Files
sigma-rules/rules/windows/execution_scheduled_task_powershell_source.toml
T
Brent Murphy ffe8e5bfc5 [Rule Tuning] Update file.name to dll.name for Library events (#893)
* [Rule Tuning] Update file.name to dll.name for Library events

* replace == with :

* updated_date

* removed spacing inconsistencies

* jibs likes spaces

* NOT again jibs
2021-02-03 11:09:29 -05:00

46 lines
1.5 KiB
TOML

[metadata]
creation_date = "2020/12/15"
maturity = "production"
updated_date = "2020/01/28"
[rule]
author = ["Elastic"]
description = """
Identifies the PowerShell process loading the Task Scheduler COM DLL followed by an outbound RPC network connection
within a short time period. This may indicate lateral movement or remote discovery via scheduled tasks.
"""
false_positives = ["Legitimate scheduled tasks may be created during installation of new software."]
from = "now-9m"
index = ["winlogbeat-*", "logs-endpoint.events.*", "logs-windows.*"]
language = "eql"
license = "Elastic License"
name = "Outbound Scheduled Task Activity via PowerShell"
references = [
"https://www.volexity.com/blog/2020/12/14/dark-halo-leverages-solarwinds-compromise-to-breach-organizations/",
]
risk_score = 47
rule_id = "5cd55388-a19c-47c7-8ec4-f41656c2fded"
severity = "medium"
tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Discovery", "Lateral Movement"]
type = "eql"
query = '''
sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 5s
[library where dll.name : "taskschd.dll" and process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")]
[network where process.name : ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") and destination.port == 135 and not destination.address in ("127.0.0.1", "::1")]
'''
[[rule.threat]]
framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
[[rule.threat.technique]]
id = "T1053"
name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
[rule.threat.tactic]
id = "TA0002"
name = "Execution"
reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"