236c630c90
* update rules using case sensitive wildcard function * add appropriate spacing * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com> * update == * Apply suggestions from code review * remove info update index * Update defense_evasion_deletion_of_bash_command_line_history.toml * Update persistence_evasion_hidden_local_account_creation.toml Co-authored-by: Justin Ibarra <brokensound77@users.noreply.github.com>
42 lines
1.1 KiB
TOML
42 lines
1.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/10/19"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2020/01/28"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies suspicious command execution (cmd) via Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) on a remote host. This could
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be indicative of adversary lateral movement.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License"
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name = "Suspicious Cmd Execution via WMI"
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "12f07955-1674-44f7-86b5-c35da0a6f41a"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Lateral Movement"]
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where event.type in ("start", "process_started") and
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process.parent.name : "WmiPrvSE.exe" and process.name : "cmd.exe" and
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process.args : "\\\\127.0.0.1\\*" and process.args : ("2>&1", "1>")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1047"
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name = "Windows Management Instrumentation"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1047/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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