Jonhnathan
86 lines
3.9 KiB
TOML
86 lines
3.9 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/12/07"
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maturity = "development"
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updated_date = "2021/09/09"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many
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other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. This rule detects the Invoke-Mimikatz
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PowerShell command.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Mimikatz Powershell Module Activity"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Mimikatz PowerShell Activity
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[Mimikatz](https://github.com/gentilkiwi/mimikatz) is an open-source tool used to collect, decrypt, and/or use cached
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credentials. This tool is commonly abused by adversaries during the post-compromise stage where adversaries have gained
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an initial foothold onto an endpoint and are looking to elevate privileges and seek out additional authentication objects
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such as tokens/hashes/credentials that can then be used to laterally move and pivot across a network.
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#### Possible investigation steps:
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- This specific rule is based on Mimikatz command-line parameters used to dump credentials from the Local Security
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Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). Any activity triggered from this rule should be treated with high priority as it
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typically represents an active adversary.
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- Any kind of available host-based events or logs such as Windows Security Events, PowerShell logging and EDR events should
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be used to seek further understanding around the events that led up to the rule as well as activity found shortly after the event.
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- Further examination should include reviewing network logs to determine potential lateral movement.
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- Validate that the source of the Mimikatz activity was not from an authorized source such as automated testing such as
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Atomic Red Team or through offensive/compromise assessments.
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### False Positive Analysis
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- This rule should be on the higher confidence side of true positive activity therefore any testing such as offensive
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/compromise engagements should be ruled out before invoking incident response procedures
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### Related Rules
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- Mimikatz Memssp Log File Detected
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- Creation or Modification of Domain Backup DPAPI private key
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- Modification of WDigest Security Provider
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### Response and Remediation
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- Immediate response should be taken to review, investigate and potentially isolate activity to prevent further post-compromise
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behavior
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- During credential dump compromises, investigate the registry in order to check the number of cached users that have
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used the machine. These users should have their password reset.
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- Validate that cleartext passwords are disabled in memory for use with `WDigest`.
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- Look into preventing access to `LSASS` using capabilities such as LSA protection or leveraging AV/EDR tools that provide
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this capability.
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- This [resource](https://adsecurity.org/?page_id=1821) provided by ADSecurity should be used as required reading for
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detecting/preventing and understanding the different Mimikatz components.
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"""
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references = ["https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0002/"]
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risk_score = 99
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rule_id = "ac96ceb8-4399-4191-af1d-4feeac1f1f46"
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severity = "critical"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Credential Access"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and process.name : ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
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and process.args : ("*DumpCreds", "*Mimikatz*")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1003"
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name = "OS Credential Dumping"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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name = "LSASS Memory"
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id = "T1003.001"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1003/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0006"
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name = "Credential Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0006/"
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