ebeb270075
* Modify investigation guides * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com> * Update rules/windows/credential_access_symbolic_link_to_shadow_copy_created.toml Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com> * Rewrite and apply previous reviews * Apply suggestions from code review Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co> * Update rules/windows/credential_access_spn_attribute_modified.toml Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: benironside <91905639+benironside@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Joe Peeples <joe.peeples@elastic.co> Co-authored-by: Mika Ayenson <Mikaayenson@users.noreply.github.com>
101 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
101 lines
4.1 KiB
TOML
[metadata]
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creation_date = "2020/11/20"
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maturity = "production"
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updated_date = "2022/04/06"
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[rule]
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author = ["Elastic"]
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description = "Identifies remote scheduled task creations on a target host. This could be indicative of adversary lateral movement."
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from = "now-9m"
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index = ["logs-endpoint.events.*", "winlogbeat-*", "logs-windows.*"]
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language = "eql"
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license = "Elastic License v2"
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name = "Remote Scheduled Task Creation"
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note = """## Triage and analysis
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### Investigating Remote Scheduled Task Creation
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[Scheduled tasks](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/taskschd/about-the-task-scheduler) are a great mechanism
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for persistence and program execution. These features can be used remotely for a variety of legitimate reasons, but at
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the same time used by malware and adversaries. When investigating scheduled tasks that were set up remotely, one of the
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first steps should be to determine the original intent behind the configuration and to verify if the activity is tied to
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benign behavior such as software installation or any kind of network administrator work. One objective for these alerts
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is to understand the configured action within the scheduled task. This is captured within the registry event data for
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this rule and can be base64 decoded to view the value.
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#### Possible investigation steps
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- Review the base64 encoded tasks actions registry value to investigate the task configured action.
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- Validate the activity is not related to planned patches, updates, network administrator activity, or legitimate software
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installations.
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- Further examination should include review of host-based artifacts and network logs from around when the scheduled task
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was created, on both the source and target machines.
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### False positive analysis
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- There is a high possibility of benign activity tied to the creation of remote scheduled tasks as it is a general feature
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within Windows and used for legitimate purposes for a wide range of activity. Any kind of context should be found to
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further understand the source of the activity and determine the intent based on the scheduled task's contents.
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### Related rules
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- Service Command Lateral Movement - d61cbcf8-1bc1-4cff-85ba-e7b21c5beedc
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- Remotely Started Services via RPC - aa9a274d-6b53-424d-ac5e-cb8ca4251650
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### Response and remediation
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- Initiate the incident response process based on the outcome of the triage.
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- Isolate the involved host to prevent further post-compromise behavior.
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- Remove scheduled task and any other related artifacts.
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- Review privileged account management and user account management settings. Consider implementing group policy object (GPO) policies to further
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restrict activity, or configuring settings that only allow administrators to create remote scheduled tasks.
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"""
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risk_score = 47
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rule_id = "954ee7c8-5437-49ae-b2d6-2960883898e9"
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severity = "medium"
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tags = ["Elastic", "Host", "Windows", "Threat Detection", "Lateral Movement"]
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type = "eql"
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query = '''
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/* Task Scheduler service incoming connection followed by TaskCache registry modification */
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sequence by host.id, process.entity_id with maxspan = 1m
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[network where process.name : "svchost.exe" and
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network.direction : ("incoming", "ingress") and source.port >= 49152 and destination.port >= 49152 and
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source.ip != "127.0.0.1" and source.ip != "::1"
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]
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[registry where registry.path : "HKLM\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows NT\\CurrentVersion\\Schedule\\TaskCache\\Tasks\\*\\Actions"]
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'''
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1021"
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name = "Remote Services"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0008"
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name = "Lateral Movement"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0008/"
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[[rule.threat]]
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framework = "MITRE ATT&CK"
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[[rule.threat.technique]]
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id = "T1053"
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name = "Scheduled Task/Job"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/"
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[[rule.threat.technique.subtechnique]]
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id = "T1053.005"
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name = "Scheduled Task"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1053/005/"
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[rule.threat.tactic]
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id = "TA0002"
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name = "Execution"
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reference = "https://attack.mitre.org/tactics/TA0002/"
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