Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/persistence_services_registry.toml
T
Jonhnathan b4c84e8a40 [Security Content] Tags Reform (#2725)
* Update Tags

* Bump updated date separately to be easy to revert if needed

* Update resource_development_ml_linux_anomalous_compiler_activity.toml

* Apply changes from the discussion

* Update persistence_init_d_file_creation.toml

* Update defense_evasion_timestomp_sysmon.toml

* Update defense_evasion_application_removed_from_blocklist_in_google_workspace.toml

* Update missing Tactic tags

* Update unit tests to match new tags

* Add missing IG tags

* Delete okta_threat_detected_by_okta_threatinsight.toml

* Update command_and_control_google_drive_malicious_file_download.toml

* Update persistence_rc_script_creation.toml

* Mass bump

* Update persistence_shell_activity_by_web_server.toml

* .

---------

Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mika.ayenson@elastic.co>
Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-06-22 18:38:56 -03:00

71 lines
2.4 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/11/18"
integration = ["endpoint"]
maturity = "production"
min_stack_comments = "New fields added: required_fields, related_integrations, setup"
min_stack_version = "8.3.0"
updated_date = "2023/06/22"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies processes modifying the services registry key directly, instead of through the expected Windows APIs. This
could be an indication of an adversary attempting to stealthily persist through abnormal service creation or
modification of an existing service.
"""
from = "now-9m"
index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "endgame-*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License v2"
name = "Unusual Persistence via Services Registry"
risk_score = 21
rule_id = "403ef0d3-8259-40c9-a5b6-d48354712e49"
severity = "low"
tags = ["Domain: Endpoint", "OS: Windows", "Use Case: Threat Detection", "Tactic: Persistence", "Data Source: Elastic Endgame"]
timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
type = "eql"
query = '''
registry where host.os.type == "windows" and
registry.path : (
"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ServiceDLL",
"HKLM\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath",
"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ServiceDLL",
"\\REGISTRY\\MACHINE\\SYSTEM\\ControlSet*\\Services\\*\\ImagePath"
) and not registry.data.strings : (
"?:\\windows\\system32\\Drivers\\*.sys",
"\\SystemRoot\\System32\\drivers\\*.sys",
"\\??\\?:\\Windows\\system32\\Drivers\\*.SYS",
"system32\\DRIVERS\\USBSTOR") and
not (process.name : "procexp??.exe" and registry.data.strings : "?:\\*\\procexp*.sys") and
not process.executable : (
"?:\\Program Files\\*.exe",
"?:\\Program Files (x86)\\*.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\winsxs\\*\\TiWorker.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\drvinst.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\services.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\msiexec.exe",
"?:\\Windows\\System32\\regsvr32.exe")
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1543"
name = "Create or Modify System Process"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/"
[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
id = "T1543.003"
name = "Windows Service"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1543/003/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0003"
name = "Persistence"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0003/"