e1205cb5c5
* [New/Tuning] Windows Top Threats 2024/2025 1) MSHTA: - tuning to exclude FPs - new rule `Remote Script via Microsoft HTML Application` compatible with 3d party EDR/sysmon/system/winlog integration and that does not require correlation or multiple type of events. 2) MSIEXEC: * Update defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml * Update defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml * Update defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml * Create defense_evasion_msiexec_remote_payload.toml * Update defense_evasion_msiexec_remote_payload.toml * ++ * Create execution_scripting_remote_webdav.toml * Create execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml * Create command_and_control_rmm_netsupport_susp_path.toml * Update command_and_control_rmm_netsupport_susp_path.toml * ++ * Update execution_jscript_fake_updates.toml * Create command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml * ++ * Create command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml * Update execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml * Update execution_scripts_archive_file.toml * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * ++ * Create execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml * Update execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml * Update execution_windows_fakecaptcha_cmd_ps.toml * Fix unit test errors * Update defense_evasion_network_connection_from_windows_binary.toml * Add system index * Add tag * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> * Remove duplicate * Update defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Create credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml * Update credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml * ++ * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_remcos_rat_iocs.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_mshta_susp_child.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/execution_windows_phish_clickfix.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml * Update execution_windows_phish_clickfix.toml * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/credential_access_browsers_unusual_parent.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/defense_evasion_msiexec_child_proc_netcon.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/execution_nodejs_susp_patterns.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update discovery_host_public_ip_address_lookup.toml * Update rules/windows/command_and_control_dns_susp_tld.toml Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com> * Update defense_evasion_masquerading_renamed_autoit.toml * Update defense_evasion_script_via_html_app.toml --------- Co-authored-by: eric-forte-elastic <eric.forte@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Eric Forte <119343520+eric-forte-elastic@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson, PhD <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Jonhnathan <26856693+w0rk3r@users.noreply.github.com>
144 lines
5.6 KiB
TOML
144 lines
5.6 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2025/08/19"
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integration = ["endpoint", "windows", "system", "sentinel_one_cloud_funnel", "m365_defender", "crowdstrike"]
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2025/08/19"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = """
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Identifies potential fake CAPTCHA phishing attack based on PowerShell or Cmd argument values. Adversaries employ this
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technique via compromised websites with browser injects, posing either as fake CAPTCHAs to access the site or as a page
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loading error requiring a fix to display the page. The victim is instructed to copy and past a malicious command to
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the Windows Run dialog box.
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"""
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from = "now-9m"
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index = [
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"logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
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"logs-crowdstrike.fdr*",
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"logs-m365_defender.event-*",
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"logs-sentinel_one_cloud_funnel.*",
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"logs-system.security*",
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"logs-windows.forwarded*",
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"logs-windows.sysmon_operational-*",
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"winlogbeat-*",
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]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Potential Fake CAPTCHA Phishing Attack"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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> **Disclaimer**:
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> This investigation guide was created using generative AI technology and has been reviewed to improve its accuracy and relevance. While every effort has been made to ensure its quality, we recommend validating the content and adapting it to suit your specific environment and operational needs.
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### Investigating Potential Fake CAPTCHA Phishing Attack
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### Possible investigation steps
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- Review the process command line and arguments to identify any malicious intent.
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- Review web activity preceeding the alert to identify the initial vector.
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- Investigate any network activity or child processes from the suspected process.
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- Correlate the event with other security alerts or logs from the same host or user to identify patterns or additional indicators of compromise.
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- Assess the risk and impact of the detected activity by considering the context of the environment, such as the presence of sensitive data or critical systems that might be affected.
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### False positive analysis
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- Legitimate administrative scripts containing the suspicious keywords such as CAPTCHA.
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### Response and remediation
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- Immediately isolate the affected system from the network to prevent further spread or communication with potential command and control servers.
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- Terminate any suspicious processes identified by the detection rule to halt ongoing malicious activities.
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- Conduct a thorough scan of the affected system using updated antivirus or endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to identify and remove any malicious payloads or scripts.
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- Review and clean up any unauthorized changes to system configurations or scheduled tasks that may have been altered by the malicious PowerShell activity.
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- Restore any affected files or system components from known good backups to ensure system integrity and functionality.
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- Escalate the incident to the security operations center (SOC) or incident response team for further analysis and to determine if additional systems are compromised.
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- Implement additional monitoring and logging for PowerShell activities across the network to enhance detection of similar threats in the future."""
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risk_score = 73
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rule_id = "fbad57ec-4442-48db-a34f-5ee907b44a22"
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severity = "high"
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tags = [
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"Domain: Endpoint",
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"OS: Windows",
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"Use Case: Threat Detection",
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"Tactic: Execution",
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"Data Source: Windows Security Event Logs",
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"Data Source: Elastic Defend",
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"Data Source: Sysmon",
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"Data Source: SentinelOne",
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"Data Source: Microsoft Defender for Endpoint",
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"Data Source: Crowdstrike",
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"Resources: Investigation Guide",
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]
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timestamp_override = "event.ingested"
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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process where host.os.type == "windows" and event.type == "start" and
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process.name : ("powershell.exe", "cmd.exe", "mshta.exe") and process.parent.name : "explorer.exe" and
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process.command_line : ("*recaptcha *", "*CAPTCHA Verif*", "*complete verification*", "*Verification ID*", "*Verification Code*", "*Verification UID*",
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"*hυmаn vаlіdаtiοn*", "*human ID*", "*Action Identificator*", "*not a robot*", "*Click OK to*", "*anti-robot test*",
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"*Cloudflare ID*")
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1059"
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name = "Command and Scripting Interpreter"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.001"
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name = "PowerShell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/001/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1059.003"
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name = "Windows Command Shell"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/003/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1218"
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name = "System Binary Proxy Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1218.005"
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name = "Mshta"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1218/005/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0005"
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name = "Defense Evasion"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0005/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1566"
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name = "Phishing"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1566.001"
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name = "Spearphishing Attachment"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/001/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0001"
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name = "Initial Access"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0001/" |