ed2daecb25
* [Rule Tuning] Several rule tunings
* Added 1 more
* optimized ransomware encryption rules
* Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_file_encryption.toml
* Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_note_detected.toml
* Added 2 more tunings based on todays telemetry
* Some tunings
* Tuning
* Tuning
* fixed user.id comparison
* Something went wrong with deprecation
* Something went wrong with deprecation
* Update rules/linux/impact_potential_linux_ransomware_file_encryption.toml
* Update rules/linux/discovery_linux_nping_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* Update rules/linux/discovery_linux_hping_activity.toml
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
* Dedeprecated the rule to deprecate later
---------
Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit a1716bd673)
51 lines
1.9 KiB
TOML
51 lines
1.9 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2023/04/11"
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integration = ["endpoint"]
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maturity = "production"
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min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
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min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
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updated_date = "2023/08/24"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies the execution of mount process with hidepid parameter, which can make processes invisible to
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other users from the system. Adversaries using Linux kernel version 3.2+ (or RHEL/CentOS v6.5+ above) can hide
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the process from other users. When hidepid=2 option is executed to mount the /proc filesystem, only the root user
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can see all processes and the logged-in user can only see their own process. This provides a defense evasion mechanism for
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the adversaries to hide their process executions from all other commands such as ps, top, pgrep and more.
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With the Linux kernel hardening hidepid option all the user has to do is remount the /proc filesystem with the option,
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which can now be monitored and detected.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Potential Hidden Process via Mount Hidepid"
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references = [
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"https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/linux-hide-processes-from-other-users/",
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]
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "dc71c186-9fe4-4437-a4d0-85ebb32b8204"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Linux", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Defense Evasion"]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "linux" and process.name == "mount" and event.action == "exec" and
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process.args == "/proc" and process.args == "-o" and process.args : "*hidepid=2*"
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1564"
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name = "Hide Artifacts"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0005"
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name = "Defense Evasion"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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