share with External Account Low telemetry volume overall, however false positives were seen for cloudfront identity and service accounts being given access to a bucket - Reduced the scope of this rule to only analyze policy that include account ids or account ARNs (which include an account ID). This eliminates the false positives triggered by sharing buckets with a service account (i.e. cloudtrail.amazonaws.com) - Excluded cloudfront identity, which should be treated the same way service accounts are being treated and be excluded as they do not include account IDs in their ARN - This rule wasn't explicitly capturing the use of `Principal: *` which is a public sharing method, often accompanied by a Condition statement (i.e. aws.SourceAccount = OR aws.PrincipalAccount= OR ip.address = ....). The new query will capture Condition statements that include an account id. However there is still a gap for Policies that have explicit `Principal:*` with or without a condition, so another rule was created that will account for these scenarios. - added highlighted fields - updated investigation guide and description - updated Mitre tactics and tags - `event.type` used in place of `event.category` field ### AWS S3 Bucket Policy Added to Allow Public Access Rule added to cover gap in public bucket policy added which includes an `Effect=Allow` and `Principal: *`. While an additional condition might be added to this policy which would exclude public access, cases where the condition is not included mean the bucket is publicly accessible. Both cases need to be verified, because even the condition could be giving access to an attacker owned account. There is also the chance that an `Effect=Deny` for `Principal:*` will trigger a false positive for this rule if the same policy also includes an `Effect=Allow` statement. We call this out in the description, false positive and investigation guide sections of the rule. * [Rule Tunings] AWS Group Creation, User Added to Group, Group Deletion All 3 rules are showing extremely low telemetry volume as expected. No major changes needed to these queries. - updated the descriptions, investigation guides and false positive sections - reduced execution window - added highlighted fields * Revert "[Rule Tunings] AWS Group Creation, User Added to Group, Group Deletion" This reverts commit c66a4f11e1c690a856b1c2f4cbb03077739629d7.
rules/
Rules within this folder are organized by solution or platform. The structure is flattened out, because nested file hierarchies are hard to navigate and find what you're looking for. Each directory contains several .toml files, and the primary ATT&CK tactic is included in the file name when it's relevant (i.e. windows/execution_via_compiled_html_file.toml)
| folder | description |
|---|---|
. |
Root directory where rules are stored |
apm/ |
Rules that use Application Performance Monitoring (APM) data sources |
cross-platform/ |
Rules that apply to multiple platforms, such as Windows and Linux |
integrations/ |
Rules organized by Fleet integration |
linux/ |
Rules for Linux or other Unix based operating systems |
macos/ |
Rules for macOS |
ml/ |
Rules that use machine learning jobs (ML) |
network/ |
Rules that use network data sources |
promotions/ |
Rules that promote external alerts into detection engine alerts |
windows/ |
Rules for the Microsoft Windows Operating System |
Integration specific rules are stored in the integrations/ directory:
| folder | integration |
|---|---|
aws/ |
Amazon Web Services (AWS) |
azure/ |
Microsoft Azure |
cyberarkpas/ |
Cyber Ark Privileged Access Security |
endpoint/ |
Elastic Endpoint Security |
gcp/ |
Google Cloud Platform (GCP) |
google_workspace/ |
Google Workspace (formerly GSuite) |
o365/ |
Microsoft Office |
okta/ |
Oka |